



UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES

SCHOOL OF LAW
LIBRARY

$$\begin{array}{r} 10 \overline{) 270} (3 \\ \underline{210} \\ 60 \end{array}$$



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

64, 406

THE LAW SOCIETY

LEADING CASES AND STATUTES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

WITH NOTES, EXPLANATORY
AND CONNECTIVE

Presenting a Systematic View of the Whole Subject



BY

ERNEST COCKLE

OF GRAY'S INN, BARRISTER-AT-LAW

SECOND EDITION

LONDON
SWEET AND MAXWELL, LIMITED
3, CHANCERY LANE, W.C.

1911

T
C6466e
1911

PREFACE

THIS book was originally intended for the use of students only. I now find, however, that it has been extensively used by practitioners, especially at Quarter Sessions, as presenting, in a handy form, the substance of cases constantly referred to. In order to make it more worthy of the attention thus bestowed on it, I have now considerably supplemented it.

The chief additional feature of this edition is the collection of Statutes on Evidence, forming Part II. of the book. I have taken much trouble to select all the important statutory provisions relating to evidence, including those contained in statutes dealing with other matters but having special provisions as to evidence. I believe this collection to be the fullest in existence on the subject. I have not attempted to make it absolutely complete, as it would be useless, and wasteful of space, to insert some of the provisions on special matters. But I believe that every statutory provision on the subject, likely to be required, will be found in the collection, except those relating to procedure, with which I do not profess to deal. Some of the provisions given are of small importance in themselves, but they serve to illustrate points or rules stated in other portions of the book.

Another new feature is the Index, which did not appear in the first edition, the rather elaborate Table of Contents being thought sufficient. It is hoped that this will add to the usefulness of the book. The Table of Contents has also been much enlarged, and is intended to afford a complete and systematic outline of the whole subject.

A few additional cases have been given, the notes have been considerably amplified, and the whole subject to some extent re-arranged. The arrangement has been a matter of much difficulty. No two books on Evidence agree, even approximately, in arrangement. That adopted in the present book is the outcome of a careful consideration of all the chief works on the subject.

I am much indebted to others for suggestions, especially to the learned writer of a review in the *Law Quarterly Review* of April, 1908, whose views on the Law of Evidence must always be entitled to the highest respect. I feel the weight of his criticisms generally, and believe that the following pages show that I have profited by them.

My objects in writing this book have been, as I stated in the first edition :—

(1) To select from the Reports the leading case on each of the most important points in the Law of Evidence.

(2) To extract the Principle from each case and to state it shortly as a headnote thereto.

(3) To state, where necessary and possible, sufficient of the facts to make the point of evidence clear, excluding all other facts as confusing.

(4) To give, in the Judge's own words, all the portions of the judgments having reference to the point of evidence involved, emphasising in heavy type the most important passages, but excluding all other portions of the judgments.

(5) To give a few preliminary notes introducing cases of a class, and a few footnotes explanatory of individual cases, or connecting them.

(6) To provide a specially full and systematic Table of Contents, as a summary or analysis of the whole subject.

With regard to the facts involved in the cases—in some instances they do not appear in the Reports, the point of evidence alone being stated. In other cases the facts are quite immaterial to the point of evidence involved, and it has been thought well to omit them altogether as confusing, together with such portions of the judgments as refer only to such facts and throw no light on the point of evidence. Nothing confuses students more than striking but immaterial facts.

E. C.

2, NEW COURT, LINCOLN'S INN, W.C.
August, 1911.

TABLE OF CONTENTS AND ANALYSIS.

PART I.

CASES.

	PAGE
EVIDENCE—THE MEANS OF PROOF—ITS DEFINITION	1
THE FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND JURY IN DEALING WITH EVIDENCE	3
(a) LAW AND FACT	5
Questions of Law for Judge to decide	5
As, whether Evidence legally sufficient	5
Questions of Fact for Jury to decide	5
As, whether Evidence establishes Issue	5
(b) ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE	7
Generally Question of Law for Judge	7
As, whether foreign Document properly stamped	7
Facts on which it depends also for Judge	7
As, whether Document is foreign	7
(c) CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS	8
Generally Question of Law for Judge	8
As, whether Document is acknowledgment of Debt	8
Meaning of peculiar Terms for Jury	8
As, whether such Terms used with alleged meaning	8
MATTERS OF WHICH PROOF IS NOT REQUIRED	10
(a) MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED	10
(1) The Law of England and Ireland	11
Including General Customs	12
And both Public and Private Statutes	12
But not Particular Customs	12
Nor Colonial or Foreign Law	14
(2) Public and Government Matters	14
As, those affecting Relations with other States	15
Upon Inquiry at Government Office	15
Court thus acting in Unison with Government	16

	PAGE
(3) Matters of Common Knowledge	16
Such as the Course of Nature	16
On the Meaning of ordinary Language	17
(b) MATTERS PRESUMED BY LAW	17
(1) Presumption of Innocence	20
Whenever Criminality is alleged	20
(2) Presumption of Legitimacy	21
Of Child born during Wedlock	21
(3) Presumption of Continuance	22
For reasonable Time according to Circumstances	22
(4) Presumption of Death	23
Of Persons unheard of for seven Years	23
(5) Presumption of Regularity	25
As regards public Officials and their Acts	25
(6) Presumption of Lawful Origin	25
As in case of Prescription or Lost Grant	26
No Presumption of Survivorship	27
Conflicting Presumptions leave Matter open	28
(c) MATTERS ADMITTED BY PARTIES	29
Formal or Express Admissions	29
Made for Purpose of the Trial	29
As, by Counsel or Solicitor ,	30
MATTERS OF WHICH PROOF IS NOT ALLOWED	32
(a) MATTERS WHICH PARTIES ARE ESTOPPED FROM ALLEGING	32
(1) Estoppel by Record	33
Only between Parties and Privies to Judgments	33
And only if expressly pleaded, when possible	37
(2) Estoppel by Deed	40
Even in respect of Recitals	40
(3) Estoppel by Conduct	41
As in Case of Tenants	44
(b) MATTERS STATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE	45
In Course of attempted Compromise	45
The whole Correspondence covered	46
Such Matters admissible for certain Purposes	46
(c) MATTERS WHICH ARE IRRELEVANT	47
Being neither Facts in Issue nor relevant thereto	47
MATTERS OF WHICH PROOF IS ALLOWED	47
(a) FACTS IN ISSUE	47
Those alleged and denied on the Pleadings	47
Direct Evidence	47
(b) FACTS RELEVANT TO THE FACTS IN ISSUE	47
Those sufficiently connected with Facts in Issue	47
Circumstantial Evidence	49
(1) Motive, Preparation, Subsequent Conduct, etc.	50
Relevant as to Act or Conduct alleged	50

	PAGE
Circumstances and Position of the Parties	52
Relevant as to Act or Conduct alleged	52
Although no direct Evidence given	52
(2) Parts of the Transaction, or "Res Gestæ"	54
Relevant to other Parts of the same Transaction	54
Acts done in same Transaction	54
Words or Statements accompanying such Acts	55
Must be at the same Time substantially	56
May be the last Item of Transaction	57
During Continuous Transactions	58
Showing State of Health, etc.	59
Acts of Conspirators, etc.	61
In Execution or Furtherance of Common Purpose	61
Documents may be Part of Transaction	62
Explaining Acts done respecting them	62
(3) Statements made after the Transaction	69
Irrelevant generally	69
Complaints relevant in Cases of Rape, etc.	69
Only admissible to Corroborate Prosecutrix	72
Whether her Consent material or not	72
Even when in Answer to simple Question	72
Not admissible in other Cases	72
(4) Course of Business	75
Relevant as to private Business Transactions	75
But not Presumption of Regularity therein	75
(5) Possession of Property	76
Relevant as to Ownership of Land or Goods	76
Evidence of Seisin in Fee Simple	78
Even of adjoining Land	78
Relevant as to Larceny or Receiving	80
In case of things recently stolen	80
Relevant as to Knowledge of Larceny	81
On charge of Receiving Stolen Property	81
(6) Reputation of Marriage	82
Relevant as to Marriage generally	82
Even in case of living Persons	83
But not to establish Bigamy or Divorce	83
(7) Conduct on other Occasions	84
Irrelevant generally as to Act in question	86
Unless actually connected therewith	88
Relevant generally as to State of Mind	88
Although subsequent to Transaction in Issue	90
Relevant as to Fact charged in Rape, etc.	92
(8) Character of Parties	93
In Civil Cases, irrelevant generally	94
Relevant when Character is in Issue	94
As in Cases of Defamation	94
Relevant as to Damages sometimes	97
As in Cases of Seduction and Breach of Promise	97
In Criminal Cases, Prisoner's Character Relevant	98
But only if he gives Evidence thereof	98

	PAGE
General "Reputation" only is admissible	98
In Cases of Rape, etc. Prosecutrix's Character relevant	101
(9) Opinion of Witnesses	102
Irrelevant generally	104
Relevant as to Matters of Science or Art	105
If Witness a skilled "Expert"	105
Judge to decide whether Witness Competent	106
Relevant as to Identification, Condition, etc.	107
Although Witness not an "Expert"	107
THE BURDEN OF PROOF	109
(a) AFFIRMATIVE AVERMENTS	110
Burden on Party alleging	110
The "Affirmative in Substance"	110
Not the "Grammatical Affirmative"	111
A Question of Substance, not of Words	111
(b) NEGATIVE AVERMENTS	112
Burden on Party alleging, generally	112
Until shifted by Evidence	112
Burden sometimes on other Party	115
As when Facts peculiarly within his Knowledge	115
Or when Exemption, Qualification, etc., in Question	118
(c) DAMAGES	118
Burden on Party claiming	118
Whenever Amount unascertained	118
Although Issues of Fact on other Party	118
THE AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR PROOF	120
(a) CORROBORATION REQUIRED BY LAW	120
(1) By Statute, in eleven Cases	120
Not necessarily by two Witnesses	120
May be by Admissions or Documents	121
(2) By Common Law, in one Case	121
Perjury	121
Must be more than Oath against Oath	121
(b) CORROBORATION REQUIRED BY PRACTICE	122
(1) Evidence of Accomplices	122
(2) Claims against deceased Persons' Estates	124
(3) Divorce Cases	125
THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR PROOF	126
(a) DIRECT EVIDENCE	126
Evidence of Facts perceived by Witness himself	126
With any of his five Senses	126
Such Evidence generally required	126
Hearsay Evidence inadmissible generally	127
Even when Witness of Fact dead	127
Or when he made Statement on Oath	130
Statement on Oath must be at Trial	130

	PAGE
(b) HEARSAY EVIDENCE	132
Facts which Witness heard from Others	132
Admissible only in Exceptional Cases	132
Where there is special Necessity	132
And special Guarantee of Credibility	132
(1) Admissions	133
Informally or unintentionally made by Parties	133
By Words	134
Even of Narrative or descriptive Nature	134
By Silence	135
Where natural to expect a Reply	135
By Conduct	137
Even as to whole Case	137
By Prisoners	138
As by Words, Silence or Conduct when accused	138
By Agents	141
If made in Course of Employment, only	142
By Privies	144
As by previous Owner of Plaintiff's Land	144
Admissions are Primary Evidence	145
Provable without Notice to produce Document	145
(2) Confessions	145
Admission of whole Offence charged	145
Must be "free and voluntary"	146
Without Threat or Promise by Person in Authority	147
Prosecution must prove it to be so	148
Otherwise it is inadmissible	149
But Facts discovered in consequence provable	149
"Threat or Promise"	149
Of temporal, not moral, Nature	149
Connected with Result of Prosecution	151
Not of mere Collateral Convenience	151
"Person in Authority"	152
Must be connected with Prosecution	152
Medical man attending Prisoner is not such	152
(3) Declarations in Course of Duty	154
Admissible after Declarant's death	154
If made by Person in regular Course of Duty	154
May be in Duty temporarily assumed	154
Must be Contemporaneous	155
Without Interest to misrepresent	156
Admissible only as to Declarant's own Acts	156
And as to Facts it was his Duty to record	156
Not Evidence of Collateral Facts stated	156
Although customary to state such Facts	157
May be written or verbal	157
(4) Declarations against Interest	158
Admissible after Declarant's Death	158
If against "Pecuniary" Interest	158
As Entry that Debt due to Declarant was paid	158
Whole statement is admissible	158

	PAGE
Even as to Collateral Facts	158
Although they may be in Declarant's Interest	160
If against " Proprietary Interest "	162
As Statement by Landowner that he was a Tenant	162
Admissible against Privies in Estate only	163
Not Evidence against Reversioner	163
(5) Declarations as to Pedigree	164
Admissible after Declarant's Death	164
If made by Family Relations	164
As to Relationship, or Facts on which it depends	164
And if made " ante litem motam "	164
That is before Controversy, though no Lawsuit	167
Only admissible in " Pedigree Cases "	169
That is where Pedigree or Relationship in Issue	169
Only Statements by Relations admissible	170
Not Statements by confidential Servants	170
May be mere Family Tradition or Hearsay	172
Or even of Absence of Family Information	172
May be by Words, Conduct, or Inscriptions	172
As by Treating Child as legitimate	173
Or by Inscriptions on Tombstones or Portraits	173
Although actually inscribed by Strangers	173
If made with Family Approval	173
(6) Declarations as to Public or General Rights	173
Admissible after Declarant's Death	173
If made by Persons of Competent Knowledge	173
As to Existence or Reputation of such Rights	173
Only where Right is Public or General	176
Not in Case of extensive Private Rights	176
Only where Statement is as to Right itself	178
Not as to Facts supporting or negating it	178
Not necessarily by Residents	180
But must be by " Competent Declarants "	180
As Justices having Jurisdiction in Place	180
(7) Dying Declarations	181
Admissible after Declarant's Death	181
If made by Person killed	181
In Trials for Homicide of Declarant	181
If no Hope of Recovery at Time of Declaration	181
Not admissible in other Cases	183
Hopelessness of Recovery may be inferred	183
Deceased must have been competent as living Witness	185
So, Infancy of Deceased might exclude Declaration	185
(8) Declaration as to Contents of Wills	185
Admissible after Declarant's Death	185
If made by Testator himself	185
As to his testamentary Intentions	185
And as to his previous testamentary Acts	185
(9) Evidence given in Former Proceedings	189
Admissible after Witness's Death	189
Or in certain other Events	189

	PAGE
If both Proceedings between the same Parties	189
And involve the same Issues	189
Admissible if Parties are Privies of former Parties	191
Present Parties must claim under former Parties	192
Not sufficient that they claim in same Right	192
(10) Statements in Public Documents	193
Admissible generally	193
If made under legal Duty by proper Officers	193
Statements therein Evidence against all Persons	193
Even mere Recitals	196
Including those in Public Acts of Parliament	196
But not in Private Acts of Parliament	199
THE MODE OF PROOF	201
(a) PAROL EVIDENCE	203
(1) Witnesses	203
Their Competency	203
Their Compellability	205
Competency and Compellability not always identical	205
Husbands and Wives as Witnesses	205
Competency depends on Capacity to understand	207
Generally on Capacity to understand Oath	207
No fixed Limit for Age of Witnesses	207
Young Persons sometimes may give unsworn Evidence	208
If they do not understand Oath	208
But understand Duty of Speaking Truth	208
Insane Persons not necessarily incompetent	209
Character and Extent of Insanity the Test	209
(2) Oath or Affirmation	209
Generally required	209
Oath not a peculiarly Christian Ceremony	209
Taken in accordance with Religious Belief	210
Affirmation allowed if no Religious Belief	211
Or if Oath contrary thereto	211
(3) Examination of Witnesses	212
(a) Examination-in-Chief	212
Questions must be on relevant Facts	212
Leading Questions generally inadmissible	212
But necessary and admissible to some extent	212
As on Matters introductory or undisputed	212
Witness may refresh Memory by Documents	213
By Documents made by himself	213
Although he has no independent Recollection	213
This does not make the Documents Evidence	213
But Opponent may inspect, and cross-examine	214
By Documents made by other Persons	214
If made under Witness's Observation	214
"Experts" may refresh Memory from Books, etc.	215
(b) Cross-examination	215
Questions may be as to the Credibility of Witnesses	215
Their Conduct, Character, and Convictions	215

	PAGE
Opposite Party entitled to cross-examine Witness .	217
Although merely called to produce Document .	217
But not if called by Mistake	217
Leading Questions admissible	218
Even if Witness favourable apparently	218
Attention should be called to discrediting Facts .	218
To afford Opportunity of Explanation	219
Party calling Witness not entitled to cross-examine	221
Even if Witness a hostile Litigant	221
Unless allowed by Judge to cross-examine	221
But never to discredit generally	221
(c) Re-examination	222
Confined to Matter of Cross-examination	222
Unless further Questions allowed by Judge	222
Leading Questions inadmissible	222
(4) Contradiction of Witnesses	224
(a) Of Parties' own Witnesses	224
By other Evidence of same Facts	224
Not by general Evidence to Discredit	224
(b) Of Opponent's Witnesses	225
By Cross-examination as to Credit	225
Not generally by Evidence to Discredit	225
(5) Discredit of Witnesses	227
Evidence to Discredit sometimes allowed	227
(a) To prove Previous inconsistent Statements	228
In Case of Opponent's Witness	228
Such Evidence admissible without Leave	228
Attention must be called to the Occasion	230
In Case of Party's own Witness	231
By Leave of Judge if Witness "hostile"	231
Attention must be called to the Occasion	232
(b) To prove Prejudice or Bias	232
As, in Case of Relationship to Party	232
(c) To prove General bad Character for Veracity	233
Evidence of general Reputation, not specific Acts .	233
(d) To prove Previous Convictions	233
(6) Privilege of Witnesses	234
Witness may refuse to answer certain Questions . .	234
Or to produce certain Documents	234
(a) Incriminating Questions and Documents	235
Danger of Prosecution must be substantial	235
Witness sometimes compellable to answer	237
But generally protected from Proceedings	237
Questions tending to prove Forfeiture privileged .	237
(b) Professional Communications and Documents	238
Only privileged in Case of Legal Profession	238
But Communications by other Persons privileged .	238
If made to Legal Adviser for purposes of Litigation .	238
Privilege is that of Client, who can waive it	241
Communications for illegal Purpose not privileged .	242
(c) State Communications and Documents	244

	PAGE
Privileged when Disclosure injurious to Public	244
Judge guided by Head of Department interested	244
No other Evidence thereof allowed	245
(d) Documents relating solely to Party's own Case	246
Privileged only if not helping Opponent	246
No real Case of Privilege	247
(e) Documents of Title of Witness not a Party	247
Privileged, whether helping Opponent or not	247
(f) Communications between Husband and Wife	247
(g) Questions tending to show Adultery of Witness	247
(7) Attendance of Witnesses	248
Must generally attend and give Evidence at Trial	248
Depositions taken before Trial sometimes admissible	248
In Criminal Cases, invariably	248
In Civil Cases, by special Order	248
Depositions used if Witness cannot attend Trial	249
As, if dead or too ill to travel	249
Or kept away by the Prisoner	249
And in any other Events if unable to attend	250
Unsworn Statement of Prisoner also admissible	251
(b) DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE	252
(1) Production of Documents	252
The "Best Evidence" Rule	252
The Original must generally be produced	252
As "Primary" Evidence of its Contents	253
Whenever its Contents are in question	255
But not where it is treated merely as a Chattel	255
Nor where Position created only in question	256
Production on Notice may make Document Evidence	257
Refusal of Production prevents subsequent Production	258
Writings other than Documents need not be produced	258
Parol Evidence thereof may be given	258
Production of Original sometimes dispensed with	260
Parol or "Secondary" Evidence allowed	260
(a) When Original in Possession of Opponent	260
Who refuses to produce it after Notice	260
Notice to Produce must give sufficient Opportunity	260
(b) When Original in Possession of Stranger	262
Who lawfully refuses Production	262
But not when he is compellable to produce	263
(c) When Original lost or destroyed	264
After proper Search according to Circumstances	264
(d) When Original cannot be brought into Court	266
Because it is physically impossible	266
As in Case of Writings on Walls or Tombstones	267
Or because the Law does not allow it	267
As in Case of Public Documents	267
As Books of the Bank of England	267
No degrees of Secondary Evidence	269
Parol Evidence admissible though Copy exists	270

	PAGE
(2) Proof of Documents	271
Execution must be proved unless admitted	271
(a) Proof of Signature or Handwriting	271
By Person who saw Document signed	272
By Person acquainted with the Handwriting	272
By Comparison with other Writing	274
(b) Proof of Sealing and Delivery	275
Presumption if Document purports to be Deed	275
(c) Proof of Attestation	276
Witness must be called if Attestation requisite	276
(d) Proof of Date	277
Presumption that Date on Document correct	277
Proof of Execution sometimes unnecessary	277
Ancient Documents prove themselves	277
If they are thirty years old	277
And are produced from "Proper Custody"	277
That is any Custody consistent with Genuineness	278
Documents claimed under by Opponent	280
Alterations in Documents	281
In Deeds presumed prior to Execution	281
In Wills presumed subsequent to Execution	281
(3) Parol Evidence respecting Documents	282
Not admissible to vary Written "Transaction"	283
Where whole Transaction reduced into Writing	283
(a) Admissible to add to mere Note or Memorandum	284
Where Verbal Transaction not reduced into Writing	284
As in Case of a written Receipt	284
By showing the other verbal Terms	284
(b) Admissible to prove Writing not the Transaction	285
By showing Matter affecting its Validity	285
As in Case of Fraud or Illegality	285
(c) Admissible to prove Collateral Transactions	287
If distinct and not inconsistent	287
But not so as to add additional Terms	289
(d) Admissible to prove Writing not yet operative	290
As in case of Conditions Precedent	290
Suspending the Commencement of the Obligation	292
(e) Admissible to prove Rescission or Modification	292
Unless Writing required by Law	292
As in case of Contracts under Statute of Frauds	292
(f) Admissible to prove Customs of general Application	293
Unless inconsistent with the Writing	293
Such as Local or Agricultural Customs	293
Or Trade or Mercantile Customs	294
Either as to Obligations or Terms used	294
(g) Admissible to explain the Subject Matter	296
As, to explain "Latent" Ambiguities	296
By Evidence of Circumstances or Statements	296
And to explain "Patent" Ambiguities	298
If not explainable by Construction	298
But not to explain defective Expressions	301

	PAGE
(h) Admissible to translate or explain Terms	301
If used with special or unusual Meaning	301
Unless Term has definite Statutory Meaning	302
(c) REAL EVIDENCE—	
Production in Court of Physical Objects	303
For Inspection by Court	303
Always admissible	303
But never legally necessary	303
Non-production a Matter of Comment	303
Or even of adverse Conclusion	304
But secondary Evidence admissible without Production	305
Although its Weight may be affected	306
Inspection may be ordered out of Court	306
DIFFERENCES IN PROOF, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL	
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES DIFFER IN RESPECT OF—	
(1) Misreception or Rejection of Evidence	307
(2) Strictness of Proof and Corroboration	309
(3) Evidence of Character	309
(4) Evidence of Parties and Husbands and Wives	309
(5) Admissions and Confessions	309
(6) Depositions of absent Witnesses	309
(7) Stamping of Documents	309
(8) Dying Declarations	309

PART II.

STATUTES.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 1677. 29 Car. 2, c. 3	311
4. Certain contracts to be evidenced by writing	311
7. Creations of trusts to be evidenced by writing	311
9. Assignments of trusts to likewise be in writing	311
TREASON ACT, 1695. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3	
2. Two witnesses required on charge of treason	312
WITNESSES ACT, 1806. 46 Geo. 3, c. 37	
Witness cannot refuse answer to question tending to show his liability to civil suit only	312

	PAGE
PREVIOUS CONVICTION ACT, 1836. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 111	313
Jury not to inquire into previous conviction until after verdict of guilty ; unless person charged gives evidence of his good character	313
OATHS ACT, 1838. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 105	314
Oath binding if administered in form declared binding by person taking same	314
PARLIAMENTARY REGISTRATION ACT, 1843. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18.	314
88. Two witnesses required on charge of personation at elections	314
EVIDENCE ACT, 1843. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85	315
No witness to be excluded by reason of incapacity from crime or interest	315
BASTARDY ACT, 1845. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 10	315
6. Corroboration required on appeals against bastardy orders .	315
INDICTABLE OFFENCES ACT, 1848. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42	316
17. Justices to take depositions when indictable offence charged ; the same to be read in certain events and con- ditions at trial	316
18. Justices to read depositions to accused, and, after specified warning, to ask whether he wishes to say anything, and to take down what he says in writing ; the same to be given in evidence if necessary at trial	317
20. Justices to have power to bind prosecutor and witnesses by recognizance to prosecute and give evidence, and on refusal to enter into recognizance to commit to prison until trial of accused	318
SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1848. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43	319
14. In summary proceedings burden of proof of certain nega- tives to be on defendant	319
EVIDENCE ACT, 1851. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99	319
2. Parties to proceedings to be competent and compellable to give evidence generally	319
3. Act not to make person charged competent witness ; nor to compel answer to incriminating question ; nor to make husband or wife competent witness in criminal proceedings .	319
4. Act not to apply to proceedings in consequence of adultery or for breach of promise of marriage	320
14. Public documents admissible in evidence on production from proper custody to be provable by examined or certified copies	320
16. Every person having authority to hear evidence empowered to administer oath	320

	PAGE
EVIDENCE AMENDMENT ACT, 1853. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83	320
1. Husbands and wives of parties to proceedings to be competent and compellable to give evidence generally	320
2. Act not to make husband or wife competent witness in criminal proceedings, or in proceedings in consequence of adultery	321
3. Husband or wife not compellable to disclose communication made during marriage	321
LARCENY ACT, 1861. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96	321
29. No person liable to be convicted of certain offences if he disclosed same under compulsory process	321
85. No person to refuse to make full disclosure as to certain offences; but no person liable to be convicted thereof if he first disclosed same under compulsory process	322
116. On indictment for offence under the Act, jury not to inquire into previous conviction until after verdict of guilty; unless person charged gives evidence of his good character	322
COINAGE ACT, 1861. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 99	323
37. On indictment for offence under the Act, jury not to inquire into previous conviction until after verdict of guilty; unless person charged gives evidence of his good character	323
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, 1865. 28 & 29 Vict. c. 18	324
1. Sections 3-8 of the Act to apply to all courts, criminal and others	324
2. If prisoner defended by counsel does not adduce evidence, prosecution allowed to sum up evidence; every prisoner entitled to open case, examine witnesses and sum up evidence; but right of reply and proceedings otherwise unaltered	324
3. Party calling witness may not discredit him generally, but, if he prove adverse, may contradict him by evidence or, by leave, prove previous inconsistent statement, the circumstances being mentioned.	324
4. If witness on cross-examination does not admit previous inconsistent statement, proof may be given thereof, the circumstances being mentioned	325
5. Witness may be cross-examined as to previous statement in writing without its being shown to him; but his attention must be called thereto before contradiction; and judge can require production thereof at any time	325
6. Witness may be questioned as to his conviction of felony or misdemeanour, and if he does not admit same it may be proved; certificate thereof being sufficient evidence	325
7. Not necessary to prove by attesting witness any instrument not requiring attestation	326

	PAGE
8. Writing in dispute may be proved by comparison with other proved writing	326
CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 1867. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35	326
3. Justices to ask person accused of indictable offence whether he desires to call witnesses, to take their depositions, and to bind them to appear and give evidence at trial	326
6. Justices to have power to take statement on oath of persons dangerously ill and able to give information as to indictable offence, for perpetuating their testimony, notice and opportunity to cross-examine having been given to any person accused	327
EVIDENCE FURTHER AMENDMENT ACT, 1869. 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68	329
2. Parties to action for breach of promise of marriage to be competent witnesses ; but corroboration required	329
3. Parties to proceedings in consequence of adultery, and their husbands and wives, to be competent witnesses ; but no witness bound to answer question showing his adultery, unless evidence given by him in disproof thereof	329
PREVENTION OF CRIMES ACT, 1871. 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112	329
19. In proceedings for receiving or having in possession stolen property, evidence may be given of finding of other stolen property in accused's possession ; also of conviction of such person in preceding five years of fraud or dishonesty ; to prove guilty knowledge	329
BASTARDY LAWS AMENDMENT ACT, 1872. 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65	330
4. Corroboration required on summonses for bastardy orders	330
DIVIDED PARISHES ACT, 1876. 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61	331
34. Corroboration required for removal of paupers	331
EVIDENCE ACT, 1877. 40 & 41 Vict. c. 14	331
1. Defendants and their husbands and wives to be competent and compellable witnesses on indictments, etc., for enforcing civil rights only	331
BANKERS' BOOKS EVIDENCE ACT, 1879. 42 Vict. c. 11	332
3. Copy of entry in banker's book to be evidence	332
4. Copy not to be received unless proof given by partner or officer of bank that it was made from one of its ordinary books, in its control, and in ordinary course	332
5. Copy not to be received unless proved correct by person who examined it with original	332
6. Bank not compellable to produce book unless by order of judge	332

	PAGE
7. Judge may order inspection and copies of entries for any purpose	332
9. "Bank," "bankers," and "bankers' books" defined	332
SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1879. 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49	333
39. (2). In summary proceedings, burden of proof of certain negatives to be on defendant	333
MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1882. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75	333
12. Husband and wife to be competent to give evidence against each other in proceedings by wife for protection of her separate property	334
EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES ACT, 1883. 46 & 47 Vict. c. 3	334
4. (1). Burden of proof of lawful object to be on person charged	334
6. (2). Witness to answer incriminating questions, but answers not to be used against him, except for perjury	334
CORRUPT PRACTICES PREVENTION ACT, 1883. 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51	335
59. (1). Witness to answer incriminating questions, but answers not to be used against him, except for perjury. Witness answering truly entitled to certificate of indemnity	335
BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883. 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52	335
17. (8). Debtor to answer all questions put on his public examination, notes whereof may be used in evidence against him	335
MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1884. 47 & 48 Vict. c. 14	336
1. Husband and wife to be competent, and, except where defendant, compellable, witnesses in criminal proceedings against husband or wife	336
CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 1885. 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69	336
2. Corroboration required for procurement, etc.	336
3. Corroboration required for threatening, etc.	336
4. Evidence of child of tender years may be without oath, under certain circumstances; but corroboration is required	336
MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT, 1887. 50 & 51 Vict. c. 28.	337
2. (1). Burden of proof of absence of intent to defraud to be on person charged	337
19. (2). Witness to answer all questions, but answers not to be used against him	337

	PAGE
CORONERS ACT, 1887. 50 & 51 Vict. c. 71	338
4. (1). Coroner to examine on oath all persons having know- ledge of facts	338
(2). Coroner to put statement of witnesses into writing, signed by them and him	338
5. (3). Coroner to deliver depositions, etc., to officer of court of trial	338
OATHS ACT, 1888. 51 & 52 Vict. c. 46	338
1. Person stating he has no religious belief, or that oath is contrary thereto, may make affirmation, of same effect	338
2. Affirmation to be in specified form	339
3. Oath taken by person having no religious belief to be valid	339
5. Any person may be sworn with uplifted hand	339
FOREIGN JURISDICTION ACT, 1890. 53 & 54 Vict. c. 37	339
4. (1). On questions of foreign jurisdiction, Secretary of State to send to court, on its application, his decision, which shall be final	339
(2). Court to send to Secretary of State questions properly framed, sufficient answers to be returned by him	339
BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1890. 53 & 54 Vict. c. 71	340
27. (2). Statements by person in compulsory examination not admissible against him under sect. 85 of Larceny Act, 1861	340
SALE OF GOODS ACT, 1893. 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71	340
4. (1). Contracts for sale of goods over £10 to be evidenced by writing	340
MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894. 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60	340
457. (1). Burden of proof of justification to be on person send- ing unseaworthy ship to sea	340
(2). Burden of proof of justification to be on master taking unseaworthy ship to sea	341
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT, 1898. 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36	341
1. Person charged, and husband or wife, to be competent witness for defence, on application of person charged; prosecution not to comment on failure to give evidence; husband or wife not compellable to disclose communi- cation during marriage; person charged may be asked questions criminating as to offence charged, but not as to other offences or character except in three cases; Act not to affect statement of person charged before justices	341
2. Person charged, if the only witness to facts, to be called immediately after evidence for prosecution	342

	PAGE
3. Fact that person charged is called is not to confer right of reply	342
4. Husband or wife may give evidence in specified cases without the consent of person charged	342
MOTOR CAR ACT, 1903. 3 Edw. 7, c. 36	346
9. (1). Corroboration required on prosecution for exceeding speed limit	346
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN ACT, 1904. 4 Edw. 7, c. 15	346
12. Person charged, and husband and wife, to be competent but not compellable to give evidence	346
15. (1). Evidence of child of tender years may be without oath under certain circumstances; but corroboration is required	347
PUNISHMENT OF INCEST ACT, 1908. 8 Edw. 7, c. 45	347
4. (4). Husband or wife may give evidence without consent of person charged	347
CHILDREN ACT, 1908. 8 Edw. 7, c. 67	348
27. Husband or wife may give evidence without consent of person charged	348
28. (1). Justices may take deposition of child or young person out of court if attendance would involve serious danger	348
29. Deposition of child or young person admissible in evidence at trial, if attendance would involve serious danger	348
30. Evidence of child of tender years may be without oath under certain circumstances; but corroboration is required	349
OATHS ACT, 1909. 9 Edw. 7, c. 39	350
2. (1). Oath may be administered in specified form without kissing book	350
(2). In case of person neither Christian nor Jew, oath to be in any manner lawful	350

TABLE OF LEADING CASES.

	PAGE		PAGE
ABBOT <i>v.</i> Plumbe . . .	276	Dunraven <i>v.</i> Llewellyn . . .	176 ✓
Abrath <i>v.</i> N. E. Ry. Co. . .	112	Dwyer <i>v.</i> Collins . . .	260
Allen <i>v.</i> Pink . . .	284		
Amos <i>v.</i> Hughes . . .	110	Ewer <i>v.</i> Ambrose . . .	224
Anderson <i>v.</i> Weston . . .	277		
Angell <i>v.</i> Duke . . .	289	Folkes <i>v.</i> Chadd . . .	105
Att.-Gen. <i>v.</i> Bowman . . .	94	Freeman <i>v.</i> Cooke . . .	41 ✓
„ „ <i>v.</i> Hitchcock . . .	228	Fryer <i>v.</i> Gathercole . . .	107
Aveson <i>v.</i> Kinnaird . . .	59		
		Goodright <i>v.</i> Moss . . .	172 ✓
Banbury Peerage Case . . .	21	Goss <i>v.</i> Nugent . . .	292
✓ Bartlett <i>v.</i> Smith . . .	7	Great Western Ry. Co. <i>v.</i>	
Baylis <i>v.</i> Att.-Gen. . . .	301	Willis . . .	143
Beatson <i>v.</i> Skene . . .	244	Greenough <i>v.</i> Eccles . . .	231
Beckett <i>v.</i> Ramsdale . . .	124		
✓ Berkeley Peerage Case . . .	164	Haines <i>v.</i> Guthrie . . .	169
Berryman <i>v.</i> Wise . . .	25	Harris <i>v.</i> Tippet . . .	225 ✓
Bessela <i>v.</i> Stern . . .	135	Henry Coxon, The . . .	155
✓ Bowman <i>v.</i> Taylor . . .	40	Hetherington <i>v.</i> Kemp . . .	75
Brandao <i>v.</i> Barnett . . .	12	Higham <i>v.</i> Ridgway . . .	158 ✓
Brett <i>v.</i> Beales . . .	199	Hollingham <i>v.</i> Head . . .	86
Brewster <i>v.</i> Sewell . . .	264		
Bristow <i>v.</i> Sequeville . . .	106	Johnson <i>v.</i> Barnes . . .	25
Brown <i>v.</i> Byrne . . .	294	„ <i>v.</i> Lawson . . .	170
Browne <i>v.</i> Dunn . . .	218	Jones <i>v.</i> Williams . . .	78
Burrough <i>v.</i> Martin . . .	214		
✓ Butler <i>v.</i> Mountgarrett . . .	167	Kingston's (Duchess of)	
		Case . . .	33
Carter <i>v.</i> Boehm . . .	104	Kirkstall Br. Co. <i>v.</i> Furness	
Chambers <i>v.</i> Bernasconi . . .	156	Ry. Co. . . .	142
Colpoys <i>v.</i> Colpoys . . .	298		
Cooke <i>v.</i> Loxley . . .	44	Llanover <i>v.</i> Homfray . . .	191
Dobell <i>v.</i> Stevens . . .	285	Macdonnell <i>v.</i> Evans . . .	253
Doe <i>v.</i> Catomore . . .	281	Maltby <i>v.</i> Christie . . .	134
„ <i>v.</i> Fleming . . .	82	Maugham <i>v.</i> Hubbard . . .	213
„ <i>v.</i> Griffin . . .	172	Meath <i>v.</i> Winchester . . .	278
„ <i>v.</i> Hodgson . . .	258	Mercer <i>v.</i> Whall . . .	118
„ <i>v.</i> Needs . . .	296	Meres <i>v.</i> Ansell . . .	283 ✓
„ <i>v.</i> Penfold . . .	78	Metropolitan Ry. Co. <i>v.</i> Jack-	
✓ „ <i>v.</i> Ross . . .	269	son . . .	5
„ <i>v.</i> Suckermore . . .	273	Mills <i>v.</i> Oddy . . .	262
„ <i>v.</i> Turford . . .	154	Morgan <i>v.</i> Griffith . . .	287
Doncaster <i>v.</i> Day . . .	189	„ <i>v.</i> Nicholl . . .	192
Dowling <i>v.</i> Dowling . . .	52	Moriarty <i>v.</i> L. C. & D. Ry. Co.	137

PAGE

Morrell <i>v.</i> Frith . . .	8
Morris <i>v.</i> Edwards . . .	246
„ <i>v.</i> Miller . . .	83
Mortimer <i>v.</i> M'Callan . . .	266
Mostyn <i>v.</i> Fabrigas . . .	14

Nepean <i>v.</i> Doe . . .	23
Newcastle <i>v.</i> Broxtowe . . .	180
Nicholls <i>v.</i> Dowding . . .	212

✓ Omichund <i>v.</i> Barker . . .	209
-----------------------------------	-----

Paddock <i>v.</i> Forrester . . .	46
Papendick <i>v.</i> Bridgwater . . .	163
Parkin <i>v.</i> Moon . . .	218
Peaceable <i>v.</i> Watson . . .	162
Pearce <i>v.</i> Hooper . . .	280
Peto <i>v.</i> Hague . . .	143
Pickering <i>v.</i> Noyes . . .	247
✓ Price <i>v.</i> Manning . . .	221
„ <i>v.</i> Torrington . . .	154
Prince <i>v.</i> Samo . . .	222
Pye <i>v.</i> Butterfield . . .	237
Pym <i>v.</i> Campbell . . .	290

Rawson <i>v.</i> Haigh . . .	58
✓ R. <i>v.</i> Baldry . . .	146
„ <i>v.</i> Bedingfield . . .	56
„ <i>v.</i> Blake . . .	61
„ <i>v.</i> Bliss . . .	178
„ <i>v.</i> Boyes . . .	235
„ <i>v.</i> Brasier . . .	207
„ <i>v.</i> Brown . . .	233
„ <i>v.</i> Buckley . . .	157
„ <i>v.</i> Carter . . .	81
„ <i>v.</i> Clarke . . .	101
„ <i>v.</i> Cox and Railton . . .	242
„ <i>v.</i> Ellis . . .	54
✓ „ <i>v.</i> Elworthy . . .	255
„ <i>v.</i> Eriswell . . .	180
„ <i>v.</i> Foster . . .	57
„ <i>v.</i> Francis . . .	305
„ <i>v.</i> Geering . . .	88
„ <i>v.</i> Gibbons . . .	152
„ <i>v.</i> Gibson . . .	307
„ <i>v.</i> Gould . . .	149
„ <i>v.</i> Hill . . .	208
„ <i>v.</i> Holmes . . .	226
„ <i>v.</i> Holy Trinity, Hull . . .	256
„ <i>v.</i> Hunt . . .	258
„ <i>v.</i> Jarvis . . .	149
„ <i>v.</i> Jenkins . . .	181

PAGE

R. <i>v.</i> Langmead . . .	80
„ <i>v.</i> Lillyman . . .	69
„ <i>v.</i> Llanfaethly . . .	263 ✓
„ <i>v.</i> Lloyd . . .	151
„ <i>v.</i> Luffe . . .	16
„ <i>v.</i> Mead . . .	183
„ <i>v.</i> Muscot . . .	121
„ <i>v.</i> Norton . . .	138
„ <i>v.</i> Osborne . . .	72
„ <i>v.</i> Palmer . . .	49
„ <i>v.</i> Pike . . .	185
„ <i>v.</i> Rhodes . . .	89
„ <i>v.</i> Riley . . .	92
„ <i>v.</i> Rowton . . .	98
„ <i>v.</i> Scaife . . .	249
„ <i>v.</i> Stubbs . . .	122
„ <i>v.</i> Sutton . . .	196
„ <i>v.</i> Turner . . .	115
„ <i>v.</i> Willshire . . .	28
„ <i>v.</i> Woodcock . . .	183 ✓
Robertson <i>v.</i> French . . .	76

Sandilands, <i>Re</i> . . .	275
Scott <i>v.</i> Sampson . . .	94
Slatterie <i>v.</i> Pooley . . .	145 ✓
Smith <i>v.</i> Wilson . . .	301
Soward <i>v.</i> Leggatt . . .	111
Stobart <i>v.</i> Dryden . . .	127
Stockdale <i>v.</i> Hansard . . .	11
Sturla <i>v.</i> Freccia . . .	193
Sugden <i>v.</i> Lord St. Leonards . . .	185
Swinfen <i>v.</i> Lord Chelmsford . . .	80

Taylor <i>v.</i> Barclay . . .	14
„ <i>v.</i> Witham . . .	160
Thomas <i>v.</i> David . . .	232
Thompson <i>v.</i> Trevanion . . .	55

Verry <i>v.</i> Watkins . . .	97
Vooght <i>v.</i> Winch . . .	37

Weeks <i>v.</i> Sparke . . .	173
Wharam <i>v.</i> Routledge . . .	257
Wheeler <i>v.</i> Le Marchant . . .	238
Wiedemann <i>v.</i> Walpole . . .	136
Wigglesworth <i>v.</i> Dallison . . .	293
Williams <i>v.</i> East India Co. . .	20
„ <i>v.</i> Innes . . .	141
Wilson <i>v.</i> Hodges . . .	22
Wing <i>v.</i> Angrave . . .	27
Wood <i>v.</i> Mackinson . . .	217
Woolway <i>v.</i> Rowe . . .	144
Wright <i>v.</i> Doe . . .	62

TABLE OF CASES CITED IN JUDGMENTS AND NOTES.

	PAGE		PAGE
Armory <i>v.</i> Delamirie . . .	304	Massey <i>v.</i> Allen . . .	155
Atkinson <i>v.</i> Morris . . .	189	Mercer <i>v.</i> Denne . . .	156
Att.-Gen. <i>v.</i> Hitchcock . . .	233	Mighell <i>v.</i> Sultan of Johore . . .	16
Bird <i>v.</i> Randall . . .	37	Minet <i>v.</i> Morgan . . .	242
Bolckow <i>v.</i> Seymour . . .	6	Morrell <i>v.</i> Frith . . .	302
Bristow <i>v.</i> Sequeville . . .	14	Moult <i>v.</i> Halliday . . .	13
Broughton <i>v.</i> Randall . . .	28	Nevill <i>v.</i> Fine Art Co. . .	9
Charnock <i>v.</i> Merchant . . .	344	Outram <i>v.</i> Morewood . . .	38
Cory <i>v.</i> Bretton . . .	45	Phené's Trusts, <i>Re</i> . . .	23
Crease <i>v.</i> Barrett . . .	162	Pickard <i>v.</i> Sears . . .	42
Daniel <i>v.</i> Pitt . . .	141	Poulett Peerage Claim . . .	22
De Lassalle <i>v.</i> Guildford . . .	288	Price <i>v.</i> Page . . .	299
Doe <i>v.</i> Kemp . . .	79	Printing, etc., Co. <i>v.</i> Drucker . . .	190
„ <i>v.</i> Needs . . .	300	R. <i>v.</i> Austin . . .	250
Doucet <i>v.</i> Geoghegan . . .	59	„ <i>v.</i> Bedingfield . . .	184
Edelstein <i>v.</i> Schuler . . .	13	„ <i>v.</i> Bird . . .	344
Fonnereau <i>v.</i> Poyntz . . .	298	„ <i>v.</i> Bond . . .	89
Forster <i>v.</i> Hale . . .	312	„ <i>v.</i> Bridgwater . . .	344
Foster <i>v.</i> Globe Venture Syndicate . . .	16	„ <i>v.</i> Carter . . .	330
Goddard's Case . . .	39	„ <i>v.</i> Chitson . . .	344
Gregory <i>v.</i> Tavernor . . .	214	„ <i>v.</i> Ellis . . .	345
Henkle <i>v.</i> Royal Ex. Ass. Co. . .	287	„ <i>v.</i> Eriswell . . .	131
Holcombe <i>v.</i> Hewson . . .	88	„ <i>v.</i> Ferry Frystone . . .	131
Hutton <i>v.</i> Warren . . .	295	„ <i>v.</i> Fisher . . .	90
Jersey <i>v.</i> Smith . . .	299	„ <i>v.</i> Fowkes . . .	56
Kurtz <i>v.</i> Spence . . .	46	„ <i>v.</i> Gardner . . .	344
Leroux <i>v.</i> Brown . . .	312	„ <i>v.</i> Gloster . . .	61
Lewis <i>v.</i> Hartley . . .	258	„ <i>v.</i> Grout . . .	345
Lyell <i>v.</i> Kennedy . . .	242	„ <i>v.</i> Haseltine . . .	106
		„ <i>v.</i> Hodgkinson . . .	344
		„ <i>v.</i> Hook . . .	122
		„ <i>v.</i> Humphries . . .	344
		„ <i>v.</i> Hunt . . .	303
		„ <i>v.</i> Jones . . .	345
		„ <i>v.</i> Lillyman . . .	73

xxvi *CASES CITED IN JUDGMENTS AND NOTES.*

	PAGE		PAGE
R. v. Lumley	23	Shore v. Wilson	302
„ v. Marshall	250	Smith v. Blakey	157
„ v. McDonald	344	Stobart v. Dryden	183
„ v. Nuneham Courtney	131	Stroughill v. Buck	41
„ v. Preston	345		
„ v. Rhodes	344	Tatam v. Reeve	43
„ v. Riley	227	Thomas v. David	230
„ v. Rouse	345	Trevivan v. Lawrence	39
„ v. Rowland	344		
„ v. Shaw	149	Wake v. Harrop	287
„ v. Sheean	345	Waldridge v. Kennison	46
„ v. Silverlock	275	Walker v. Wilsher	46
„ v. Spilsbury	149	Wallis v. Littell	291
„ v. Tate	123	Ward v. Sinfield	326
„ v. Thompson	149	Webb v. Plummer	295
„ v. Warren	343	Weeks v. Sparke	178
„ v. Willshire	24	Wharam v. Routledge	214
„ v. Wilson	83	Wilson v. Rastall	241
Ridley v. Gyde	59	Woodward v. Goulstone	189
Rouch v. G. W. Ry.	59	Woolway v. Rowe	164
Rutland's Case	282	Wright v. Bagnall	43

TABLE OF STATUTES.

	PAGE
Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1879. 42 Vict. c. 11, ss. 3—7, 9	332
Bankruptcy Act, 1883. 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 17 (1), (7), (8)	335
Bankruptcy Act, 1890. 53 & 54 Vict. c. 71, s. 27 (2)	340
Bastardy Act, 1845. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 10, s. 6	315
Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872. 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, s. 4	330
Children Act, 1908. 8 Edw. 7, c. 67, ss. 27, 28 (1), 29, 30	348
Coinage Act, 1861. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 99, s. 37	323
Coroners Act, 1887. 50 & 51 Vict. c. 71, ss. 4 (1), (2), 5 (3)	338
Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, 1883. 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, s. 59 (1)	335
Criminal Evidence Act, 1898. 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, ss. 1—4, 6 (1)	341
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1867. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, ss. 3, 6	326
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885. 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69, ss. 2, 3, 4	336
Criminal Procedure Act, 1865. 28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, ss. 1—8	324
Divided Parishes Act, 1876. 39 & 40 Vict. c. 61, s. 34	331
Evidence Act, 1843. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85	315
Evidence Act, 1851. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, ss. 2, 3, 4, 14, 16	319
Evidence Amendment Act, 1853. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83, ss. 1, 2, 3	320
Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869. 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, ss. 2, 3	329
Evidence Act, 1877. 40 & 41 Vict. c. 14, s. 1	331
Explosive Substances Act, 1883. 46 & 47 Vict. c. 3, ss. 4 (1), 6 (2)	334
Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890. 53 & 54 Vict. c. 37, s. 4 (1), (2)	339
Frauds, Statute of, 1677. 29 Car. 2, c. 3, ss. 4, 7, 9	311
Indictable Offences Act, 1848. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, ss. 17, 18, 20	316
Larceny Act, 1861. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, ss. 29, 85, 116	321
Married Women's Property Act, 1882. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, ss. 12, 16	333
Married Women's Property Act, 1884. 47 & 48 Vict. c. 14, s. 1	336
Merchandise Marks Act, 1887. 50 & 51 Vict. c. 28, ss. 2 (1), 19 (2)	337
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 457 (1), (2)	340
Motor Car Act, 1903. 3 Edw. 7, c. 36, s. 9 (1)	346
Oaths Act, 1838. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 105	314
Oaths Act, 1888. 51 & 52 Vict. c. 46, ss. 1, 2, 3, 5	338
Oaths Act, 1909. 9 Edw. 7, c. 39, ss. 2, 3	350

	PAGE
Parliamentary Registration Act, 1843. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 88. . .	314
Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871. 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 19 . . .	329
Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1904. 4 Edw. 7, c. 15, ss. 12, 15 (1)	346
Previous Conviction Act, 1836. 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 111	313
Punishment of Incest Act, 1908. 8 Edw. 7, c. 45, s. 4 (4)	347
Sale of Goods Act, 1893. 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 4 (1)	340
Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 14 . . .	319
Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879. 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 39 (2) . .	333
Treason Act, 1695. 7 & 8 Wm. 3, c. 3, s. 2	312
Witnesses Act, 1806. 46 Geo. 3, c. 37	312

LEADING CASES AND STATUTES

ON

THE LAW OF EVIDENCE.

PART I.

CASES ON EVIDENCE.

7 May 1932

EVIDENCE GENERALLY.

THE term "evidence" as used in law, bears the same meaning as in popular language,—the means by which facts are made evident or established to the satisfaction of persons enquiring into them,—narrowed by certain legal rules contrived to secure, as far as possible, its sufficiency and credibility; the result being that facts sufficient to satisfy or convince prudent persons of clear understanding generally, may not be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the law in matters arising for judicial determination.

Amongst the various definitions of "evidence" in its legal sense—"judicial evidence" as it is sometimes called—the following may be noticed as useful, or as affording food for reflection.

"That which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or on the other" (*Blackstone's Commentaries*, III. 367).

"All the legal means, exclusive of mere argument, which tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to judicial investigation" (*Taylor on Evidence*, I. 1).

"The *means* by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved" (*Wills on Circumstantial Evidence*, 2).

"The evidence received by courts of justice in proof or disproof of *facts*, the existence of which comes in question before them" (*Best on Evidence*, 21).

"That part of the Law of Procedure which, with a view to ascertain individual rights and liabilities in particular cases, decides—

I. What facts may, and what may not be proved in such cases ;

II. What sort of evidence must be given of a fact which may be proved ;

III. By whom and in what manner the evidence must be produced by which any fact is to be proved" (*Stephen on Evidence*, xiii.).

THE FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND JURY IN DEALING WITH EVIDENCE.

In the case of trial by jury, it is, in the first place, essential to distinguish the respective functions of the Judge and the jury, inasmuch as they both have to deal with the evidence tendered, but in different manner. The Judge has the general conduct of the proceedings, deciding questions of law and practice, including those relating to the production and admissibility of evidence. The jury find the facts, thus dealing with the credibility and weight of the evidence.

But it is the duty of the Judge to instruct the jury in the rules of law and practice by which the evidence is to be weighed; for instance, he should advise them not to convict upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice (see *post*, p. 122); he should explain to them the nature and effect of any presumptions applicable (see *post*, p. 17), or any rule of law rendering evidence either unnecessary (see *post*, p. 10), or of peculiar application (see *post*, p. 72). The Judge also, in summing up the case to the jury, frequently comments upon the weight of the evidence.

With respect to the duty of the Judge thus to deal with the weight of the evidence, there appears to be some difference of opinion. It is sometimes maintained that, when he has explained to the jury the matter in issue, together with the law and practice applicable, he is *functus officio* and should not comment on the facts. But this rule is certainly largely departed from in general practice, and it is usually considered that temperate comment by the Judge on the facts may well be of material assistance to the jury, although any officious interference with the functions of the latter is not only

improper on the part of the Judge, but frequently defeats its own purpose by inclining the jury against the Judge's opinion. As Lord Chancellor Bacon said to Mr. Justice Hutton, when swearing in the latter as a Judge—"Draw your learning out of your books, not out of your brain. Mix well the freedom of your own opinion with the reverence of the opinion of your fellows. Be a light to jurors to open their eyes, not a guide to lead them by the noses" (*Campbell's Lives of Chancellors*, II. 428).

Professor Thayer speaks of the notion, that a judge has no right to indicate to the jury his own views of the facts, as one which would have amazed any English judge "from the beginning down," remarking that "It is not too much to say of any period, in all English history, that it is impossible to conceive of trial by jury as existing there in a form which would withhold from the jury the assistance of the Court in dealing with the facts" (*Thayer on Evidence*, 188).

The general functions of the Judge have thus been shortly summarised :

"The duty of a Judge presiding at a trial by jury is fourfold : first, he must decide all questions respecting the admissibility of evidence ; secondly, he must instruct the jury in the rules of law, by which the evidence, when admitted, is to be weighed ; thirdly, he must determine, as a legal question, whether there be any evidence fit to be submitted to the jury for their consideration ; and lastly, he must explain and enforce those general principles of law that are applicable to the point at issue" (*Taylor*, I. 25). These points are illustrated by the cases following.

METROPOLITAN RY. CO. v. JACKSON (1877).

L. R. 3 A. C. 193 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 303 ; 37 L. T. 679 ;
26 W. R. 175.

Questions of law are for the Judge, questions of fact for the jury, to determine. Whether there is sufficient evidence to be left to the jury from which they may legally and properly infer the matter in issue is a question of law for the Judge ; whether such evidence establishes the matter in issue is a question of fact for the jury.

Thus, in an action for damages caused by negligence, it was held that the Judge was to decide whether there was any evidence proper to be left to the jury of negligence causing the injury, and for the jury to say whether, and how far, such evidence was to be believed.

LORD CAIRNS, L.C. "The Judge has a certain duty to discharge, and the jurors have another and a different duty. The Judge has to say whether any facts have been established by evidence from which negligence *may be* reasonably inferred ; the jurors have to say whether, from those facts, when submitted to them, negligence *ought to be* inferred. It is, in my opinion, of the greatest importance in the administration of justice that these separate functions should be maintained, and should be maintained distinct. It would be a serious inroad on the province of the jury, if, in a case where there are facts from which negligence may reasonably be inferred, the Judge were to withdraw the case from the jury upon the ground that, in his opinion, negligence ought not to be inferred ; and it would, on the other hand, place in the hands of the jurors a power which might be exercised in the most arbitrary manner, if they were at liberty to hold that negligence might be inferred from any state of facts whatever.

LORD O'HAGAN. "Your Lordships have never held that, when negligence is alleged, any state of facts assumed to bear upon the issue can be made the subject of inference by jurors, although not

really connected with the issue before them. The consequences of such a doctrine would be disastrous, and it is of high importance that the authority of the Judge should restrain a latitude of decision which might often in the result be very inconsistent with reason and justice."

LORD BLACKBURN. "I think it has always been considered a question of law to be determined by the Judge, subject, of course, to review, whether there is evidence which, if it is believed, and the counter-evidence, if any, not believed, would establish the facts in controversy. It is for the jury to say whether and how far the evidence is to be believed. And if the facts, as to which evidence is given, are such that from them a farther inference of fact may legitimately be drawn, it is for the jury to say whether that inference is to be drawn or not. But it is for the Judge to determine, subject to review, as a matter of law, whether from those facts that farther inference may legitimately be drawn."

LORD GORDON. "The duty of a Judge in such a case is an exceedingly delicate one, as the line of division between what is proper to be submitted to the jury, as necessary to support a charge of negligence in point of law, and what may be submitted to the jury as sufficient to support a charge of negligence in point of fact, is often a very narrow one. But I agree . . . that there is in every case a preliminary question, which is one of law, namely, whether there is any evidence on which the jury could properly find the question for the party on whom the onus of proof lies. If there is not, the Judge ought to withdraw the question from the jury, and direct a nonsuit if the onus is on the plaintiff, or direct a verdict for the plaintiff if the onus is on the defendant."

Note.—The following matters have, amongst others, been held to be matters of fact for the jury to decide—actual knowledge, real intention, express malice, good faith, reasonable skill, reasonable time, due diligence, negligence, and questions of foreign law. As to libel, see *post*, p. 9.

Where a contract is verbal, wholly or partially, the question as to its terms is for the jury (*Bolckow v. Seymour*, 17 C. B. N. S. 107). As to written contracts, see *post*, p. 8.

BARTLETT v. SMITH

(1843).

12 L. J. Ex. 287; 7 JUR. 448; 11 M. & W. 483; 63
R. R. 664.

The admissibility of evidence, documentary or otherwise, is a question of law for the Judge; and, if its admissibility depends on certain facts, the Judge should himself adjudicate upon such facts without submitting them to the jury.

It was objected by the defendant at the trial, that a bill of exchange with a foreign stamp could not be read, on the ground that it was drawn in this country. Evidence of that fact was tendered and refused at that stage, but was afterwards received as part of the defendant's case and submitted to the jury. It was held that the Judge ought to have received evidence of the place of drawing, in the first instance, to enable him to decide upon the admissibility of the bill, and that he ought not to have submitted the evidence to the jury.

LORD ABINGER, C.B. "All facts which are necessary to be proved with a view to the reception of evidence are for the consideration of the Judge, and he is to receive evidence respecting them for his own satisfaction. He might, indeed, if he pleased, ask the opinion of the jury, but still the decision ought to be his own. A Judge should receive evidence as to the competency of a witness, or the sufficiency of a stamp, which is good upon the face of it, and ought to determine these questions for himself, instead of submitting them to the jury."

PARKE, B. "This is one of the many cases in which a Judge ought to receive evidence for his own satisfaction, and ought not to submit it to the jury."

ALDERSON, B. "Where the admissibility of the evidence is a question for the Judge, the facts upon which that admissibility depends, are to be determined by him and not by the jury. If

another rule were to prevail, it would always be left to the jury to decide upon the admissibility of evidence."

Note.—Questions of admissibility, which the Judge decides, include such questions as—whether the fact offered in evidence is relevant (see *post*, p. 47), whether the witness is competent (see *post*, p. 203), whether a document comes from proper custody (see *post*, p. 277) or is properly stamped, whether a dying declaration (see *post*, p. 181) or confession (see *post*, p. 145) is admissible, and whether secondary evidence is admissible (see *post*, p. 252).

MORRELL v. FRITH (1838).

3 M. & W. 402; 49 R. R. 659.

The construction of a document is generally a question of law for the Judge; but where extrinsic evidence is allowed, and required to explain it, as where peculiar terms or expressions are used, such evidence is for the jury.

The question was, whether a certain letter was a sufficient acknowledgment in writing to take the case out of the Statute of Limitation. The Judge was of opinion that it was not sufficient; and, although requested by the plaintiff's counsel to leave the question to the jury, he declined to do so, and directed a nonsuit. On an application for a new trial, it was held that he was right.

LORD ABINGER, C.B. "One case in which the effect of a written document must be left to a jury, is, whether it requires parol evidence to explain it, as in the ordinary case of mercantile contracts in which peculiar terms and abbreviations are employed. So also, where a series of letters form part of the evidence in the cause, they must be left, with the rest of it, to the jury. But where the question arises on the construction of one document only, without reference to any extrinsic evidence to explain it, it is the safest course to adhere to the rule, that the construction of written documents is a question of law for the Court. The intention of the parties is a question for the jury, and, in some cases, in cases of libel for instance, the meaning of

the document is part of that intention, and therefore must be submitted to the jury. But where a legal right is to be determined from the construction of a written document which either is unambiguous or of which the ambiguity arises only from the words themselves, that is a question to be decided by the Judge."

PARKE, B. "The construction of a doubtful instrument itself is not for the jury, although the facts by which it may be explained are."

ALDERSON, B. "Where it is a letter only, and there is no evidence beyond the written instrument itself, the construction of it is for the Court only, and not for the jury. The case of mercantile documents is altogether different. There the meaning of the words themselves is in question, being words that are used in a particular and technical sense; it is as if the document were in a foreign language, and the truth or propriety of the translation were in question."

Note.—The question of existence or non-existence of a document would be a question of fact for the jury. Cases on the admissibility of evidence to explain peculiar terms and ambiguities are given *post*, pp. 296, 301. The question whether a writing is sufficient acknowledgment to prevent a debt being statute-barred is for the Judge. So is the construction of policies of insurance, of foreign contracts (after proof of the meaning of words used), and of lost documents (after proof of their contents by secondary evidence), and the question whether an amount agreed to be paid is a penalty or liquidated damages. As to verbal contracts, see *ante*, p. 6.

The case of libel appears to be somewhat anomalous. Prior to 1792, in prosecutions for libel, the general practice was for the jury to decide merely the question of publication, clearly one of fact; the judge deciding whether the writing was defamatory or not. Although the defamatory meaning would appear strictly to be a question of law for the judge, yet it was felt that the practice placed too much power in the hands of the judge, and it caused much acrimonious discussion, which ultimately resulted in Fox's Libel Act of 1792, providing that in criminal prosecutions for libel the jury shall, after direction by the judge on the law, give a general verdict upon the whole matter; thus in effect construing the writing, if the judge holds it to be capable of a defamatory meaning. This rule has now been applied to civil proceedings for libel (*Nevill v. Fine Art Co.*, [1897] A. C. 68).

PROOF.

Before dealing with the matters requiring proof, and the mode of proving them, it is necessary to consider those matters which (a) do not require proof, or (b) are not allowed to be proved. Under the former head we have (1) matters judicially noticed, (2) matters presumed, and (3) matters admitted; under the latter head we have (1) matters which a party is estopped from alleging, (2) matters stated "without prejudice," and (3) matters which are irrelevant to the issue.

MATTERS OF WHICH PROOF IS NOT REQUIRED.

JUDICIAL NOTICE.

There are certain matters which are considered too notorious to require proof: such matters are therefore "judicially noticed," that is to say, the Judge takes notice of their existence and nature without requiring any evidence thereof. English Law is dealt with in the same way, as, although it may not be so notorious to the public generally, it is taken to be within the knowledge of the Judge.

It is impossible to state completely the matters which the Court will judicially notice. Any matter of such common knowledge that it would be an insult to intelligence to require proof of it would probably be dealt with in this way. Sir James Stephen gives a list of twelve kinds of matters which would be judicially noticed, but it is obviously incomplete, and apparently without either classification or order (*Dig. Ev.* Art. 58). Mr. Wills, in his well-known book on Evidence, classifies the matters under the three following heads, which seem to cover well all cases:—

1. Law and Practice of the Courts.
 2. Public Acts and Matters connected with the Government of the Country.
 3. Matters of Fact of Common and certain Knowledge.
- Cases are here given under each of these three heads.

STOCKDALE v. HANSARD

(1839).

9 A. & E. 905 ; 2 P. & D. 1 ; 3 JUR. 905 ; 48 R. R. 326.

The Court will judicially notice the Law of England, including the Law and Custom of Parliament, and the privileges and course of proceedings of each House of Parliament.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. "It is said that the Courts of law must be excluded from all interference with transactions in which the name of privilege has been mentioned, because they have no means of informing themselves what these privileges are. They are well known, it seems, to the two Houses, and to every member of them, so long as he continues a member ; but the knowledge is as incommunicable as the privileges to all beyond that pale. It might be presumption to ask how this knowledge may be obtained, had not the Attorney-General read to us all he had to urge on the subject from works accessible to all and familiar to every man of education. The argument here seems to run in a circle. The Courts cannot be entrusted with any matter connected with privilege, because they know nothing about privilege ; and this ignorance must be perpetual, because the law has taken such matters out of their cognisance. . . . Lord Holt in terms denied this presumption of ignorance, and asserted the right and duty of the Courts to know the law of Parliament, because the law of the land on which they are bound to decide. Other Judges,

without directly asserting the proposition, have constantly acted upon it ; and it was distinctly admitted by the Attorney-General in the course of his argument."

PATTESON, J. "It is further said that the Courts of law have no knowledge as to the *lex et consuetudo parliamenti*, and cannot therefore determine any question respecting it. And yet, at the same time, it is said that the *lex et consuetudo parliamenti* are part of the law of the land. And this Court is, in this very case, actually called upon by the defendants to pronounce judgment in their favour, upon the very ground that their act is justified by that very *lex et consuetudo parliamenti*, of which the Court is said to be invincibly ignorant, and to be bound to take the law from a resolution of one branch of the Parliament alone. . . . **There is nothing so mysterious in the law and custom of Parliament, so far at least as the rest of the community not within its walls are concerned, that this Court may not acquire a knowledge of it in the same manner as of any other branch of the law.**"

Note.—The law judicially noticed by the English Courts is that of England and Ireland only, not the law of Scotland, nor that of the Colonies, and, of course, not that of foreign countries (see *post*, p. 14). Scotch law is a fundamentally different system from English law, but Irish law is substantially English law varied to some extent by statute.

The law thus noticed includes both public and (since 1850) private Acts of Parliament (see *post*, p. 200), general customs and some local customs of well-known extensive application, such as Gavelkind and Borough-English customs ; but, generally, local or particular customs must be proved.

Of course, if the Judge should happen not to bear in mind the particular law in question, he may refer to, or be referred to, authorities in order to direct his attention to the law in question, and to refresh his memory ; but this is not "proving" the law.

BRANDAO v. BARNETT

(1846).

3 C. B. 519 ; 12 C. & F. 787 ; 69 R. R. 204.

The Court will judicially notice all general customs, such as the custom of Banker's Lien, and other customs

of the Law Merchant, when they have once been judicially ascertained and established.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

LORD CAMPBELL. "The first question that arises upon this record is, whether judicial notice is to be taken of the general lien of bankers on the securities of their customers in their hands? The Exchequer bills, for which this action is brought, are found to be the property of the plaintiff, and the defendants rest their defence on their second plea, that they were not possessed, etc., relying on the lien claimed for the balance due to them from Edward Burn."

"The usage of trade by which bankers are entitled to a general lien, is not found by the special verdict, and unless we are to take judicial notice of it, the plaintiff is at once entitled to judgment. But, my Lords, I am of opinion that the general lien of bankers is part of the law merchant, and is to be judicially noticed—like the negotiability of bills of exchange or the days of grace allowed for their payment. When a general usage has been judicially ascertained and established, it becomes a part of the law merchant which Courts of justice are bound to know and recognise. Such has been the invariable understanding and practice in Westminster Hall for a great many years; there is no decision or *dictum* to the contrary, and justice could not be administered if evidence were required to be given *toties quoties* to support such usages, and issue might be joined upon them in each particular case."

LORD LYNTHURST. "There is no question that, by the law merchant, a banker has a lien for his general balance on securities deposited with him. I consider this as part of the established law of the country, and that the Courts will take judicial notice of it: it is not necessary that it should be pleaded, nor is it necessary that it should be given in evidence in this particular instance."

Note.—Care must be taken to distinguish "general" from "particular" customs, the latter not being judicially noticed, but requiring proof on each occasion. See note to previous case.

It appears, however, to be necessary, in practice, to prove a general custom once at least, so that it may become "judicially ascertained and established," as was said above. See *Moult v. Halliday*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 125,

and *Edelstein v. Schuler*, [1902] 2 K. B. 144, as to proof of general customs.

Besides mercantile liens, the following general customs may be mentioned as having been judicially noticed—the negotiability of instruments, the general practice of conveyancers, the custom or law of the road, customs of navigation, and market overt.

MOSTYN v. FABRIGAS

(1774).

1 COWPER, 161.

The Court will not judicially notice the Laws of the Colonies or Foreign Countries. They must be proved as matters of fact.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

LORD MANSFIELD, C.J. “The way of knowing foreign laws is, by admitting them to be proved as facts, and the Court must assist the jury in ascertaining what the law is. For instance, if there is a French settlement, the construction of which depends upon the custom of Paris, witnesses must be received to explain what the custom is; as evidence is received of customs in respect to trade. . . . So in the supreme resort before the King in Council, the Privy Council determines all cases that arise in the plantations, in Gibraltar or Minorca, in Jersey or Guernsey; and they inform themselves, by having the law stated to them.”

Note.—Foreign and Colonial Law is one of those matters of “science or art” upon which evidence of opinion may be given by experts. (See *Bristow v. Sequeville*, *post*, p. 106). For the word “plantations” in the above case we may now read “colonies.”

TAYLOR v. BARCLAY

(1828).

2 SIMONS, 213; 29 R. R. 89.

The Court will judicially notice Public, Constitutional, or International Matters, affecting the Government of

Great Britain and its relations with other States; in order that the Court and the Executive may take the same view and act in unison in dealing with such matters. For such purpose the Court should enquire of the Executive and thereby acquire the information, rather than by hearing evidence thereon.

The plaintiffs alleged themselves to be the agents of the Government of the "Federal Republic of Central America, which was a sovereign and an independent State, recognised and treated as such by His Majesty the King of these realms." The Judge, after proper enquiry, took judicial notice of the fact that the so-called Republic had not been recognised as an independent Government by the Government of this country.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR. "In consequence of the arguments in this case, I have had communication with the Foreign Office, and I am authorised to state that the Federal Republic of Central America has not been recognised, as an independent Government, by the Government of this country. It appears to me that, when it is stated in the bill, that this Republic was, and still is, a sovereign and independent State, recognised and treated as such by His Majesty, the King of these realms, it must have been meant that it has been recognised by the Government of this country as an independent State altogether; and, inasmuch as I conceive it is the duty of the Judge in every Court to take notice of public matters which affect the government of the country, I conceive that, notwithstanding that there is this averment in the bill, I am bound to take the fact as it really exists, and not as it is averred to be."

"I must judicially take notice of what is the truth of the fact, notwithstanding the averment on the record, because nothing is taken to be true except that which is properly pleaded; and I am of opinion that, when you plead that which is historically false, and which the Judges are bound to take notice of as being false, it cannot be said you have properly pleaded, merely because it is averred, in plain terms; and that I must take it just as if there was no such averment on the record."

Note.—With regard to public matters it is said, in *Taylor on Evidence*, p. 19—"The Courts will judicially recognise the political constitution or frame of their own government; its essential political agents or public officers sharing in its regular administration; and its essential and regular political operations and actions. . . . But they will not recognise private orders made at the Council table, for these are matters of particular concernment; nor, it seems, any orders of Council, even though they regard the Crown and the Government; nor the transactions on the journals of either House of Parliament."

It will be observed that, in the above case, the Judge satisfied himself on the point in question by communication with the Foreign Office. In the later case of *Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate*, [1900] 1 Ch. 811, it was said that sound policy demands that in dealing with questions involving the sovereignty and extent of territory of a foreign State the Court should act in unison with the Government. So, where a dispute arises concerning the status and boundaries of a foreign State, the Court will, by enquiring of the Foreign Office, obtain judicial knowledge not only of such status, but also of the fact whether the district in dispute is within the territory of that State. Information relating to the boundaries of a foreign State should be acquired, it was held, by such a method, rather than by evidence adduced by the litigants which might lead to a result inconsistent with the practice of the Government. The same course was adopted in *Mighell v. Sultan of Johore*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 149. See also the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, sect. 4, *post*, p. 339.

R. v. LUFFE (1807).

8 EAST, 193; 9 R. R. 406.

The Court will judicially notice facts which must have happened according to the constant and invariable course of nature; matters of common knowledge.

The question arising as to the legitimacy of a child, and the fact appearing that the husband had not access to the wife until a fortnight before the birth, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that, according to the course of nature, he could not have been the father.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "Here, however, in nature, the fact may certainly be known that the husband, who had no access until within a fortnight of his wife's delivery, could not be the actual father of the child. Where the thing cannot certainly be

known, we must call in aid such probable evidence as can be resorted to, and the intervention of a jury must, in all cases in which it is practicable, be had to decide thereupon ; but where the question arises as it does here, and where it may certainly be known from the invariable course of nature, as in this case it may, that no birth could be occasioned and produced within those limits of time, we may venture to lay down the rule plainly and broadly, without any danger arising from the precedent."

GROSE, J. "We go upon the sure ground of natural impossibility and good sense."

LE BLANC, J. "Where it can be demonstrated to be absolutely impossible, in the course of nature, that the husband could be the father of the child, it does not break in upon the reason of the current of authorities, to say that the issue is illegitimate."

Note.—Other matters judicially noticed as matters of common knowledge are the course of time, the ordinary public fasts and festivals, the dates of legal sittings of the Court, the order of the months, the meaning of ordinary language, weights and measures, etc.

PRESUMPTIONS.

In several cases the law itself presumes certain facts in favour of certain persons, who are thereby relieved from the burden of proof of such facts.

Presumptions, or conclusions drawn from certain facts, are frequently stated to be of three kinds—(1) Presumptions of fact; (2) Conclusive or irrebuttable presumptions of law; (3) Rebuttable presumptions of law. But, for the purposes of the law of evidence, the first two may, with advantage, be disregarded. A practical lawyer, when he speaks of a presumption, always means a rebuttable presumption. Presumptions of fact are nothing but the conclusions which the Court draws from any individual combination of facts in evidence before it, and are obviously as various and uncertain as such combinations of fact may be. It is impossible to classify or draw rules from them. They may be considered

as outside the law of evidence altogether. Conclusive presumptions of law may be, with advantage, considered as mere rules of substantive law, and not presumptions at all. For instance, it is said to be a conclusive presumption that a child under seven cannot commit a crime. Is it not more proper to put it, as a rule of substantive law, that a person of such age is incapable of crime?

Sir J. Stephen uses the term in the third sense only. He says "I use the word 'presumption' in the sense of a presumption of law capable of being rebutted. A presumption of fact is simply an argument. A conclusive presumption I describe as conclusive proof" (*Dig. Ev.*, p. 161). And he defines a presumption as "a rule of law that Courts and Judges shall draw a particular inference from a particular fact, or from particular evidence, unless and until the truth of such inference is disproved" (*Dig. Ev.*, p. 2). This use of the term is undoubtedly the most proper.

Such presumptions or arbitrary conclusions can only be laid down by the law in cases of certain well-defined, and generally frequent, combinations of facts, instances of which are here given. In such cases the defined conclusion must be drawn until it is rebutted by other facts. Such other facts really produce a fresh combination of facts, from which the Court or jury may draw its own conclusion.

It is, however, practically impossible to give any complete, or generally recognised, list of presumptions. On no other question in the law of evidence does there appear to be such vagueness and difference of opinion. The cases given below illustrate six presumptions which may be said to be generally accepted by the authorities as actual presumptions of law. Beyond these there appears to be so little agreement among the authors of different works on evidence that there are not even two books giving the same list. The main reason of this entire want of harmony seems to be this. Presumptions appear to have developed in all cases from relevant facts.

The relevant facts, as will appear later (see *post*, p. 47) are those from which the Court *may* draw a certain conclusion. Facts raising presumptions are those from which the Court *must* draw a certain conclusion, until it is rebutted. In every case, it appears, where there is now a presumption, or imperative conclusion, there was a time when the conclusion was optional, or, in other words, when the Court *might* draw the conclusion which now it *must* draw. There has been a transition from relevancy to presumption. The Court having repeatedly had before it the same combination of facts, and having drawn what may have been the natural or obvious conclusion from such facts, the rule of law was ultimately evolved that the usual and familiar conclusion *should* be drawn, for the sake of uniformity and convenience. Thus we have developed presumptions of law. But the difficulty is to ascertain when the boundary between relevancy and presumption has been passed. Decisions and judicial statements are not always clear on the matter, partly because the word "presumption" is frequently used loosely as meaning a presumption of fact, and partly because the occasion for laying down the law definitely may not have occurred. These observations may be illustrated by the rule as to proof of marriage. It is clear that marriage *may* generally be proved by cohabitation and reputation (see *post*, p. 81). Such facts are clearly *relevant* to the fact of marriage, and some writers treat the question as one of relevancy merely. Others say there is a presumption of law in such a case, whilst some seek safety in putting the point under both heads. On the whole there seems to be no clear authority that this particular case has crossed the dividing line between relevancy and presumption.

There are certain well-recognised presumptions respecting documents; on which matter cases appear, *post*, pp. 275, 277, 281). There are also many statutory presumptions, too numerous to be dealt with here. See, for instance, sect. 30 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.

WILLIAMS v. EAST INDIA CO.

(1802).

3 EAST, 192; 6 R. R. 589.

There is a presumption of innocence, not only in criminal cases, but in all cases where an allegation of criminality is made.

Therefore, where a plaintiff declared that the defendants, who had chartered his ship, put on board dangerous substances without due notice to the captain or any other person concerned in the navigation, it lay upon him to prove even such negative averment, as the law presumed innocence of such a criminal neglect of duty.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "The rule of law is that where any act is required to be done on the one part, so that the party neglecting it would be guilty of a criminal neglect of duty in not having done it, the law presumes the affirmative, and throws the burden of proving the contrary, that is, in such case, of proving a negative, on the other side. . . . That the declaration, in imputing to the defendants the having wrongfully put on board a ship, without notice to those concerned in the management of the ship, an article of a highly dangerous combustible nature, imputes to the defendants a criminal negligence, cannot well be questioned. In order to make the putting on board wrongful, the defendants must be conversant of the dangerous quality of the article put on board; and if being so, they yet gave no notice, considering the probable danger thereby occasioned to the lives of those on board, it amounts to a species of delinquency in the persons so concerned in so putting such dangerous articles on board, for which they were criminally liable and punishable as for a misdemeanour at least."

Note.—The rule that an alteration in a deed is presumed to have been made before execution appears to be an illustration of the above presumption (see *post*, p. 281).

PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY.

BANBURY PEERAGE CASE

(1811).

1 SIM. & ST. 153 ; 24 R. R. 159.

There is a presumption that a child born during wedlock is legitimate.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

SIR JAMES MANSFIELD, C.J., stated the unanimous opinion of the Judges on questions put to them by the House of Lords :—

“That the presumption of legitimacy arising from the birth of a child during wedlock, the husband and wife not being proved to be impotent, and having opportunities of access to each other, during the period in which a child could be begotten and born in the course of nature, may be rebutted by circumstances inducing a contrary presumption.”

“That, after proof given of such access of the husband and wife, by which, according to the laws of nature, he might be the father of a child, no evidence can be received except it tend to falsify the proof that such intercourse had taken place.”

“That in every case where a child is born in lawful wedlock, the husband not being separated from his wife by a sentence of divorce, sexual intercourse is presumed to have taken place between the husband and wife, until that presumption is encountered by such evidence as proves, to the satisfaction of those who are to decide the question, that such sexual intercourse did not take place at any time, when, by such intercourse, the husband could, according to the laws of nature, be the father of such child.”

“That the presumption of the legitimacy of a child born in lawful wedlock, the husband not being separated from his wife by a sentence of divorce, can only be legally resisted by evidence of such facts or circumstances as are sufficient to prove, to the satisfaction of those who are to decide the question, that no sexual intercourse did take

place between the husband and wife, at any time, when, by such intercourse, the husband could, by the laws of nature, be the father of such child. Where the legitimacy of a child, in such a case, is disputed, on the ground that the husband was not the father of such child, the question to be left to the jury is, whether the husband was the father of such child, and the evidence to prove that he was not the father must be of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient to prove, to the satisfaction of a jury, that no sexual intercourse took place between the husband and the wife at any time, when, by such intercourse, the husband could, by the laws of nature, be the father of such child."

Note.—The presumption of legitimacy is said to be a very strong one. Formerly indeed, in order to rebut it, it was necessary to show that the husband had been "beyond the four seas," or out of the kingdom during the whole of the material period. This has been relaxed to the extent shown above. A recent important case on this subject is the *Poulett Peerage Claim*, [1903] A. C. 395.

PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUANCE.

WILSON v. HODGES

(1802).

2 EAST, 312; 6 R. R. 427.

There is a presumption that things once proved to have existed in a certain state or condition continue to exist in such state or condition for a reasonable time. This presumption is applicable to the continuance of life; but apparently only as a presumption of fact.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "Where the issue is upon the life or death of a person once shown to be living, the proof of the fact lies on the party who asserts the death; for that the presumption is that the party continues alive until the contrary be shown."

Note.—This presumption of continuance is clearly one of the most practical importance. It is frequently quite impossible to prove, for instance, the existence of a certain thing in a certain state or condition at the particular moment in question. It is sufficient with the aid of this presumption, to prove such existence and state at such an earlier time that, according to its nature, it may fairly be presumed to have lasted to the moment in question.

But so much depends upon the particular circumstances, that it may be doubted whether there is ever a presumption of *law* as to continuance. Indeed, with regard to the continuance of life, the presumption has clearly been held to be one of *fact* only. See *R. v. Lumley*, 1 C. C. R. 196, and *re Phené's Trusts*, 5 Ch. App. 139. In such case so much would depend upon particular circumstances, such as age, health, etc., that it would be difficult to lay down any presumption of law. A young man might be presumed to live longer than an old man. The presumption, if any, is of continuance for a reasonable time according to the circumstances. After seven years there may arise the contrary presumption of death under certain circumstances (see next case).

PRESUMPTION OF DEATH.

NEPEAN v. DOE

(1837).

2 M. & W. 894 ; 46 R. R. 789.

There is a presumption that a person who is not heard of for seven years, by those who would be likely to hear of him if living, is dead; but there is no presumption that he died at any particular time.

The facts sufficiently appear from the judgment.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. "The law presumes that a person shown to be alive at a given time, remains alive until the contrary be shown, for which reason the onus of showing the death of Matthew Knight lay in this case on the plaintiff. He has shown the death, by proving the absence of Matthew Knight, and his not having been heard of for seven years, whence arises, at the end of those seven years, another presumption of law, namely, that he is not then alive."

"Now, when nothing is heard of a person for seven years, it is

obviously a matter of complete uncertainty at what point of time in those seven years he died; of all the points of time the last day is the most improbable, and most inconsistent with the ground of presuming the fact of death. That presumption arises from the great lapse of time since the party has been heard of; because it is considered extraordinary, if he was alive, that he should not be heard of. In other words, it is presumed that his not being heard of has been occasioned by his death, which presumption arises from the considerable time that has elapsed. If you assume that he was alive on the last day but one of the seven years, then there is nothing extraordinary in his not having been heard of on the last day; and the previous extraordinary lapse of time, during which he has not been heard of, has become immaterial by reason of the assumption that he was living so lately. The presumption of the fact of death seems, therefore, to lead to the conclusion that the death took place some considerable time *before* the expiration of the seven years."

"We adopt the doctrine of the Court of King's Bench, that the presumption of law relates only to the fact of death, and that the time of death, whenever it is material, must be a subject of distinct proof."

Note.—It is frequently stated that this presumption of death only arises where the person in question "goes abroad," and is not heard of for seven years. It is true that in the above case the person had gone abroad, but the rule appears to be general, as stated. Indeed, the presumption of death must be stronger where the person has not gone abroad, as he is in such case more likely to be heard of, and the absence of news of him would still more strongly suggest his death.

It should be particularly noted that, in order to raise this presumption, evidence must be given that the person whose death is in question has not been heard of for seven years. It is not, as is thought sometimes, that the presumption of continuance of life comes to an end after seven years. If the only evidence were that a young person was alive and well eight years ago, the presumption would be that he was still alive. So, in the case of *R. v. Willshire* (*post*, p. 28), life was presumed to continue after eleven years. Two statutes which have given effect to seven years' absence should be noted, viz. 19 Car. 2, c. 6, s. 2, providing that persons upon whose lives estates depend shall be accounted as naturally dead if they "remain beyond the seas or elsewhere absent themselves in this realm" for seven years; and 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 57, providing that the penalty of bigamy shall not extend to any person whose husband or wife "shall have been continually absent from such person" for seven years and "shall not have been known by such person to be living within that time."

PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY.

BERRYMAN v. WISE

(1791).

4 T. R. 366 ; 2 R. R. 413.

There is a presumption that public and official acts and duties have been regularly and properly performed ; and that persons acting as public officers have been regularly and properly appointed.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

BULLER, J., said that in the case of all peace officers, justices of the peace, constables, etc., it was sufficient to prove that they acted in those characters without producing their appointments. . . . Neither in actions for tithes is it necessary for the incumbent to prove presentation, institution, and induction ; proof that he received the tithes, and acted as the incumbent, is sufficient.

Note.—This presumption, which is of very wide application, is said to be based on principles of public policy, and upon the idea that a person is not likely to be in a position to act as a public officer unless he really were such. There is no such presumption concerning private offices (see *post*, p. 75), in which the course of business is merely a relevant fact from which a conclusion *may* be drawn.

Among the other public officials to whom this rule has been applied may be mentioned—solicitors, commissioners for oaths, County Court Judges, Masters in Chancery, Post Office officials, Churchwardens, vestry clerks, and Lords of the Treasury.

PRESUMPTION OF LAWFUL ORIGIN.

JOHNSON v. BARNES

(1873).

L. R. 8 C. P. 527 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 259 ; 29 L. T. 65.

There is a presumption that rights exercised without interruption for a long time had a lawful origin.

Thus, where the Corporation of a Borough had from time immemorial exercised exclusively a right of pasturage over certain lands, it was presumed that the Corporation was legally entitled to an exclusive right of pasturage over such lands, and not a mere right of common which could not, under the circumstances, have been legal, and this notwithstanding that the right had been described as a right of common in a long series of documents.

KELLY, C.B. "I think we are bound to presume a legal origin, if such be possible, in favour of a right which appears, from the facts stated in the case, to have existed for many hundreds of years, and that the inaccurate description of such a right in a series of conveyances cannot interfere with the presumption which we should otherwise be entitled to make from the facts with relation to the enjoyment of the right. When we look to these facts, we find that the Corporation of Colchester has in fact exercised a right of pasturing an unlimited number of cattle or sheep on certain lands around the walls of the town during a certain season of the year, except as to any part of the land under cultivation. . . . It seems to me manifest that what the Corporation have exercised from time immemorial is a right which, though frequently spoken of as a right of common, was, in fact, an exclusive right of pasturage."

"Then we come to what has been made one of the most important questions in the case, that is to say, supposing that the right actually exercised has always been in fact a right of exclusive pasturage, and has always been treated and dealt with as such, is the presumption which would naturally arise from the facts destroyed by the effect of a long and numerous series of documents in which the right is spoken of in expressions indicating a right in the nature of a right of common? I do not think we should be justified in giving this effect to the documents, if the result would be to set aside a right which has been so long exercised in fact. . . . It appears to me, therefore, on consideration of the whole of the facts and documents in this case, that we are bound, in accordance with one of the best established principles of law, to presume a legal origin, if one were possible, in favour of a long and interrupted actual enjoyment of a right."

Note.—The most noticeable application of this presumption of legal origin occurs in the case of common law prescription. Strictly, a prescriptive right should have existed from "time immemorial," but, when

it was shown to have been actually exercised for a considerable number of years, according to circumstances, it was presumed to have existed from time immemorial, and thus to have had a legal origin, or to have been created by a "lost grant" since time immemorial. Without such presumption it would have been practically impossible to prove prescriptive rights. The Prescription Act, 1832, now simplifies the matter by laying down definite periods (*e.g.*, twenty years for easements, and thirty years for rights of common, etc.), for the acquirement of prescriptive rights in most cases.

SURVIVORSHIP.

WING v. ANGRAVE (1860).

30 L. J. CH. 65; 8 H. L. C. 183.

There is no presumption arising from age or sex, etc., as to survivorship among persons dying from the same cause, nor is there any presumption that they all died at the same time. The question is one of fact, and if the evidence does not establish the survival of any individual, the law will treat it as a matter incapable of determination.

A husband, wife and two children were swept off the deck of a ship by one wave, and there was no evidence that any one of them was seen later than the others. Although the husband was a strong man and a good swimmer, and the wife weak and delicate and no swimmer, the Court would not presume that the husband survived the wife.

LORD CAMPBELL, L.C. "According to our law (unlike the *Code Napoleon*, which has been relied on), where two individuals perish from the same calamity, there is no inference of law as to age or sex which was the survivor. There must be evidence of the fact, and the *onus probandi* lies on the party who asserts the affirmative. . . . There is no foundation for the supposed doctrine that, where the evidence left it doubtful which of two individuals died first, there is a presumption of law that they died at the same time."

LORD CHELMSFORD. "There is no rule of presumption in our

law which would govern this case, and the evidence left the matter in mere conjecture."

Note.—Mr. Best, in his *Law of Evidence*, p. 394, says that this subject is "one which has embarrassed more or less the jurists and lawyers of every country. . . . The civil law and its commentators were considerably occupied with questions of this nature, and seem to have established as a general principle (subject, however, to exceptions) that, where the parties thus perishing together were parent and child, the latter, if under the age of puberty, was presumed to have died first; but if above that age, the rule was reversed; while in the case of husband and wife, the presumption seems to have been in favour of the survivorship of the husband. The French lawyers also, both ancient and modern, have taken much pains on this subject. All the theories that have been formed respecting it are based on the assumption that the party deemed to have survived was likely from superior strength, to have struggled longer against death than his companion. . . . The English law has judged more wisely; for notwithstanding some questionable *dicta*, the true conclusion from the authorities seems to be, that it recognises no *artificial* presumption in cases of this nature, but leaves the real or supposed superior strength of one of the persons perishing by a common calamity to its natural weight, *i.e.*, as a *circumstance* proper to be taken into consideration by a judicial tribunal, but which standing alone is insufficient to shift the burden of proof."

The curious case of *Broughton v. Randall*, Cro. Eliz., 503 (1596), illustrates this matter. A father and son "were both hanged in one cart: but because the son (as was deposed by witnesses) survived, as appeared by some tokens, viz. his shaking his legs," it was held that he was the survivor.

CONFLICTING PRESUMPTIONS.

R. v. WILLSHIRE

(1881).

L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 366; 50 L. J. M. C. 57; 44 L. T. 222;
29 W. R. 473; 45 J. P. 375; 14 Cox, C. C. 541.

Where there are conflicting presumptions, they are to be dealt with in the same way as conflicting evidence, *i.e.*, they must be left to the jury.

In a prosecution for bigamy, it appeared that the prisoner had gone through four marriage ceremonies, with A, B, C and D, in 1864, 1868, 1879 and 1880 respectively. Having been convicted in

1868 of marrying B in the lifetime of A, he was now prosecuted for marrying D in the lifetime of C. In defence, the prisoner gave evidence of the previous conviction, thus proving that A, his real, or first, wife, was alive in 1868. The presumption then arose that her life continued to 1879, when the prisoner married C, and that therefore the marriage with C was void, and he had not committed bigamy by marrying D in the lifetime of C. On the other hand, there was a presumption of innocence as to the marriage with C, consequently a conflicting presumption of the real or first wife's death. It was held to be a question of fact for the jury whether she was alive or not.

LORD COLERIDGE, C.J. "This conflict of presumptions was sufficient to raise a question of fact for the jury to determine. It was for the jury to decide whether the man told or acted a falsehood for the purpose of marrying in 1879, or whether his real wife was then dead. The learned Common Serjeant did not leave the question to the jury, but, on these conflicting presumptions, held that the burthen of proof was on the prisoner, who, besides showing the existence of the life in 1868, was bound to prove that it continued till 1879. There is no such rule of law. The prisoner was not bound to do more than set up the life in 1868, which would be presumed to continue, and it was then for the prosecution to show by evidence that that presumption was rebutted."

Note.—As to the two presumptions which arose and were in conflict in this case, viz., that of continuance, and that of innocence, see *ante*, pp. 20, 22.

ADMISSIONS.

Any matters which have been admitted for the purpose of the trial need not be proved. Admissions thus expressly made in the proceedings prior to trial are sometimes called "formal" admissions, to distinguish them from those informal or casual statements made by a party against his interest, which may, at the trial, be proved by witnesses. Such "informal"

admissions, as they may be called, are dealt with hereafter, as exceptions from the "hearsay" rule (see *post*, p. 133).

Formal or Express admissions may be made—

(a) On the Pleadings. Facts alleged in an opponent's pleading, if not denied, are generally taken to be admitted.

(b) On a Notice to Admit facts or documents, served by one party on another.

(c) In Answers to Interrogatories administered by one party to another.

(d) By Solicitor or Counsel, in the exercise of his discretion, either before or at the trial.

Details of such admissions should be sought in books of Procedure.

It should, however, be noted here that express admissions are only allowed in civil cases. They are never used in criminal cases, unless a plea of "guilty" can be treated as such. It is otherwise as to informal admissions (see *post*, p. 138).

The case following illustrates head (d).

SWINFEN v. LORD CHELMSFORD (1860).

29 L. J. Ex. 382; 2 L. T. 406; 8 W. R. 545; 6
JUR. (N. S.) 1035; 5 H. & N. 890.

A barrister may make any admission on behalf of his client which, in the honest exercise of his judgment, he thinks proper; but he has no authority on matters collateral to the suit.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

POLLOCK, C.B. "The conduct and control of the cause are left necessarily to counsel. If a party desires to retain the power of

directing counsel how the suit shall be conducted. he must agree with some counsel willing to bind himself. . . . Although counsel has complete authority over the suit, the mode of conducting it, and all that is incident to it, such as withdrawing the record, withdrawing a juror, or calling a witness, or selecting such as in his discretion he thinks ought to be called, and other matters which properly belong to the suit, and the management and conduct of the trial, he has not, by virtue of his retainer in the suit, any power over matters that are collateral to it."

Note.—The same rule would apply to a solicitor acting as an advocate. It is provided by Order 32 of the Rules of the Supreme Court:—

(1) Any party to a cause or matter may give notice, by his pleading, or otherwise in writing, that he admits the truth of the whole or any part of the case of any other party.

(2) Either party may call upon the other party to admit any *document*, saving all just exceptions; and in case of refusal or neglect to admit, after such notice, the costs of proving any such document shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the cause or matter may be, unless at the trial or hearing the Court or a judge shall certify that the refusal to admit was reasonable.

(4) Any party may, by notice in writing . . . call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of the cause, matter or issue only, any specific *fact* or facts mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same . . . the costs of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the cause, matter or issue may be, unless at the trial or hearing the Court or a judge certify that the refusal to admit was reasonable, or unless the Court or a judge shall at any time otherwise order or direct. Provided that any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular cause, matter or issue, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other occasion or in favour of any person other than the party giving the notice.

MATTERS OF WHICH PROOF IS NOT ALLOWED.

ESTOPPEL.

The law in some cases estops or prevents a person from alleging certain facts, which consequently cannot be proved by him.

An estoppel, says Blackstone, "happens where a man hath done some act or executed some deed which estops or precludes him from averring anything to the contrary" (*Commentaries*, III., 308). Coke's explanation of it is that it is so called "because a man's owne act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to alleage or plead the truth" (*Coke on Littleton*, 352 a); for which reason it is said to be "odious" and to be construed strictly; but the better view appears to be that the reason is "to provide certain means by which a man may be concluded, not from saying the truth, but from saying that that which, by the intervention of himself or his, has once become accredited for truth, is false" (*Smith's Leading Cases*, II., 726). Sometimes an estoppel is spoken of as a "conclusive admission"; one which cannot be controverted.

Estoppels are generally divided into three kinds: (1) by record; (2) by deed; (3) by conduct (or *in pais*). The following cases illustrate each kind.

THE DUCHESS OF KINGSTON'S CASE (1776).

20 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS, 355, 537.

A person who was a party to legal proceedings in which judgment was given, or who claims under a person who was a party thereto, is estopped from denying the facts upon which such judgment was based, if such judgment be pleaded as an estoppel.

But a judgment does not thus estop persons who were neither parties nor privies thereto.

Nor are the parties or their privies estopped from denying matters which merely came collaterally into question in such legal proceedings, or which were only incidentally cognisable, or which might be inferred by argument from the judgment.

Any person against whom a judgment is offered in evidence may prove that it was obtained by fraud or collusion to which he was no party.

The Duchess of Kingston was indicted and tried in the House of Lords for bigamy, in marrying the Duke of Kingston in March, 1769, during the lifetime of her husband the Earl of Bristol. The Duchess pleaded that, in a suit for jactitation of marriage instituted by her against the Earl of Bristol, in the Ecclesiastical Court, namely, in the Consistory Court of the Bishop of London, it had been decreed and declared in February, 1769, that she was a spinster, and that the Earl of Bristol had wickedly and maliciously boasted and publicly asserted (though falsely) that they were joined and contracted together in matrimony; and he was admonished to desist from such boasting and asserting of such alleged marriage.

It was objected that such decree of the Ecclesiastical Court was not binding on the Crown, and did not estop the prosecution from proving that in fact there was a lawful marriage as alleged, at the date of such decree, on the grounds: (1) that the Crown was not a party to the proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Courts, and (2) that the decree was obtained by fraud or collusion of the parties to such proceedings.

It was ordered by the Lords that the following questions be put to the Judges, viz. :

1. Whether a sentence of the Spiritual Court against a marriage in a suit for jactitation of marriage is conclusive evidence so as to stop the counsel for the Crown from proving the said marriage in an indictment for polygamy ?

2. Whether, admitting such sentence to be conclusive upon such indictment, the counsel for the Crown may be admitted to avoid the effect of such sentence, by proving the same to have been obtained by fraud or collusion ?

SIR WILLIAM DE GREY, C.J. “As a general principle, a transaction between two parties, in judicial proceedings, ought not to be binding upon a third ; for it would be unjust to bind any person who could not be admitted to make a defence, or to examine witnesses, or to appeal from a judgment he might think erroneous ; and therefore the depositions of witnesses in another cause in proof of a fact, the verdict of a jury finding the fact, and the judgment of the Court upon the facts found, although evidence against the parties, and all claiming under them, are not, in general, to be used to the prejudice of strangers.”

“From the variety of cases relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suits, these two deductions seem to follow as generally true : first, that the judgment of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon this point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question in another Court ; secondly, that the judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in question in another Court for a different purpose. But neither the judgment of a concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came collaterally in question, though within their jurisdiction, nor of any matter incidentally cognisable, nor of any matter to be inferred by argument from the judgment.”

“Upon the subject of marriage, the Spiritual Court has the sole and exclusive cognisance of questioning and deciding, directly, the legality of marriage ; and of enforcing, specially, the rights and obligations respecting persons depending upon it ; but the

Temporal Courts have the sole cognisance of examining and deciding upon all temporal rights of property ; and, so far as such rights are concerned, they have the inherent power of deciding incidentally, either upon the fact, or the legality of marriage, where they lie in the way to the decision of the proper objects of their jurisdiction. . . . So that the trial of marriage, either as to legality or fact, was not absolutely and from its nature, an object *alieni fori*."

"A sentence of nullity and a sentence in affirmation of a marriage have been received as conclusive evidence on a question of legitimacy arising incidentally upon a claim to a real estate. A sentence in a case of jactitation has been received upon a title in ejectment as evidence against a marriage, and, in like manner in personal actions, immediately founded on a supposed marriage. . . . But in all these cases the parties to the suits, or at least the parties against whom the evidence was received, were parties to the sentence and had acquiesced under it, or claimed under those who were parties and had acquiesced."

"But although the law stands thus with regard to civil suits, proceedings in matters of crime, and especially of felony, fall under a different consideration, first, because the parties are not the same ; for the King, in whom the trust of prosecuting public offences is vested, and which is executed by his immediate orders, or in his name by some prosecutor, is no party to such proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Court, and cannot be admitted to defend, examine witnesses, in any manner intervene, or appeal ; secondly, such doctrines would tend to give the Spiritual Courts, which are not permitted to exercise any judicial cognisance in matters of crime, an immediate influence in trials for offences, and to draw the decision from the course of the common law, to which it solely and peculiarly belongs."

"But if a direct sentence upon the identical question in a matrimonial cause should be admitted as evidence, . . . yet a cause of jactitation is of a different nature ; it is ranked as a cause of defamation only. . . . The sentence has only a negative and qualified effect, viz., 'that the party has failed in his proof, and that the libellant is free from all matrimonial contract, as far as yet appears' ; . . . so that, admitting the sentence in its full extent and

import, it only proves that it did not yet appear that they were married, and not that they were not married at all."

"But if it was a direct and decisive sentence upon the point, and, as it stands, to be admitted as conclusive evidence upon the Court, and not to be impeached from within; yet, like all other acts of the highest judicial authority, it is impeachable from without; although it is not permitted to show that the Court was mistaken, it may be shown that they were misled."

"Fraud is an extrinsic, collateral act; which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of Courts of justice. Lord Coke says, it avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal."

"We are therefore unanimously of opinion:—

"First, that a sentence in the Spiritual Court against a marriage in a suit of jactitation of marriage is not conclusive evidence so as to stop the counsel for the Crown from proving the marriage in an indictment for polygamy.

"Secondly, admitting such sentence to be conclusive upon such indictment, the counsel for the Crown may be admitted to avoid the effect of such sentence by proving the same to have been obtained by fraud or collusion."

Note.—Judgments are said to be of two kinds—in *Rem* and *in Personam*. The former term seems never to have been clearly defined, but it is commonly understood to apply to all judgments affecting the legal *status* of some subject-matter, person or thing; *e.g.* Admiralty judgments in cases of forfeiture or prize, Divorce Court decrees, grants of Probate and Administration, and adjudications in Bankruptcy. Such judgments are conclusive against all persons, whether parties or strangers. Judgments *in Personam* are all ordinary judgments between persons not so affecting status. Such judgments bind only parties and privies as to the facts in issue. But all judgments are conclusive against all persons of their legal effect, as distinguished from the facts upon which they are based.

"Privies" are divided by Coke (*Co. Lit.* 271a) and other writers into three classes:—(1) *In estate* (or interest), as donor and donee, lessor and lessee, or vendor and purchaser; (2) *In blood*, as ancestor and heir, or coparceners; (3) *In law* (or representation), as testator and executor, intestate and administrator, tenant and lord claiming by escheat, or successive incumbents. The same rule applies to these privies as to original parties, viz. that a party claiming through another is estopped in the same manner as the original party.

7 May 32

VOOGHT v. WINCH
(1819).

may 9 32

2 B. & ALD. 662; 21 R. R. 446.

A former judgment between the same parties on the same subject-matter will operate as an estoppel and be conclusive only when it is so pleaded, or there is no opportunity of so pleading it. Otherwise it is only a relevant fact from which the Court may draw a conclusion in favour of the person who tenders it as evidence.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

ABBOTT, C.J. "I am of opinion that the verdict and judgment obtained for the defendant in the former action was not conclusive evidence against the plaintiff upon the plea of not guilty. It would indeed have been conclusive if pleaded in bar to the action by way of estoppel. In that case the plaintiff would not be allowed to discuss the case with the defendant, and for the second time to disturb and vex him by the agitation of the same question. But the defendant has pleaded not guilty, and has thereby elected to submit his case to a jury. Now if the former verdict was proper to be received in evidence by the learned Judge, its effect must be left to the jury. If it were conclusive indeed, the learned Judge ought immediately to have nonsuited the plaintiff, or to have told the jury that they were bound, in point of law, to find a verdict for the defendant. It appears to me, however, that the party, by not pleading the former judgment in bar, consents that the whole matter shall go to a jury, and leaves it open to them to inquire into the same upon evidence, and they are to give their verdict upon the whole evidence then submitted to them. I am aware that in *Bird v. Randall* (3 Burr. 1353), Lord MANSFIELD is reported to have said that a former recovery need not be pleaded but will be a bar when given in evidence. I cannot, however, accede to that; for the very first thing I learnt in the study of the law was that a

judgment recovered must be pleaded : that has so strongly engrafted itself on my mind as a general principle, that nothing I have heard in argument this day, has shaken it."

BAYLEY, J. "An action is here brought, as it is alleged, for the same cause in respect of which a former action had been brought, and in which a verdict was obtained by the defendant. Now a defendant ought not, in point of law, to be twice vexed for the same cause of action; and he would have had a right, if he had thought fit, to have pleaded the former verdict by way of estoppel, and thereby have shown that the plaintiff was not at liberty to try that question a second time, which had been tried before and decided against him. Instead, however, of putting himself on that estoppel, he merely says, that he is not guilty of the offence imputed to him; and, upon that issue, the jury are to try, not whether the plaintiff is estopped from trying the question, but whether the defendant be guilty or not. Upon that issue, the defendant may prove, that the act imputed was not done by him, and that another jury were of opinion that he was not guilty; and, for that purpose, he may give in evidence the judgment in the former cause for the consideration of the second jury. The question, however, for the second jury (when the defendant has chosen to plead the general issue) is, whether the defendant be guilty or not? and the question raised upon that issue, in an action on the case is, whether the plaintiff had or had not any cause of action at the time of the commencement of the suit? Now the judgment for the defendant in a former action for the same cause, does not necessarily prove that the plaintiff has no cause of action. It decides nothing unless by way of estoppel. In *Outram v. Morewood* (3 East, 346), where this subject was very fully considered, Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C.J., in giving the judgment of the Court, takes this distinction, and states expressly that a former judgment, if properly pleaded by way of estoppel, would be conclusive, but if only offered in evidence it would not be so. For these reasons, I am of opinion, that, upon this issue, the judgment in the former verdict was evidence only to go to the jury."

HOLROYD, J. "There were two modes, by either of which the defendant might defend himself. There having been a former action, in which he had succeeded, he might have alleged that he was

not to be called upon to defend himself again for the same cause. If he chooses to adopt that mode of defence, he must plead it in bar ; and say that the other party is not at liberty to call upon him to answer again that which he had before called upon him to do, when a verdict was given in his favour. If, however, he declines that mode of defence, and submits to answer for the cause of action alleged, and defends himself by saying that the plaintiff has no ground of action ; he then leaves the question to the jury, and they are to try, not whether there was a former action for the same cause, but whether the plaintiff has such a ground of action as he alleges in his present declaration. A party may have matter which he may either give in evidence, or which, if pleaded, would be an estoppel ; but when he puts it to the jury to find what the fact was, it is inconsistent with the issue which he has joined, for him to say that the jury are estopped from going into the enquiry. He may, however, use the former verdict as evidence, and pregnant evidence, to guide the jury who are to try the second case, to a conclusion in his favour. But if, notwithstanding the prior verdict and judgment, the jury think the case is with the plaintiff, they are not estopped from finding the verdict accordingly. . . . In *Trevivan v. Lawrence* (Salk. 276), it was held, that if a party will not rely on the estoppel when he may, but takes issue on the fact, the jury shall not be bound by the estoppel, for they are to find the truth of the fact which is against him ; and in *Buller's Nisi Prius*, it is laid down, that the jury cannot find anything against that which the parties have affirmed and admitted of record, though the truth is contrary ; but in other cases, though the parties be estopped to say the truth, the jury are not ; as in *Goddard's case* (4 Coke, 44), where the bond was dated nine months after the execution, and after the death of the obligor. I think, therefore, that upon principle as well as upon authority, the former judgment was not conclusive against the plaintiff upon this issue, and that the learned Judge, therefore, did right in receiving the evidence, and suffering the trial to proceed."

Note.—Apparently, estoppels either by record or by deed must be specially pleaded. There seems to be some doubt as to the necessity of pleading estoppels by conduct. For instance, *Taylor* (I. 92) says there is no need to plead them ; but *Odgers' (Pleading, 222)* says they must always be pleaded.

BOWMAN v. TAYLOR

(1834).

4 L. J. K. B. 58 ; 2 Ad. & E. 278 ; 4 N. & M. 264 ;
41 R. R. 437.

A person who is party to a deed is estopped from denying its contents. So also are his privies.

The estoppel extends to statements made even in recitals.

A deed, by which the plaintiff granted to the defendant a licence to use certain looms, recited that the plaintiff had invented certain improvements, etc., in power looms, and had obtained letters-patent and had caused a specification to be enrolled. It was held that the defendant was estopped from pleading that the plaintiff was not the inventor, that it was not a new invention, and that no specification had been enrolled.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. "An estoppel operates because it concludeth a man to allege the truth by reason of the assertion of the party that that fact is true. **The doctrine, as laid down by Coke, that a recital doth not conclude, because it is no direct affirmation, is not supported by any authority.** If a party has by his deed directly asserted a specific fact, it is impossible to say that he shall not be precluded from disputing that fact, thus solemnly admitted by him on the face of his deed."

PATTESON, J. "The only authority which seems to press upon us is the authority of Lord Coke, but **there have been many cases in which a party has been estopped from disputing a recital.** But it is said that it will be found in these cases that the recitals are so bound up in and part of the deed as that they are the same as the deed itself. Try the present case by that test. **This recital is manifestly so clearly connected with the operative part of the deed as to be essentially part of the deed itself.** . . . The current of authorities is clearly in favour of the position, that the defendant in this case is estopped by the recital in the deed."

Note.—Recitals are the introductory or explanatory statements in a deed, inserted before the operative part of the deed, and are intended to

explain the transaction and make its effect clear. The operative part then proceeds to declare the operation and effect of the present deed and to bind the parties. The present rule, that all statements in a deed estop the parties is doubtless based on the idea that they should be careful with regard to all the statements in a deed, even those which are merely introductory.

It may be, however, that the statement in question is in reality the statement of one party only. In such case it estops such party only (*Stroughill v. Buck*, 14 Q. B. 787).

FREEMAN v. COOKE (1848).

18 L. J. Ex. 114; 12 JUR. 777; 2 Ex. 654; 6 D. & L. 187; 76 R. R. 711.

A person who, by his words or conduct, "wilfully" causes another person to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his position, is estopped from setting up against the latter person a different state of things as existing at the time in question.

This is so whatever such person's real intention was, if he so conducted himself that a reasonable man would take the representation to be true and believe that it was meant he should act upon it. Conduct by negligence or omission, where there is a duty cast upon a person by usage of trade or otherwise to disclose the truth, may often have the same effect.

But there is no estoppel unless either the words or conduct were intended to induce the other person so to act, or were such that a reasonable man would act upon them; although he did as a fact act upon them to his prejudice.

The defendant was sheriff of Yorkshire, and his officer had seized certain goods under a writ of execution against Joseph and Benjamin Broadbent. Evidence was given that the goods belonged to William Broadbent, but that he, expecting an execution against himself,

removed them to the house of his father, Joseph Broadbent; then again, anticipating a distress for rent on his father Joseph, he removed them to the house of his brother, Benjamin Broadbent. When the sheriff's officer entered the house of Benjamin, William gave him notice not to seize the goods as they were the property of Benjamin. The officer then produced his writ, which was against Benjamin. Then William said the goods belonged to another brother, and finally that they belonged to himself. The officer seized and sold the goods as the goods of Benjamin. William having become bankrupt, an action was brought by his assignees to recover the goods in question, and it was contended by the defendant that the statements of William operated as conclusive evidence, or an estoppel, that the property was not his. It was held that it was not so.

PARKE, B. "The only question is whether it be an estoppel. It is contended that it was, upon the authority of the rule laid down in *Pickard v. Sears* (6 A. & E. 469). That rule is, that 'where one by his words or conduct *wilfully* causes another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, or to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the time.' . . . By the term '*wilfully*,' however, in that rule, we must understand, if not that the party represents that to be true which he knows to be untrue, at least that he means his representation to be acted upon, and that it is acted upon accordingly; and if, whatever a man's real meaning may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would take the representation to be true, and believe that it was meant he should act upon it, and did act upon it as true, the party making the representation would be equally precluded from contesting its truth; and conduct by negligence or omission, when there is a duty cast upon a person by usage of trade or otherwise to disclose the truth, may often have the same effect—as, for instance, a retiring partner omitting to inform the customers of the firm, in the usual mode, that the continuing partners were no longer authorised to act as his agents, is bound by all contracts made by them with third persons on the faith of their being authorised."

"It is not found that the bankrupt intended to induce the

officers to seize the goods as those of Benjamin, and whatever intention he had on his first statement was done away with by an opposite statement before the seizure took place; nor can it be said that any reasonable man would have seized the goods on the faith of the bankrupt's representations taken all together. In truth, in most cases to which the doctrine in *Pickard v. Sears* is to be applied, the representation is such as to amount to the contract or licence of the party making it. Hence there is no pretence for saying it amounted to a licence, and a contract is out of the question."

Note.—It will be observed that, in the above case, William Broadbent made three inconsistent statements, therefore the sheriff's officer could not say that he reasonably acted on either of such statements. If the only statement made had been the first one, that the goods belonged to Benjamin, and the officer then seized them as Benjamin's goods, doubtless there would have been an estoppel.

The doctrine of estoppel by conduct may be applied generally to all cases in which a person seeks to give evidence in direct conflict with any of his previous deliberate acts or statements, by which he has naturally misled another person.

A person may by his conduct be estopped even from pleading an Act of Parliament or statutory defence. Thus, an employer was estopped from pleading that a workman had not taken proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act within the statutory period of six months, where he had led him to believe the claim was admitted (*Wright v. Bagnall*, [1900] 2 Q. B. 240; and a defendant might be estopped from pleading that money was paid in respect of a gaming debt, where he had led the plaintiff to believe it was not so (*Tatam v. Reeve*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 44).

"The truth is, that the Courts have been, for some time, favourable to the utility of the doctrine of estoppel, hostile to its technicality. Perceiving how essential it is to the quick and easy transaction of business, that one man should be able to put faith in the conduct and representations of his fellow, they have inclined to hold such conduct and such representations binding in cases where a mischief or injustice would be caused by treating their effect as revocable. At the same time, they have been unwilling to allow men to be entrapped by formal statements and admissions, which were perhaps looked upon as unimportant when made, and by which no one ever was deceived or induced to alter his position. Such estoppels are still, as formerly, considered *odius*" (*Smith's Leading Cases*, II., 865).

COOKE v. LOXLEY

(1792).

5 T. R. 4; 2 R. R. 521.

A tenant of land is estopped from disputing the title of the landlord by whom he was let into possession, or whom he has acknowledged by payment of rent.

In an action for use and occupation of land let to the defendant by the predecessor in title of the present plaintiff, to whom the defendant had also paid rent, the defendant offered evidence to the effect that the plaintiff had no title to the land. Lord Kenyon rejected the evidence, and, on an application for a new trial, his decision was upheld.

LORD KENYON, C.J. "Conforming to the uniform decisions in all the cases upon this subject, I ruled at the trial, and continue to entertain the same opinion, that in an action for use and occupation it ought not to be permitted to a tenant, who occupies land by the licence of another, to call upon that other to show the title under which he let the land. This is not a mere technical rule, but is founded in public convenience and policy. And the only question here is whether that rule shall still prevail; if it do, it applies equally strong to the present case as to all others. Here the defendant, who occupied the land, did so by the permission of the plaintiff, and then refused to pay his rent under an idea that he might contest the plaintiff's right; but the plaintiff could not be supposed to come to trial prepared to meet such a defence and to make out his title; such an action as the present does not involve the question of title."

GROSE, J. "It has been said that the rule of not giving in evidence *nil habuit in tenementis* in an action for use and occupation is a technical rule; but, in my opinion, **no rule is better founded in justice and policy than this.** The general rule is admitted that in such an action as this **the tenant cannot dispute the landlord's title;** and no exception to it has been shown applicable to this case."

Note.—This estoppel of a tenant is one of the most noticeable instances of estoppel by conduct. Similar cases of estoppel are those of bailees, licensees and agents, who cannot deny the title of the bailors, licensors or principals, after having acknowledged them by their dealings.

But the tenant is not estopped from showing that the title of his landlord has expired since the tenancy commenced, or that the land in question is not comprised in the lease. There is no inconsistency in holding the land and at the same time proving such matters.

STATEMENTS “WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”

The second class of matters of which proof is not allowed consists of statements or admissions made “without prejudice.” Such statements are invariably made in the course of negotiations for settlement of disputes. It is considered necessary to allow the parties to speak somewhat freely in attempting settlements, and to disclose their cases to each other to some extent. But it is clear that the necessary freedom of discussion could not well take place if all the statements or admissions made could be given in evidence after the negotiations for settlement had failed. It is usual, and certainly advisable, expressly to state that the communications in question are made without prejudice; but it seems clear that the rule of exclusion would apply if it appeared from the circumstances that it was intended that the communications should not be used as evidence (see *Cory v. Bretton*, 4 C. & P. 462).

This matter is sometimes dealt with under the head of “Privilege” (see *post*, p. 234). But this seems scarcely correct. Privilege arises when a witness objects to disclose facts or documents; it is an advantage to the witness. In the case of statements made without prejudice, the law prohibits him from disclosing facts which he may wish to disclose.

PADDOCK v. FORRESTER

(1841).

3 SCOTT, N. R. 715; 3 M. & G. 903; 11 L. J. C. P.
107; 67 R. R. 634.

Communications, admissions or other statements, written or verbal, made by a party to an action, pending the dispute or action, and made expressly or impliedly "without prejudice," with the *bonâ fide* object of compromise or settlement, cannot be given in evidence against the person making them.

A letter written without prejudice protects from disclosure the whole of the correspondence of which it forms part.

A letter was written by one party "without prejudice." The reply thereto was not stated to have been so written. The latter was held inadmissible.

TINDAL, C.J. "It is of great consequence that parties should be unfettered by correspondence entered into upon the express understanding that it is to be without prejudice. And it would be hard indeed to hold that a letter which is stated to be written without prejudice is admissible in evidence because the same terms are not adopted in the reply. When used in the letter containing the offer, the words 'without prejudice' must cover the whole correspondence."

COLTMAN, J. "It is of the utmost importance that parties should have the opportunity of free communication without prejudice; and I should be sorry to hold anything that might be in the slightest degree calculated to embarrass or discourage the practice."

Note.—Such communications cannot, without the consent of both parties, be looked at even by the Judge for the purpose of dealing with questions of costs, on the ground of willingness to settle the action (*Walker v. Wilsher*, 23 Q. B. D. 337). But if they result in a settlement they are clearly admissible. So also are they for the purpose of proving independent admissions not concerning the matter in dispute (*Waldridge v. Kennison*, 1 Esp. 142). And a person cannot protect himself from liability for a communication, in itself involving legal liability, by expressly marking it "without prejudice." So, a threat made in such manner may be proved (*Kurtz v. Spence*, 57 L. J. Ch. 238). And, to explain delay or lapse of time, the fact that there was correspondence without prejudice, but not its contents, may be proved (*Walker v. Wilsher*, *supra*).

RELEVANCY.

The third class of facts which a party is not allowed to prove are those irrelevant to the issue. It would be idle to attempt to discuss what matters are irrelevant; attention should be addressed to the question—what matters are relevant?

Evidence may be given of two sets of facts only: (1) of facts in issue; (2) of facts relevant to the facts in issue. Evidence of (1) is generally known as “direct” evidence, that of (2) as “circumstantial” evidence.

The facts in issue are those which are alleged by one party and denied by the other on the pleadings, in a civil case; or alleged in the indictment and denied by the plea of “not guilty,” in a criminal case. There is, therefore, little difficulty in ascertaining what are the facts in issue.

The relevant facts are all other facts which are in the eye of the law so connected with or related to the facts in issue that they render the latter probable or improbable, or, roughly, throw light upon them. “Relevancy” may indeed be considered as synonymous with “connection,” a word which frequently appears in discussions on the subject. Of course both words must be taken in their legal meaning, which is generally restricted. Common sense, or logical, relevancy is, as a rule, wider than legal relevancy. A Judge might, in ordinary transactions, take one fact as evidence of another, and act upon it himself, when, in Court, he would rule that it was legally irrelevant.

It should also be observed that the Judge may exclude facts, although relevant, if they appear to him too remote to be really material to the issue.

The limits of legal relevancy cannot be strictly stated, as the connection between facts varies infinitely in different cases. The cases below given show some of the chief rules and illustrations which have been developed.

In connection with such cases, one general matter should be considered—

It is sometimes asked—when can evidence be given of what was said or done behind the back of or in the absence of a party? As a general rule such evidence is not admissible, the maxim usually applied being, “*Res inter alios actae alteri nocere non debent.*” But many instances of the admissibility of such evidence can be given.

It may be said generally, that acts done are more readily received than statements made under such circumstances.

Evidence of Acts done in the absence of a party may be given (*inter alia*) in the following cases.

(1) When such acts, although not expressly connected with the fact in issue, are necessary to prove or show its nature or quality, provided such acts directly lead up to or explain such fact. So, on a charge of receiving stolen goods, the larceny may be proved; and on a charge of larceny, the deposit of the goods in a certain place, or the fact that a mark was put upon them may be proved (see *post*, p. 54).

(2) When such Acts are expressly connected with the fact in issue, so as, in substance, to form the basis of such fact. So, if a contract were made with one person expressly on the same terms as a contract made with another person, such latter contract might be proved (see *post*, p. 87).

(3) When such acts are legally relevant to prove the actual fact in issue, as in the case of acts of possession to prove ownership (see *post*, p. 76), or cohabitation to prove marriage (see *post*, p. 81), or course of business to prove a business transaction (see *post*, p. 75).

(4) When such acts are admissible to corroborate, illustrate, or show the reason for, or ground of, evidence given, as in the case of experiments or examination of persons or things by experts in support of their opinions (see *post*, p. 106).

(5) When such acts tend to establish, or prove the nature of, any custom or usage (see *post*, p. 296).

Evidence of Statements made in the absence of a party may be given (*inter alia*) in the following cases.

(1) When such statements are actually part of the transaction in issue (see *post*, p. 55).

(2) When such statements were made by a fellow-conspirator or by a person engaged in some joint transaction (see *post*, p. 61).

(3) When such statements amount to complaints in cases of rape and similar offences (see *post*, p. 69).

(4) When such statements were made by deceased persons under such circumstances that they amount to admissible declarations in course of duty (see *post*, p. 154); against interest (see *post*, p. 158); as to pedigree (see *post*, p. 164); as to public or general rights (see *post*, p. 173); as to cause of death (see *post*, p. 181); or as to contents of wills (see *post*, p. 185).

(5) When such statements are made in public documents (see *post*, p. 193).

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

R. v. PALMER

(1856).

REPORT OF TRIAL OF WILLIAM PALMER; STEPHEN,
HIST. OF CR. LAW, III., 389.

Evidence is admissible not only of the facts in issue, but also of other facts which render the facts in issue probable or improbable by reason of their connection with or relation to them. Facts so connected with the facts in issue are said to be "relevant facts," and they constitute what is known as "circumstantial evidence."

Thus facts which supply a motive for an act, or constitute preparation for it, or show subsequent conduct apparently influenced by the act, are relevant to the question whether such act was done by the person concerning whom such motive, preparation or subsequent conduct is proved.

In this trial for murder, the pecuniary embarrassment of the prisoner, his buying poison and attempting to avoid an inquest and other such facts, were held to be relevant as circumstantial evidence.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J. (in his charge to the jury). "By the law and practice of some countries it is allowed, to raise a probability that the party accused has committed the offence which he has to answer, to show that he has committed other offences; with a view of showing that he is an immoral man, and not unlikely to commit other offences, whether of the same or of a different nature; but the law of England is different, and, presuming every man to be innocent until his guilt is established, it allows his guilt to be established only by evidence directly connected with the charge brought against him."

"But in a case of this kind you cannot expect that witnesses should be called to state that they saw the deadly poison administered by the prisoner, or mixed up by the prisoner openly before them. Circumstantial evidence as to that is all that can be reasonably expected; and if there are a series of circumstances leading to the conclusion of guilt, then, gentlemen, a verdict of guilty may satisfactorily be pronounced. With respect to the alleged motive, it is of great importance to see whether there was a motive for committing such a crime, or whether there was not, or whether there was an improbability of its having been committed so strong as not to be overpowered by positive evidence. But, gentlemen, if there be any motive which can be assigned, I am bound to tell you that the adequacy of that motive is of little importance. We know from the experience of criminal Courts that atrocious crimes of this sort have been committed from very slight motives; not merely from malice or revenge, but to gain a small pecuniary advantage, and to drive off for a time pressing difficulties."

“I shall best discharge my duty by beginning with that part of the case that was first opened by the Attorney-General, respecting the motive that the prisoner may have had for accomplishing the death of Cook. Now I think that that arises out of certain pecuniary transactions, the nature of which has been most minutely laid before you. It appears that the prisoner had borrowed large sums of money upon bills of exchange, which he drew, and which purported to be accepted by his mother, a lady, it seems, of considerable wealth. Those acceptances were forgeries. . . . It had been expected by Palmer that he would have been able to meet those bills by the proceeds of a policy of insurance, which had been effected upon the life of his brother Walter . . . ; but the Prince of Wales Insurance Office denied their liability upon that policy and refused to pay. Thence arose a most pressing embarrassment—payments were urgently required, and there was danger unless they were immediately paid that the law would be put in force, and that the system of forgeries which had been so long carried on would in all human probability be detected and brought to light.”

“Then, gentlemen, comes the more direct evidence that the prisoner at the bar, if you believe the witnesses, procured this very poison. . . . For what purpose was that obtained? . . . You have no account of that poison. What was the intention with which it was purchased, and what was the application of it, you are to infer?”

“Then, gentlemen, it is impossible that you should not pay attention to the conduct of the prisoner at the bar, and there are some instances of his conduct which you will say whether they belong to what might be expected from an innocent or a guilty man. He was eager to have the body fastened down in the coffin. Then, with regard to the betting-book, there is certainly evidence from which you may infer that he did get possession of the betting-book, that he abstracted it and concealed it. Then, gentlemen, you must not forget his conduct in trying to bribe the postboy to overturn the carriage in which the jar was being conveyed, to be analysed in London, and from which evidence might be obtained of his guilt. Again, you find him tampering with the postmaster, and procuring from the postmaster the opening of a letter from Dr. Taylor, who

had been examining the contents of the jar, to Mr. Gardiner, the attorney employed on the part of Mr. Stevens. And then, gentlemen, you have **tampering with the coroner**, and trying to induce him to procure a verdict from the coroner's jury which would amount to an acquittal."

Note.—Such facts as motive, preparation, subsequent conduct, opportunity, etc., referring to the circumstances and position of the party whose act is alleged, are the facts which are generally and specially referred to as "circumstantial" evidence. But this term is properly applicable to all evidence other than that of the facts in issue themselves. Evidence of such facts in issue is known as "direct" evidence. All evidence which is admissible merely as being relevant to the facts in issue is strictly "circumstantial" or "indirect."

"On a superficial view, direct and indirect or circumstantial, would appear to be *distinct* species of evidence; whereas, these words denote only the different modes in which those classes of evidentiary facts operate to produce conviction. Circumstantial evidence is of a nature identically the same with direct evidence; the distinction is that by DIRECT EVIDENCE is intended evidence which applies directly to the fact which forms the subject of inquiry, the *factum probandum*; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE is equally direct in its nature, but, as its name imports, it is direct evidence of a minor fact or facts incidental to or usually connected with some other fact as its accident, and from which such other fact is therefore inferred. . . . The *evidence* of these facts is *direct*; the facts themselves are *indirect* and *circumstantial*" (*Wills on Circumstantial Evidence*, p. 19).

The word "direct" is used in another sense. It is also opposed to "hearsay" in the law of evidence (see *post*, p. 126). The distinction between "direct" and "circumstantial" refers to the facts offered in evidence; that between "direct" and "hearsay" refers to the mode of proving such facts.

DOWLING v. DOWLING

(1860). .

10 IRISH C. L. R. 236.

Facts shewing the circumstances and position of the parties whose conduct is in question are generally relevant to such conduct.

Circumstantial evidence is admissible not only in the absence of direct evidence, but also in aid of direct evidence.

The question being whether A. lent money to B.; evidence of the poverty of A. about the time of the alleged loan was held admissible as tending to disprove it, in support of the defendant's direct evidence that it had not been lent.

PIGOT, C.B. "In my own experience, now of many years, it has been the constant practice of Judges to receive such evidence when offered, whether in a Court of law or a Court of equity, upon the question whether or not money was paid; especially where that question related to transactions of a remote period, to which it was difficult to apply other than circumstantial evidence. In such cases, proof that a party was in such circumstances that he *could not*, has been received as evidence that he *did not*, pay the money in question. . . . Evidence of this nature is plainly admissible; for the simple reason, that it constitutes, or forms part of, circumstantial evidence, from which the jury are entitled to form their judgment as to the fact of payment and as to the credibility of conflicting testimony."

"Here the evidence that was offered went back a distance of seven years; but the object of showing the plaintiff's circumstances, seven years before, was to prove the position in life out of which he then emerged, and to show, partly by his own statements, on his cross-examination, of his own intervening pursuits, and partly by the evidence of the defendant, that he had not acquired property in the interval; and that at the time when the loan was alleged to have been made he had not the means of making it."

"The circumstances of the parties, and the position in which they stood when the matter the subject of controversy occurred, are, for the most part, proper subjects of evidence to be submitted to a jury, and the recent changes in the law, by which parties are enabled to swear for themselves, have rendered evidence of 'surrounding circumstances' still more important than they were before. They often supply the only means of determining upon testimony at one side directly conflicting with the testimony at the other; and such was the testimony in the case now before us."

Note.—A good deal of discussion has taken place as to the relative weight and reliability of direct and circumstantial evidence. The theory seems to be that the former is superior, as the latter is only a substitute for it. It is said also that there are only two chances of error in the case

of direct evidence, namely (1) the mistake, and (2) the untruthfulness of witnesses; while there is a further danger in the case of circumstantial evidence, namely, (3) the fallacious inference of the tribunal. On the other hand, it is said that circumstantial evidence has the advantage of presenting less opportunities for conspiracy and perjury. Many small unimportant facts are more difficult of fabrication, and less likely to be thought of beforehand, than single important facts nearer to the issue.

"The best writers, ancient and modern," it has been said, "on the subject of evidence, have concurred in treating circumstantial as inferior in cogency and effect to direct evidence. . . . But, in truth, direct and circumstantial evidence ought not to be placed in contrast, since they are not mutually opposed; for evidence of a circumstantial and secondary nature can never be justifiably resorted to, except where evidence of a direct and therefore of a superior nature is unattainable. . . . Where the evidence is direct, and the testimony credible, belief is the immediate and necessary result; whereas, in cases of circumstantial evidence, processes of inference and deduction are essentially involved—frequently of a delicate and perplexing character—liable to numerous causes of fallacy" (*Wills on Circumstantial Evidence*, pp. 35—42).

THE TRANSACTION. "RES GESTÆ."

R. v. ELLIS

(1826).

6 B. & C. 145.

All facts which are parts of the same transaction are relevant to each other, so that, when one of such facts is in issue, the others are admissible.

Such facts as are thus parts of the transaction in issue are generally known as "res gestæ."

The prisoner being charged with stealing six shillings, marked money, from a till, evidence was allowed of the taking not only of that amount but also of other moneys taken at the same time.

BAYLEY, J. "I think that it was in the discretion of the Judge to confine the prosecutor to the proof of one felony, or to allow him to give evidence of other acts, which were all part of one entire transaction. Generally speaking, it is not competent to a prosecutor to prove a man guilty of one felony, by proving him guilty of another

unconnected felony; but where several felonies are connected together, and form part of one entire transaction, then the one is evidence to show the character of the other. Now all the evidence in this case tended to show that the prisoner was guilty of the felony charged in the indictment. It went to show the history of the till from the time when the marked money was put into it up to the time when it was found in the possession of the prisoner."

Note.—This rule as to "res gestæ" is one of the clearest illustrations of relevancy, the connection between the facts being that they are all parts of the same "transaction." Once establish that they are all parts of the same transaction, then each of such facts is relevant to the others, so that if any of them be in issue the others are admissible as relevant facts. The real, and very substantial, difficulty is to determine the limits of the transaction, and what facts are really part of it.

Stephen defines a "transaction" as "a group of facts so connected together as to be referred to by a single legal name, as a crime, a contract, a wrong or any other subject of inquiry which may be in issue" (*Dig. Ev.*, Art. 3). It may perhaps be roughly described as any physical act or series of connected physical acts, together with the words accompanying such act or acts (see next case).

THOMPSON v. TREVANION

(1693).

SKINNER, 402.

As a "transaction" consists both of the physical acts and the words accompanying such physical acts, whether spoken by the doer of the physical act or by other persons present, such words are admissible as part of the transaction.

Thus, in a civil action for assault on the plaintiff's wife,

HOLT, C.J., allowed "that what the wife said immediate upon the hurt received, and before that she had time to devise or contrive anything for her own advantage, might be given in evidence."

Note.—The difficulty is to determine whether the words in question do really accompany the physical acts, or whether they are subsequent to such acts and are therefore mere "narrative" and inadmissible (see the next two cases).

The true test of admissibility of the spoken words seems to be indicated by HOLT, C.J., in the above case—did the speaker have time to contrive anything for his own advantage, or to invent a false tale? If sufficient time elapsed to allow the invention of a false tale, obviously the evidence would be unreliable. In the following case such time would scarcely appear to have elapsed, and yet the statement was rejected.

The case of *R. v. Fowkes* (*Stephen*, p. 4) shews how the statement of a third party may be relevant as part of the transaction, if he be actually present at the time.

R. v. BEDINGFIELD

(1879).

14 Cox, C. C. 341.

A statement, in order to be admissible in evidence as part of the transaction or "*res gestæ*," must strictly accompany, or be made at the same time as, the physical acts.

On a trial for murder, it appeared that the deceased, with her throat cut, came suddenly out of a room, in which she left the prisoner, and that she said something immediately after coming out of the room, shortly before she died. It was held that her statement was not admissible in evidence, either as a dying declaration, as it did not appear that she was in fear of death, or as *res gestæ*, as it was made after the transaction was complete.

COCKBURN, C.J. "Anything uttered by the deceased at the time the act was being done would be admissible, as, for instance, if she had been heard to say something, as 'Don't, Harry!' But here it was something stated by her after it was all over, whatever it was, and after the act was completed."

"At the time she made the statement she had no time to consider and reflect that she was dying; there is no evidence to show that she knew it, and I cannot presume it. There is nothing to show that she was under the sense of impending death, so the statement is not admissible as a dying declaration."

Note.—This case has been the subject of much discussion and criticism, and it certainly does not appear consistent with the next case,

in which, apparently, a longer time elapsed between the act in question and the spoken words than in the present case. But the cases illustrate the difficulty in determining the limits of the transaction. Cases on such a subject are of little use. Each case must rest on its own facts.

For the rule under which dying declarations are admissible, see *post*, 181.

R. v. FOSTER

(1834).

6 C. & P. 325.

A statement may be part of the transaction, and admissible in evidence, although it followed the physical acts, and was indeed the last item of the transaction. It is a question, on the facts, whether it was made substantially at the same time.

The prisoner was charged with manslaughter by driving over deceased. A witness saw the vehicle drive by, but did not see the accident. He immediately afterwards went up to the deceased, who then made a statement as to the cause of the injury. Such statement was admitted in evidence.

GURNEY, B. "What he said at the instant, as to the cause of the accident is clearly admissible."

PARK, J. "I am of opinion that his evidence ought to be received. It is the best possible testimony that, under the circumstances, can be adduced to show what it was that had knocked the deceased down."

Note.—The very short judgments in this case do not elucidate the matter much. But the facts speak for themselves. The words admitted in evidence as part of the transaction were spoken after the act of driving over the deceased was completed, and after the lapse of at least many seconds. Nevertheless the words were held to be substantially part of the transaction.

RAWSON v. HAIGH

(1824).

2 BING. 99; 9 MOORE, 217; 1 C. & P. 77.

A transaction may be a continuous one, extending over a long period. In such case any words or statements accompanying such continuous transaction, at any time during its continuance, are admissible as part of it.

Thus, where the question was whether a man had absented himself from the realm "with the intent to hinder his creditors," and so brought himself within the Bankruptcy Act, letters written during his absence, indicating such an intention, were admissible in proof thereof.

BEST, C.J. "When these letters are coupled with the fact of his running away in a hurry, would not the jury be warranted in finding that he went to avoid his creditors? If so, there has been a clear act of bankruptcy. But it has been urged, that the second and third letters, having been written subsequently to the act of departing the realm, were not admissible in evidence. I am clear that they were admissible. The going abroad was of itself an equivocal act, and where an act is equivocal, we must get at the motive with which it was committed. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, this can only be got at by the declarations of the party himself. . . . The declarations, in order to be admissible, must be made, or the letters written, at the time of the act in question; but it is sufficient if they are written at any time during the continuance of the act; the departing the realm is a continuing act, and these letters were written during its continuance."

PARK, J. "I am satisfied that declarations made during departure and absence are admissible in evidence to show the motive of the departure. It is impossible to tie down to time the rule as to the declarations; we must judge from all the circumstances of the case; we need not go the length of saying, that a declaration made a month after the fact would of itself be admissible; but if, as in

the present case, there are connecting circumstances, it may even at that time, form part of the whole *res gestæ*. . . . The declarations, however, must be connected with the state of the party's mind at the time, and in the present instance I think the connection sufficiently clear for the admission of the letters."

Note.—So, if the question were, whether a person who had remained abroad for some years had acquired a domicile in the country of his residence, letters written by him during such residence, showing his intention to remain there permanently, or otherwise, would doubtless, be admissible as part of the transaction (see *Doucet v. Geoghegan*, 9 C. D. 455).

Other cases, such as *Rouch v. G. W. R.*, 1 Q. B. 51, and *Ridley v. Gyde*, 9 Bing. 349, have been cited sometimes for the proposition that the statements need not be strictly contemporaneous in order to be admissible; but they do not appear to shew this, as the transactions were continuous and the statements were made during their continuance, although sometime after the commencement of the continuous act.

AVESON v. KINNAIRD

(1805).

6 EAST, 188; 8 R. R. 455.

Statements made by a person respecting the state of his health and bodily feelings at a particular time are admissible as evidence of such state of health and feelings.

In an action upon a policy of insurance on the life of the plaintiff's wife, the question being whether the statement of the insured's good health, given at the time of effecting the policy, was false; the Court allowed evidence to be given by a friend to the effect that she had visited deceased at the time, and had been told by her that she was in a bad state of health.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "The question being, what was the state of her own health at a certain period, a witness has been received to relate that which has always been received from patients to explain, her own account of the cause of her being found in bed at an unseasonable hour with the appearance of being ill. She was questioned as to her bodily infirmity. She said it was of some

duration, several days. . . . What were the complaints, what the symptoms, what the conduct of the parties themselves at the time, are always received in evidence upon such inquiries, and must be resorted to from the very nature of the thing. The substance of the whole conversation was that the wife had been ill at least from the 9th of November, when she was examined by the surgeon and certified to be in good health, down to the day when the conversation took place, and those appearances were exhibited to the witness; and in that view I think the evidence unexceptionable. . . . The admission, then, of the evidence in this case is free from any imputation of breaking in upon the confidence subsisting between man and wife; the declaration was upon the subject of her own health at the time, which is a fact of which her own declaration is evidence; and that, too, made unawares before she could contrive any answer for her own advantage and that of her husband."

GROSE, J. "The question in the cause was concerning her state of health at the time of the insurance effected, and in order to ascertain that it became material to inquire what the state of her health was between the time of her first examination by the surgeon and the time when she was seen by the witness who conversed with her. The first question put the witness was, in what situation she found Mrs. Aveson when she called? The answer was, in bed. To that there could be no objection. The next question was, why was she in bed? Now who could possibly give so good an account of that as the party herself? It is not only good evidence, but the best evidence which the nature of the case afforded."

LAWRENCE, J. "As to the general ground of objection to the evidence as hearsay, it is in every day's experience in actions of assault that what a man has said of himself to his surgeon is evidence to show what he suffered by reason of the assault. The wife was found in bed at an unusual time; she complained of illness, and naturally answered her friend's inquiries by describing how long her health had been bad. . . . If what she said to Susannah Lees were not evidence against her husband, then what she said to the surgeon could not be evidence for him; yet the testimony of the surgeon was brought forward by the plaintiff in order to show that the woman was an insurable life at the time."

Note.—Although this decision has been generally considered correct, there seems to have been some difference of opinion as to the right ground of the admissibility of such evidence. It would appear to be but an instance of a statement accompanying a transaction or act, or being part of it, the act of living or being in a certain state of health, or, as the Judge put it, the act of being in bed at an unusual hour.

But "the statements must be confined to contemporaneous symptoms, and nothing in the nature of a narrative is admissible as to who caused them, or how they were caused" (*R. v. Gloster*, 16 Cox, 473). It is apparently immaterial whether the person who made the statement is dead or not.

R. v. BLAKE

(1844).

13 L. J. M. C. 131; 8 JUR. 667; 6 Q. B. 126;
66 R. R. 311.

Acts and statements by one of several conspirators or joint offenders, or other persons engaged in any transaction entailing mutual legal liability, if done or made in the course of the transaction are evidence against the others, as if done or made by them, so far (only) as they were in the execution or furtherance of their common purpose.

Thus, A. and B., servants in the Custom House, were charged with conspiring to pass goods without paying full duty. A. had made false entries in two books; in one book the entries were necessary in order to carry out the fraud, in the other book the entry was not thus necessary, but was for A.'s convenience only. The former were admissible against B., the latter were not.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. "Upon the first point, the evidence was clearly receivable; it was an entry made in the course of the transaction, which could not have been proved by any other means. With regard to the other piece of evidence . . . full effect might have been given to the conspiracy without it. . . . It is a mere statement of what this party was doing. . . . A mere statement made by one conspirator, or an act that he may choose to do, which

is not necessary to carry the conspiracy to its end, and is not evidence to affect another."

COLERIDGE, J. "Acts or declarations are not receivable unless they tend to the advancement of the common object. That assumes the object not to be then completed. If it has been accomplished, the act or statement is not receivable. This was a mere statement as to the share of the plunder."

WRIGHT v. DOE

(1838).

4 BING. N. C. 489 ; 6 SCOTT, 58 ; 5 C. & F. 670.

When the act or conduct of any person is in question, the contents of any documents, such as letters, upon which he has acted, or which qualify, illustrate or explain such act or conduct, are admissible as part of the transaction.

The question being as to the sanity of a deceased testator, Mr. Marsden, his conduct in indorsing, answering, and acting upon letters received by him from third persons would have been admissible ; and, such conduct having been proved, the contents of the letters would have been receivable as statements accompanying and explaining it.

But it was held that the mere fact that such letters were written to him was inadmissible as evidence of his sanity, although they were letters which would only be written to a person believed to be sane. Such fact would only shew the writer's opinion of his sanity, and such opinion, being thus given out of Court, would be mere "hearsay."

COLERIDGE, J. "I am now brought to the consideration of the third ground taken by the counsel for the defendant below ; that these letters are admissible, because they accompany and explain acts done by Mr. Marsden ; in other words, that there is evidence with respect to each of these letters that Mr. Marsden had done some act, which act would in itself be relevant to and admissible upon the point

in issue, his competency, and the act itself being admissible, whatever accompanies it and serves to explain his character, is relevant and admissible also. The principle here applied is admitted on all hands to be correct. . . . The only question therefore remaining is one of fact, whether there was any evidence of such act by Mr. Marsden in regard to all or any one of these letters. . . . What is the evidence of these facts? None direct; and every circumstance stated is equally consistent with the assumption of competency or incompetency. . . . The facts then being consistent with either view of the case, he must fail whose duty it is affirmatively to establish either, and who relies on this for proof."

WILLIAMS, J. "I think that all the three letters contained in the bill of exceptions are inadmissible. . . . If upon the back of all or any of these letters, there had been any indorsement in the handwriting of Mr. Marsden, or if any act had been done by him avowedly in consequence of the contents, or any part of them, such letters or letter must of necessity be submitted to the jury with a view to ascertain how far such indorsement contained any material or appropriate comment, or how far the act was consequent upon, or in accordance with, a fair and reasonable interpretation of the contents."

"It was contended that, apart from all agency of Mr. Marsden, or consciousness by him, a letter addressed to him by a person of intelligence and capacity was, in itself, proof of his status as to intellect; that, if it furnished evidence of treatment, as it has been called—how he was estimated, and what was the judgment of the writer—it was more than opinion; it was opinion with an overt act attached to it—opinion acted upon; and that to suppose that a man of undoubted understanding should address sensible observations upon any matter of business or pleasure to a known driveller and idiot, is a monstrous absurdity, and an outrage on experience and common sense. . . . I must observe, that with whatever industry and ingenuity the argument may be cloaked and disguised, it is at last resolvable into opinion and opinion only; and that if it be so, it is opinion presented in such a shape as makes it inadmissible for want of the sanction of an oath, under which evidence of opinion is always given."

"Moreover, it is to be observed that it is not the matter or the manner of the party writing or speaking, but that of the party addressed, which is material when the capacity of the latter is in question. Persons may have been found whose malignity or bad taste, or in whatever manner such a character should be described, might attribute to acknowledged infirmity the possession of qualities and attainments to which there was not the slightest pretension."

"The question then is, whether Mr. Marsden has in any manner identified himself with—if the expression be allowable—or in other words has by any act, speech or writing, manifested an acquaintance with and knowledge of the contents of all or any of these letters. If he has, such letter or letters must have been improperly rejected, otherwise not. . . . The foundation of my opinion is, that neither competency nor incompetency should be presumed, and that, therefore the burthen was cast upon the defendant below, who tendered this piece of evidence, to give affirmatively some proof that the mind of Mr. Marsden had been exercised upon it, to make it admissible in a case where the only question was the actual state of that mind ; and no such proof was given."

PATTESON, J. "If it be conceded, as I think it must, that the mere opinion of a deceased writer as to the competency of another person, not given upon oath, nor under circumstances which afford the parties to be affected by that opinion any means of inquiring into the reason on which it was adopted, or the facts on which it was founded, cannot be held admissible, I am quite at a loss to see how the circumstance of that opinion being contained in a letter addressed to the individual respecting whose competency the inquiry is instituted, can make any difference ; it shows, after all, nothing but the opinion of the writer, and the sort of treatment which he adopts toward the party ; but it does not in the least tend to enable a jury to judge whether that opinion was right, or that treatment proper ; it cannot have any weight, unless it be some which is derived from the authority of the writer ; and it ought not on that ground to influence, or even to be laid before a jury. The conduct of the individual whose competency is in dispute, under such treatment by others, is that alone which can enable a jury to judge as to the propriety of that treatment ; and it is that conduct which is in

truth the admissible evidence, and not the treatment, which is proper and necessary to be laid before the jury in order to enable them to understand and appreciate the conduct of the individual, and for that purpose only."

"Every act of the party's life is relevant to the issue; of course, therefore, anything which he can be shown to have done in regard to any written document, being evidence, it follows that such written document must itself be received; otherwise the true character of the act which he has done in regard to it cannot be properly estimated, or the jury be enabled to judge how far that act is indicative of the state of his mind or not. In every case, therefore, the first point to be considered will be whether any act has in truth been done by the party in regard to the document proposed to be given in evidence."

ALDERSON, B. "These letters were addressed to the testator by persons acquainted with him, and whose opinion as to his capacity, if properly proved, would be received as evidence in the cause."

"But the point to be considered first, is, how that, which is matter of opinion, is to be proved; I conceive that it is to be proved, like any other fact, by evidence on oath, given in open Court. . . . I conceive, therefore, that these letters are not receivable upon this ground."

"But then, lastly, it is said that the letters are receivable as having been acted upon by the testator and as explanatory of his acts; and if that were the case, I should agree in the conclusion."

"Every act of the testator is evidence, and if these are letters which qualify, or illustrate, or explain any act of his, they are receivable."

"But then, the first step to be taken is to show some act of the testator, by clear evidence, for that is the foundation of the whole."

"Here, that step wholly fails; this is an attempt to raise a superstructure which has nothing to support it."

"If the testator had made an indorsement on any one of them, the contents of the letter would have been receivable. But why? only for the purpose of showing that the indorsement was a rational act, not for the purpose of showing the opinion of the writer. If an

answer to the letter had been sent by him, the letter is in like manner receivable to show the rationality of such answer."

"It is clear that in this case those who propose these letters as evidence, do it only for the purpose of laying the opinion of the writers before the jury; a point which I believe all the Judges are unanimous in thinking they are not receivable to prove."

BOSANQUET, J. "The opinions of deceased persons, acquainted with the testator, respecting his sanity, however distinctly expressed, are not receivable in evidence, unless given upon oath in the course of a judicial proceeding. The letters and acts of such persons from which their opinion may be inferred, cannot amount to more than opinion positively stated, unless they afford occasion to the testator of manifesting his own conduct or deportment respecting them. Everything spoken to or read by the testator, and every act done in his sight or hearing, may afford an important inference of his capacity or incapacity; but the acts of individuals to which he is not a party, can lead to no conclusion beyond that of the agent entertaining a certain opinion or conviction of the testator's state of mind. No one of the letters is expressly proved to have been opened by the testator, or in any way recognised by him."

BOLLAND, B. "I take it to be settled, that in order to show the state of mind and understanding of a person whose competency, as in the present case, is brought in question, whatever is said, written, or done by the friends of the party, and of others who may have had transactions with him, is evidence to be submitted to the jury, who are to decide upon such competency, provided what has been so said, written or done, can be proved to have been known to and acted upon by such party."

PARKE, B. "These letters are sufficiently proved to have been written and sent to the house of the deceased by persons now dead, and they indicate the opinion of the writers that the alleged testator was a rational person and capable of doing acts of ordinary business. But it is perfectly clear that in this case an opinion not given upon oath in a judicial inquiry between the parties is no evidence; for the question is not what the capacity of the testator was reputed to be, but what it really was in point of fact; and though the opinion of a witness upon oath, as to that

fact, might be asked, it would only be a compendious mode of ascertaining the result of the actual observation of the witness, from acts done, as to the habits and demeanour of the deceased. Nor is the evidence the more admissible, because the persons writing the letters do not merely express an opinion in writing, but prove their belief of it by acting upon it to the extent of sending the letters and putting them in the course of reaching the person addressed. After all it is but an expression of opinion vouched by an act."

"Besides that, there is another ground, and the only other ground on which these letters are argued to be receivable in evidence, and that is, that there was proof in this case of acts done by the testator in reference to these letters, or at least one of them, which render the contents admissible by way of explanation of those acts. Those acts are the opening of two of the letters, and placing them in the supposed usual repository of the papers of the deceased, and the opening of the third one, and transmitting it to the attorney."

"The answer to this argument is, that there is no direct proof whatever of these acts being done by the testator; and as to indirect proof, to infer that the testator did the acts is to assume the very fact to be proved."

VAUGHAN, J. "It appears not to be disputed that the letters which are the subject of the present inquiry, considered merely with reference to the expressed opinions of the several writers, are inadmissible in evidence. They are not sanctioned by the solemnity of an oath; they are not subjected to the test of cross-examination; and they are not within the bounds of the great rule of evidence which requires the presence of both these circumstances. Considered therefore as independent evidence in the character of expressed opinions, they are liable to all the objections to which hearsay evidence is exposed."

"But we are called upon to give them greater weight in the character of acts superadded to opinion, or, as it is expressed by counsel, as treatment of the testator by those who knew him."

"Acts performed by strangers, expressive not merely of opinion, but of the strongest conviction, even in cases where such conviction conflicts altogether with the interest of the person entertaining it,

the law will not allow to be presented to the minds of jurymen as evidence. **They are merely opinions expressed in different language, in the language of conduct instead of the language of words."**

"It must be confessed that if any acts on the part of the testator could be proved, either by letter or from other sources, all declarations and writings which tend to explain such acts, may be put in evidence. The principle then upon which alone the letters can claim admission is the following: That where any facts are proper evidence upon an issue, all oral or written declarations which can explain such facts may be received in evidence."

LITTLEDALE, J. "If a party were alive and could be cross-examined, he could be examined as to the ground of his belief of the competency. But letters of this sort are much less likely to express the real sentiments of the writer than if written to a third person, as it is not likely that the writer would in letters to the party himself indicate anything tending to a doubt of his incapacity."

"In a question of competence, where the party who alleges the competency is bound to prove it, **he must show that the person has done some act upon this manifestation of opinion, which indicates that he understands the manifestation ; if he does so, it is admissible in evidence, and the effect of it will be left to the jury."**

TINDAL, C.J. "The question, therefore, with respect to the admissibility of the three letters comes to this: **Is there any evidence stated to us from which it can be inferred that the contents of these letters, or any of them, were ever perused by the testator, and by that means submitted to the exercise of his understanding and reasoning powers? or, Is there any evidence of his doing any act with reference to them, which may, according to the nature of such act, import the exercise of a larger or smaller extent of reasoning power?"**

COMPLAINTS.

R. v. LILLYMAN

(1896).

L. R. [1896] 2 Q. B. 167 ; 65 L. J. M. C. 195 ;
74 L. T. 730 ; 44 W. R. 654 ; 60 J. P. 536.

Statements made after the transaction are generally irrelevant and inadmissible ; but, in cases of rape and similar offences, the fact that a complaint was made by the prosecutrix shortly after the alleged occurrence, and the particulars of such complaint, may, so far as they relate to the charge, be given in evidence by the prosecution, not as evidence of the facts complained of, but as evidence of the consistency of the conduct of the prosecutrix with the story told by her in the witness-box, or as negating her consent.

On a charge of attempted rape and indecent assault the mistress of the prosecutrix, being a person to whom she would naturally complain, was allowed to state all that the prosecutrix told her, in the absence of the prisoner, very shortly after the commission of the act.

HAWKINS, J. "It is necessary in the first place to have a clear understanding as to the principles upon which evidence of such a complaint, not on oath, nor made in the presence of the prisoner, nor forming part of the *res gestæ*, can be admitted. It clearly is not admissible as evidence of the facts complained of ; those facts must therefore be established, if at all, upon oath by the prosecutrix or other credible witness, and, strictly speaking, evidence of them ought to be given before evidence of the complaint is admitted. The complaint can only be used as evidence of the consistency of the conduct of the prosecutrix with the story told by her in the witness-box, and as being inconsistent with her consent to that of which she complains."

"In every one of the old text-books, proof of complaint is treated as a most material element in the establishment of a charge of rape or other kindred charge. . . . It is too late, therefore, now to make serious objection to the admissibility of evidence of the fact that the complaint was made, provided it was made as speedily after the acts complained of as could reasonably be expected."

"That the general usage has been substantially to limit the evidence of the complaint to prove that the woman made a complaint of something done to her, and that she mentioned in connection with it the name of a particular person, cannot be denied ; but it is equally true that Judges of great experience have dissented from this limitation, and of those who have adopted the usage, none have ever carefully discussed or satisfactorily expressed the grounds upon which their views have been based. . . . When and for what reason the proof of the complaint was first limited to answers to such questions as whether the prosecutrix made a complaint, whether she mentioned a name, or whose name she mentioned, I have not been able to discover."

"After very careful consideration we have arrived at the conclusion that we are bound by no authority to support the existing usage of limiting evidence of the complaint to the bare fact that a complaint was made, and reason and good sense are against our doing so. The evidence is admissible only upon the ground that it was a complaint of that which is charged against the prisoner ; it can be legitimately used only for the purpose of enabling the jury to judge for themselves whether the conduct of the woman was consistent with her testimony on oath given in the witness-box. . . . It is to be left to the witness to whom the statement is made to determine and report to the jury whether what the woman said amounted to a real complaint?"

"Nor can it be that the jury are bound to accept the witness's interpretation of her words as binding upon them without having the whole statement before them, and without having the power to require it to be disclosed to them, even though they may feel it essential to enable them to form a reliable opinion. . . . In reality, affirmative answers to such stereotyped questions as whether the prosecutrix made a complaint (which is a very leading question) of

something done to herself, and whether she mentioned a name, amount to nothing to which any weight ought to be attached; they tend rather to embarrass than to assist a thoughtful jury, for they are consistent either with there having been a complaint or no complaint of the prisoner's conduct. To limit the evidence of the complaint to such questions and answers is to ask the jury to draw important inferences from imperfect materials, perfect materials being at hand, and in the cognisance of the witness in the box."

"It has been sometimes urged that to allow the particulars of the complaint would be calculated to prejudice the interests of the accused, and that the jury would be apt to treat the complaint as evidence of the facts complained of. Of course, if it were so left to the jury, they would naturally so treat it. But it never could be legally so left, and we think it is the duty of the Judge to impress upon the jury in every case that they are not entitled to make use of the complaint as any evidence whatever of those facts, or for any other purpose than that we have stated. With such direction we think the interests of an innocent accused would be more protected than they are under the present usage. For when the whole statement is laid before the jury they are less likely to draw wrong and adverse inferences, and may sometimes come to the conclusion that what the woman said amounted to no real complaint of any offence committed by the accused."

Note.—It is not easy to say on what ground such evidence of a complaint is admissible. It is stated in the above judgment that it is not part of the *res gesta*, or the transaction. But it is very near to it. An exclamation made at the time of the act would be part of the transaction, and would be admissible for all purposes, not merely as corroboration. A statement to be admissible as a complaint must be made very shortly after the transaction (see next case).

Statements made after the transaction are admissible also if they amount to admissions (see *post*, p. 133).

R. v. OSBORNE

(1905).

L. R. [1905] 1 K. B. 551; 74 L. J. K. B. 311; 92 L. T. 393; 53 W. R. 494; 69 J. P. 189.

Evidence of complaints made in the absence of the accused, after the matter complained of, is only admissible in cases of rape and similar offences against females.

Such evidence is admissible, whether consent is or is not a material element in the charge, in order to shew the consistency of her conduct with her evidence, and to corroborate the latter.

But the complaint must be shown to have been made at the first opportunity which reasonably offered itself after the commission of the offence.

The fact that the complaint has been made in answer to a question does not of itself render it inadmissible; but it must not have been elicited by questions of a leading and inducing or intimidating character.

The Judge ought to inform the jury that the statement is not evidence of the facts complained of, and must not be regarded by them as other than corroboration of the prosecutrix's evidence, or of the absence of consent.

On a charge of indecent assault on a girl aged twelve, evidence was given by another girl aged eleven, to the effect that she had left the prosecutrix with the prisoner shortly before the alleged offence, arranging to return soon. On her way back she met the prosecutrix running home, and said to her, "Why are you going home? Why did you not wait until we came back?" Her answer, incriminating the prisoner, was admitted in evidence as corroboration of her story.

RIDLEY, J. "It was contended for the prisoner that the evidence was inadmissible—first, because the answer made by the girl was not a complaint, but a statement or conversation, having been made in answer to a question; and secondly, because, as Keziah Parkes

was under the age of thirteen, her consent was not material to the charge."

"As to the first point. . . . It appears to us that the mere fact that the statement is made in answer to a question in such cases is not of itself sufficient to make it inadmissible as a complaint. Questions of a suggestive or leading character will, indeed, have that effect, and will render it inadmissible; but a question such as this, put by the mother or other person, 'What is the matter?' or 'Why are you crying?' will not do so. These are natural questions which a person in charge will be likely to put. On the other hand, if she were asked, 'Did So-and-So (naming the prisoner) assault you?' 'Did he do this and that to you?' then the result would be different, and the statement ought to be rejected. In each case the decision on the character of the question put, as well as other circumstances, such as the relationship of the questioner to the complainant, must be left to the discretion of the presiding Judge. If the circumstances indicate that but for the questioning there probably would have been no voluntary complaint, the answer is inadmissible. If the question merely anticipates a statement which the complainant was about to make, it is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that the questioner happens to speak first."

"Upon the second point it was contended that, although under the decision of *Reg. v. Lillyman* (*ante*, p. 69), the particulars of a complaint made may in some circumstances be given in evidence on a charge of rape, that ruling does not extend to a charge of criminal knowledge or indecent assault where, as in the present case, consent is not legally material."

"By the judgment in *Reg. v. Lillyman* it was decided that the complaint was admissible, not as evidence of the facts complained of, nor as being a part of the *res gestæ* (which it was not), but 'as evidence of the consistency of the conduct of the prosecutrix with the story told by her in the witness-box, and as being inconsistent with her consent to that of which she complains.' Counsel for the prisoner urged upon this that the reasons so given were one only, and that the 'consistency of the complaint with the story' given by the prosecutrix was material only so far as the latter alleged non-consent. If, however, that argument were sound, the words in

question might have been omitted from the sentence, and it would have been sufficient to say that the complaint was admissible only and solely because it negatived consent. We think, however, if it were a question of the meaning of words, that the better construction of the judgment is that, while the Court dealt with the charge in question as involving in fact (though not in law) the question of consent on the part of the prosecutrix, yet the reasons given for admitting the complaint were two—first, that it was consistent with her story in the witness-box ; and secondly, that it was inconsistent with consent. . . . It is not, therefore, because the charge itself involves proof of the absence of consent that the evidence is admissible ; on the contrary, the prosecutrix herself can make it evidence by deposing that she did not consent, when that is no part of the charge. In other words, whether non-consent be legally a necessary part of the issue, or whether, on the other hand, it is what may be called a collateral issue of fact, the complaint becomes admissible. But how does non-consent become a collateral issue of fact ? The answer must be, in consequence of the story told by the prosecutrix in the witness-box. And the judgment treats the two cases on the same footing. If non-consent be a part of the story told by the prosecutrix, or if it be legally a part of the charge, in each case alike the complaint is admissible. But if that is so, does not the reasoning apply equally to other parts of the story and not merely to the part in which the prosecutor has denied consent ? If not it seems illogical to allow, as the Court did allow, that the whole of the story may be given in evidence. The true result is, we think, that while the decision in *Reg. v. Lillyman* is not strictly on all fours with the present case, yet the reasoning which it contains answers the questions now raised for decision."

"But, however that may be, it appears to us that, in accordance with principle, such complaints are admissible, not merely as negativing consent, but because they are consistent with the story of the prosecutrix. In all ordinary cases, indeed, the principle must be observed which rejects statements made by any one in the prisoner's absence. Charges of this kind form an exceptional class, and in them such statements ought, under the proper safeguards, to be admitted. Their consistency with the story told is, from the

very nature of such cases, of special importance. Did the woman or girl make a complaint at once? If so, that is consistent with her story. Did she not do so? That is inconsistent. And in either case the matter is important for the jury."

"We are at the same time not insensible of the great importance of carefully observing the proper limits within which such evidence should be given. It is only to cases of this kind that the authorities on which our judgment rests apply; and our judgment also is to them restricted. It applies only where there is a complaint not elicited by questions of a leading and inducing or intimidating character, and only when it is made at the first opportunity after the offence which reasonably offers itself. Within such bounds we think the evidence should be put before the jury; the Judge being careful to inform the jury that the statement is not evidence of the facts complained of, and must not be regarded by them, if believed, as other than corroboration of the complainant's credibility, and, where consent is in issue, of the absence of such consent."

Note.—The above case seems to settle definitely three debated points:—

1. Such evidence is only admissible in cases of rape and similar offences.

2. It is not necessary that consent should be a material element in the charge.

3. The evidence may be admissible although the complaint was made in answer to a question.

Professor Kenny says, "In a wife's suit for judicial separation, on the ground of cruelty, the question, 'Did the petitioner complain to you of her husband's cruelty?' is always allowed to be put (even by the examiner-in-chief) to such of her witnesses as are examined subsequently to herself" (*Outlines of Criminal Law*, 366); but he cites no authority for this.

COURSE OF BUSINESS.

HETHERINGTON v. KEMP

(1815).

4 CAMPBELL, 193; 16 R. R. 773.

There is no presumption that the course of business in a private office has the regularity of that in a public

department. But the existence of any course of business, according to which an act in question would have been done, is relevant to the question whether such act was in fact done.

The question being whether a certain letter was posted, the facts that all letters put in a certain place were in the usual course of business taken to the post, and that such letter was put in that place, although relevant facts, were held insufficient to prove posting.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "You must go further. Some evidence must be given that the letter was taken from the table in the counting-house, and put into the post-office. Had you called the porter, and he had said that although he had no recollection of the letter in question, he invariably carried to the post-office all the letters found upon the table, this might have done; but I cannot hold this general evidence of the course of business in the plaintiff's counting-house to be sufficient."

Note.—As to the presumption of regularity in public offices, etc., see *ante*, p. 25.

In the case of public offices the jury *must* draw the conclusion that the act was done, until it is rebutted, as there is a *presumption*. In the case of private offices they *may* draw the conclusion, as the course of business is only *relevant* there (see *ante*, p. 25).

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY.

ROBERTSON v. FRENCH

(1803).

4 EAST, 130.

Possession of property, real or personal, and acts of ownership thereof, are evidence of ownership. Ownership or title need not generally be strictly proved by production of documents of title.

In an action on a policy of insurance on a ship and its cargo, evidence of the facts of possession and dealing with such ship as

owners, was allowed as evidence of the plaintiffs' ownership, although the title of the plaintiffs actually depended on a deed, *i.e.*, a bill of sale.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "As to the first point made in this case on the part of the defendant, viz., that the ownership alleged was not sufficiently proved; it was proved by the captain in the ordinary way, that the owners by whom, as such, he was appointed and employed, were the persons in whom the ownership is by the declaration averred to be. And though it afterwards appeared by his answers on cross-examination, that the ownership was derived to those persons under a bill of sale executed by himself as attorney to one Lawrence Williams, the former owner, it did not on that account become necessary for the plaintiffs to produce that bill of sale, or the ship's register, or to give any further proof of such their property; the mere fact of their possession as owners being sufficient *primâ facie* evidence of ownership, without the aid of any documentary proof or title deeds on the subject, until such further evidence should be rendered necessary in support of the *primâ facie* case of ownership which they made, in consequence of the adduction of some contrary proof on the other side."

Note.—The fact of possession is clearly relevant to the fact of ownership, as the former undoubtedly renders the latter probable. The person who possesses and acts as owner is generally the owner, at least as regards personal property.

The matter in question has been very clearly and concisely stated by a well-known and reliable author—"The acts of enjoyment from which the ownership of real property may be inferred are very various, as for instance, the cutting of timber, the repairing of fences or banks, the perambulation of boundaries of a manor or parish, the taking of wreck on the foreshore, and the granting to others of licenses or leases under which possession is taken and held; also the receipt of rents from tenants of the property; for all these acts are fractions of that sum total of enjoyment which characterises *dominium*" (*Wills on Evidence*, 60).

DOE v. PENFOLD

(1838).

8 C. & P. 536.

Possession of land may be taken as sufficient "*primâ facie*" evidence of seisin in fee simple.

In an action of ejectment, the only evidence to show the seisin of a person, in whom title was alleged, was that he was in possession of the whole of the property. This was held sufficient *primâ facie* evidence.

PATTESON, J. "If he was in actual possession, that is evidence that he was seised in fee, unless there be something to show that he had a less estate. I think that if nothing further be shown, it is, at least, some evidence of a seisin in fee."

Note.—This rule that the possessor of land is *primâ facie* owner in fee simple is the basis of the law as to declarations against proprietary interest, as to which see *post*, p. 162.

JONES v. WILLIAMS

(1837).

2 M. & W. 218; 46 R. R. 611.

Acts of possession and enjoyment of land, as cutting timber, repairing hedges, granting leases, etc., may be evidence of ownership, not only of the particular piece of land with reference to which such acts are done, but also of other land so situated or connected therewith by locality or similarity that what is true as to the one piece of land is likely to be true of the other piece of land.

Thus, acts showing apparent ownership of a hedge and the bed of a river at a point, were admitted as evidence of ownership thereof at a neighbouring point.

LORD ABINGER, C.B. "The plaintiff was endeavouring to prove that upon both sides of the river—on the same side with the land of the defendant—he had exercised acts of ownership, such as repairing the hedge; and therefore he claimed a right up to the hedge; and then going further, he shows that the hedge continued a visible line of demarcation without anything occurring to break its continuity—except that a cross hedge ran down to it, dividing the defendant's farm from his neighbour's land on the same side of the river—down to a considerable distance, till it came opposite to the extremity of the plaintiff's land on the other side. From these facts the plaintiff purposes to show that it is all his; and it appears to me that the evidence ought to have been received, in order to rebut the presumption that the middle of the river was to be considered as the boundary between two distinct closes."

PARKE, B. "I think the evidence offered of acts in another part of one continuous hedge, and in the whole bed of the river, adjoining the plaintiff's land, were admissible in evidence, on the ground that they are such acts as might reasonably lead to the inference that the entire hedge and bed of the river, and consequently the part in dispute, belonged to the plaintiff. Ownership may be proved by proof of possession, and that can be shown only by acts of enjoyment of the land itself; but it is impossible, in the nature of things, to confine the evidence to the very precise spot on which the alleged trespass may have been committed; evidence may be given of acts done on other parts, provided there is such a common character of locality between those parts and the spot in question as would raise a reasonable inference in the minds of the jury that the place in dispute belonged to the plaintiff if the other parts did."

Note.—A similar case is *Doe v. Kemp*, 2 Bing. N. C. 102, in which it was held that acts of ownership over certain strips of land at the side of a highway were evidence of ownership of similar strips on the same highway at a considerable distance, but were not evidence of ownership of similar strips on other roads, although in the same manor. The matter must depend on the facts in each case.

R. v. LANGMEAD

(1864).

10 L. T. 350 ; 9 Cox, C. C. 464 ; L. & C. 427.

Possession of property, proved to have been stolen recently, is evidence that the person in possession either stole it or received it knowing it to have been stolen.

The prisoner was indicted for (a) stealing, and (b) receiving feloniously, certain sheep, which were found in his possession a few days after they had been stolen. The circumstances seemed to shew he had not himself stolen them, and he gave no explanation of his possession. The jury, acting on this evidence of possession, found him guilty of receiving. The Court for Crown Cases reserved affirmed the conviction.

BYLES, J. "There are three ways in which the prisoner may have received these sheep with a guilty knowledge. . . . The jury may fairly have drawn any one of these conclusions from the facts before them. Whether they were right or wrong in their conclusion is not a question for us. Where there has been a burglary, and some men and a woman are found in possession of the property stolen, although the evidence may be the same against all, the jury almost universally find the men guilty of the burglary and the woman only of receiving ; the consideration of her sex inclining their minds to the belief that she did not take any part in the burglary."

BLACKBURN, J. "When it has been shewn that property has been stolen, and has been found recently after its loss in the possession of the prisoner, he is called upon to account for having it ; and, on his failing to do so, the jury may very well infer that his possession was dishonest, and that he was either the thief or the receiver according to the circumstances. If he had been seen near the place where the property was kept before it was stolen, they may fairly suppose that he was the thief. If other circumstances shew that it is more than probable that he was not the thief, the presumption would be that he was the receiver. The jury should

not convict the prisoner of receiving, unless they are satisfied that he is not the actual thief."

MELLOR, J. "In theory the jury ought to agree in their opinion; but in practice they often do not. Some think that the prisoner was the actual thief, and others that he was the receiver only. . . . It is clear that, whatever was the mode in which the jury in this case arrived at their verdict, there was evidence from which they might safely have drawn either conclusion."

Note.—The substantial question in such cases is whether such possession of the property is so near in time to the stealing that it may fairly be concluded that the person in possession was connected with the offence. If such time had elapsed that, in all probability, the wrong-doer would have got rid of the property, possession thereof would rather shew that the possessor had no connection with the crime. Much would depend on the nature of the property, the opportunity of getting rid of it, and other circumstances. Several cases illustrating the matter may be found in books on Criminal Law. It appears to be the common practice now to direct the jury that the prisoner should satisfy them that he came by the property honestly.

R. v. CARTER

(1884).

L. R. 12 Q. B. D. 522; 53 L. J. M. C. 96; 50 L. T. 432;
32 W. R. 663; 48 J. P. 456; 15 Cox, C. C. 448.

Where a prisoner is charged with receiving or having in his possession stolen property; in order to show that he knew such property to have been stolen, evidence may be given, under 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, that he had in his possession, at or soon after (but not before) the time when the property the subject of the charge was found, other property stolen within the preceding twelve months.

The prisoner was charged with receiving a mare, knowing it to have been stolen, on the 20th May, 1883; and the question was whether evidence could be admitted under the above statute that another mare was in his possession and sold by him on the 9th May, 1883. It was held that such evidence was inadmissible.

HAWKINS, J. "The prisoner was in possession of the mare first stolen in the month of May, but before the crime the subject-matter of the present indictment was committed. I cannot think that a case falling within the section relied on; the true construction of the section appears to me to be that of Bramwell, L.J. If you find other stolen property in the possession of the person charged as a receiver at the same time that you find the property with regard to which you are charging him with receiving, you can prove that you did so find such property, if it be property stolen within twelve months preceding. I do not mean to say that you must find the property the subject of the indictment and the property with regard to which you are seeking to give evidence at the same identical moment. It would be enough, I should say, if a police constable after finding one quantity of stolen property took it away with him and then came back to the premises of the accused where he had found the first lot for a further search, and on such search succeeded in finding there more stolen property, stolen within the required period, that is substantially a finding at the same time, but here in the present case there is nothing of the kind."

Note.—This is a statutory extension of the principle that conduct on other occasions is admissible to prove guilty knowledge, etc., introduced in consequence of the great difficulty in proving such knowledge in the case of receiving stolen goods. It allows the mere fact of possession of other stolen goods to be given in evidence, which seems to be something less than the fact of receiving, which would have to be proved under the ordinary rule, as "similar" conduct. For the full provision of the statute, see *post*, p. 330.

REPUTATION OF MARRIAGE.

DOE v. FLEMING

(1827).

4 BING. 266 ; 29 R. R. 562.

Marriage may usually be proved by evidence of cohabitation or general reputation, even when it is not

supported by other evidence, and although the persons reputed to be married are still alive.

The plaintiff sought to recover certain premises as heir-at-law, and the only evidence of the marriage of his parents was the reputation of their having lived together as man and wife. This was held sufficient, although the father was still alive.

PARK, J. "The general rule is, that reputation is sufficient evidence of marriage, and a party who seeks to impugn a principle as well established ought, at least, to furnish cases in support of his position. As we have heard none, I see no reason for disturbing the verdict."

BEST, C.J. "The rule has never been doubted. It appeared on the trial that the mother of the plaintiff was received into society as a respectable woman, and under such circumstances improper conduct ought not to be presumed."

Note.—For the exceptions to this rule, see next case. As to whether there is a presumption in law of marriage, see *ante*, p. 19.

MORRIS v. MILLER (1767).

4 BURROW, 2057; 1 WM. BLACKSTONE, 632.

In proceedings for bigamy, divorce, or damages for adultery, the marriages or ceremonies upon which the proceedings are based cannot be proved by reputation. Strict evidence thereof must be given.

Thus, in an action for criminal conversation (damages for adultery), proof of "cohabitation, name, and reception by everybody as wife" was held insufficient.

LORD MANSFIELD, C.J. "We are all clearly of opinion that in this kind of action, an action for criminal conversation with the plaintiff's wife, there must be evidence of a marriage *in fact*; acknowledgment, cohabitation, and reputation are not sufficient to maintain this action."

“This is a sort of criminal action ; there is no other way of punishing this crime at common law.”

“It shall not depend upon the mere reputation of a marriage, which arises from the conduct or declarations of the plaintiff himself.”

“In prosecutions for bigamy, a marriage in fact must be proved.”

“No inconvenience can happen by this determination ; but inconvenience might arise from a contrary determination, which might render persons liable to actions founded upon evidence made by the persons themselves who should bring the action.”

Note.—Stephen says, “the facts that they cohabited and were treated by others as man and wife . . . are not sufficient to prove a marriage in a prosecution for bigamy,” etc. (*Dig Ev.*, Art. 53). But this seems to put it too broadly. The marriage and subsequent ceremony upon which the prosecution is based certainly cannot be so proved, but it may be that another marriage becomes material in such prosecution, and such marriage can certainly be proved by reputation, although it is proving a marriage “in a prosecution for bigamy.” Thus, in the case of *R. v. Wilson*, 3 F. & F. 119, the prisoner pleaded that, when she went through the first ceremony alleged, the man was already married, and, therefore, the ceremony was void, and she had not committed bigamy. This marriage, so alleged by the prisoner, was allowed to be proved by reputation.

CONDUCT, CHARACTER, AND CONVICTIONS OF PARTIES.

It is most important to keep distinct three matters which are frequently confused :—

- (1) Conduct of the parties on other occasions.
- (2) Character of the parties.
- (3) Convictions of the parties previously.

(1) The law as to CONDUCT ON OTHER OCCASIONS is laid down by cases appearing below, and is shortly as follows :—

- (a) Such evidence must be of similar acts of the party.
- (b) It is never admissible to prove or disprove the act alleged on the present occasion, unless directly connected therewith.

(c) It is admissible to prove the state of mind of the person doing the act alleged, after such act has been proved.

(d) It is admissible, to such extent, in both civil and criminal cases.

(2) The law as to CHARACTER of parties is likewise laid down by cases appearing below, and is shortly as follows:—

(a) Such evidence must be of reputation, not of disposition, nor of specific acts.

(b) It is evidence, when admissible, to prove or disprove the act alleged on the present occasion.

(c) It is admissible in both civil and criminal cases to the extent shewn, *post*, p. 93.

(3) The law as to PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS is laid down by certain Statutes, and is shortly as follows:—

(a) Such evidence must be of actual conviction of a criminal offence.

(b) In criminal cases generally it is inadmissible before verdict, unless essential to prove the offence charged on the present occasion (6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 111, *post*, p. 313; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 116, *post*, p. 322).

(c) On a charge of receiving stolen goods, evidence of previous conviction of the prisoner for fraud or dishonesty, within the previous five years, may be given before verdict to shew his guilty knowledge, even although the prisoner does not give evidence of his good character (34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 19, *post*, p. 330).

(d) On a charge of any non-capital felony, if the prisoner gives evidence of his good character, evidence of previous conviction for felony may be given before verdict (6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 111, *post*, p. 313).

(e) On a charge of any offence under the Larceny Act, 1861, if the prisoner gives evidence of his good character, evidence of previous conviction for any felony, misdemeanour or offence punishable upon summary

conviction may be given before verdict (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 116, *post*, p. 322).

- (f) On a charge of any offence under the Coinage Act, 1861, if the prisoner gives evidence of his good character, evidence of previous conviction for any offence relating to coin may be given before verdict (24 & 25 Vict. c. 99, s. 37, *post*, p. 323).
- (g) After verdict evidence of previous convictions may always be given, in order that the punishment may be properly adjusted (see *e.g.* 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 116, *post*, p. 322).
- (h) In civil cases such evidence is not admissible unless the party gives evidence and in cross-examination denies his conviction (28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, s. 6, *post*, p. 325).

These observations refer only to evidence of the conduct, character, and convictions of the parties themselves. Different considerations apply to such evidence concerning witnesses, and to the cross-examination of witnesses, whether parties or strangers. On these matters, see *post*, p. 215.

CONDUCT ON OTHER OCCASIONS.

HOLLINGHAM v. HEAD

(1858).

27 L. J. C. P. 241; 4 JUR. N. S. 379; 4 C. B. N. S. 388.

Conduct on other occasions, unconnected with the act or conduct in question, is generally irrelevant. The fact that a person has done a certain thing on other occasions is not relevant to the question whether he did it on the occasion in question.

The question being whether the plaintiff had sold guano to the defendant on certain special terms, the fact that he had sold guano to other persons on such terms was inadmissible in evidence.

WILLES, J. "The question is, whether in an action for goods sold and delivered, it is competent for the defendant to show, by way of defence, that the plaintiff has entered into contracts with other persons in a particular form, for the purpose of inducing the jury to come to the conclusion that the contract sued upon was in that particular form, and so to defeat the action; and I am of opinion that it is not competent for the defendant to do so."

"It may be often difficult to decide upon the admissibility of evidence, where it is offered for the purpose of establishing probability, but to be admissible it must at least afford a reasonable inference as to the principal matter in dispute. . . . It appears to me that the evidence, which was proposed to be given in this case, would not have shown that it was probable that the plaintiff had made the contract, which the defendant contended he had made; for I do not see how the fact that a man has once or more in his life acted in a particular way, makes it probable that he so acted on a given occasion. The admission of such evidence would be fraught with the greatest inconvenience. Where, indeed, the question is one of guilty knowledge or intent, as in the case of uttering forged documents or base coin, such evidence is admissible as tending to establish a necessary ingredient of the crime. But if the evidence were admissible in this case, it would be difficult to say that in any case, where the question was whether or not goods had been sold upon credit, the defendant might not call evidence to prove that other persons had received credit from the plaintiff; or in an action for an assault, that the plaintiff might not prove that the defendant had assaulted other persons generally, or persons of a particular class."

"To obviate the prejudice, the injustice, and the waste of time to which the admission of such evidence would lead, and bearing in mind the extent to which it might be carried, and that litigants are mortal, it is necessary not only to adhere to the rule, but to lay it down strictly. I think, therefore, the fact that the plaintiff had entered into contracts of a particular kind with other persons on other occasions could not properly be admitted in evidence, where no custom of trade to make such contracts, and no connection between such and the one in question, was shown to exist."

BYLES, J. "As regards the question put to the plaintiff on cross-examination, it may be that he might have been asked whether he had not made the same contract with other persons, which the defendant contended he had made with him, for the purpose of testing his memory or his credit. But such evidence, when offered as part of the defendant's case, was totally inadmissible. To have admitted it would have been contrary to all principle, and to what has been the universal practice so long as I have known the profession."

WILLIAMS, J. "As to the evidence offered by the defendant, there can be no doubt whatever that that was inadmissible. It would lead to the greatest inconvenience if we were once to relax the rule, which requires the evidence to be confined to the points in issue, by allowing other transactions to be inquired into."

Note.—It will be observed that the rule in the above case applies to "unconnected" conduct. If the conduct on another occasion were connected with that in question, as if it were part of the same transaction (see *ante*, p. 54), it then might be admissible. Or if, in the above case, the plaintiff had said he would supply guano to the defendant on the same terms as those made with the other persons in question, then, doubtless, his conduct in dealing with such persons would have been admissible.

Another useful case is *Holcombe v. Hewson*, 2 Camp. 391, where the question was whether the plaintiff had supplied good beer to the defendant. Evidence that he had supplied good beer to other persons was held inadmissible. If it had been shewn that all the beer was of the same brewing and supplied at the same time, it is probable that the evidence would have been admitted.

R. v. GEERING (1849).

18 L. J. M. C. 215.

When a person is charged with, or alleged to have done, some act involving guilty knowledge or intention, or other state of mind, after proof of the physical act, evidence is admissible of his similar acts on other occasions, in order (only) to show such guilty knowledge or intention, or state of mind.

The question being whether prisoner murdered her husband by poison ; after proof of the actual administering of the poison, evidence could be given that other members of her family, whose food she prepared, died from similar poison, in order to show that such administering was not accidental.

POLLOCK, C.B. "The tendency of such evidence is to prove and to confirm the proof already given, that the death of the husband, whether felonious or not, was occasioned by arsenic. In this view of the case, I think it wholly immaterial whether the deaths of the sons took place before or after the death of the husband. The domestic history of the family during the period that the four deaths occurred is also receivable in evidence, to show that during that time arsenic had been taken by four members of it, with a view to enable the jury to determine as to whether such taking was accidental or not. The evidence is not inadmissible by reason of its having a tendency to prove or to create a suspicion of a subsequent felony."

Note.—The matter may be roughly stated thus: conduct on other occasions is never admissible to prove the *actus reus*, but is admissible to prove the *mens rea*, or other state of mind. The rule applies to both civil and criminal cases.

With regard to criminal charges, in the recent case of *R. v. Bond*, [1906] 2 K. B. 389, Bray, J., summarised the law as follows:—

"A careful examination of the cases where evidence of this kind has been admitted shows that they may be grouped under three heads:—

"(1) Where the prosecution seeks to prove a system or course of conduct.

"(2) Where the prosecution seeks to rebut a suggestion on the part of the prisoner of accident or mistake.

"(3) Where the prosecution seeks to prove knowledge by the prisoner of some fact."

R. v. RHODES

(1899).

L. R. [1899] 1 Q. B. 77 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 83 ; 79 L. T. 360 ;
47 W. R. 121 ; 62 J. P. 774 ; 19 Cox, C. C. 182.

Evidence of similar acts on other occasions is admissible to prove guilty knowledge or intention, or state of

mind, even though such acts were subsequent to the transaction in question, if they show a connected scheme or system of operations.

On a trial for obtaining eggs by false pretences, it was proved that the prisoner had falsely represented by advertisements that he was carrying on a *bonâ fide* dairyman's business. Evidence was admitted that, subsequently to the transaction in question, he had obtained eggs from other persons by similar advertisements.

LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, C.J. "It is plain that the prisoner was carrying on a single and entire scheme of fraud by means of one and the same sham business and sham advertisements. Had the transactions been disconnected and isolated, I should be by no means prepared to admit evidence of the later transactions upon a charge arising out of a former transaction. But here, where, so far from being isolated, a plain connection between each of these transactions is afforded by the advertisement, which shows that the whole scheme was one entire fraud, and that the business was an absolute sham, and that the method was the same in every case, and with the one view of defrauding the public, I am of opinion that the evidence with regard to the prisoner's subsequent transactions was admissible."

WILLS, J. "The charge here is that the prisoner falsely pretended he was carrying on a real business when he was carrying on a bogus business. How is this to be shown when a man has, as the prisoner had here, some of the apparatus of a regular business—that is to say, a real shop with his name over it—unless by showing that other like transactions have been carried on by the accused, and that the transaction, the subject of the charge, was part of a system forming a single and entire scheme of fraud? If these other transactions be prior in date to the one in question, there can be no doubt as to their admissibility in evidence. What difference does it make whether they took place before or after, so long as they would fairly lead to the inference that the transaction on which the charge is based is part of a connected system of operations? The difficulty here is the interval of time which elapsed; and if there had been no connecting link between the first and last transactions I

agree that the evidence of the last transaction would have been inadmissible. . . . But here we find that the same advertisement had been continued, and that its operation in the last case was precisely similar to its operation in the first. This being so, in my judgment the evidence relating to the later transactions was properly left to the jury."

WRIGHT, J. "It was an essential part of the proof that it was a business of a bogus character to show its general nature, and the best evidence of this would be that it was carried on in the same manner for a considerable time, and once the continuity of the business was shown, transactions after the date of the alleged particular crime were as relevant in proof of its general character as transactions before that date."

BRUCE, J. "I cannot say that the evidence is not relevant, because I think it may have tended to show that the prisoner's business was a sham business. It seems to me, however, that it had only a remote bearing upon the case, but that is an objection that relates to the weight of the evidence only, and not to its admissibility."

Note.—It will be observed that the substantial question is—do such acts show a scheme or system of operations of which the act charged forms a part? If so, and one act in the scheme is in issue, the other acts, before or after it, are relevant.

But the other acts offered in evidence must be sufficiently "similar" to the act charged, in order to show system. This is illustrated by the recent case of *R. v. Fisher*, [1910] 1 K. B. 149, where a prisoner was charged with obtaining goods and credit by false pretences and other fraud, it was held that evidence should not have been admitted that on other occasions he had obtained goods from other persons by false pretences, as the acts were not, under the circumstances, sufficiently similar, Channell, J., saying—"Of course if the swindling charged was swindling by a particular method, the prosecution might prove similar acts of swindling. In the present case, however, the evidence ought not to have been admitted, because the offence charged ought to have been proved otherwise than by showing that the prisoner was a fraudulent person."

R. v. RILEY
(1877).

L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 481 ; 56 L. J. M. C. 52 ; 56 L. T. 371 ;
35 W. R. 382 ; 16 Cox, 191.

In prosecutions for rape, or assault with intent to commit rape, or indecent assault, evidence of similar conduct on other occasions, between the prosecutrix and the prisoner is admissible, as being relevant to the issue.

(The facts sufficiently appear from the judgments.)

LORD COLERIDGE, C.J. "The indictment charged the prisoner with an assault with intent to commit a rape upon a woman, and the woman having denied previous voluntary connection with the accused, the prisoner proposed to show that she had had such connection with him. That evidence was rejected. It is clear that it was receivable. It has been held again and again that if in such a case evidence as to connection with persons other than the accused is denied by the prosecutrix, evidence offered in contradiction must be rejected. There are good reasons, other than those suggested in argument, for rejecting such evidence. It would be very unfair and sometimes cruel to the prosecutrix to admit such evidence ; but, in addition, it does not go to the point in issue."

"But rejection of evidence of previous voluntary connection with the prisoner is another matter, because not only does such evidence render it more likely that the woman has consented, but it is a line of examination going to the very point in issue."

"Upon principle and authority, I think that the evidence in question was receivable."

POLLOCK, B. "I agree. The only question is whether the evidence tendered was relevant to the issue. If it was irrelevant as merely going to the woman's character, as in the case of evidence as to connection by the woman with other men, then it was

properly rejected. In my opinion, evidence as to her connection with the prisoner, whether of recent date or not, is clearly relevant to the issue."

STEPHEN, J. "I am of the same opinion, and have hardly anything to add. I think the weight of authority is decidedly in the direction in which this decision will place it."

Note.—For other cases on special rules of evidence concerning rape, etc., see *ante*, p. 69 and *post*, p. 101 and p. 226.

CHARACTER OF PARTIES.

"Character" has two popular meanings—"disposition" and "reputation." The legal meaning of the term is the latter, at any rate so far as the Law of Evidence is concerned. A man of evil disposition who has secured a good reputation is entitled to the benefit of it in those cases where evidence of his good character is admissible, and *vice versâ*.

Character must be distinguished from conduct on other occasions, with which it is sometimes confused. In order to show system and guilty knowledge, as we have seen, evidence of specific acts of conduct may be given. But a man, concerning whom such specific acts are proved may still have a good character or reputation, which is not legally affected by evidence of specific acts, as character may be proved by evidence of general reputation only (see *post*, p. 98).

The cases in which evidence of character of the parties is admissible may be thus summed up:—

In civil cases:

(1) In cases in which character is in issue, as in actions for defamation, evidence of the plaintiff's character may be given.

(2) In cases in which the amount of damages depends upon character, as in actions for breach of promise of marriage and seduction, evidence of the character of the female plaintiff, or of the woman seduced, may be given on the question of damages.

In criminal cases :

(3) In all cases, evidence of the prisoner's character may be given, at his option.

(4) In cases of rape, evidence of the character of the prosecutrix may be given.

The following cases illustrate these four points.

As to character of witnesses, see *post*, p. 215.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. BOWMAN

(1791).

2 B. & P. 532.

The character of the parties to a civil action is generally irrelevant and inadmissible.

Upon the trial of an information against the defendant for keeping false weights, and for offering to corrupt an officer, the defendant's counsel called a witness to character. His evidence was not admitted, as it was not a criminal prosecution, but only a penal action.

EXRE, C.B. "I cannot admit this evidence in a civil list. The offence imputed by the information is not in the shape of a crime. It would be contrary to the true line of distinction to admit it, which is this ; that in a direct prosecution for a crime, such evidence is admissible : but where the prosecution is not directly for the crime but for the penalty, as in this information, it is not."

SCOTT v. SAMPSON

(1882).

L. R. 8 Q. B. 491 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 380 ; 46 L. T. 412 ;
30 W. R. 541 ; 46 J. P. 408.

In all actions or proceedings in which a plaintiff's character is actually in issue, as in actions for

defamation, evidence of the plaintiff's character may be given. But evidence cannot be given of particular acts of misconduct by the plaintiff, nor evidence of rumours to the same effect as the matter complained of.

(The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.)

MATHEW, J. "I have had the advantage of seeing the judgment which my brother Cave is about to deliver, and I agree with him in the conclusions at which he has arrived after a careful examination of the cases."

CAVE, J. "These decisions relate to the admissibility—first, of evidence of reputation; secondly, evidence of rumours of and suspicions to the same effect as the defamatory matter complained of; and, thirdly, evidence of particular facts tending to show the character and disposition of the plaintiff."

"Speaking generally, the law recognises in every man a right to have the estimation in which he stands in the opinion of others unaffected by false statements to his discredit; and if such false statements are made without lawful excuse, and damage results to the person of whom they are made, he has a right of action. The damage, however, which he has sustained must depend almost entirely on the estimation in which he was previously held. He complains of an injury to his reputation, and seeks to recover damages for that injury, and it seems most material that the jury who have to award those damages should know, if the fact is so, that he is a man of no reputation. 'To deny this would,' as is observed in Starkie on Evidence, 'be to decide that a man of the worst character is entitled to the same measure of damages with one of unsullied and unblemished reputation. A reputed thief would be placed on the same footing with the most honourable merchant, a virtuous woman with the most abandoned prostitute. To enable the jury to estimate the probable *quantum* of injury sustained, a knowledge of the party's previous character is not only material, but seems to be absolutely essential.'"

“As to the second head of evidence, or evidence of rumours and suspicions to the same effect as the defamatory matter complained of, it would seem that upon principle such evidence is not admissible, as only indirectly tending to affect the plaintiff's reputation. If these rumours and suspicions have, in fact, affected the plaintiff's reputation, that may be proved by general evidence of reputation. If they have not affected it, they are not relevant to the issue. . . . Unlike evidence of general reputation, it is particularly difficult for the plaintiff to meet and rebut such evidence; for all that those who know him best can say is that they have not heard anything of these rumours. Moreover, it may be that it is the defendant who himself has started them.”

“As to the third head, or evidence of facts and circumstances tending to show the disposition of the plaintiff, both principle and authority seem equally against its admission. At the most it tends to prove not that the plaintiff has not, but that he ought not to have, a good reputation, and to admit evidence of this kind is, in effect, to throw upon the plaintiff the difficulty of showing an uniform propriety of conduct during his whole life. It would give rise to interminable issues which would have but a very remote bearing on the question in dispute, which is to what extent the reputation which he actually possesses has been damaged by the defamatory matter complained of.”

Note.—It is obvious that in cases of defamation evidence of the character of the plaintiff must be admitted, the action being brought for injury to such character, which is thus directly in issue, and all matters in issue may undoubtedly be proved. The evidence may show that his character was correctly described, or that it was such that little damage was done to it. (See note to next case.)

It is perhaps unusual to find other cases, besides defamation, in which character is actually in issue. It might, conceivably, be so in applications to remove trustees or guardians, or in actions for wrongful dismissal on the ground of want of character.

VERRY v. WATKINS

(1836).

7 C. & P. 308.

In a few cases, where the amount of damages depends upon character, as in seduction and breach of promise of marriage, evidence may be given of the character of the woman seduced, or the female plaintiff, but upon the question of damages only.

In an action for seduction, the plaintiff's daughter was cross-examined with the object of showing that she was a girl of loose character. Evidence was also called for the defence showing her general bad character in respect of chastity and moral conduct.

ALDERSON, B. (to the jury). "If you think that the defendant had such intercourse with the daughter of the plaintiff as caused him to be the father of the child to which she gave birth, your verdict must be for the plaintiff; and the case then comes to a question of damages; in which view, and in which view alone, you will consider what reliance you ought to place on the evidence adduced on the part of the defendant."

Note.—Stephen says: "In civil cases, the fact that a person's general reputation is bad, may, it seems, be given in evidence in reduction of damages" (*Dig. Ev.*, Art. 57). Stated in this general manner, it would suggest that a person's character could be given in evidence when he claimed damages for a breach of contract or a broken leg. It cannot be so. But in cases of seduction and breach of promise the woman's character for modesty, etc., may clearly be relevant as to the damage suffered.

There does not appear to be any case in which evidence of the defendant's character is admissible in civil cases.

Order 36, rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides—"In actions for libel or slander, in which the defendant does not by his defence assert the truth of the statement complained of, the defendant shall not be entitled on the trial to give evidence in chief, with a view to mitigation of damages, as to the circumstances under which the libel or slander was published, or as to the character of the plaintiff, without the leave of the Judge, unless seven days at least before the trial he furnishes particulars to the plaintiff of the matters as to which he intends to give evidence."

R. v. ROWTON

(1865).

34 L. J. M. C. 57 ; 11 L. T. 745 ; 13 W. R. 436 ; 11
JUR. N. S. 325 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 25 ; L. & C. 520.

A prisoner, or defendant in a criminal case, at his trial, can always give evidence of his good character. The prosecution may rebut such evidence by evidence of his bad character, although they cannot give evidence of his bad character as part of their case.

Evidence of character must not be evidence of particular facts, but must be evidence of general reputation only, having reference to the nature of the charge ; not evidence of disposition.

On a trial for indecent assault, where the defendant had given evidence of his good character, a witness called by the prosecution to rebut such evidence was asked, "What is the defendant's general character for decency and morality of conduct?" The witness said, "I know nothing of the neighbourhood's opinion, because I was only a boy at school when I knew him ; but my own opinion, and the opinion of my brothers, who were also pupils of his, is, that his character is that of a man capable of the grossest indecency and the most flagrant immorality." It was held, by eleven Judges against two, that this answer was not admissible in evidence.

COCKBURN, C.J. "Two questions present themselves, the first, whether, when evidence in favour of the character of the prisoner has been given on his behalf, evidence of his bad character can be adduced upon the part of the prosecution to rebut the evidence so given. I am clearly of opinion that such evidence may properly be received. It is true that, probably in the experience of all of us, no occasion has presented itself when such evidence has been given on the part of the prosecution. That may be easily explained by the circumstance that it seldom happens that evidence is called to the character of a prisoner when those who represent the prisoner are aware that the character will be liable to be rebutted. Notice is often

given from a sense or spirit of fairness by the prosecuting counsel, that if any attempt is made to set up the character of the prisoner, against the facts adduced on the part of the prosecution, such attempt will be met either by a rigorous examination or rebutting evidence ; but it seems to me, when we come to consider whether such evidence is admissible, speaking logically and reasonably, it is impossible to come to any other than one conclusion."

"Assuming, then, that evidence was properly received to rebut the prior evidence of good character, adduced by the prisoner, the question still presents itself of whether the answer which was given to the question, which is perfectly legitimate in its character, was an answer which it was proper to leave to the jury ? Now, in determining this, it becomes necessary, in the first instance, to consider what is the meaning of evidence to character. It is laid down in the books that a prisoner is entitled to give evidence as to his general character. What does that mean ? Does it mean evidence as to his reputation amongst those to whom his conduct and position are known, or does it mean evidence of disposition ? I think it means evidence of reputation only. . . . No one ever heard of a question put deliberately to a witness called on behalf of a prisoner as to the prisoner's disposition of mind ; the way, and the only way the law allows of your getting at the disposition and tendency of his mind, is by evidence as to his general character founded upon the knowledge of those who know anything about him and his general conduct. Now, that is the sense in which I find the word 'character' used and applied in all the books of the text-writers of authority upon the subject of evidence."

"No one pretends that, according to the present practice, examination can be made as to a specific fact, though every one would agree that evidence of one fact of honesty or dishonesty, as the case might be, would weigh infinitely more than the opinions of a man's friends or neighbours as to his general character. The truth is, this part of our law is an anomaly. Although, logically speaking, it is quite clear that an antecedent bad character would form quite as reasonable a ground for the presumption and probability of guilt, as previous good character lays the foundation for the presumption of innocence, yet the prosecution cannot go into evidence

as to the prisoner's bad character. The allowing evidence of a prisoner's good character to be given has grown up from a desire to administer the law with mercy, as far as possible."

"When we come to consider the question of what, in the strict interpretation of the law, is the limit of such evidence, I must say that, in my judgment, it must be restrained to this: **the evidence must be of the man's general reputation, and not the individual opinion of the witness.** . . . The witness who acknowledged that he knew nothing of the general character, and had no opportunity of knowing it in the sense of reputation, would not be allowed to give an opinion as to a man's character in the more limited sense of his disposition."

"If that be the true doctrine on the subject of the admissibility of evidence to character in favour of the prisoner, the next question that presents itself is, **within what limits must the evidence be confined which is adduced in rebutting evidence to meet the evidence which the prisoner has brought forward?** I think that **that evidence must be of the same character and kept within the same limits;** that while the prisoner can give evidence of general good character, so the evidence called to rebut it must be evidence of the same general description, showing that the evidence which has been given to establish a good reputation on the one hand is not true, because the man's general reputation was bad."

"Now, then, what is the answer in the present case? **The witness, it seems, disclaims all knowledge as to the general reputation of the accused;** what he says is this: 'I know nothing of the neighbourhood's opinion.' I take the witness in this expression to mean to say, 'I know nothing of the opinion of those with whom the man has in the ordinary occupations of life been brought immediately into contact. I knew him, and so did two brothers of mine when we were at school, and in my opinion his *disposition*' (for in that sense the word 'character' is used by the witness)—'in my opinion his disposition is such that he is capable of committing the class of offences with which he stands charged.' I am strongly of opinion that **that answer was not admissible in evidence.** . . . **I take my stand on this:** I find it uniformly laid down in the books of authority that **the evidence to character must be evidence to general character in the sense of reputation.**"

Note.—It is generally stated, that evidence of a prisoner's good character is admissible, but evidence of his bad character is inadmissible, except in answer to evidence of his good character. But why cut up the rule into two parts? It seems to be simply this—evidence of the prisoner's character, good or bad, is always admissible at the prisoner's option. Whenever his good character is admissible so is his bad character.

"Evidence of character must, of course, be applicable to the particular nature of the charge; to prove, for instance, that a party has borne a good character for humanity and kindness, can have no bearing in reference to a charge of dishonesty. The correct mode of inquiry is as to the *general* character of the accused" (*Wills on Circumstantial Evidence*, p. 226).

The rule in the above case only applies to criminal charges.

R. v. CLARKE

(1817).

2 STARKIE, 241.

In prosecutions for rape, or assault with intent to commit rape, or indecent assault, evidence of the bad character of the prosecutrix may be given in defence, her character, under the circumstances, being considered, to some extent, in issue.

(The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.)

HOLROYD, J. "It is clear that no evidence can be received of particular facts, and such evidence could not have been received, although the prosecutrix had been cross-examined as to those facts, because her answers upon those facts must have been taken as conclusive. With respect to such facts the case is clear. Then, with respect to general evidence; such evidence, it has been held, is admissible in all cases where character is in issue, and therefore the only question is, whether the character of the prosecutrix is involved in the present issue. In the case of an indictment for a rape, evidence that a woman had a bad character previous to the supposed commission of the offence is admissible; but the defendant cannot go into evidence of particular facts. This is the law upon an

indictment for rape, and I am of opinion that the same principles apply to the case of an indictment for an assault with intent to commit a rape."

Note.—This seems to be the only case in which evidence is allowed of the character of the person prosecuting. The act here charged as a crime, is, unlike most other criminal acts, one which may be consented to, and the character of the prosecutrix is material as to consent. See also *ante*, pp. 69 and 90, and *post*, p. 226.

OPINION.

As a general rule, the fact that a witness has a certain opinion as to a fact in issue is not relevant to such fact. It is for the Court to form opinions from the relevant facts proved, and it is improper for a witness to express an opinion upon any fact as to which the Court itself can form an opinion.

"Vain would it be for the law to constitute the jury the triers of disputed facts, to reject derivative evidence when original proof is withheld, and to declare that a party is not to be prejudiced by the words or acts of others with whom he is unconnected, if tribunals might be swayed by opinions relative to those facts, expressed by persons who come before them in the character of witnesses. If the opinions thus offered are founded on no evidence, or on illegal evidence, they ought not to be listened to; if founded on legal evidence, that evidence ought to be laid before the jury, whom the law presumes to be at least as capable as the witnesses of drawing from them any inferences that justice may require" (*Best on Evidence*, p. 487).

But, of course, in those matters in which the Court is not thus as capable as the witnesses of drawing inferences, *i.e.*, in matters which require special study or experience in order that a just opinion may be formed, such as matters of science

or art, the rule of exclusion cannot prevail, and the opinions of "experts" must be received.

"The reasonable principle appears to be, that scientific witnesses shall be permitted to testify only to such matters of fact as have come within their own cognisance, or as they have acquired a knowledge of by their reading, and to such inferences from them, or from other facts provisionally assumed to be proved, as their particular studies and pursuits specially qualify them to draw; so that the jury may thus be furnished with the necessary scientific *criteria* for testing the accuracy of their conclusions, and enabled to form their own independent judgment by the application of those *criteria* to the facts established in evidence before them" (*Wills on Circumstantial Evidence*, p. 140).

But opinion evidence is by no means confined to "experts." There have been many cases in which ordinary witnesses have been allowed to give their opinions in evidence, and they must frequently be allowed to do so. There are many matters on which it is naturally impossible for any witness to give positive evidence of facts which he observed. He must, if he says anything at all, speak as to his opinion or belief, on matters which are essentially matters of opinion or are so complex or indefinite that he can only form a general opinion upon them. So, on questions of identity, condition, age, appearance or resemblance of persons or things; on the general character of the weather, or the general conduct of a business or of persons during a certain period, or the general character of a meeting alleged to be seditious, clearly only evidence of opinion can be given, and would in most cases be received.

CARTER v. BOEHM
(1766).

3 BURROW, 1905.

A witness may not, generally, give his opinion as to facts in issue or relevant facts. The fact that he has such an opinion is not relevant to such facts. It is for the Court to form opinions on the facts proved.

In an action on an insurance policy, the question arose as to the materiality of certain facts which had not been communicated to the insurers. It was proposed to give in evidence the opinions of certain insurance brokers, who had had long acquaintance with insurance business. Such evidence was rejected.

LORD MANSFIELD, C.J. "Great stress was laid upon the opinion of the broker. But we all think the jury ought not to pay the least regard to it. **It is mere opinion; which is not evidence.** It is opinion after an event. It is opinion without the least foundation from any previous precedent or usage. It is an opinion which, if rightly formed, could only be drawn from the same premises from which the Court and jury were to determine the cause, and therefore it is improper and irrelevant in the mouth of a witness."

Note.—It should be observed that a good deal of discussion has taken place as to the correctness of this decision, and such evidence has been admitted in other cases (see *Smith's Leading Cases*, I. 504).

Really, the question is not whether the witness is "expert"; it is rather whether the Court is "non-expert." If the Court can properly form an opinion it is its province to do so, and the opinion of persons, however experienced, is irrelevant, as it can only be drawn from the same premises as those from which the Court can draw its opinion.

FOLKES v. CHADD
(1782).

3 DOUGLAS, 157.

On matters such as those of science or art, upon which the Court itself cannot form an opinion, special study and experience being required for the purpose, "expert" witnesses may give evidence of their opinions.

The question arising whether a certain bank, erected for the purpose of preventing the sea overflowing certain meadows, contributed to the choking and decay of a certain harbour, the evidence of Mr. Smeaton, the celebrated engineer, of his opinion on the subject, was allowed.

LORD MANSFIELD, C.J. "The question is, to what has this decay been owing? The defendant says to this bank. Why? Because it prevents the back-water. That is matter of opinion; the whole case is a question of opinion, from facts agreed upon. Nobody can swear that it was the cause; nobody thought that it would produce this mischief when the bank was erected."

"Mr. Smeaton is called. A confusion now arises from a misapplication of terms. It is objected that Mr. Smeaton is going to speak, not as to facts, but as to opinion. That opinion, however, is deduced from facts which are not disputed—the situation of banks, the course of tides and of winds, and the shifting of sands. His opinion, deduced from all these facts, is, that, mathematically speaking, the bank may contribute to the mischief, but not sensibly. Mr. Smeaton understands the construction of harbours, the causes of their destruction, and how remedied. In matters of science no other witnesses can be called. . . . I cannot believe that where the question is, whether a defect arises from a natural or an artificial cause, the opinions of men of science are not to be received. **Hand-writing is proved every day by opinion; and for false evidence on such questions a man may be indicted for perjury.**"

"I have myself received the opinion of Mr. Smeaton respecting mills, as a matter of science. The cause of the decay of the harbour

is also a matter of science, and still more so, whether the removal of the bank can be beneficial. Of this, such men as Mr. Smeaton alone can judge. Therefore, we are of opinion that his judgment, formed on facts, was very proper evidence."

Note.—The matters upon which such opinion evidence can be given, include, *inter alia*, causes of death, insanity, effects of poison, genuineness of works of art, value of articles, genuineness of handwriting, proper navigation of vessels, meaning of trade terms, foreign law, etc. And in support of such opinion evidence the witness may prove experiments, inspections and other acts upon which he bases his opinion, although they were made or done in the absence of the party. See *R. v. Heseltine*, 12 Cox, 404.

BRISTOW v. SEQUEVILLE

(1850).

19 L. J. Ex. 289; 14 JUR. 674; 5 Ex. 275; 82 R. R. 664.

It is for the Judge to decide whether the skill of any proposed witness is sufficient to entitle him to be considered as an expert. A person whose knowledge of foreign law is derived solely from study without actual practice is incompetent to give evidence on such matter.

In order to prove the foreign law in force at Cologne, a witness was called, who stated that he was a jurisconsult and adviser to the Prussian consul in England; that he had studied law at the University of Leipsic, and knew from his studies there that the Code Napoléon was in force at Cologne. Held, that he was incompetent to prove the law of Cologne.

ALDERSON, B. "If a man who has studied law in Saxony, and has never practised in Prussia, is a competent witness, why may not a Frenchman, who has studied the books relating to Chinese law, prove what the law of China is?"

ROLFE, B. "If this is sufficient, it would do to study the German law at Oxford."

Note.—Foreign or Colonial law is a matter of “science,” upon which opinion evidence can be given. As to the judicial notice of English law, see *ante*, p. 11.

It may, perhaps, be doubted whether the evidence of a learned jurist—consult or professor, who had never actually practised, would always be rejected. It would be strange that a young and comparatively inexperienced practitioner should be admitted as a witness in preference to a learned professor of high reputation. The Judge would probably consider the general qualification of the proposed witness, and would not rely solely upon the question of practice.

FRYER v. GATHERCOLE

(1849).

13 JUR. 542.

On matters with respect to which it is practically impossible for any witness to swear positively, ordinary or “non-expert” witnesses may give evidence of their opinions.

So, on questions of identification, condition, comparison or resemblance, of persons or things, a witness may speak as to his belief or opinion, when he cannot swear positively; although he has no special knowledge, skill or experience on such matters generally.

To prove the publication of a libellous pamphlet, a female witness was called, who deposed to having received from the defendant a copy of a pamphlet, of which she read some portions, and lent it to several persons in succession, who returned it to her, after which she wrote her name on it; and, although there was no mark by which she could identify it, she *believed* the copy produced to be the same, but could not swear that it was. It was held that this was proper evidence of identification of the pamphlet.

POLLOCK, C.B. “The question resolves itself into a question of degree. The witness could say no more than this: ‘I believe the copy of the pamphlet produced to be the same with that which I received from the defendant, because when I lent that copy to other persons it was returned to me, and I had no reason to believe it

otherwise when I last got it back. I then for certainty put my name to it.' If the name had been written in the first instance no doubt could have arisen. . . . As has been truly argued, **there are many cases of identification where the law would be rendered ridiculous if positive certainty were required from witnesses.** . . . The evidence in this case was therefore properly received ; any objection to it goes merely to its value."

ALDERSON, B. "She said she read a portion—read several parts of it. She lends it to A. B., he has it in his possession out of her sight, he returns her a similar book on the same subject, and **she believes it is the same copy.** It is open to contend that A. B. may have substituted another copy, and that that returned is not the same which was lent. The jury may judge how far that is probable or reasonable."

PARKE, B. "**In the identification of person you compare in your mind the man you have seen with the man you see at the trial. The same rule belongs to every species of identification.**"

Note.—One of the chief matters on which non-experts are called to give opinion evidence of identification or comparison is handwriting, as to which see *post*, p. 271. Expert witnesses may also be called on such questions, to apply their special skill thereto.

Another matter upon which opinion evidence may be given is referred to in the Motor Car Act, 1903, *i.e.* the speed of a car (see *post*, p. 346).

THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

Before the Court can proceed to hear a case, it is, of course, necessary to determine which party shall begin, or upon whom the burden of proof lies. The general rule is that the party who alleges the matter in issue must prove it. In a criminal case the allegations are invariably made by the prosecution, on whom the burden of proof lies, with the exception sometimes as to negative averments, explained in the following pages. In civil cases the pleadings must be looked at in order to settle the question.

The plaintiff naturally, in his Statement of Claim, makes the first allegation. If the defendant, in his Defence, pleads a "traverse," or denial of the plaintiff's allegation, that puts the plaintiff's allegation in issue and leaves the burden of proof upon him. If the defendant pleads a "confession and avoidance," admitting the plaintiff's allegation, but alleging further facts by way of defence, the matter in issue is not the plaintiff's allegation, but that of the defendant, if denied, and the burden of proof is therefore upon the latter.

The expression "right to begin," frequently used in this connection, may seem inconsistent with the expression "burden of proof," as both expressions refer to the same position. The two expressions both indeed refer to the position of the party who, on the facts, is to begin, but they indicate the different way in which such position may be viewed. If such party has not sufficient evidence to establish his case by his own witnesses, he would consider his position a burden; if he has clearly sufficient evidence to make out a *prima facie* case, he would consider his position a right or privilege, as it would generally entitle him to both the first

and the last word in the case, by way of Reply (see hereon the Criminal Procedure Act, 1865, s. 2, *post*, p. 324).

AFFIRMATIVE AVERMENTS.

AMOS v. HUGHES

(1835).

1 M. & ROB. 464.

The burden of proof or right to begin is with the party who alleges the "affirmative in substance" of the matter in issue. The test is, generally, who would be entitled to the verdict if no evidence were given? The burden of proof is on the other party.

In an action for a breach of contract to emboss calico in a workmanlike manner, the defendant pleading that he had done the work properly, the question arose as to which party should begin; it was held that the plaintiff should do so.

ALDERSON, B., said, questions of this kind were not to be decided by simply ascertaining on which side the affirmative, in point of form, lay: the proper test is, which party would be successful if no evidence at all were given? Now here, supposing no evidence to be given on either side, the defendant would be entitled to the verdict, for it is not to be assumed that the work was badly executed; therefore the onus lies on the plaintiff.

Note.—It should be observed that the burden of proof is upon, or the right to begin belongs to, the party who alleges the affirmative "in substance." As in the above case, the grammatical affirmative does not settle the question. It is always possible to make an allegation in a negative form, so that the defendant must answer it affirmatively; as above, where the defendant said "he had done the work properly," the plaintiff having alleged, apparently, that it was "not done properly." The proof cannot be shifted by putting an allegation in a negative form. The question is, on the facts, who substantially alleges the "affirmative in substance"? He begins. The next case is perhaps a still better illustration of the rule.

SOWARD v. LEGGATT

(1836).

7 C. & P. 613.

In determining which party ought to begin, it is not so much the grammatical language of the pleading which is to be considered as the substance and effect of it. The Judge should consider what is the substantial fact in issue, and who alleges the "affirmative in substance" thereof.

The plaintiff, being the landlord of the defendant, alleged that the latter "did not repair" the premises in question. The defendant pleaded that he "did well and sufficiently repair" the same. It was held that, notwithstanding that the defendant's pleading was the grammatical affirmative, the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff.

LORD ABINGER, C.B. "Looking at these things according to common sense, we should consider what is the substantive fact to be made out, and on whom it lies to make it out. It is not so much the form of the issue which ought to be considered, as the substance and effect of it. In many cases, a party, by a little difference in the drawing of his pleadings, might make it either affirmative or negative, as he pleased. The plaintiff here says, 'You did not repair'; he might have said, 'You let the house become dilapidated.' I shall endeavour by my own view to arrive at the substance of the issue, and I think in the present case that the plaintiff's counsel should begin."

Note.—The questions practically are—what is the matter in issue? Who brought it into question? The party who did so must prove it.

NEGATIVE AVERMENTS.

ABRATH v. NORTH EASTERN RY. CO.
(1883).

L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 440; 52 L. J. Q. B. 620; 49 L. T. 618; 32 W. R. 50; 47 J. P. 692.

The burden of proof is upon the party who alleges the matter in issue, even although his allegation involves a negative, as a general rule.

When the party alleging has made out a "*primâ facie*" case in support of his allegation, the burden of proof may shift to his opponent.

Thus, in an action for malicious prosecution, where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant instituted proceedings against him *without* reasonable and probable cause, the burden is on the plaintiff to show, *primâ facie*, the want of reasonable and probable cause. The burden may then shift to the defendant to show that he had such cause.

BRETT, M.R. "It seems to me that the propositions ought to be stated thus: the plaintiff may give *primâ facie* evidence which, unless it be answered either by contradictory evidence, or by the evidence of additional facts, ought to lead the jury to find the question in his favour: the defendant may give evidence either by contradicting the plaintiff's evidence or by proving other facts: the jury have to consider upon the evidence given upon both sides, whether they are satisfied in favour of the plaintiff with respect to the question which he calls upon them to answer; if they are, they must find for the plaintiff; but if upon consideration of the facts they come clearly to the opinion that the question ought to be answered against the plaintiff, they must find for the defendant. Then comes this difficulty—suppose that the jury, after considering the evidence, are left in real doubt as to which way they are to answer the question put to them on behalf of the plaintiff; in that case also the burden of proof lies upon the plaintiff; and if the defendant has been able, by the additional facts which he has

adduced, to bring the minds of the whole jury to a real state of doubt, the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the burden of proof which lies upon him."

BOWEN, L.J. "Whenever litigation exists somebody must go on with it; the plaintiff is the first to begin; if he does nothing he fails; if he makes a *prima facie* case, and nothing is done to answer it, the defendant fails. The test, therefore, as to the burden of proof or onus of proof, whichever term is used, is simply this: to ask oneself which party will be successful if no evidence is given, or if no more evidence is given than has been given at a particular point of the case, for it is obvious that as the controversy involved in the litigation travels on, the parties from moment to moment may reach points at which the onus of proof shifts, and at which the tribunal will have to say that if the case stops there it must be decided in a particular manner. The test being such as I have stated, it is not a burden that goes on for ever resting on the shoulders of the person upon whom it is first cast. As soon as he brings evidence which, until it is answered, rebuts the evidence against which he is contending, then the balance descends on the other side, and the burden rolls over until again there is evidence which once more turns the scale. That being so, the question of onus of proof is only a rule for deciding on whom the obligation of going further, if he wishes to win, rests. It is not a rule to enable the jury to decide on the value of conflicting evidence. So soon as a conflict of evidence arises it ceases to be a question of onus of proof."

"There is another point which must be cleared in order to make plain what I am about to say. As causes are tried, the term 'onus of proof' may be used in more ways than one. Sometimes when a cause is tried the jury is left to find generally for either the plaintiff or the defendant, and it is in such a case essential that the Judge should tell the jury on whom the burden of making out the case rests, and when and at what period it shifts. Issues again may be left to the jury upon which they are to find generally for the plaintiff or the defendant, and they ought to be told on whom the burden of proof rests; and indeed it is to be observed that very often the burden of proof will be shifted within the scope of a particular issue

by presumptions of law which have to be explained to the jury. But there is **another way** of conducting a trial at Nisi Prius, which is by asking certain definite questions of the jury. If there is a conflict of evidence as to these questions, it is unnecessary, except for the purpose of making plain what the Judge is doing, to explain to the jury about onus of proof, unless there are presumptions of law, such as, for instance, the presumption of consideration for a bill of exchange, or a presumption of consideration for a deed. And if the jury is asked by the Judge a plain question, as, for instance, whether they believe or disbelieve the principal witness called for the plaintiff, it is unnecessary to explain to them about the onus of proof, because the only answer which they have to give is 'Yes' or 'No,' or else they cannot tell what to say. If the jury cannot make up their minds upon a question of that kind it is for the Judge to say which party is entitled to the verdict. I do not forget that there are canons which are useful to a Judge in commenting upon evidence and rules for determining the weight of conflicting evidence ; but they are not the same as onus of proof."

"Now in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff has the burden throughout of establishing that the circumstances of the prosecution were such that a Judge can see no reasonable or probable cause for instituting it. In one sense this is the assertion of a negative, and we have been pressed with the proposition that when a negative is to be made out the onus of proof shifts. That is not so. If the assertion of a negative is an essential part of the plaintiff's case, the proof of the assertion still rests upon the plaintiff. The terms 'negative' and 'affirmative' are after all relative and not absolute. In dealing with a question of negligence that term may be considered either as negative or affirmative according to the definition adopted in measuring the duty which is neglected. Wherever a person asserts affirmatively as part of his case that a certain state of facts is present or is absent, or that a particular thing is insufficient for a particular purpose, that is an averment which he is bound to prove positively. It has been said that an exception exists in those cases where the facts lie peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party. The counsel for the plaintiff have not gone the length of contending that in all

those cases the onus shifts, and that the person within whose knowledge the truth peculiarly lies is bound to prove or disprove the matter in dispute. I think a proposition of that kind cannot be maintained, and that the exceptions supposed to be found amongst cases relating to the game laws may be explained on special grounds."

"The ground of our decision comes back to what was suggested. Who had to make good their point as to the proposition whether the defendants had taken reasonable and proper care to inform themselves of the true state of the case? The defendants were not bound to make good anything. It was the plaintiff's duty to show the absence of reasonable care."

Note.—A negative averment must be distinguished from a contradiction of a positive averment, technically known as a "traverse." The former is part of the allegation which has, generally, to be proved by the party making it. The latter is an answer to the allegation of the opposite party, who must prove his allegation.

R. v. TURNER (1816).

5 M. & S. 206.

In some cases, if a negative averment is made by one party, and the facts involved are so numerous or complex or are so peculiarly within the knowledge of the other party that it is practically impossible for the party alleging to prove such negative, the burden of proof thereof may be on the party within whose knowledge such facts are, and not upon the party alleging.

So, in a prosecution against a carrier for having pheasants and hares in his possession without being qualified or authorised by law to do so; as there were ten different qualifications recognised by the game laws, and the prisoner knew which qualification, if any, he had, it was held that the burden of proof was upon him to show

what qualification he had, notwithstanding that the absence of qualification was affirmatively alleged by the prosecution. Otherwise the prosecution would have been obliged to expressly negative the whole of the ten possible qualifications.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "The question is, upon whom the *onus probandi* lies ; whether it lies upon the person who affirms a qualification, to prove the affirmative, or upon the informer, who denies any qualification, to prove the negative. **There are, I think, about ten different heads of qualification enumerated in the statute, to which the proof may be applied ; and, according to the argument of to-day, every person who lays an information of this sort is bound to give satisfactory evidence before the magistrates to negative the defendant's qualification upon each of those several heads. The argument really comes to this, that there would be a moral impossibility of ever convicting upon such an information. If the informer should establish the negative of any part of these different qualifications that would be insufficient, because it would be said, *non liquet*, but that the defendant may be qualified under the other. And does not, then, common sense show, that the burden of proof ought to be cast on the person who, by establishing any one of the qualifications, will be well defended ? Is not the statute of Anne, in effect, a prohibition on every person to kill game, unless he brings himself within some one of the qualifications allowed by law ; the proof of which is easy on the one side, but almost impossible on the other ?**"

BAYLEY, J. "I have always understood it to be a general rule, that if a negative averment be made by one party, which is peculiarly within the knowledge of the other, the party within whose knowledge it lies, and who asserts the affirmative, is to prove it, and not he who avers the negative. And if we consider the reason of the thing in this particular case, we cannot but see that it is next to impossible that the witness for the prosecution should be prepared to give any evidence of the defendant's want of qualification. If, indeed, it is to be presumed that he must be acquainted with the defendant, and with his situation or habits in life, then he might give general evidence what those were ; but if, as it is more probable, he is unacquainted with any of these matters,

how is he to form any judgment whether he is qualified or not, from his appearance only? Therefore, if the law were to require that the witness should depose negatively to these things, it seems to me, that it might lead to the encouragement of much hardihood of swearing. The witness would have to depose to a multitude of facts; he must swear that the defendant has not an estate in his own or his wife's right of a certain value; that he is not the son and heir-apparent of an esquire, etc.; but how is it at all probable that a witness should be likely to depose with truth to such *minutiæ*? On the other hand, there is no hardship in casting the burden of the affirmative proof on the defendant, because he must be presumed to know his own qualification, and to be able to prove it. . . . But if the onus of proving the negative is to lie on the other party, it seems to me that it will be the cause of many offenders escaping conviction. I cannot help thinking, therefore, that the onus must lie on the defendant, and that when the prosecutor has proved everything which, but for the defendant's being qualified, would subject the defendant to the penalty, he has done enough; and the proof of qualification is to come in as matter of defence."

HOLROYD, J. "It is a general rule, that the affirmative is to be proved, and not the negative, unless under peculiar circumstances, where the general rule does not apply. Therefore, it must be shown, that this is a case which ought to form an exception to the general rule. Now all the qualifications mentioned in the statute are peculiarly within the knowledge of the party qualified. If he be entitled to any such estate as the statute requires, he may prove it by his title deeds, or by receipt of the rents and profits; or if he is son and heir-apparent, or servant to any lord or lady of a manor appointed to kill game, it will be a defence. All these qualifications are peculiarly within the knowledge of the party himself, whereas the prosecutor has probably no means whatever of proving a disqualification."

Note.—The law on the subject-matter of this case is not free from doubt, and the above case has itself been criticised. It is generally a question of construction of a particular statute. If the negative averment be a simple one, as doing something "without consent of the owner," the burden of proof would undoubtedly be upon the person so alleging, as he could easily satisfy it. But if the averment be complex, as in the above

case, it may be held that the burden, after proof of the physical act alleged, is upon the person. It is much a question of degree.

Some statutes expressly provide that proof of exemption, qualification, absence of fraudulent intent, etc., shall be upon the person charged.

Among these the following may be mentioned—the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, s. 14 (*post*, p. 319); the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, s. 39 (*post*, p. 333); the Explosive Substances Act, 1883, s. 4 (*post*, p. 334); the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, s. 2 (*post*, p. 337); and the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 457 (*post*, p. 340). Many other examples might be given; there being a growing tendency to put such proof upon the person charged.

DAMAGES.

MERCER v. WHALL

(1845).

14 L. J. Q. B. 267; 9 JUR. 576; 5 Q. B. 447.

In all cases in which a party claims damages, the amount of which is unascertained, he has the right to begin, and the burden of proof although the affirmative of the issue on the record rests with the other party.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. "The natural course would seem to be, that the plaintiff should bring his own cause of complaint before the Court and jury, in every case where he has anything to prove, either as to the facts necessary for his obtaining a verdict, or as to the amount of damage to which he conceives the proof of such facts may entitle him. . . . It appears expedient that the plaintiff should begin, in order that the Judge, the jury, and the defendant himself, show know precisely how the claim is shaped. This disclosure may convince the defendant that the defence which he has pleaded cannot be established. . . . If in an action for damages the damages are ascertained, and the plaintiff has a *primâ facie* case on which he must recover that known amount, and no more, unless the defendant proves what he has affirmed in pleading; here is a satisfactory

ground for the defendant's proceeding at once to establish that fact. But if the extent of damage is not ascertained, the plaintiff is the person to ascertain it, and his doing so will have the good effect of making even the defence, in a vast majority of cases, much more easily understood for all who are interested with the decision."

Note.—There is an acknowledged difficulty in cases where the proof of all the issues of a fact is upon the defendant, and that of the amount of damages is upon the plaintiff. Formerly the authorities were conflicting, but the above case seems to have settled the rule as stated.

THE AMOUNT OF PROOF. COGENCY.

CORROBORATION.

The law does not, as a general rule, deal directly with the amount of proof required or its cogency and weight. Such matters are obviously for the Court in most cases. But in a few special cases it does deal with such matters by requiring corroboration.

Generally, the evidence of one witness, entirely uncorroborated, is sufficient to establish any fact, if the jury choose to believe it.

In one case the Courts, and in eleven cases the Legislature, have laid down the rule that there must be corroboration. The only case in which corroboration is required apart from statute is that of perjury, for the obvious reason stated in the leading case.

The cases where corroboration is required by statute are:—

- (1) Offences under the Act of Supremacy, 1558 (1 Eliz. c. 1).
- (2) Treason (7 & 8 Will. III. c. 3), see *post*, p. 312.
- (3) Offences under the Blasphemy Act, 1697 (9 Will. 3, c. 35).
- (4) Personation at Elections (6 & 7 Vict. c. 18), see *post*, p. 314.
- (5) Affiliation (8 & 9 Vict. c. 10, and 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65), see *post*, pp. 315, 330.
- (6) Breach of Promise of Marriage (32 & 33 Vict. c. 68), see *post*, p. 329.
- (7) Removal of Paupers (39 & 40 Vict. c. 61), see *post*, p. 331.
- (8) Offences under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. c. 69), see *post*, p. 336.

(9) Offences under the Motor Car Act, 1903 (3 Edw. VII. c. 36), see *post*, p. 346.

(10) Offences under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1904 (4 Edw. VII. c. 75), see *post*, p. 347.

(11) Offences under the Children Act, 1908 (8 Edw. VII. c. 67), see *post*, p. 349.

It should be observed that by the first four of the above statutes two witnesses are required. In all other cases the corroboration may be in other ways, for instance by an admission, even by conduct (see *post*, p. 135), of the party implicated, or by documents. Sir James Stephen (*Dig. Ev.*, Arts. 121, 122) draws the distinction between "corroboration" and "number of witnesses," but puts the case of perjury under the latter head, although showing, by the language used, that it has no place there.

The above-mentioned cases, in which the law strictly requires corroboration, must be distinguished from the cases (given below) in which it is merely the practice, or custom of the Courts to require corroboration.

R. v. MUSCOT (1716).

10 MODERN, 192.

A person cannot legally be convicted of perjury on the uncorroborated evidence of one witness.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

HOLT, C.J. "There is this difference between a prosecution for perjury and a bare contest about property, that in the latter case the matter stands indifferent; and therefore a credible and probable witness shall turn the scale in favour of either party; but in the former, presumption is ever to be made in favour of innocence;

and the oath of the party will have a regard paid to it, until disproved. Therefore to convict a man of perjury, a probable, a credible witness is not enough; but it must be a strong and clear evidence, and more numerous than the evidence given for the defendant; for else there is only oath against oath."

Note.—This is the only case in which the Judges have taken upon themselves to require corroboration without statutory requirement.

An admission by the prisoner has been allowed as corroboration in perjury (*R. v. Hook, Dearsly and Bell*, 606).

R. v. STUBBS (1855).

25 L. J. M. C. 16; DEARS. C. C. 555.

It is a rule of practice that a person shall not be convicted on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. But corroboration is not legally required. The Judge should, however, advise the jury not to convict on such evidence.

Stubbs and three others were indicted for stealing copper. Three accomplices swore that Stubbs assisted in taking some of the copper and selling it to a marine-store dealer. The latter, being called, stated that the three other prisoners were the parties who brought the copper and sold it to him. No other evidence was adduced against Stubbs, but the accomplices were corroborated in other particulars with regard to the three other prisoners. The Judge directed the jury that it was not necessary that the accomplices should be confirmed as to each individual prisoner being connected with the crime charged; that their being corroborated as to material facts, tending to show that two of the other prisoners were connected with the larceny, was sufficient as to the whole case, but that the jury should look with more suspicion at the evidence in Stubbs's case, where there was no corroboration, than to the cases of the others, where there was corroboration, but that it was a question for the jury. The jury found all the prisoners guilty, and the Court for

Crown Cases Reserved affirmed the conviction, although they regretted it had been arrived at without a warning from the Judge that a conviction should not take place on such evidence.

JERVIS, C.J. "We cannot interfere, though we may regret the result that has been arrived at, for it is contrary to the ordinary practice. It is not a rule of law that accomplices must be confirmed in order to render a conviction valid, and it is the duty of the Judge to tell the jury that they may act on the unconfirmed testimony of an accomplice; but it is usual in practice for the Judge to advise the jury not to convict on such testimony alone; and juries generally attend to the Judge's direction and require confirmation. But it is only a rule of practice. . . . In this case the jury have acted on the evidence, and we cannot interfere."

PARKE, B. "During all the time that I have been on the bench, I have usually laid down the rule as it has been stated by the Chief Justice Jervis. I have told the jury that they may find a prisoner guilty upon the unsupported testimony of an accomplice, but the Judges have been in the habit of advising them not to act on such testimony unless corroborated. There has been a difference of opinion among the Judges respecting the corroboration requisite. My practice always has been to tell the jury not to convict the prisoner unless the evidence of the accomplice be confirmed, not only as to the circumstances of the crime, but also as to the person of the prisoner."

WILLES, J. "This is not a question of law, but of practice, and questions of law only can be reserved for our opinion."

Note.—The distinction between corroboration required strictly by law, and that required as a matter of practice or prudence merely, should be specially noted. A conviction on uncorroborated evidence would, in the former case, be illegal, in the latter case, it is perfectly legal, although improper. Sir James Stephen's arrangement (*Dig. Ev.*, Art. 121), where the case of an accomplice is put with the cases where corroboration must be had, and is separated from the case of claims against estates of deceased persons, which stand on the same footing as the case of an accomplice (see next case), is misleading.

In the above case, it was held that the conviction could not be quashed, but in the recent case of *R. v. Tate*, [1908] 2 K. B. 680, a conviction was quashed by the Court of Criminal Appeal on the ground of want of corroboration of an accomplice.

"Accomplices" are all those jointly concerned in a crime, either as principal or accessories.

"Corroboration by another accomplice, or even by several accomplices, does not suffice; nor apparently does corroboration by even the innocent wife of the accomplice. But a spy, since his complicity extends only to the *actus reus* and not to the *mens rea*, is not truly an accomplice, and so does not need corroboration" (*Kenny, Criminal Law*, 387).

BECKETT v. RAMSDALE

(1885).

L. R. 31 C. D. 177 ; 55 L. J. CH. 241 ; 54 L. T. 222 ;
34 W. R. 127.

A claim against the estate of a deceased person is not generally allowed on the uncorroborated evidence of the claimant, although there is no rule of law against allowing it.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

SIR J. HANNEN. "It is said on behalf of the defendants that the evidence is not to be accepted by the Court because there is no corroboration of it, and that in the case of a conflict of evidence between living and dead persons there must be corroboration to establish a claim advanced by a living person against the estate of a dead person. We are of opinion that there is no rule of English law laying down such a proposition. The statement of a living man is not to be disbelieved because there is no corroboration, but we must take into account the necessary absence through death of one of the parties to the transaction, and in considering the statement of the survivor it is natural to look for corroboration in support of it; but if the evidence given by the living man does bring conviction to the tribunal which has to try the question, then there is no rule of law which prevents that being acted upon."

Note.—"There is in England no rule of law precluding a claimant from recovering against the estate of a deceased person on his own testimony without corroboration; but the Court will always regard such evidence

with jealous suspicion, and, it is said, will in general receive such corroboration, and in Ireland it has been said that there is a positive rule of law admitting of no exception, that a claim upon the assets of a deceased person cannot be allowed on the uncorroborated evidence of the claimant. In Scotland, the general rule is that the testimony of one witness is not full proof of any ground of action or defence whatever" (*Best on Evidence*, p. 599).

DIVORCE CASES.

It appears also to be the regular practice of the Divorce Court to require corroboration to establish adultery, and certain other matters.

"The Court will not act upon the uncorroborated evidence of a party to a matrimonial action" (*Browne on Divorce*, p. 233).

"The Court hesitates, and, at times, refuses to find that adultery has been committed, on the evidence of one witness alone. The evidence of the other party to the marriage invariably requires corroboration, but the evidence of one credible and disinterested witness is usually accepted" (*Dixon on Divorce*, p. 158).

"Corroborative evidence is almost always required to substantiate any really material averment. It is certainly required to prove both adultery and cruelty. . . . It is certainly no less required in suits for nullity on the ground of non-consummation through impotence than it is in suits for dissolution, for the fear of collusion must be removed to the last reasonable trace" (*Gwynne Hall on Divorce*, p. 550).

THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED. DIRECT EVIDENCE.

A rule known as the "best evidence rule" appears to have been formerly of very wide application. It is understood to have excluded circumstantial evidence if direct evidence were available; proof of handwriting by other witnesses if the writer himself were available; proof of a person's consent by other witnesses if he were available, and other like evidence. It still excludes secondary evidence of documents if the originals are available (see *post*, p. 252), but this seems to be the only existing application of the rule. But the rule against "hearsay" evidence, is sometimes placed under the best evidence rule. This seems scarcely correct. The rule against hearsay is that such evidence is not legal evidence at all, not that it is, as in the other cases mentioned, legal evidence postponed to or excluded by other, or the "best" evidence.

The rule, however, respecting hearsay is clear and definite. It is, except in a few clearly defined cases, inadmissible, and direct evidence is generally the only permissible evidence. The witness must say that he perceived the fact in question by one of his five senses; he must say in effect that he saw, heard, felt, smelt or tasted, that of which he speaks—not that he heard of it from another person.

For good general discussions of the "best evidence rule," see *Thayer*, 484; *Best*, 78; *Phipson*, 36; *Taylor*, 303.

STOBART v. DRYDEN (1836).

5 L. J. EX. 218; 1 M. & W. 615; 2 GALE, 146;
1 TYR. & GR. 899; 46 R. R. 424.

Direct evidence, that is evidence of a witness who perceived the facts with his own senses, is generally required.

Hearsay evidence, that is evidence of a witness of facts which he did not himself perceive, but of which he heard from other persons, is not admissible, except in a few special cases. This rule excludes statements made by deceased persons generally.

The plaintiff sued the defendant on a mortgage deed. The defendant pleaded that the deed had been fraudulently altered by one of the attesting witnesses, who had since died. In support of this plea, the defendant called a witness to prove statements and letters made and written by the deceased attesting witness, tending to shew that he had fraudulently altered the deed. It was held that the evidence was inadmissible.

PARKE, B. "The general rule is, that hearsay evidence is not admissible as proof of a fact which has been stated by a third person. This rule has been long established as a fundamental principle of the law of evidence; but certain exceptions have also been recognised, some from very early times, upon the ground of necessity or convenience. The simple question for us to decide is, whether such a declaration as this be one of the allowed exceptions to the general rule. . . . Is evidence of what the subscribing witness *has said* admissible?"

"It was contended on the argument that it was, and that it formed an exception to the general rule, and on two grounds; one of them, which I shall mention first, in order to dispose of it, was, that, as the plaintiff used the declaration of the subscribing witness, evidenced by his signature, to prove the execution, the defendant might use any declaration of the same witness to disprove it. The

answer to this argument is, that evidence of the handwriting in the attestation is not used as a declaration by the witness, but to shew the fact that he put his name in that place and manner, in which in the ordinary course of business he would have done, if he had actually seen the deed executed. A statement of the attesting witness by parol, or written on any other document than that offered to be proved, would be inadmissible. The proof of actual attestation of the witness is, therefore, not the proof of a declaration, but of a fact."

"The other ground, and the principal one, on which the most reliance was placed, was, that it was in the nature of a substitute for the loss of the benefit of the cross-examination of the subscribing witness, if he had been alive and personally examined; by which, either the fact confessed would have been proved; or, if not, the witness would have been liable to be contradicted by proof of his admission: and it was contended that every declaration was admissible which might have been given in evidence to impeach the credit of the witness himself on his personal examination."

"Let us inquire what the authorities are in support of this exception. If we should find them numerous, and of long standing, we should be bound to give effect to them, though we might doubt the policy of introducing such a departure from the established rule: if we find them few, and of comparatively recent origin, and not supported by the deliberate judgment of any Court, we ought not to sanction the introduction of such an exception, especially if its convenience and practical utility be of a doubtful nature."

(Here follows a review of the previous cases.)

"Such is the state of the authorities, which are very limited indeed in point of number. . . . it is impossible to say that there is any such weight or authority, however great our respect for the eminent Judges whose names have been mentioned, as to induce us to hold that this case is established and recognised as an exception from the great principle of our law of evidence, that facts, the truth of which depends on parol evidence, are to be proved by testimony on oath."

"If we had to determine the question of the propriety of admitting the proposed evidence, on the ground of convenience,

apart from the consideration of the expediency of abiding by general rules, we should say that it was at the least very doubtful, whether, generally speaking, it would not cause greater mischief than advantage in the investigation of truth. An extreme case might occur, as there seems to have done before Mr. Justice Heath, where the exclusion of evidence of a death-bed declaration would probably have been the exclusion of one mode of discovering the truth. The same may, perhaps, be said of all solemn assertions *in extremis* by deceased witnesses. But, on the other hand, if any declarations at any time from the mouth of subscribing witnesses who are dead are to be admitted in evidence (and you cannot stop short of that, for no one contends that the exception is to be confined to death-bed declarations, and if so confined, the evidence would be inadmissible in the present case), the result would be that the security of solemn instruments would be much impaired. The rights of parties under wills and deeds would be liable to be affected at remote periods, by loose declarations of attesting witnesses, which those parties would have no opportunity of contradicting, or explaining by the evidence of the witnesses themselves. The party impeaching the validity of the instrument would, it is true, have an equivalent for the loss of his power of cross-examination of the living witness; but the party supporting it would have none for the loss of his power of re-examination. We cannot help feeling, therefore, that it is at least very doubtful whether the establishment of such an exception would be productive of any advantage: and when the great benefit to the administration of justice, of abiding by general rules and acting upon general principles, is taken into consideration, we feel no doubt but that it would be inexpedient to sanction this additional exception to the established rule of evidence."

Note.—The only case in which evidence may be given of a statement made by a dying person is in a trial for homicide (see *post*, p. 187).

R. v. ERISWELL

(1790).

3 T. R. 707.

Hearsay evidence is not admissible even though it be shown that the statement in question was made on oath out of court.

Thus, the evidence of a witness taken *ex parte* on oath before two magistrates was rejected.

GROSE, J. "Is such evidence competent? It is what is commonly called *hearsay evidence* of a fact. Now it is a general rule that such evidence is not admissible, except in some few particular cases where the exception (for aught we know) is as ancient as the rule. . . . No principle was stated to take this out of the general rule, to show why hearsay evidence of the agreement should be permitted in this case any more than any other. But cases have been cited both to prove that this evidence was admissible as hearsay evidence, and as given upon oath before the magistrates. . . . An idea has prevailed that such hearsay evidence is sufficient; but I can make no difference between evidence necessary to prove an hiring, that is, an agreement to hire, and any other agreement. . . . and no one ever conceived that an agreement could be proved by a witness swearing that he heard another say that such an agreement was made."

"Is the evidence better upon the ground that it was upon oath administered by two justices? Evidence, though upon oath, to affect an absent person, is incompetent, because he cannot cross-examine; as nothing can be more unjust than that a person should be bound by evidence which he is not permitted to hear."

"But it may be said that it is in this case wise and discreet to depart from the general rule of evidence, and in this instance to admit hearsay evidence of a fact, or evidence on oath administered in the absence of the adverse party. I dread that rules of evidence shall ever depend upon the discretion of Judges; I wish to find the rule laid down, and to abide by it. In this case I find the general rule; I find no decided authority that forms an exception to it;

and nothing but a clear uncontrovertible decision upon the point ; and not the concession of counsel or the *obiter dictum* of a Judge, ought to form an exception to a general rule of law framed in wisdom by our ancestors, and adopted in every case except where the exception is as ancient as the rule."

LORD KENYON, C.J. "The evidence should be given under the sanction of an oath legally administered and in a judicial proceeding depending between the parties affected by it, or those who stand in privity of estate or interest with them. . . . Examinations upon oath, except in the excepted cases, are of no avail unless they are made in a cause or proceeding depending between the parties to be affected by them, and where each has an opportunity of cross-examining the witness ; otherwise it is *res inter alios acta*, and not to be received."

Note.—A very learned reviewer, in the *Law Quarterly Review*, April, 1908, has criticised the introduction of the above case into this book, rightly saying that the decision "was precisely the other way, for the Court below had admitted the evidence, and on appeal, the Judges being equally divided, that decision was affirmed." The writer was not ignorant of this when he introduced the case, but he did not, and does not now, consider that the ultimate result of the proceedings in any way affects the propriety of quoting the two judgments from which extracts have above been given, and which now are always treated as correct expositions of the law. The two contrary judgments have been purposely omitted as being generally discredited. In a later case (*R. v. Ferry Frystone*, 2 East, 54) (1801), Lord Kenyon said—"The point upon which the Court were divided in opinion, in the case of *The King v. Eriswell*, has been since considered to be so clear against the admissibility of the evidence . . . that it was abandoned by the counsel at the bar in the case of *The King v. Nuneham Courtney*, 1 East, 373, without argument."

It should be remembered that evidence may be taken out of Court by special order, before a commissioner or examiner (see *post*, p. 202).

HEARSAY EVIDENCE. WHEN ADMISSIBLE.

It will be observed that in the two last cases given, reference was made to certain exceptions from the rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The law has, indeed, from early times allowed several exceptions, practically in most cases on the ground of necessity, but it has invariably taken care that the exception shall be guarded by some security which makes the evidence really reliable. We shall therefore find generally that there is (1) some special necessity for the admission of such evidence, and (2) some special guarantee of its credibility, to take the place of those incidental to direct evidence, viz., the oath and cross-examination.

Such special necessity for the admission of the hearsay evidence is particularly noticeable in the case of the several instances of admissible statements made by deceased persons, generally called "declarations," hereinafter noticed. If such statements were not admitted, frequently most material evidence, perhaps the only evidence on the subject, would be unavailable, the only persons who could give direct evidence being dead. But it will be noticed that in every case the law is careful to secure some guarantee of credibility, and generally the rules for the admission of such evidence are strictly construed.

The word "declaration" may suggest formality; but really the most informal statements, written or verbal, or even conduct, where it can be understood, are generally admissible, where the circumstances are otherwise proper.

The instances of admissible hearsay may be stated as follows:—

- (1) Admissions.
 - (2) Confessions.
 - (3) Declarations in course of duty.
 - (4) Declarations against interest.
 - (5) Declarations as to pedigree.
 - (6) Declarations as to public and general rights.
 - (7) Declarations as to cause of death.
 - (8) Declarations as to contents of wills.
 - (9) Evidence given in former proceedings.
 - (10) Statements in public documents.
- Mr. Taylor gives another exception—
- (11) Statements in ancient documents.

Referring to documents thirty years old, he writes—"as these furnish the only attainable evidence of ancient possession, the law, on the principle of necessity, allows them to be read . . . provided they are not mere narratives of past events, but that they *purport* to have formed a part of the act of ownership, exercise of right, or other transaction to which they relate" (*Taylor*, p. 467). But he afterwards says—"Though they are usually spoken of as hearsay evidence of ancient possession, and, as such, are said to be admitted in exception to the general rule; yet they seem rather to be parts of the *res gestæ*, and therefore admissible as original evidence" (*Taylor*, p. 473). It is certainly not usual now to treat them as hearsay.

(As to (8), *supra*, being treated as hearsay, see *post*, p. 189.)

ADMISSIONS.

Perhaps the most important instance of admissible hearsay is to be found in the case of "admissions," or statements made by either party to a suit against his interest, as tending either to the proof of his opponent's case or to the disproof of his own. At first sight admissions may not appear to be hearsay, but in reality they are. For instance, a witness for the plaintiff, who may himself know nothing of the facts,

proves that the defendant told him something which is against his case. This would appear to be clearly hearsay, although some writers do not treat it as such. Phipson, Stephen, and Wills treat admissions and confessions as hearsay; Taylor, Powell, and Best do not.

The admissions here referred to are what may be called "informal" admissions, as distinguished from express or "formal" admissions—those made for the purposes of the trial—dealt with *ante*, p. 29, where an attempt has been made to explain the difference. Informal admissions, unlike formal admissions, appear in criminal as well as in civil cases (*e.g.* see the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, sect. 18, *post*, p. 318). But when they amount to admissions of the whole charge they are termed "confessions" (see *post*, p. 145).

It should be observed that admissions are not conclusive, but only evidence, so they can be explained or rebutted by other evidence.

MALTBY v. CHRISTIE (1795).

1 ESPINASSE, 340.

Statements made by either party to a suit tending to prove his opponent's case or disprove his own are admissible in evidence as admissions. Admissions need not be in writing, or even in express words. They may be gathered from a narrative or descriptive words.

In an action brought against an auctioneer, to recover the proceeds of sale of goods belonging to A, a bankrupt, the plaintiff (being the assignee of the bankrupt) was allowed to put in evidence, as an admission of the bankruptcy by the defendant, the catalogue of sale issued by him in which he described the goods as "the property of A, a bankrupt."

BESSELA v. STERN

(1877).

L. R. 2 C. P. D. 265 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 467 ; 37 L. T. 88 ;
25 W. R. 561.

Silence or conduct may amount to an admission, when it is natural to expect a reply or statement.

In an action for breach of promise of marriage, it was proved that the plaintiff said to the defendant, "You always promised to marry me, and you don't keep your word," and the defendant made no answer (beyond saying he would give her money to go away) ; his silence on the point was held to be an admission.

COCKBURN, C.J. "If that conversation took place, no doubt it is not conclusive ; for a man might think it not worth while to contradict the assertion of the promise, and raise a dispute. On the other hand, it might be said he made no reply to the accusation, because he could not with truth deny it."

BRAMWELL, L.J. "If in such a case it would not have been natural to deny it, it is no evidence of an admission that he does not. But, if a denial is what one would naturally expect, it is strong evidence of an admission and must be considered as corroboration of the claim set up."

BRETT, L.J. "The question is, would it have been natural at the time when the woman made the statement, that the man should have contradicted it? If so, the jury had a right to consider his not denying it evidence of the truth of what she said."

Note.—The above case should be compared with the next case. See note thereto.

WIEDEMANN v. WALPOLE

(1891).

L. R. [1891] 2 Q. B. 534; 60 L. J. Q. B. 762; 40 W. R. 114.

When the circumstances are such that a reply cannot properly be expected, the party's silence in face of a charge or assertion will not amount to an admission.

In an action for breach of promise of marriage, the fact that the defendant had not answered a letter written to him by the plaintiff, calling upon him to perform his promise of marriage, was held not to be any admission by him.

LORD ESHER, M.R. "The letter could only be put in as some evidence of an admission of the truth of the statements contained in it There are, no doubt, mercantile and business cases in which it is the ordinary course of mankind to answer a letter written upon a matter of business, and, if the letter were not answered, the Court would take notice of the ordinary course adopted by men of business—namely, to answer a letter where it is not intended to admit the truth of the statements contained in it; and if it were not answered, would take it as some evidence of the truth of the statements in it. But that is not like the case of a letter charging a man with some offence or impropriety. . . . It is the ordinary and wise practice of mankind not to answer such a letter, because, if a man answered it, a correspondence would be entered into, and he would be lost. I have no doubt that the mere fact of not answering a letter containing a statement of a promise to marry is not an admission."

BOWEN, L.J. "It would be a monstrous thing if it were the law that the mere fact of a man not answering a letter charging him with some offence, or making some claim against him, would necessarily and in all circumstances be evidence of admission of the truth of the charge or statement contained in the letter. There must be some limit placed upon such a proposition to make it consonant with common sense. I think the limit to be placed

upon it is, that silence upon the receipt of a letter cannot be taken as evidence of admission of the truth of its contents, unless there are some circumstances in the case which would render it probable that the person receiving the letter, who dissented from the statements, would answer it and deny them."

KAY, L.J. "I decline to lay down any general rule. There are certain business letters, the not answering of which by the persons who received them has been taken to be an admission by those persons of the truth of the statements contained in them. In other cases, all the circumstances under which the letter was written and received must be looked at in order to determine whether the omission to reply to it does fairly amount to an admission."

Note.—This case appears to have been much misunderstood; and it has been treated by some text-books as laying down the broad rule that the omission to answer a letter is no admission (see *Best*, 336; *Stephen*, 135). But the case clearly does not lay down so broad a rule. It is plain from the judgments that the whole question depends upon whether it was natural to expect a reply or not. If it were, silence is an admission; if it were not, silence is no admission. In the above case the Court held it was not natural, under the circumstances, to expect a reply, therefore the silence was no admission. But the Judges all admitted that there might be cases in which silence to a letter would be an admission. The Master of the Rolls appears to have taken a very low view of human nature, when he suggests that a man would more naturally reply to a business letter than repudiate a charge of some offence or impropriety. It is suggested that a man of high character would act otherwise.

MORIARTY v. L. C. & D. RY. CO.

(1870).

L. R. 5 Q. B. 314; 39 L. J. Q. B. 109; 22 L. T. 163;
18 W. R. 625.

An admission may be by conduct only; and it may relate not only to specific facts, but even show that the party's whole case is bad.

Thus, where the plaintiff sued a Railway Company for personal injury, evidence was given that he had gone about suborning false

witnesses who had not been present at the accident, and it was held that such conduct amounted to an admission that he had no case.

COCKBURN, C.J. "Here, if you can shew that a man has been suborning false testimony, and has endeavoured to have recourse to perjury, it is strong to shew that he knew perfectly well that his cause of action was an unrighteous one."

BLACKBURN, J. "The jury should be cautioned against giving the evidence too much weight, which they might possibly do, and directed that they were not to punish a man for giving false testimony by taking away his right of action, but only to see whether it shook their belief in his evidence."

LUSH, J. "This species of evidence is receivable as an admission by the party that the case he is putting forward is not the true one. It was an admission by conduct, and receivable on that ground."

R. v. NORTON

(1910).

L. R. [1910] 2 K. B. 496; 79 L. J. K. B. 756; 102 L. T. 926; 74 J. P. 375; 26 T. L. R. 550.

Admissions made by a prisoner may be proved against him on a criminal charge. Such admissions may be made by his answer to, or words used in reply to, an accusation or statement made in his presence, or by his silence or conduct when such statement is made, according to the circumstances.

But statements made in his presence are not, in themselves, evidence of the facts stated. They are admissible only as introductory to, or explanatory of, such answer, silence or conduct of the prisoner.

On a charge of an offence against a girl under thirteen, the evidence in question was to the effect that, on being asked by the prisoner who had done the act, she said "You"; and, being asked by another person, she said "Stevie Norton," and pointed to the

prisoner; that the prisoner said, "No, Madge, you are mistaken"; that then she said, "You have done it, Stephen Norton," and pointed to him again. According to one witness he then lifted his arms and said, "If I have done it I hope the Lord will strike me dead;" and according to another witness, "If you say so I might as well put my clothes on and go home." There was, therefore, nothing in his answers necessarily amounting to an admission of the girl's statements.

The evidence was admitted on the trial and the prisoner convicted. On appeal it was held that the evidence did not amount to an admission, and the conviction was quashed.

PICKFORD, J. "As a general rule, statements as to the facts of a case under investigation are not evidence unless made by witnesses in the ordinary way, but to this rule there are exceptions. One is that statements made in the presence of a prisoner upon an occasion on which he might reasonably be expected to make some observation, explanation, or denial are admissible under certain circumstances. We think it is not strictly accurate, and may be misleading, to say that they are admissible in evidence against the prisoner, as such an expression may seem to imply that they are evidence of the facts stated in them and must be considered upon the footing of other evidence. Such statements are, however, never evidence of the facts stated in them; they are admissible only as introductory to, or explanatory of, the answer given to them by the person in whose presence they are made. Such answer may, of course, be given either by words or by conduct, *e.g.* by remaining silent on an occasion which demanded an answer."

"If the answer given amount to an admission of the statements or some part of them, they or that part become relevant as shewing what facts are admitted; if the answer be not such an admission, the statements are irrelevant to the matter under consideration and should be disregarded. This seems to us to be correctly and shortly stated in *Taylor on Evidence*, s. 814, p. 574: 'The statements only become evidence when by such acceptance he makes them his own statements.'"

"No objection was taken in this case to the admission of the statements in evidence, but as the prisoner may be tried again on an

indictment on which that question may arise, we think it well to state in what cases such statements can be given in evidence. We think that the contents of such statements should not be given in evidence unless the judge is satisfied that there is evidence fit to be submitted to the jury that the prisoner by his answer to them, whether given by word or conduct, acknowledged the truth of the whole or part of them. If there be no such evidence, then the contents of the statement should be excluded ; if there be such evidence, then they should be admitted, and the question whether the prisoner's answer, by words or conduct, did or did not in fact amount to an acknowledgment of them left to the jury."

"In trials of prisoners on indictment, in which the most numerous and important of these cases arise, there is, as a rule, no difficulty in deciding whether there be such evidence or not, as the prisoner's answer appears upon the depositions, and the chance that the evidence with regard to it may be different on the trial is so small that it may be disregarded. When, however, the evidence of the prisoner's answer does not appear, there does not seem to be any practical difficulty in applying the rule above stated. The fact of a statement having been made in the prisoner's presence may be given in evidence, but not the contents, and the question asked, what the prisoner said or did on such a statement being made. If his answer, given either by words or conduct, be such as to be evidence from which an acknowledgment may be inferred, then the contents of the statement may be given and the question of admission or not in fact left to the jury ; if it be not evidence from which such an acknowledgment may be inferred, then the contents of the statements should be excluded. To allow the contents of such statements to be given before it is ascertained that there is evidence of their being acknowledged to be true must be most prejudicial to the prisoner, as, whatever directions be given to the jury, it is almost impossible for them to dismiss such evidence entirely from their minds. It is perhaps too wide to say that in no case can the statements be given in evidence when they are denied by the prisoner, as it is possible that a denial may be given under such circumstances and in such a manner as to constitute evidence from which an acknowledgment may be inferred ; but, as above stated, we think they should be

rejected unless there is some evidence of an acknowledgment of the truth. Where they are admitted we think the following is the proper direction to be given to the jury:—That if they come to the conclusion that the prisoner had acknowledged the truth of the whole or any part of the facts stated they might take the statement, or so much of it as was acknowledged to be true (but no more), into consideration as evidence in the case generally, not because the statement standing alone afforded any evidence of the matter contained in it, but solely because of the prisoner's acknowledgment of its truth; but unless they found as a fact that there was such an acknowledgment they ought to disregard the statement altogether."

WILLIAMS v. INNES

(1808).

1 CAMPBELL, 364; 10 R. R. 702.

Admissions may be made by agents. Referring one person to another for information may make the latter an agent for the purpose.

In an action against executors, who pleaded that they had fully administered the estate, the plaintiff, in order to prove assets, put in a letter from the defendants, telling her that if she wanted further information concerning the affairs of the deceased she should apply to a Mr. Ross, and she proposed to give in evidence what he said on the matter. The evidence was held admissible.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "If a man refers another upon any particular business to a third person, he is bound by what this third person says or does concerning it, as much as if that had been said or done by himself."

Note.—This case is generally quoted as an authority for the proposition stated, but the judgment is very short and general in its terms. It must, doubtless, be taken as applying only to cases of real "particular business," not to every case of mere casual inquiry. In another case the same judge said—"Wherever a party refers to the evidence of another, he is bound by it—and this is constantly good evidence" (*Daniel v. Pitt*, 1 Camp. 366).

KIRKSTALL BREWERY CO. v. FURNESS RY. CO.

(1874).

L. R. 9 Q. B. 468 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 142 ; 30 L. T. 783 ;
22 W. R. 876.

Whatever an agent or servant does or says in carrying out the business in which he is employed binds his principal. An agent or servant may therefore bind his principal by admissions made in the course of and within the scope of his employment or duty.

In an action against a Railway Company for loss of a parcel of money, statements made by the station-master to a police officer, tending to shew theft thereof by one of the company's servants, were received as admissions against the company, the station-master being the proper agent to make such statements.

COCKBURN, C.J. "I think it impossible to say that a man who has the sole management of a railway station, and had authority to cause a person to be apprehended if he had reasonable and probable cause to suppose that a felony had been committed, could not have authority to give instructions to the police, and could not make such communications as would be admissible in evidence just as if they were made by his principals."

QUAIN, J. "In putting the police in motion he was acting within his duty, and within the scope of the authority given to him."

ARCHIBALD, J. "Being in charge of the station at the time a felony was committed, it was his duty to put the police in motion. That being so, I think that he was acting within the scope of his duty, that he had power to bind the company, and therefore that the evidence was admissible."

G. W. RY. CO. v. WILLIS
(1865).

34 L. J. C. P. 195; 18 C. B. (N. S.) 748.

Statements made by agents or servants are not necessarily admissions against the principal, although they would have been admissions if made by the principal himself. Such statements, in order to bind the principal, must have been in the course and within the scope of the agent's employment, and made at the time of the transaction in question.

In an action against a Railway Company for not delivering cattle promptly, the plaintiff gave evidence of a conversation a week after the transaction between himself and the company's night inspector, who had charge of the night cattle trains at a certain station, in the course of which the night inspector said the cattle had been forgotten. It was held that this statement was not an admission against the company, as the night inspector was a subordinate servant without authority to make such a statement, and also the statement was made some time after the transaction.

ERLE, C.J. "I am of opinion that this night inspector is not to be presumed to have been authorised by the company to make admissions on their behalf of things gone by."

PETO v. HAGUE
(1804).

5 ESPINASSE, 134.

What an agent says about past transactions conducted for the principal in the nature of mere "narrative" will not bind the principal as an admission. When the agent's right to act in the particular matter has

ceased, the principal can no longer be affected by his statements any more than by his acts.

The facts sufficiently appear from the judgment.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "Pelly appeared to be the manager and conductor of the defendant's business; what he might have said respecting a former sale made by the defendant, or on another occasion, would not be evidence to affect his master; but what he said respecting a sale of coals, then about to take place, and respecting the disposition of the coals then lying at the wharf, which were the object of sale, was in the course of witness's employment for the defendant, and was evidence to affect his master.

WOOLWAY v. ROWE

(1834).

3 L. J. K. B. 121; 1 A. & E. 114; 3 N. & M. 849;
40 R. R. 264.

Admissions made by the privies, or predecessors in title, of the parties may be given in evidence against them.

The statement of the plaintiff's father, the former owner of the plaintiff's land, that he had not the right claimed by the plaintiff in respect of it, was held admissible; although the father was living and in court at the time.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. "The first question raised in this case was, whether the declarations of a person formerly interested in the estate now the plaintiff's were admissible in evidence, when the party himself might have been called. We think they were receivable, on the ground of identity of interest. The fact of his being alive at the time of the trial, when perhaps his memory of facts was impaired, and when his interest was not the same, does not, in our opinion, affect the admissibility of those declarations which he formerly made on the subject of his own rights."

Note.—As to "privies," see *ante*, p. 36.

SLATTERIE v. POOLEY
(1840).

10 L. J. Ex. 8; 6 M. & W. 664; 1 H. & W. 16;
4 JUR. 1038.

Admissions, being primary evidence against a party, are admissible to prove even the contents of written documents, without notice to produce, or accounting for absence of originals.

PARKE, B. "The rule as to the production of the best evidence is not at all infringed. It does not apply to the present case. That rule is founded on the supposition that a party is going to offer worse evidence than the nature of the case admits. But what is said by a party to the suit is not open to that objection. . . . We therefore think it is a sound rule that admissions made by a party to a suit may be received against him, although they relate to the contents of a written document."

Note.—As to the rules concerning the "production of the best evidence," and notices to produce, see *post*, pp. 252 and 260.

CONFESSIONS.

In criminal cases it may appear that the prisoner has admitted or confessed his guilt of the crime alleged. But, before such confession is put in evidence, the prosecution must prove that such confession was "free and voluntary," as the following cases show. And even when such a confession is admitted, it is not treated as conclusive. It is open to the prisoner to rebut or explain it.

And in the case of a charge of murder it is not the practice to keep the prisoner to his confession, but to suggest that he should plead "not guilty" and be duly tried.

"With respect to the effect of extra-judicial confessions or

statements when received, the rule is clear that, unless otherwise directed by statute, no such confession or statement, whether plenary or not plenary, whether made before a justice of the peace, or other tribunal having only an inquisitorial jurisdiction in the matter, or made by deed, or matter *in pais*, either amounts to an estoppel, or has any conclusive effect against an accused person, or is entitled to any weight beyond that which the jury in their conscience assign to it" (*Best on Evidence*, p. 536).

"Of the credit and effect due to a confessional statement the jury are the sole judges; they must consider the whole confession, together with all the other evidence of the case, and if it is inconsistent, improbable or incredible, or is contradicted or discredited by other evidence, or is the emanation of a weak or excited state of mind, they may exercise their discretion in rejecting it, either wholly or in part, whether the rejected part make for or against the prisoner" (*Wills on Circumstantial Evidence*, p. 100).

It should be noted that the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, sect. 18, requires the magistrate, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, to warn the prisoner that he need not say anything in reply, that what he does say may be used in evidence against him at the trial, and that he has nothing to hope or fear from any promise or threat (see *post*, p. 317).

R. v. BALDRY (1852).

2 DENISON, 430; 21 L. J. M. C. 130; 16 JUR. 599;
5 Cox, C. C. 523.

In criminal cases a confession made by the prisoner can be given in evidence against him, if the prosecution show it was free and voluntary; not otherwise.

It will be held not to be free and voluntary if it were

induced by any threat or promise made by a person in authority.

Any expressions suggesting that it would be "better" for the prisoner to tell the truth import a threat or promise.

On the part of the prosecution a police constable was called, whose evidence began thus : "I went to the prisoner's house on the 17th December. I saw the prisoner. Dr. Vincent, and Page, another constable, were with me. I told him what he was charged with. He made no reply, and sat with his face buried in his handkerchief. I believe he was crying. I said he need not say anything to criminate himself ; what he did say would be taken down and used as evidence against him." It was held that such words did not amount to any threat or promise to induce the prisoner to confess ; that it could have no tendency to induce him to say anything untrue ; and that in spite of it if he did afterwards confess the confession must be considered voluntary and admissible.

POLLOCK, C.B. "The ground for not receiving such evidence is that it would not be safe to receive a statement made under any influence or fear. There is no presumption of law that it is false or that the law considers such statement cannot be relied upon ; but such confessions are rejected because it is supposed that it would be dangerous to leave such evidence to the jury. A simple caution to the accused to tell the truth if he says anything has been decided not to be sufficient to prevent the statement made being given in evidence ; and although it may be put that when a person is told to tell the truth, he may possibly understand that the only thing true is that he is guilty, that is not what we ought to understand. He is reminded that he need not say anything, but if he says anything let it be true. . . . But where the admonition to speak the truth has been coupled with any expression importing that it would be better for him to do so, it has been held that the confession was not receivable, the objectionable words being that it would be better to speak the truth, because they import that it would be better for him to say something. . . . The true distinction between the present case and a case of that kind is, that it is left

to the prisoner a matter of perfect indifference whether he should open his mouth or not."

"The question now is, whether the words employed by the constable, 'he need not say anything to criminate himself; what he did say would be taken down and used as evidence against him,' amount either to a promise or a threat. We are not to torture this expression. . . . The words are to be taken in their obvious meaning. . . . It is proper that a prisoner should be cautioned not to criminate himself; but I think that what he says ought to be adduced either as evidence of his guilt, or as evidence in his favour. For these reasons I think that the Lord Chief Justice properly received the confession at the trial."

PARKE, B. "In order to render a confession admissible in evidence it must be perfectly voluntary; and there is no doubt that any inducement in the nature of a promise or of a threat held out by a person in authority vitiates a confession. The decisions to that effect have gone a long way; whether it would not have been better to have allowed the whole to go to the jury, it is now too late to inquire, but I think there has been too much tenderness towards prisoners in this matter. . . . The rule has been extended quite too far, and justice and common sense have, too frequently, been sacrificed at the shrine of mercy."

ERLE, J. "I am of opinion that when a confession is well proved it is the best evidence that can be produced; and that unless it be clear that there was either a threat or a promise to induce it, it ought not to be excluded."

WILLIAMS, J. "What was said to the prisoner was nothing more than that what he said would not be kept secret, but would be used in evidence; and it is an over-refinement to say that a statement made after such a caution was inadmissible."

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J. "If there be any worldly advantage held out, or any harm threatened, the confession must be excluded. The reason is, not that the law supposes that the statement will be false, but that the prisoner has made the confession under a bias, and that, therefore, it would be better not to submit it to the jury."

Note.—It is clearly settled now that the prosecution must prove affirmatively, to the satisfaction of the Judge (who is himself to decide facts on

which admissibility depends, see *ante*, p. 7), that the confession was obtained without illegal inducement (*R. v. Thompson*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 12).

But it would seem that if there were no such illegal inducement the confession would be legally admissible although the witness promised, or even swore, not to disclose it, or obtained it by any mean trick (see *R. v. Shaw*, 6 C. & P. 372; *R. v. Spilsbury*, 7 C. & P. 187).

R. v. GOULD

(1840).

9 C. & P. 364.

Notwithstanding that a confession has been obtained by the threat or inducement of a person in authority, it seems that facts discovered in consequence thereof, and so much of such confession as distinctly relates to such facts, may be proved.

A prisoner accused of burglary made a confession which was strictly inadmissible. Part of the confession was that he had thrown a lantern into a pond. The facts, that he said so, and that the lantern was found in the pond in consequence, were allowed to be proved. The other parts of the statement were not given in evidence.

Note.—The rule as above stated is apparently considered correct now, although earlier cases are inconsistent with it. Of course such rule gives the prisoner away altogether in such cases, notwithstanding that the confession was extorted. Perhaps there is still some doubt on the point.

But the finding of articles, etc., in consequence of the confession certainly appears to render it trustworthy.

R. v. JARVIS

(1867).

L. R. 1 C. C. R. 96; 37 L. J. M. C. 1; 16 W. R. 111.

A “threat or promise” must offer some temporal advantage or disadvantage connected with the prosecution in order to render a confession involuntary.

Exhortations to confess on moral or religious grounds are not sufficient to exclude a confession.

One of a firm who employed the prisoner, having called him up into the private counting house of the firm, in the presence of another of the firm and two officers of police, said, "I think it is right that I should tell you that, besides being in the presence of my brother and myself, you are in the presence of two officers of the police: and I should advise you that, to any question that may be put to you, you will answer truthfully, so that if you have committed a fault you may not add to it by stating what is untrue"; and having shown a letter to him, which he denied having written, added, "Take care, we know more than you think we know." The prisoner thereupon made a confession, which was held admissible.

KELLY, C.B. "The question is, do the words before us in substance and fairly considered import a threat of evil, or hold out a hope of benefit to the accused in case he should state the truth? . . . In the first place, this appears to me to be advice given by a master to a servant, and when he adds, 'So that if you have committed a fault you may not add to it by stating what is untrue,' he appears to me to be giving further advice on moral grounds. It is neither a threat that evil shall befall him, nor is it an inducement or holding out of advantage."

"As to the words, 'you had better,' referred to in the argument, there are many cases in which those words have occurred, and they seem to have acquired a sort of technical meaning, that they hold out an inducement or threat within the rule that excludes confessions under such circumstances. It is sufficient to say that those words have not been used on this occasion; and that the words used appear to me to import advice given on moral grounds, and not to infringe upon the rule of law prohibiting a threat in these cases."

WILLES, J. "I agree; but if it had appeared that the prisoner could have supposed the words meant 'you had better,' I think the case would have been different."

Note.—If a magistrate were to tell a prisoner that if he did not confess he would get six months' longer sentence, a confession induced thereby

would undoubtedly be inadmissible. But, if he told him he would go to Hell, that would not render it inadmissible, apparently. The latter threat might appear the worse, but it would scarcely have the same effect on the mind of the prisoner, who would for the moment be more troubled with his immediate difficulty of getting out of his present trouble, than with his affairs thereafter. Moreover, the magistrate has no jurisdiction with reference to the place mentioned in the latter threat. The prisoner therefore might naturally ignore it.

R. v. LLOYD (1834).

6 C. & P. 393.

The offer of some merely collateral convenience, or temporal advantage unconnected with the result of the prosecution, or an appeal to a man's moral feelings, is not such an inducement as will render a confession inadmissible. The promise, or words, to have such effect, must have reference to the result of the prosecution.

The prisoner and his wife were both in custody for larceny, but in separate rooms. A person who was in the room where the former was in custody, said, "I hope you will tell, because Mrs. Gurner can ill afford to lose the money"; and the constable said, "If you will tell where the property is, you shall see your wife." A statement made afterwards by the prisoner was held admissible.

PATTESON, J. "I think that this is not such an inducement to confess as will exclude the evidence of what the prisoner said. It amounts only to this, that if he would tell where the money was, he should see his wife."

Note.—"The cases on the subject of what is an illegal inducement to confess are very numerous, and far from consistent with each other; and there can be little doubt that the salutary rule which excludes confessions unlawfully obtained has been applied to the rejection of many not coming within its principle, although Judges are now less disposed than they formerly were to hold that the language used amounts even to an inducement" (*Best on Evidence*, p. 461).

A few further illustrations, drawn from decided cases, may be useful.

The confession was rejected where the following expressions were used—

“Tell me where the things are, and I will be favourable to you.”

“If you do not tell me all about it, I will send for a constable.”

“If you don’t tell me, I will give you in charge of the police till you do tell me.”

“If you don’t tell, you may get yourself into trouble and it will be the worse for you.”

“You had better tell all you know.”

“Speak the truth, it will be better for you if you do.”

The confession was admitted where the following expressions were used—

“Don’t run your soul into more sin, but tell the truth.”

“Be sure to tell the truth.”

“I must know more about it.”

“You had better, as good boys, tell the truth.”

And promises to give the prisoner some spirits, or to strike off his handcuffs, have been held not to render a confession bad.

R. v. GIBBONS

(1823).

1 C. & P. 97.

The term “person in authority,” in connection with confessions by prisoners, includes the prosecutor, officers of justice, and other persons directly connected with the prosecution only.

Thus, it was held not to include a medical man called in to attend the prisoner. A confession made to such a person, even under threat or inducement, is admissible.

PARK, J. “The only inducement had been held out (as was alleged) by a person having no sort of authority. . . . If the promise had been held out by any person having any office or authority, as the prosecutor, constable, etc., the case would be different.”

Note.—The following have been held to be “persons in authority”—magistrates, even those not acting as such in the case, their clerks, coroners, police constables, warders and others having custody of the prisoner, searchers, prosecutors and their wives and attorneys. Masters and mistresses are only so considered if they are themselves prosecuting, or the charge is connected with the employment.

DECLARATIONS BY DECEASED PERSONS.

It has long been recognised that the exclusion of evidence of statements made by deceased persons would frequently lead to a defeat of justice, and that they might in some cases be properly admitted when the circumstances were such that they could fairly be relied upon. In many cases there might be no other evidence available, the deceased person having been solely acquainted with the facts. In the six following cases the law has recognised that there is sufficient guarantee of the credibility of such hearsay statements to allow of their admission :—

1. Declarations in course of duty.
2. „ against interest.
3. „ as to pedigree.
4. „ „ public rights.
5. „ „ cause of death.
6. „ „ contents of Wills.

For the principle underlying these exceptions, see the remarks of Jessel, M.R., *post*, p. 188.

It should be observed that, although the term “declaration” may suggest rather a formal statement, yet statements made in any manner are generally admissible.

It would appear that declarations in course of duty and against interest are admissible on any matter in issue whatever. Those as to pedigree are only admissible in pedigree cases (see *post*, p. 169) ; those as to public rights in cases of strictly public rights (see *post*, p. 176) ; those as to cause of death in cases of homicide (see *post*, p. 183) ; and those as to contents of wills in cases in which questions arise as to such contents.

DECLARATIONS IN COURSE OF DUTY.

✓ PRICE v. TORRINGTON

(1730).

SALKELD, 285 ; 2 LORD RAYMOND, 873.

Statements made by a person in the regular course of his business or duty are admissible evidence, after his death, of the facts stated. Such statements are known as "declarations in the course of duty."

The facts sufficiently appear from the judgment.

"The plaintiff, being a brewer, brought an action against the Earl of Torrington for beer sold and delivered, and the evidence given to charge the defendant was, that the usual way of the plaintiff's dealing was that the draymen came every night to the clerk of the brew-house and gave him an account of the beer they had delivered out, which he set down in a book kept for that purpose, to which the draymen set their hands; and that the drayman was dead, but that this was his hand set to the book; and this was held good evidence of a delivery; otherwise of the shop-book itself, without more."

DOE v. TURFORD

(1832).

3 B. & AD. 890 ; 37 R. R. 581.

Declarations in the course of duty are admissible although the duty was only temporarily assumed.

Thus, where in consequence of the absence of his clerk, a solicitor had on one occasion performed the clerk's duty for him, and served and indorsed a notice as his clerk would have done, the indorsement of service on such notice was admissible as evidence of service.

LORD TENTERDEN, C.J. "Notices to quit were usually served by

the clerks, and not by the principals; but a principal might occasionally serve such a notice, and we must assume that when a principal served the notice, he would do what he required his clerk to do. Now, here it is proved that Patteshall took the notice with him when he went out, and that the indorsement on it is in his handwriting. Then the indorsement, having been made in the discharge of his duty, was, according to the authority cited, admissible evidence of the fact of the service of the original."

PARKE, J. "The only question in the case is, whether the entry made by Mr. Patteshall was admissible in evidence, and I think it was, not on the ground that it was an entry against his own interest, but because the fact that such an entry was made at the time of his return from his journey was one of the chain of facts (there are many others) from which the delivery of the notice to quit might lawfully be inferred. . . . It was proved to be the ordinary course of this office that when notices to quit were served, indorsements like that in question were made; and it is to be presumed that Mr. Patteshall, one of the principals, observed the rule of the office as well as the clerks."

TAUNTON, J. "A minute in writing like the present, made at the time when the fact it records took place, by a person since deceased, in the ordinary course of his business, corroborated by other circumstances which render it probable that that fact occurred, is admissible in evidence."

Note.—But, although the duty may thus, apparently, be assumed for the occasion by a principal, it seems that a mere personal custom by a principal, to do a certain act and to record it, would not be sufficient. There must, it is said, be a duty towards a third person, to do and to record the matter in question. See *Massey v. Allen*, 13 Ch. D. 558.

✓ THE HENRY COXON

(1878).

L. R. 3 P. D. 156; 47 L. J. ADM. 83; 38 L. T. 819.

Declarations in the course of duty, in order to be admissible, must be contemporaneous, must be made by a

person who has no interest to misrepresent, and must relate to his own acts only.

In an action against the owners of a ship for collision, entries made in the log book of a ship by the first mate, since deceased, were rejected on three grounds: (1) they were made two days after the occurrence recorded, whereas the "duty" was to make them immediately; (2) the first mate had an interest to misrepresent, so as to negative the idea of negligence of himself and the ship's crew; (3) the entries referred not only to his own acts, but to those of the crew, and such declarations are not admissible as to the acts of others.

SIR ROBERT PHILLIMORE, J. "Neither do I think that the entry can be considered as contemporaneous; also it was in the interest of the party who made it; and the authorities point to this, that when such evidence is admitted, it must relate to acts done by the person who makes the entry and not by others, but the mate must enter, not only the manœuvres on his own ship, but also the consequences of the manœuvres and navigation of the other ship. These different sets of facts are so inextricably mixed up that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to separate them. I therefore, for these reasons, reject this evidence."

Note.—The recent case of *Mercer v. Denne*, [1904] 2 Ch. 534, illustrates the point that the acts recorded must be those of the declarant and not of other persons.

CHAMBERS v. BERNASCONI

(1834).

3 L. J. Ex. 373; 1 C. M. & R. 347; 4 TYR. 531; 40 R. R. 604.

Declarations in the course of duty are only evidence of the precise facts which it was the writer's duty to state or record, and not of other matters which, though contained in the same statement, were merely collateral.

Thus, the question being whether A. was arrested in a certain parish; a certificate by a deceased officer, stating the fact, time and place of the arrest, was held inadmissible as to the place, as it was his duty merely to record the fact and time, not the place of his arrest.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. "We are all of opinion that, whatever effect may be due to an entry made in the course of any office reporting facts necessary to the performance of a duty, the statement of other circumstances, however naturally they might be thought to find a place in the narrative, is no proof of those circumstances. Admitting, then, for the sake of argument, that the entry tendered was evidence of the fact, and even of the day when the arrest was made (both which facts it might be necessary for the officer to make known to his principal), we are all clearly of opinion that it is not admissible to prove in what particular spot within the bailiwick the caption took place, that circumstance being merely collateral to the duty done."

Note.—It was shown in the above case to be the actual custom and practice of the officer to record the place of arrest, although it was not his strict duty to do so. This case has been much questioned. See, for instance, the observations in *Smith's Leading Cases*, II. 324. But, in the later case of *Smith v. Blakey*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 326, Blackburn, J., said—"It is an essential fact to render such an entry admissible, that not only it should have been made in the due discharge of the business about which the person is employed, but the duty must be to do the very thing to which the entry relates, and then to make a report or record of it."

With regard to declarations against interest a different rule as to the extent of the admissibility of the declaration has been laid down—the whole being admissible (see *post*, p. 160).

✓ R. v. BUCKLEY
(1873).

13 Cox, 293.

Declarations in the course of duty may be either written or verbal.

Thus, the question being whether A. murdered B., a policeman, at

a certain time and place ; a verbal report made by B. in the course of his duty to his inspector, that he was about to go to that place at that time, in order to watch A.'s movements, was held admissible evidence to show that the prisoner and the deceased had met on that occasion.

DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST.

✓ HIGHAM v. RIDGWAY

(1808).

10 EAST, 109 ; 10 R. R. 235.

Statements made by a person against his "pecuniary" interest are admissible evidence, after his death, not only of the facts against such interest, but also of all other facts in the same statement. Such statements are known as "declarations against interest."

An entry made by a deceased surgeon, who had delivered a woman of a child, of his having done so on a certain day, and referring to his ledger, in which he had made a charge for his attendance which was marked as "paid," was held evidence of the date of birth of such child ; the word "paid" being held to be a statement against the pecuniary interest of the surgeon, as affording evidence against him if he had sued for his charges. All the facts stated in the same entry, including those in the ledger to which it referred, which were considered part of the same entry, were held admissible in evidence.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "I think the evidence here was properly admitted, upon the broad principle on which receiver's books have been admitted ; namely, that the entry made was in prejudice of the party making it. In the case of the receiver, he charges himself to account for so much to his employer. In this case the party repelled by his entry a claim which he would otherwise have had upon the other for work performed, and medicines furnished to the wife ; and the period of her delivery is the time for which the former charge is made, the date of which is

the 22nd April; when it appears by other evidence that the man-midwife was in fact attending at the house of Wm. Fowden. If this entry had been produced when the party was making a claim for his attendance, it would have been evidence against him that his claim was satisfied. It is idle to say that the word 'paid' only shall be admitted in evidence, without the context, which explains to what it refers; we must, therefore, look to the rest of the entry, to see what the demand was which he thereby admitted to be discharged. By the reference to the ledger, the entry there is virtually incorporated with and made a part of the other entry of which it is explanatory. . . . The discharge in the book in his own handwriting repels the claim which he would otherwise have had against the father from the rest of the evidence as it now appears. Therefore, the entry made by the party was to his own immediate prejudice, when he had not only no interest to make it, if it were not true, but he had an interest the other way, not to discharge a claim, which it appears from the evidence that he had."

LE BLANC, J. "On inquiring into the truth of facts which happened a long time ago, the Courts have varied from the strict rules of evidence applicable to facts of the same description happening in modern times, because of the difficulty or impossibility, by lapse of time, of proving those facts in the ordinary way by living witnesses. On this ground, hearsay and reputation (which latter is no other than the hearsay of those who may be supposed to have been acquainted with the fact, handed down from one to another) have been admitted as evidence in particular cases. On that principle stands the evidence, in cases of pedigree, of declarations of the family who are dead, or of monumental inscriptions, or of entries made by them in family Bibles. The like evidence has been admitted in other cases where the Court were satisfied that the person whose written entry or hearsay was offered in evidence, had no interest in falsifying the fact, but, on the contrary, had an interest against his declaration or written entry; as in the case of receiver's books. . . . Here the entries were made by a person who, so far from having any interest to make them, had an interest the other way; and such entries against the interest of the party making them are clearly evidence of the fact stated."

BAYLEY, J. "This is no officious entry made by one who had no concern in the transaction ; he had no interest in making it ; and as he thereby discharged an individual against whom he would otherwise have had a claim, I think the entry was evidence by all the authorities. . . . If he had brought an action for his work, and had received notice to produce his books, this entry would have discharged the father. Now, all the cases agree that a written entry, by which a man discharges another of a claim which he had against him, or charges himself with a debt to another, is evidence of the fact which he so admits against himself, there being no interest of his own to advance by such entry."

Note.—It should be particularly observed that such statements, in order to be admissible, must be against "pecuniary" or "proprietary" interest. It is not sufficient, for instance, that the statement was made under circumstances which show that the person making it would be liable to a criminal prosecution (*Sussex Peerage Case*, 11 C. & F. 108) ; although that would seem to be a case in which he would be liable to a pecuniary penalty, by way of fine, or to something admittedly worse, *i.e.*, imprisonment.

The above case and the next one refer to pecuniary interest, the two subsequent cases to proprietary interest.

✓ TAYLOR v. WITHAM
(1876).

L. R. 3 CH. D. 605 ; 45 L. J. CH. 798.

If any part of a statement by a deceased person is against such person's pecuniary interest, the whole statement is admissible, even such parts thereof as prove to be actually in such person's interest. But though admissible, it may be of no weight as evidence.

The question being whether A. (deceased) had lent money to B. ; an entry by A. in his book, "B. paid me three months' interest," followed by other entries connected therewith, and pointing to such a loan, was held admissible as evidence of the loan. The entry of such payment, by itself being against interest, was held to render

admissible all the other entries, although the latter were actually for the declarant's interest.

JESSEL, M.R. "It is, no doubt, an established rule in the Courts of this country that an entry against the interest of the man who made it is receivable in evidence after his death for all purposes. . . . Of course, if you can prove *aliunde* that the man had a particular reason for making it, and that it was for his interest, you may destroy the value of the evidence altogether, but the question of admissibility is not a question of value. The entry may be utterly worthless when you get it, if you show any reason to believe that he had a motive for making it, and that though apparently against his interest, yet really it was for it; but that is a matter for subsequent consideration when you estimate the value of the testimony."

"Why should a man enter in his book '**interest paid me,**' intending to make an entry for himself, and not against himself? Obviously the natural meaning of it is that it is **against himself,** '**Interest**' standing alone would not help him; but these entries appear to be connected with two other entries: '**December 27. Paid off £20**'; that is against his interest, but following that there is this, '**Left £1,980,**' and that enables you to carry your eye to the connecting entry, which is, '**January, 1872. J. Witham acknowledged loan to this date £2,000,** and then you see you connect the entries with the £1,980. No doubt, if admissible, it becomes very important evidence by reason of connecting it with the rest of the entry, but the entry itself is only an entry, '**Interest paid me.**' It would not, standing alone, have been evidence of a debt from any particular person independent of the connection, and it appears to me when a man puts '**Interest paid me,**' or '**Paid off £20,**' it is *primâ facie* a clear entry against interest which ought to be admitted, and I admit it on the general ground. But, independently of the general ground, there is proof that the £2,000 was paid to J. Witham, and there is proof that every one of these four sums of £20 was actually paid to the testator, so that here again we have this fact, that there are entries not standing alone, but connected with the facts proved. I have no hesitation in saying that it is not only admissible as evidence, but is evidence of a very material character."

Note.—This rule as to the admissibility of the whole declaration should be compared with the rule that, in the case of declarations in course of duty, only so much thereof as it was strictly the declarant's duty to state is legally admissible (see *ante*, p. 156).

It should also be noted that the above case only deals with the question of *admissibility* of such evidence, not its *weight*, which is quite another matter.

✓ PEACEABLE v. WATSON

(1811).

4 TAUNTON, 16; 13 R. R. 552.

Statements made by a person against his "proprietary" interest are admissible evidence after his death.

Statements made by any one in possession of land tending to limit his interest therein to any less estate than a fee simple are admissible as declarations against his proprietary interest, possession being evidence of ownership in fee simple, until the contrary appears.

A verbal statement by a deceased occupier of land, that he rented it under a certain person, was held to be evidence of the latter's ownership.

SIR J. MANSFIELD, C.J. "Possession is *primâ facie* evidence of seisin in fee simple; the declaration of the possession that he is tenant to another makes most strongly, therefore, against his own interest, and consequently is admissible, but it must be first shown that he was in possession of the premises for which the ejectment is brought."

Note.—This rule is based on the rule that possession of land is evidence of ownership in fee simple (see *ante*, p. 78). Otherwise it would be impossible to say that any statement was against the occupier's proprietary interest. The statement of a deceased lord of a manor, as to the extent of the manor, was rejected on the ground that he was not at the time in possession, *Crease v. Barrett*, 1 C. M. & R. 919.

✓ PAPENDICK v. BRIDGWATER

(1855).

24 L. J. Q. B. 289 ; 1 JUR. N. S. 657 ; 5 E. & B. 166.

A declaration against proprietary interest is admissible only against those persons who are privy to the estate of the person making it.

A declaration by a deceased tenant of a farm, that he was not entitled to common of pasture in respect of the farm, was held not to be admissible in evidence against the reversioner.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J. "You cannot receive in evidence a declaration of a tenant which derogates from the title of the landlord. Such evidence, if receivable, would be most mischievous, because a tenant might thus destroy a valuable easement or be enabled to impose a servitude."

COLERIDGE, J. "Several exceptions have been established to the general rule that what is said by one person is no evidence against another person not in parity of estate and interest with him ; but the present case is not within any of the exceptions recognised by the authorities. . . . Nothing, I think, would lead to greater inconvenience than that the landlord by loose declarations of his tenant should be ousted of his rights and burthened with a servitude."

ERLE, J. "This does not come within any of the exceptions which were introduced for general convenience, such as entries made in discharge of legal duty, or in the course of business, nor, what is more apposite, declarations binding privies. . . . This kind of evidence is of a most dangerous character, because, though *prima facie* it is against the interest of the declarant, it is easy to suggest circumstances under which a tenant going out from one farm and coming into another might wish to burden the farm he was about to leave, with a view to benefit the latter, and be induced to make a declaration which, under the actual circumstances, was not against his interest at the moment, but in furtherance of it. I am, therefore, of opinion that we ought not to extend the exception to this case."

Note.—These cases as to declarations against proprietary interest should be compared with the case as to admissions by predecessors in title, *Woolway v. Rowe*, *ante*, p. 144.

DECLARATIONS AS TO PEDIGREE.

✓ BERKELEY PEERAGE CASE (1811).

4 CAMPBELL, 401 ; 14 R. R. 782.

In "pedigree cases," the statements, verbal or written, and conduct of deceased persons, who were connected by blood or marriage with the family in question, if made "*ante litem motam*," are admissible to prove relationship, or the facts upon which relationship depends, such as births, marriages and deaths.

Entries in family Bibles, being looked on as family registers, to which the family have general access, are of special weight in this connection. Such statements and conduct are known as "declarations as to pedigree."

In a claim before the Committee of Privileges of the House of Lords, the legitimacy of the claimant was disputed, the question being whether his parents were privately married before his birth. The judges were summoned to give their opinions upon the following questions submitted to them by the Lords.

1. "Upon the trial of an ejectment respecting Black Acre, between A. and B., in which it was necessary for A. to prove that he was the legitimate son of J. S., A. after proving by other evidence that J. S. was his reputed father, offered to give in evidence a *deposition* made by J. S. in a cause in Chancery, instituted by A. against C. D., in order to perpetuate testimony to the alleged fact disputed by C. D., that he was the legitimate son of J. S., in which character he claimed an estate in remainder in White Acre, which was also claimed in remainder by C. D. B., the defendant in the

ejectment, did not claim Black Acre under either A. or C. D., the plaintiff and defendant in the Chancery suit.

“According to law, could the deposition of J. S. be received upon the trial of such ejectment, against B., as evidence of declarations of J. S. the alleged father in matters of pedigree ?

2. “Upon the trial of an ejectment respecting Long Acre, between E. and F., in which it was necessary for E. to prove that he was the legitimate son of W., the said W. being at that time dead, E. after proving by other evidence that W. was his reputed father, offered to give in evidence *an entry in a Bible* in which Bible W. had made such entry in his own handwriting, that E. was his eldest son, born in lawful wedlock from G., the wife of W., on the 1st day of May, 1778, and signed by W. himself.

“Could such entry in such Bible be received to prove that E. is the legitimate son of W., as evidence of the declaration of W. in matter of pedigree ?

3. “Upon the trial of an ejectment respecting Little Acre, between N. and P., in which it was necessary for N. to prove that he was the legitimate son of T., the said T. being at that time dead ; N., after proving by other evidence that T. was his reputed father, offered to give in evidence *an entry in a Bible*, in which Bible T. had made such entry in his own handwriting that N. was his eldest son, born in lawful wedlock from J., the wife of T., on the 1st day of May, 1778, and signed by T. himself ; and it was proved in evidence on the said trial that the said T. had declared : that he, T., had made such entry for the express purpose of establishing the legitimacy, and the time of the birth, of his eldest son N., in case the same should be called in question, in any case or in any cause whatsoever, by any person, after the death of him the said T.

“Could such entry in such Bible be received, to prove that N. is the legitimate son of T., as evidence of the declaration of T. in matter of pedigree ? ”

In the opinion of the majority of the judges, the deposition, referred to in the first question, was inadmissible, as it was made after the dispute had arisen, *post litem motam*, when the party making the same had an interest to misrepresent the facts.

In the unanimous opinion of the Judges, the entries in the Bibles, referred to in the second and third questions, were admissible, as they

were made *ante litem motam*; the entry, however, referred to in the third question being liable to suspicion on account of the reason stated therein for the making of it. The Lords gave judgment accordingly.

LORD ELDON, L.C. "There does seem a hardship in rejecting the declarations of the late Lord Berkeley after the dispute had arisen; for there was no way in which the claimant as heir apparent to his titles could have availed himself of his testimony. . . . Upon the admissibility of this evidence, Judges have held different opinions, and it might appear remarkable that a declaration under no sanction was receivable, and a declaration upon oath was not. . . . The previous existence of the dispute would be a sufficient ground to proceed upon. I have known no instance in which declarations *post litem motam* have been received. . . . Therefore, although the authorities are at variance, principle and practice unite in rejecting the evidence."

"I introduced the Bible into the second and third questions, as the book in which such entries are usually made. If the entry be the ordinary act of a man in the ordinary course of life, without interest or particular motive, this, as the spontaneous effusion of his own mind, may be looked at without suspicion, and received without objection. Such is the contemporaneous entry in a family Bible, by a father, of the birth of a child. But a doubt had been entertained upon this point, and it was fit that it should be solemnly decided. I agree to the admissibility of similar entries in other books. There is a great difference between the competency of evidence and the credit to which it is entitled."

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "I had conceived some doubts whether this deposition could not be received as a declaration: but the arguments of the learned Judges have convinced me that it is inadmissible. It is only the answer to particular interrogatories, and may be very different from the genuine reputation upon the subject. I agree with the Judges that an entry made in a Bible does not therefore become evidence; but I cannot say it is not greatly strengthened by being found there, that being the ordinary register in families."

LORD REDESDALE. "The circumstance of an entry being in

a family Bible, to which all the family have access, gives it that solidity which it would not have if made in a book which remained in the exclusive possession of the father. Entries in family Bibles have therefore become common evidence of pedigree in this country ; and in America, where there is no register of births or baptisms, hardly any other is known. With regard to the main question of the admissibility of the deposition as a declaration, one circumstance is in my mind decisive. In cases of reputation, the attorney takes down what old witnesses will prove, and it often happens that some of them afterwards die before the trial. But what was taken down from their mouths is never offered in evidence. And why ? Because declarations *post litem motam* are not receivable."

BUTLER v. MOUNTGARRETT

(1859).

7 H. L. CASES, 633.

A controversy in a family, though not at that moment the subject of a lawsuit, is sufficient to exclude evidence of declarations as to pedigree, on the ground that they are not made "*ante litem motam*."

There was offered in evidence a letter written by one member of the family to another, stating that the writer said he knew of a certain alleged marriage, material to the issue. This letter itself showed that a dispute had then arisen with reference to such marriage. It was held inadmissible as evidence.

LORD CAMPBELL, L.C. "The question is this, whether there had been a marriage in Scotland between Henry Butler and Mrs. Colebrooke. It was to prove that there had been such a marriage that the letter was proposed to be given in evidence. Had there not been a controversy upon that subject before the letter was written ? And at the time when the letter was written, did it not subsist ?"

"It was for the Judge to say whether the letter was admissible or inadmissible, and in order to come to a right conclusion upon that

question, he was to consider whether there was evidence of *lis mota*, independently of the letter. And, moreover, he was bound to look at the letter, and to read it, and to see from its contents whether it was admissible or not. Without entering minutely into the evidence, I think that there was, independently of the letter, evidence to show that before the letter was written there had been a controversy in the Butler family as to whether there had been this Scotch marriage or not. But the letter itself, I think, is quite conclusive on the subject, because the whole scope of it shows that there had been such a controversy. And it was in my opinion a controversy which was likely to create a bias one way or the other upon the mind of every member of the family. . . . It was a matter of great interest to them, as to which no doubt each might take one side or another ; and, according to the established rules of the law of England, if there is such a controversy, it is supposed to create a bias upon the minds of those who make statements upon the subject, and it renders hearsay evidence upon the subject inadmissible."

LORD BROUGHAM. "If the letter had been produced and tendered, and there had been nothing else in the cause to lead the learned Judge's mind to the conclusion of the existence of *lis mota* at the time, and if he had therefore admitted the letter, the moment that letter was read, it would so clearly have proved that there was a *lis mota* at the time, that it must at once have been struck out of the evidence."

LORD CRANWORTH. "If the letter itself shows that at that time there was a *lis mota*, then the letter is inadmissible. Now, upon the question whether this letter does show that or not, it appears to me that not only does it show that, but it shows nothing else. . . . It appears to me that to admit that letter would be directly at variance with the principle upon which this sort of evidence is received, and which is stated by Lord Eldon to be, that such declarations are admitted upon the ground that they are the natural effusions of parties who must know the truth, 'upon occasions when their minds stand in an even position without any temptation to exceed or to fall short of the truth.' As to every one of these propositions, the case here would fail."

LORD CHELMSFORD. "The very commencement of the letter shows that the parties were entering into a consideration of the state of the family with reference to the devolution of the honours and the estates which were involved in the discussion. The writer of the letter says, 'I think it fair and just to tell you what I know of the circumstances connected with Henry and Mrs. Colebrooke. 'Then it was for the Judge to determine whether the letter itself, if there was no other evidence in the case, was not sufficient to establish the fact of there being a *lis mota*. The learned Judge was of that opinion, and rejected the evidence. I think the learned Judge was perfectly justified in so doing. I think the letter shows, in the strongest possible way, that there was a controversy existing.'"

HAINES v. GUTHRIE

(1884).

L. R. 13 Q. B. D. 818 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 521 ; 51 L. T. 645 ;
33 W. R. 99 ; 48 J. P. 756.

A "pedigree case," in which evidence of declarations by deceased relations is admissible, must be one in which the question of pedigree or relationship is directly in issue. In such cases only, any fact upon which such relationship depends may be so proved, e.g., the date of a birth.

In an action for goods sold, to which the defence of infancy was pleaded, the date of birth being thus in question, a declaration made by defendant's deceased father as to such date was not admissible, it not being a pedigree case. If it had been, then such fact could have been proved thus.

BRETT, M.R. "It is obvious that in this case the question of family is immaterial, that the question whose son the defendant was is immaterial, and so were all such questions as whether he was a legitimate or a natural son, an elder or a younger son, or as to what relation he occupied with regard to the rest of the family. There

was, therefore, no question which could be called a question of family; the only question is, what was the date of the birth of the defendant?"

"This evidence is *primâ facie* hearsay evidence, and the general rule of law is that hearsay evidence is not admissible; it is therefore sought to bring this case within some recognised exception to that rule. . . . The exception which applies to this case is that the evidence is admissible in cases where it is a question of pedigree. Here there is no question as to pedigree, no question as to descent, none as to relationship, none as to the position of any person in any family—all these questions are wholly immaterial—so that in this case no question of pedigree could arise, and therefore this case does not fall within the recognised exception to the general rule of evidence."

BOWEN, L.J. "No question is raised as to the family of the defendant, or as to his position in that family; the only question raised was as to the age of this particular individual."

FRY, L.J. "The exception is confined to questions of pedigree, and no such question is raised in this case."

Note.—The evidence of the date of birth in this case was rejected merely on the ground that it was not a "pedigree case," *i.e.*, not a case in which a question of relationship was in issue. If it had been such a case, then the date of birth would have been a proper matter to prove in such manner.

JOHNSON v. LAWSON

(1824).

2 BINGHAM, 86; 9 MOORE, 183; 27 R. R. 558.

Declarations as to pedigree must have been made by members of the family. If made by servants or intimate acquaintances, whatever their position or knowledge, they are not admissible.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

BEST, C.J. "As a general rule, hearsay is not admissible evidence,

but to this general rule pedigree-causes form an exception, from the very nature of the case. Facts must be spoken of which took place many years before the trial, and of these, traditional evidence is often the only evidence which can be obtained; but evidence of that kind must be subject to limitation, otherwise it would be a source of great uncertainty, and the limitation hitherto pursued, namely, the confining such evidence to the declarations of relations of the family, affords a rule at once certain and intelligible. If the admissibility of such evidence were not so restrained, we should on every occasion, before the testimony could be admitted, have to enter upon a long inquiry as to the degree of intimacy or confidence that subsisted between the party and the deceased declarant. . . . If we look into the cases, we shall find that the rule has always been confined to the declarations of kindred . . . it has been carried as far as it can with safety, and we must not extend it farther."

PARK, J. "It has been urged that great confidence is often reposed in servants; but it is not confidence of this kind, nor is it usual for a man to confer with his domestics on the situation of the various members of his family. My objection to the proposed evidence is, that if it were to be admitted, the practice would be so loose as to occasion great inconvenience; whereas, if the rule be confined to members of a family, the path to be pursued is clear and certain."

BURROUGH, J. "This exception from the general rule, that hearsay shall not be admitted, must be construed strictly, and the natural limits of it are the declarations of members of the family. If we go beyond, where are we to stop? Is the declaration of a groom to be admitted? of a steward? of a chambermaid? of a nurse? may it be admitted if made a week after they have joined the family? and if not, at what time after? We should have to try in every case the life and habits of the party who made the declaration, and on account of this uncertainty such evidence must be excluded."

Note.—It might well be that an old family servant had greater knowledge of the family affairs than a member of the family had; but it is considered that a servant would not have the same interest in keeping up a correct record of the family. Also, the admission of a servant's

evidence would, as Burrough, J., said in the above case, involve the further inquiry as to the position and means of knowledge of the servant, after he was dead; not an easy matter.

DOE v. GRIFFIN

(1812).

15 EAST, 293; 13 R. R. 474.

Declarations in pedigree cases are not confined to matters within the personal knowledge of the declarant. The matter stated may be mere family tradition, or hearsay upon hearsay, so long as it is confined to the statements and belief of deceased members of the family; or even of absence of information.

In an ejectment case, the question arose whether a certain person had died without issue. Evidence by an elderly lady, one of the family, was admitted to the effect that the person in question "had many years before, when a young man, gone abroad, and according to the repute of the family, had afterwards died in the West Indies, and that she had never heard in the family of his having been married."

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "The evidence was sufficient to call upon the defendant to give *primâ facie* evidence at least that Thomas was married; for what other evidence could the lessor be expected to produce that Thomas was not married, than that none of the family had ever heard that he was?"

GOODRIGHT v. MOSS

(1777).

COWPER, 591.

Declarations as to pedigree may be in any form, oral, written, carved on tombstones, inscribed on portraits, or on written or printed pedigrees, or even by

conduct, as, for instance, by treating a child as legitimate or otherwise.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

LORD MANSFIELD, C.J. "The question is, whether the declarations of the father and mother in their lifetime can be admitted in evidence after their death? Tradition is sufficient in point of pedigree; circumstances may be proved. For instance, suppose from the hour of one child's birth to the death of its parent, it had always been treated as illegitimate, and another introduced and considered as the heir of the family; that would be good evidence. An entry in a father's family Bible, an inscription on a tombstone, a pedigree hung up in the family mansion, are all good evidence."

Note.—Inscriptions on tombstones, portraits, etc., would naturally be made by strangers, but with family approval, and would amount to declarations by relations.

DECLARATIONS AS TO PUBLIC RIGHTS.

WEEKS v. SPARKE

(1813).

1 M. & S. 679; 14 R. R. 546.

In proof of public or general rights or customs, or matters of public or general interest, statements made by deceased persons of competent knowledge as to the existence of such rights, etc., and as to the general reputation thereof in the neighbourhood, if made "ante litem motam," are admissible. Such statements are known as "declarations as to public and general rights."

So, on a question of prescriptive right of common, in which many persons had an interest, such evidence was allowed, on the ground

that it was, in some degree, a public right. (But see note at end of this case.)

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "The admission of hearsay evidence upon all occasions, whether in matters of public or private right, is somewhat of an anomaly, and forms an exception to the general rules of evidence. The question here is whether this is a case of a public or merely private right. . . . I confess myself at a loss fully to understand upon what principle, even in matters of public right, reputation was even deemed admissible evidence. It is said, indeed, that upon questions of public right all are interested, and must be presumed conversant with them; and that is the distinction taken between public and private rights; but I must confess I have not been able to see the force of the principle on which that distinction is founded so clearly as others have done, though I must admit its existence; and it has not been controverted in argument to-day, that in the case of public rights reputation is to be received in evidence."

"Reputation is in general weak evidence; and when it is admitted, it is the duty of the Judge to impress on the minds of the jury how little conclusive it ought to be, lest it should have more weight with them than it ought to have."

LE BLANC, J. "The question arose upon a claim of a prescriptive right of common; such a right as the party alleged to have existed beyond the time of legal memory; and the question is how that right is to be proved. First, it is to be proved by acts of enjoyment within the period of living memory. And when that foundation is laid, then inasmuch as there cannot be any witnesses to speak to acts of enjoyment beyond the time of living memory, evidence is to be admitted from old persons (not any old persons, but persons who have been conversant with the neighbourhood where the waste lies over which the particular right of common is claimed), of what they have heard other persons of the same neighbourhood, who are deceased, say respecting the right. Thus far it is evidence as applicable to this prescriptive right, it being a prescription in which others are concerned as well as the person claiming it; because a right of common is to a certain degree a public right. And the only

evidence of reputation which was received was that from persons connected with the district."

"In the same manner in questions of pedigree, although they are not of a public nature, the evidence of what persons connected with the family have been heard to say, is received, as to the state of that family. In like manner, also upon questions of boundary, though the evidence of perambulations may be considered to a certain degree as evidence of an exercise of the right, yet it has been usual to go further and admit the evidence of what old persons who are deceased have been heard to say on those occasions."

"The rule generally adopted upon questions either of prescription or custom is this, that after a foundation is once laid of the right by proving acts of ownership, then the evidence of reputation becomes admissible, such evidence being confined to what old persons who were in a situation to know what these rights are, have been heard to say concerning them. The issue here was on the prescriptive right of common, and the evidence admitted was as to a right derogatory to that prescriptive right ; which must be governed by the same rules."

BAYLEY, J. "In cases of prescription, which must have originated beyond the time of legal memory, and of which it is impossible to establish the claim by evidence of the grant, reputation seems to be admissible, and therefore for that reason, when instances have been adduced to show the exercise of the right claimed, it is usual to admit it. . . . I take it that where the term 'public right' is used, it does not mean public in the literal sense, but is synonymous with general ; that is what concerns a multitude of persons. Now this is a general right exercised by a variety of persons, though not a public right of common."

DAMPIER, J. "In public rights it is not disputed that reputation is admissible ; and that it has been extended to other rights which cannot be strictly called public, such as manors, parishes, and a modus, which comes the nearest to this case. That, strictly speaking, is a private right, but has been considered as public, as it regards the admissibility of this species of evidence, because it affects a large number of occupiers within a district."

Note.—The above case is generally taken as the leading one, which first

laid down the law clearly, although it has been disapproved of (see the next case) on the point whether the right in question was public or private.

Although such evidence is not admissible as to *private* rights, it is admissible both as to *public* and as to *general* rights.

Public rights are those common to all the community, such as rights to use highways, ferries, and public fisheries.

General rights are those common to a considerable class of the community, such as parochial or manorial rights.

With reference to the remark of Le Blanc, J., in the above case, that the right is first proved "by acts of enjoyment within the period of living memory," Sir James Stephen remarks: "This seems superfluous, as no jury would ever find that a public right of way existed, which had not been used in living memory, on the strength of a report that some deceased person had said that there once was such a right" (*Dig. Ev.*, p. 183).

But the declarations must be made "*ante litem motam*." As to the meaning of such expression, see *ante*, p. 167.

It should be observed that such declarations may be made in any manner or form, as in oral statements, writings, deeds, depositions, maps, books, presentments of Manorial Courts, or verdicts, judgments or orders of competent Courts, such as Quarter Sessions.

LORD DUNRAVEN v. LLEWELLYN (1850).

19 L. J. Q. B. 388 ; 14 JUR. 1089 ; 15 Q. B. 791 ;
81 R. R. 809.

A public or general right, or matter of public or general interest, to be evidenced by reputation or declarations by deceased persons, must be one which is common to all persons interested, as to all the inhabitants of a particular manor. A right is not within the rule simply because it is enjoyed by many persons in their own individual capacities, such as a right of common enjoyed by several persons in the same manor in their individual capacities.

Evidence of reputation is admissible although no actual enjoyment of the right be proved.

On a question between the lord of a manor and the owner of a freehold estate within the manor, whether a piece of land was part

of the lord's waste or part of the defendant's land, after proof had been given that there were many lands held of the manor the tenants of which had always exercised rights of common on the waste of the manor, evidence was offered, on the part of the lord, of declarations of deceased tenants that the land was parcel of the waste. It was held that these declarations were not admissible in evidence, as there is no common law right for all tenants of a manor to have common on the waste of the manor, but that each tenant who has the right has it as an incident by law attached to his particular grant, and that the numerous private rights of common of the several tenants do not compose one public right so as to render evidence of reputation admissible. It was also held that evidence of actual enjoyment of a right need not be given in order to render evidence of reputation admissible.

PARKE, B. "In the course of the argument we intimated our opinion that the want of evidence of acts of enjoyment of the rights did not affect the admissibility of the evidence, but only its value when admitted. We also stated that no objection could be made to the evidence, on the ground that it proceeded from persons who had not competent knowledge upon the subject, or from persons who were themselves interested in the question. The main inquiry was, whether this was a subject of a sufficiently public nature to justify the reception of hearsay evidence relating to it."

"If this question had been one in which all the inhabitants of the manor, or all the tenants of it, or of a particular district of it, had been interested, reputation from any deceased inhabitant or tenant, or even deceased residents in the manor, would have been admissible, such residents having presumably a knowledge of such local customs; and if there had been a common law right for every tenant of the manor to have common on the wastes of a manor, reputation from any deceased tenant as to the extent of those wastes, and therefore as to any particular land being waste of the manor, would have been admissible. But . . . it is not to be understood that every tenant of a manor has by the common law such a right, but only that certain tenants have such a right, not by prescription, but as a right by common law, incident to the grant."

"This right, therefore, is not a common right of all tenants, but

belongs only to each grantee of arable land by virtue of his individual grant, and is an incident thereto. . . . We are therefore of opinion that this case is precisely in the same situation as if evidence had been offered that there were many persons, tenants of the manor, who had separate prescriptive rights over the lord's wastes, and reputation is not admissible in the case of such separate rights, each being private and depending on each separate prescription, unless the proposition can be supported, that because there are many such rights, the rights have a public character, and the evidence therefore becomes admissible. We think this position cannot be maintained."

"It is impossible to say in such a case where the dividing point is. What is the number of rights which is to cause their nature to be changed and to give them a public character? But it is said that there are cases which have decided that where there are numerous private prescriptive rights, reputation is admissible, and the case of *Weeks v. Sparke* (*ante*, p. 173) is relied upon as establishing that proposition. The reasons given by the different Judges in that case would certainly not be satisfactory at this day."

"We are of opinion, therefore, that the evidence of reputation offered in this case was, according to the well-established rule in the modern cases, inadmissible, as it is in reality in support of a mere private prescription, and the number of these private rights does not make them to be of a public nature."

Note.—Matters of public or general interest within the rule under discussion include, among others—rights of highway, ferry, fishing, tolls, and landing-places; boundaries of towns, parishes, counties, hamlets and manors; manorial, borough or district customs; and rights of common.

R. v. BLISS

(1837).

7 Ad. & E. 550; 2 N. & P. 464; W. W. & D. 624.

Declarations as to public or general rights must relate directly to the existence of the right itself, and not

to particular facts which may support or negative it. The latter are liable to be misrepresented or misunderstood.

Thus, the question being whether a road was public or private, a statement made by a deceased resident that he had planted a tree to mark the boundary of the road was inadmissible.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. "Is it then evidence of reputation? Everything which depends upon hearsay should be received with great caution. Hearsay evidence in matters of this sort was received by Lord Ellenborough in the first case with great reluctance. It is only to be received as showing general reputation, and not as evidence of particular facts. Here the hearsay evidence relates to a particular fact, and therefore is inadmissible. The statement did not describe the road as public or private."

PATTESON, J. "To determine whether it was receivable as evidence of reputation, it is necessary to see what was the issue. It was whether this was or was not a public road. If the issue had been as to the boundary of a public road it might have been receivable in evidence, but evidence of reputation as to boundary cannot be given in evidence where the question is whether the road is public or private. If the witness had said this always was a public road as far as this place, it would have been receivable. The statement is clearly not receivable as evidence of reputation."

WILLIAMS, J. "The declaration in this case related to a particular fact, and was not, therefore, admissible."

COLERIDGE, J. "No rule is more universal than that statements admissible in evidence on the ground that they are evidence of reputation must relate to general matters and not to particular facts."

Note.—The recent case of *Mercer v. Denne*, [1904] 2 Ch. 534, illustrates the point that declarations as to particular facts are inadmissible.

NEWCASTLE v. BROXTOWE (1832).

4 B. & AD. 273 ; 1 N. & M. 598.

Persons whose statements are receivable in evidence as declarations as to (public and) general rights must be shown to have been "competent declarants"; that is, they must have been so situated as to the place in question, by residence, duty or other connection, that it may be concluded they had both the means and the motive for giving a true account of the matter.

Thus, in order to prove that a public building was within the hundred of Broxtowe, ancient orders made by justices at Quarter Sessions for the county, so describing it, were admissible without proof that such justices resided in the hundred or county, their competency being presumed from their office.

PARKE, J. "These documents were admitted, not as orders upon matters over which the magistrates had jurisdiction, but as evidence of reputation; in that point of view we are of opinion that they were admissible. Four of them contain an express statement, the fifth an implied one, that the Castle (or the Brewhouse, or the Park of Nottingham, which belong to it) is within the wapentake or hundred of Broxtowe. The statement is made by the justices of the peace assembled in Sessions who, though they were not proved to be residents within the county or hundred, must from the nature of their offices alone be presumed to have sufficient acquaintance with the subject to which these declarations relate; and the objection cannot prevail that they were made after a controversy upon that subject had arisen, because there appears to have been no dispute upon the particular question, whether the Castle and its precincts were in the hundred of Broxtowe. These statements, therefore, fall within the established rule as to the admission of evidence of reputation."

Note.—It would appear, however, that all persons are strictly competent declarants as to public, as distinct from general, rights, as all

persons are legally interested in them. But their delarations would be worthless, even if admissible, unless they were shown to have had competent knowledge.

DYING DECLARATIONS.

R. v. JENKINS

(1869).

L. R. 1 C. C. R. 187 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 82 ; 20 L. T. 372 ;
17 W. R. 621 ; 11 Cox, 250.

In trials for homicide, statements made by the deceased person, whose death is the subject of the charge, relating to the cause and circumstances of his death are admissible in evidence, provided it is clearly proved that the deceased had at the time abandoned all hope of recovery. Such statements are known as "dying declarations."

The prisoner was charged with the murder of a woman, who, on her death-bed, accused him of the crime. A magistrate's elerk attended her to take down her statement, writing down that she made it "with no hope of my recovery." He then read it over to her, but, before she signed it, she desired the addition of the words "at present," so that the words read "with no hope at present of my recovery." It was held that such statement could not be received in evidence, as her objection to sign the statement without the words "at present" suggested some faint hope of recovery.

KELLY, C.B. "I am of opinion that the result of the cases is, that there must be an unqualified belief, without any hope of recovery, that the declarant is about to die. According to the language of Eyre, C.B., every hope of this world must be gone. According to Tindal, C.J., any hope of recovery, however slight, must exclude the evidence. Then the burden of proof lies entirely

on the prosecution. The Judge must be perfectly satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the declarant was under the belief that no hope of recovery existed. Now, in the statement as it read at first it was 'no hope of recovery;' then she herself desires the insertion of the important words 'at present.' We have to consider the effect of those words under the circumstances under which they were uttered. For the prosecution we were asked to give no importance to those words; but the woman must have had some meaning, and, if so, we have to give effect to the meaning we think she had. It might have meant only that as the clerk had used the word 'present' when he first put the question to her, she thought it more correct that the same form should be adhered to in the written statement. She may, however, have meant to say, not that she had absolutely no hope, but that at present she had not, but she hoped still that ultimately a change might come, and then she might recover. We should have to solve the doubt, if we had any, 'in favorem vitæ' in favour of the prisoner; but we think the circumstances call upon us to give our decision in his favour."

BYLES, J. "These dying declarations are to be received with scrupulous, I had almost said with superstitious, care. The declarant is subject to no cross-examination. No oath need be administered. There can be no prosecution for perjury. There is always danger of mistake which cannot be corrected. I think there should be the sense of danger of an almost immediate impending death. Here the woman said, in effect, 'I have no hope at present.' The clerk wrote it down 'I have no hope.' She said 'That is not what I mean; I mean I have no hope at present.' That merely means, If I don't get better soon, I shall not recover."

Note.—The question in the above case apparently turned upon her refusal to sign the statement without the words "at present," although such words in themselves are apparently meaningless. If the statement had, in the first instance, been drawn up with such words, it might well be argued that it would have been admissible.

R. v. MEAD

(1824).

2 B. & C. 605 ; 4 D. & R. 120 ; 26 R. R. 484.

A dying declaration is only admissible in trials for murder and manslaughter.

Thus, such a declaration was rejected in a trial for perjury.

ABBOTT, C.J. "Evidence of this description is only admissible where the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death the subject of the dying declarations."

Note.—This rule is also illustrated, as to a civil case, by *Stobart v. Dryden*, ante, p. 127.

R. v. WOODCOCK

(1789).

1 LEACH, C. C. 500.

A dying declaration is admissible although the deceased did not expressly refer to his expectation of death. It is sufficient if the circumstances show that he expected speedy death, and was without hope.

The facts sufficiently appear from the judgment.

EYRE, C.B. "The general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is, that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so awful is considered by law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a court of justice. But a difficulty also arises with respect to these declarations; for it has not

appeared, and it seems impossible to find out, whether the deceased herself apprehended that she was in such a state of mortality as would inevitably oblige her soon to answer before her Maker for the truth or falsehood of her assertions. The several witnesses could give no satisfactory information as to the sentiments of her mind upon this subject. The surgeon said that she did not seem to be at all sensible of the danger of her situation, dreadful as it appeared to all around her; but lay, submitting quietly to her fate, without explaining whether she thought herself likely to live or die. Upon the whole of this difficulty, however, my judgment is, that inasmuch as she was mortally wounded, and was in a condition which rendered almost immediate death inevitable; as she was thought by every person about her to be dying, though it was difficult to get from her particular explanations as to what she thought of herself and her situation; her declarations, made under these circumstances, ought to be considered by a jury as being made under the impression of her approaching dissolution; for, resigned as she appeared to be, she must have felt the hand of death, and must have considered herself as a dying woman. She continued to repeat, rationally and uniformly, the facts which she had disclosed from the moment her senses had returned, until her tongue was no longer capable of performing its office. Declarations so made are certainly entitled to credit; they ought therefore to be received in evidence; but the degree of credit to which they are entitled must always be a matter for the sober consideration of the jury, under all the circumstances of the case."

Note.—The case of *R. v. Bedingfield*, ante, p. 56, might be referred to in connection with the above case. It was there held that, notwithstanding the dying condition of the woman, her statement was not admissible as a dying declaration.

R. v. PIKE

(1829).

3 C. & P. 598.

A dying declaration is not admissible unless the declarant would have been competent as a witness, and was mentally capable of appreciating his condition. Thus, imbecility or tender age may exclude the declaration.

The prisoner being indicted for murder of a child aged four years, it was proposed to put in evidence, as a dying declaration, what the child said shortly before her death. It was held that it was inadmissible.

PARK, J. "We allow the declaration of persons *in articulo mortis* to be given in evidence, if it appear that the person making such declaration was then under the deep impression that he was soon to render an account to his Maker. Now, as this child was but four years old, it is quite impossible that she, however precocious her mind, could have had that idea of a future state which is necessary to make such a declaration admissible."

DECLARATIONS AS TO WILLS.**SUGDEN v. ST. LEONARDS**

(1876).

L. R. 1 P. D. 154 ; 45 L. J. P. 49 ; 34 L. T. 369 ;
24 W. R. 479.

When a question arises as to the contents, genuineness or validity of a will, whether existing, lost or destroyed, statements or declarations made by the testator concerning such will, either prior thereto, as to his testamentary intentions, or (perhaps) subsequent thereto, as to his testamentary acts, are admissible in proof thereof.

The will of Lord St. Leonards was missing at his death, and was never found. A daughter of the deceased wrote out the contents of the will from memory, there being no draft or copy of it. The daughter had lived with the testator all her life; he had constantly consulted her about the will and explained its provisions to her, and she had from time to time assisted him to make and alter it. Her statement of the will was in some degree corroborated by other papers of the testator, and also by his verbal statements made after the execution of the will to his friends and relatives.

The Court held that such statements or declarations made by the testator, whether before or after the execution of the will, were admissible as evidence of its contents, and granted probate of the will as written down by the daughter.

COCKBURN, C.J. "When the idea of the testator's having himself destroyed the will is done away with, the next question is, whether the will having been lost, secondary evidence can be given of its contents? Now that question is disposed of by the authority of the case of *Brown v. Brown*, which, as I think, has been recognised as perfectly sound. There Lord Campbell says, '**Parol evidence of the contents of a lost instrument may be received as much when it is a will as if it were any other document,**' and in that I, for one, most entirely concur. The consequence of a contrary ruling would be most mischievous. It would enable any person who desired, from some sinister motive, to frustrate the testamentary disposition of a dead man."

"The third question is, whether we have before us sufficient evidence of the contents of the will. This depends upon the evidence of Miss Sugden, and, I must say, upon her evidence alone, to this extent, that if we had not her evidence, all the other parol, and even the documentary evidence in the case, would not enable us to say that we had ascertained the contents of the will so as to give effect to it."

"The question presents itself whether the declarations of the testator can be received as secondary evidence of the contents of the lost will. No doubt, generally speaking, where secondary evidence is admissible, if oral, it must be given on oath; if documentary, it must be verified on oath. Nevertheless, the declarations of deceased persons are, in several instances, admitted as exceptions

to the general rule, when such persons had peculiar means of knowledge, and may be supposed to have been without motive to speak otherwise than according to the truth. It is obvious that a man who has made his will stands pre-eminently in that position. He must be taken to know the contents of the will he has made. If he speaks of its provisions, he can have no motive for misrepresenting them, except in the rare instances in which a testator may have the intention of misleading by his statements respecting his will. Generally speaking, statements of this kind are honestly made, and this class of evidence may be put on the same footing with the declarations of members of a family in matters of pedigree, evidence not always to be relied upon, yet sufficiently so to make it worth admitting, leaving its effect to be judged of by those who have to decide the case."

"I entertain no doubt that prior instructions, or a draft authenticated by the testator, or verbal declarations of what he was about to do, though of course not conclusive evidence, are yet legally admissible as secondary evidence of the contents of a lost will. . . . The question is simply one of the admissibility of secondary evidence, and has to be determined by the rules of evidence alone. I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion that all statements or declarations, written or oral, made by a testator prior to the execution of the will are admissible as evidence of its contents."

"The admissibility of declarations made subsequently to the execution of the will creates greater difficulties by reason of a dictum of Lord Campbell and a decision of Lord Penzance. In principle there appears to me to be no distinction. The position of the testator is the same, both as respects peculiar knowledge and motive for speaking the truth, which can be no less than the motives which he has for making statements as to his intentions prior to the execution of the will."

"I am therefore of opinion that the various statements of Lord St. Leonards, whether before or after the execution of his will, are admissible to prove the contents of the will."

JESSEL, M.R. "Can we admit, as a matter of course, secondary evidence in proof of a will? Now I should have thought there could be but one answer to that question. . . . The meaning of

secondary evidence is to supply the loss by accident or otherwise of primary evidence. . . . The whole theory of secondary evidence depends upon this, that the primary evidence is lost, and that it is against justice that the accident of the loss should deprive a man of the rights to which he would otherwise be entitled. I am at a loss to discover any reason whatever for distinguishing between the loss of a will and the loss of a deed."

"The next point, and one no doubt also of great importance, is what secondary evidence is admissible. In this particular instance there is the evidence of a person who had seen the will, and the real point to be considered and decided is, whether that evidence can be confirmed or corroborated by declarations of the testator made either to that witness or to other persons, and, if so, whether those declarations to be admissible in evidence must be limited to declarations made at or before the execution of the will, or may be extended to declarations made after the execution of the will."

"As a rule the declarations, whether in writing or oral, made by deceased persons, are in our law not admissible in evidence at all. But so inconvenient was the law upon this subject, so frequently has it shut out the only obtainable evidence, so frequently would it have caused a most crying and intolerable injustice, that a large number of exceptions have been made to the general rule."

(The exceptions are here mentioned.)

"Now I take it that the principle which underlies all these exceptions is the same. In the first place, it must be a case in which it is difficult to obtain other evidence, for no doubt the ground for admitting the exceptions was that very difficulty. In the next place, the declarant must be disinterested; that is, disinterested in the sense that the declaration was not made in favour of his interest. And, thirdly, the declaration must be made before dispute or litigation, so that it was made without bias on account of the existence of dispute or litigation which the declarant might be supposed to favour. Lastly, and this appears to me one of the strongest reasons for admitting it, the declarant must have had peculiar knowledge—knowledge not possessed in ordinary cases."

"Now you will find that all these reasons . . . exist in this case, that is the case of a testator declaring the contents of his will.

Of course, as in the case of pedigree, the Courts must be careful and cautious in admitting such evidence. From its very nature it is evidence not open to the test of cross-examination, it is very often produced at second or third hand, and is therefore particularly liable to lose something of its colour in the course of transmission. It is so easily and so frequently fabricated that all Courts which dispose of such cases must be especially on their guard. But that only goes to the question as to the weight to be attributed to the evidence when admitted; it does not go to the question of admitting the evidence itself, and I must say it appears to me that, having regard to the reasons and principles which have induced the tribunals of this country to admit exceptions in the other cases to which I have referred, we should be equally justified and equally bound to admit it in this case."

"I should, therefore, entirely concur with the Lord Chief Justice's conclusion that this evidence would be admissible, not only as regards that portion which was anterior to the execution of the will, but also as regards that portion of it which is posterior to its execution."

Note.—It is very doubtful whether this case should be put under the head of "hearsay." It might certainly be placed under the head of "secondary evidence" of documents (see *post*, p. 252). For a good discussion of the question see *Phipson*, p. 306. It should also be observed particularly that the admissibility of the evidence of the testator's post-testamentary statements has been seriously questioned. See *Woodward v. Goulstone*, 11 App. Cas. 469; *Atkinson v. Morris*, [1897] P. 40.

EVIDENCE IN FORMER PROCEEDINGS.

MAYOR OF DONCASTER v. DAY

(1810).

3 TAUNTON, 262; 12 R. R. 650.

When a witness, who gave evidence in a former proceeding between the same parties, involving the same issue, is dead, or unable to attend the second

trial (for certain recognised reasons), his evidence so given may be proved and repeated by any person who heard it.

A new trial having been granted, application was made that, if any of the witnesses, many of whom were very aged, should die or become unable to attend the second trial, their evidence given on the former occasion might be read at the next trial.

SIR J. MANSFIELD, C.J. "You do not want a rule of Court for that purpose. What a witness, since dead, has sworn upon a trial between the same parties, may, without any order of the Court, be given in evidence, either from the Judge's notes, or from notes that have been taken by any other person, who will swear to their accuracy; or the former evidence may be proved by any person who will swear from his memory to its having been given."

Note.—The events in which such evidence taken in former proceedings between the same parties is admissible are not quite clear. It certainly cannot be given unless the witness cannot, in the opinion of the Court, reasonably be expected to attend on the second occasion. If he be (1) dead, (2) permanently insane, or (3) kept out of the way by the adverse party, it seems the evidence is clearly admissible; but if he be (4) ill or (5) out of the jurisdiction, or (6) he cannot be found, then it would seem to be a question for the Court, having regard to the special circumstances.

Under the former Chancery practice, an order was required to read such evidence, but it is now provided generally, by Order 37, rule 3, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, as follows—

"An order to read evidence taken in another cause or matter shall not be necessary, but such evidence may, saving all just exceptions, be read on *ex parte* applications by leave of the Court or a Judge, to be obtained at the time of making any such application, and in any other case upon the party desiring to use such evidence giving two days' previous notice to the other parties of his intention to read such evidence."

It has been held that this rule does not enable the Court to grant leave to use the evidence of witnesses in another action, between other parties on a similar issue, with a view to avoid the expense of a commission to take evidence (*Printing, etc. Co. v. Drucker*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 801). The only object of the rule is to save the expense of the order required under the former Chancery practice. It does not affect the law as to the admissibility of such evidence.

With regard to evidence given at an earlier stage of the same proceedings, Order 37, rule 25, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, provides—

"All evidence taken at the hearing or trial of any cause or matter may be used in any subsequent proceedings in the same cause or matter."

LLANOVER v. HOMFRAY

(1881).

L. R. 19 CH. D. 224 ; 30 W. R. 557.

Evidence given in former proceedings is admissible in subsequent proceedings although the parties in the subsequent proceedings are not personally the same, provided they are the privies of or claim through the former parties.

Thus, where in 1815 evidence was given in an action between manorial tenants and the lord of a manor as to a manorial right ; and in 1881 another action was tried, as to the same right, between the manorial tenants and the lord of the manor of that time, none of whom were personally parties to the former suit, yet, as they were all "privies in estate" of the former parties, the evidence given in the former action, by witnesses since deceased, was admitted in the latter action.

JESSEL, M.R. "The question has been raised whether this evidence is admissible in the present suit. I must say that I have no doubt whatever that it is. **The suit was a suit by persons who were privies in estate with the present tenants ; they were not, indeed, owners of the same estate, but as the suit was on behalf of all the tenants it included the then owners of the estate now belonging to the Messrs. Phillips, and on the other side there was a lord of the manor, who is now represented by the present lord of the manor.** Therefore it was a suit between persons privy in estate to the parties in the present action. **The issue in that suit was the same as that in the present action, and the evidence in one is therefore admissible in the other. Why should the evidence not be admissible ? The lord had an opportunity of cross-examining, and the evidence answers every condition of admissibility, the last condition being that the witnesses must be dead or not producible, which, of course, is the case now with these old witnesses. . . . If the witnesses were now alive, of course their evidence could not be read, but they must be called. There is, in my opinion, no more objection to reading**

this evidence than there is in any other case where the witnesses have been called and are dead. If a witness gave evidence at the trial of an action, and a new trial was ordered, then if he were dead at the time of the new trial you would read his former evidence; but if he were alive you could not do so, but would have to call him again."

Note.—As to "privies," see *ante*, p. 36.

MORGAN v. NICHOLL (1866).

L. R. 2 C. P. 117; 36 L. J. C. P. 86; 15 L. T. 184;
15 W. R. 110; 12 JUR. N. S. 963.

Evidence given in former proceedings is not admissible in subsequent proceedings merely on the ground that the parties in both proceedings claim in the same right. The parties must either be the same, or the later parties must claim under the former parties.

Thus, where, in 1856, A. brought an action of ejectment against X., and in 1866 B., the father of A., brought a similar action against the same defendant, claiming the same property under the same title, the plaintiff in the latter action was not allowed to read in evidence a shorthand writer's notes of the evidence given in the action of 1856, by a relation of the plaintiff, who gave evidence as to the pedigree, but who had since died.

ERLE, C.J. "If that former trial had been in an action brought against the defendant by the present plaintiff, or anyone claiming under him, the evidence would have been admissible. But the evidence ought not to be admissible against the defendant unless it would also have been admissible against the present plaintiff. In my opinion, the two plaintiffs, that is to say, the plaintiff in the present action and the plaintiff in the former one, are perfect strangers. On the former trial, the plaintiff, who was the son of the plaintiff in the present action, claimed under his father, in the

belief that his father was dead ; and on that trial this evidence of Henry Morgan was admitted. It turned out, however, that the father was not dead, and he has since brought this action, in which he is a perfect stranger to the son, so far as this rule of law is concerned. If the defendant had wanted to have used this evidence against the plaintiff in this action, he could not have done so ; and therefore I think the evidence was not admissible for the plaintiff."

WILLES, J. "The question is, whether the rule as to the admissibility of evidence given by a witness on a former trial of the same matter in dispute, and between the same parties or their privies, extends to the present case ; that is to say, whether all relations in blood are bound by or may take advantage of the rule, because the only thing here connecting the present plaintiff with the plaintiff in the former action is the relationship of blood, the present plaintiff being the father of the former plaintiff. The argument would be the same if the two plaintiffs had been cousins, which shows its absurdity. . . . He is no privy to the plaintiff in the former action, since a father does not claim through his son. . . . There has been no case in which the evidence has been admitted where the parties to the action were not parties to the former action, except they were persons who claimed under such former parties."

KEATING, J. "The defendant was party to the former action, but the plaintiff was not, nor was he claiming under the plaintiff in the former action. A son is obliged to claim through his father ; but the father does not claim through the son, and for the present purpose they are strangers."

STATEMENTS IN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.

STURLA v. FRECCIA

(1880).

L. R. 5 A. C. 641 ; 50 L. J. CH. 86 ; 43 L. T. 209 ;
29 W. R. 217 ; 44 J. P. 212.

Entries or statements in "public documents," such as official books and registers, British or foreign, are

evidence against every one, provided there was a legal duty to make such entries for public information or reference, and they were made in proper time by the proper officers, after proper inquiry.

Although foreign public documents are within the rule, yet the report of a committee appointed by a public department in a foreign state, though addressed to that department and acted on by the Government, was not admitted in the English Court as evidence of the facts stated therein : there being no evidence of any such legal duty to make either the entries therein, or any particular inquiries on which they were based, nor any evidence that such report was to be for public reference.

LORD SELBORNE, L.C. "There is abundant proof that the report which contains the passage it is desired to use is an authentic public document of the Genoese Government, to which, so far as the good faith of those who made it is concerned, credit might be justly given on any occasion on which it might properly be used. But . . . it does not appear that any particular rules were prescribed to them as to the kind of information which they should collect ; still less as to the evidence which they were to require to substantiate such information. . . . It appears to me to have been perfectly open to its members to receive any species of information, on hearsay or otherwise, to which they themselves at the moment thought credit could be given ; and therefore, I am unable to apply to them any analogy derived from the cases of Courts, commissioners, or other persons having a special duty or authority under the English law to make particular kinds of inquiries."

LORD HATHERLEY. "When you come to look at the character of the document which is sought to be produced, what do you find ? There are no original entries to be found in that document, but there appear to have been books kept, although we have not any very precise information about how they were kept, or whose duty it was to keep them, and the like. . . . I do not think this comes near the case of the heralds' books, nor the commissions for making specific inquiries, these specific inquiries falling plainly under the head of a discharge of a duty, which duty is discharged in the only proper manner in which it could be discharged ; and, therefore, the

law taking notice that such had been the course of investigation or inquiry, and such had been the result of the due execution by the commission of that duty, gives credit to what the return states upon the matter."

LORD BLACKBURN. "It is an established rule of law that public documents are admitted for certain purposes. What a public document is, within that sense, is of course the great point which we have now to consider. . . . It should be a public inquiry, a public document, and made by a public officer. I do not think that 'public' there is to be taken in the sense of meaning the whole world. I think an entry in the books of a manor is public in the sense that it concerns all the people interested in the manor. And an entry probably in a corporation book concerning a corporate matter, or something in which all the corporation is concerned, would be 'public' within that sense. But it must be a public document, and it must be made by a public officer. I understand a public document there to mean a document that is made for the purpose of the public making use of it, and being able to refer to it. It is meant to be where there is a judicial, or quasi-judicial, duty to inquire, as might be said to be the case with the bishop acting under the writs issued by the Crown. That may be said to be quasi-judicial. He is acting for the public when that is done; but I think the very object of it must be that it should be made for the purpose of being kept public, so that the persons concerned in it may have access to it afterwards. . . . Can the document in this case be said to come within that class of cases? I think it is impossible to look at it in that way. There is not the slightest evidence, or the least circumstance, to lead me to the conclusion that it was even intended that this private and confidential report should be seen by anyone interested in it. It was meant for private information, to guide the discretion of the Government. It was not, like the bishop's return of the first-fruits, for the public information, to be kept in the office and to be seen by all in the diocese who might be concerned when there came to be any litigation."

LORD WATSON. "It does not appear to me that the duty cast upon the committee necessarily, or even by fair implication, involved the necessity of making any quasi-judicial or strict inquiry into

the circumstances which they were about to report. . . . The sort of commission that was given here was one of a very roving description, to find out every little circumstance, whatever it might be, wherever they could pick it up, and in whatever manner they could ascertain it. . . . I cannot conceive, when you take these circumstances into consideration along with the undoubted fact that **this was not made for the purpose of being recorded in a public register**, that it can have the authority of a public register."

Note.—There are two special rules respecting "public documents"—

(1) Statements in them are evidence against every one.

(2) They can always be proved by secondary evidence.

The first point only is in question here. The second is dealt with *post*, p. 268.

"The very gist of such documents," it has been well said, "is that they contain a statement of some matter of fact by a person duly authorized to make it, who is not, save in very exceptional cases, called as a witness. And the guarantee of their credibility consists in the public duty of the official who keeps them to ascertain the truth of the matters to be recorded, and to make accurate entries of them in the public interest for the purpose of reference" (*Wills*, 233). In connection with this matter, the presumption of regularity in public offices should be borne in mind (see *ante*, p. 25).

Among such "public documents" may be mentioned the following:—Public Statutes, the London Gazette, Registers of births, marriages and deaths, and other public Registers, Surveys of Crown lands, maps attached to Inclosure Awards, and public Inquisitions.

But ancient documents such as surveys, estimates and petitions of a private character, produced from the Record Office, which do not affect the King's property or revenues, are not public documents in the above sense. Nor are confidential plans or reports made to the War Office, not intended as permanent records (*Mercer v. Denne*, [1905] 2 Ch. 538).

R. v. SUTTON

(1816).

4 M. & S. 532.

Recitals in public Acts of Parliament are, like direct statements in public documents and State Papers generally, "primâ facie" evidence against every one.

Thus, to prove that certain organised outrages had occurred in various parts of England, recitals that such outrages had occurred,

contained in a public Statute, and in a Royal Proclamation offering a reward for the discovery of the offenders, were held admissible.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "Public Acts of Parliament are binding upon every subject, because every subject is, in judgment of law, privy to the making of them, and therefore supposed to know them, and formerly the usage was for the sheriff to proclaim them at his county court; and yet what every subject is supposed to know, and what the Judge is bound judicially to take notice of, it is said the jury cannot advert to; for if this evidence was inadmissible, it must be because the jury could not be charged with it."

"Next as to the proclamation; I consider it as an Act of State. The proclamation recites, that it had been represented to the Prince Regent, that a number of persons had committed various acts of outrage in the town, and in different parts of the county of Nottingham, etc.; and that the Prince Regent has thought it necessary to propound certain rewards for the discovery and conviction of the persons concerned in such proceedings. The propounding of these rewards necessarily implies that such acts of outrage have actually been committed, for otherwise it would have been nugatory to propound them. I do not say that it was conclusive evidence of the fact that these outrages were committed; but surely it was admissible, and, like other acts of state, to be laid before the jury."

LE BLANC, J. "This evidence consists of the King's proclamation, reciting that it had been represented that certain disturbances caused by persons employed in the stocking manufactories had taken place in Nottingham and several parts of the county, and offering a reward for the discovery and apprehension of offenders. There are likewise two Acts of Parliament reciting in their preambles the existence of these outrages, and making provision in the body of them, the first, for the more exemplary punishment of persons committing these outrages; the second, for the better preserving the peace, by enforcing the duties of watching and warding. When the nature of these documents is considered, is it possible to say that they were not admissible, particularly as the libel refers to the conduct of the persons called *Luddites* in destroying frames in *Nottingham* and the neighbourhood, and compares that conduct with the conduct of the military in *America*? Are not the documents

material to show that these disturbances existed in *Nottingham*, and existed to such a degree as to call for the interference of the Executive Government and the Legislature, to offer reward for their discovery, and to inflict a more exemplary punishment upon them, and to protect the peaceable inhabitants by compelling the observance of watch and ward? Surely they were evidence for this purpose, when the inquiry respected a libel of the description laid in the information, tending, as it is charged, to alienate the minds of the subjects from the King and Government, and to make them think that what had been condemned at Nottingham by the Government, was held laudable in America; when, according to the language of the libel, they were singing a new tune to an old song. I cannot see therefore any ground on which these public instruments could be objected to as inadmissible. They seem to me to go clearly to prove the facts which are alleged, because they show in what way the Executive Government and the Legislature acted upon them."

BAYLEY, J. "The proclamation sets forth, that it had been represented to the Prince Regent that a number of persons, chiefly of those employed in the stocking manufactories, had actually committed various acts of outrage; it is therefore an assertion on the part of His Royal Highness, that such a representation had been made to him, and he proceeds to act upon it, by offering a reward for the discovery of the offenders. This I think was evidence to this extent, and no farther, that a representation was made to the Executive Government that such outrages existed, and that the Executive Government thought fit to act upon it; for they so far acted as to promulgate an Act of State upon it."

"The preambles to the two Acts of Parliament I think are still more free from objection than the proclamation, and they assume as facts that outrages did exist. When we consider in what manner an Act of Parliament is passed, and that it is a public proceeding in all its stages, and challenges public inquiry, and when passed is in contemplation of law the act of the whole body, it seems to me that its recital must be taken as admissible evidence."

BRETT v. BEALES

(1829).

M. & M. 416 ; 34 R. R. 499.

Recitals or statements of fact in private Acts of Parliament are evidence only against the parties to them, even although they may be declared public Acts for the purpose of proof.

A private Act, authorising the making and maintaining of a navigable canal, contained a recital that the Corporation of Cambridge were entitled to divers tolls. The plaintiff was the lessee of the tolls under the Corporation of Cambridge, and he brought the action to recover such tolls. In support of the claim it was proposed to read the said recital as evidence, it being urged that the Act was for this purpose to be treated as a public statute (in which case the recital would have been evidence), as it was provided "that this Act should be deemed and taken to be a public Act, and shall be judicially taken notice of as such by all Judges, justices, and others, without being specially pleaded." It was held that the recital was not admissible in evidence.

LORD TENTERDEN, C.J. "The point is quite new, and of great importance, as it will apply to so large a class of statutes."

"Two grounds have been laid for the admission of this evidence : the one, that the concluding clause renders it admissible as a public Act ; the other, that even independently of this clause, it is so from its nature. The answer given to the first was that the clause only applied to the forms of pleading, and did not vary the general nature and operation of the Act. I was inclined to that opinion at the time, and my learned brothers agree with me in that impression. We also think that the second ground fails. It is said that the bill gives a power of levying a toll on all the King's subjects, and therefore the Act is public ; the power given is not so extensive, it is only to levy toll on such as shall think fit to use the navigation. The

ground, therefore, on which it is said the Act is public, and the evidence admissible, fails ; and I cannot receive it."

Note.—It was customary, before the year 1850, to insert a clause in private Acts of Parliament declaring that the same should be deemed public and be judicially noticed. The effect of this clause was to dispense with the necessity, not only of pleading the Act specially, but of producing an examined copy, or a copy printed by the Printer for the Crown ; a public Act requiring neither to be specially pleaded nor proved. By 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, it was enacted : "That every Act made after the commencement of this Act shall be deemed and taken to be a public Act, and shall be judicially taken notice of as such, unless the contrary be expressly provided and declared by such Act" (see *ante*, p. 12). This provision is now repealed by the Interpretation Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, which provides, by sect. 8, that every Act passed after 1850 "shall be a public Act and shall be judicially noticed as such, unless the contrary is expressly provided by the Act."

THE MODE OF PROOF.

There are three methods of proof allowed by the law—

- (1) Witnesses.
- (2) Documents.
- (3) Inspection.

So we have three kinds of evidence—

- (1) Parol.
- (2) Documentary.
- (3) Real.

It is proposed to deal with these three methods of proof and kinds of evidence in the order indicated. Each method has its own special rules; but a very important general rule has been laid down for use in the Supreme Court by Order 30, r. 7, which, in reference to a Summons for Directions, provides—

“On the hearing of the summons, the Court or a Judge may order that evidence of any particular fact, to be specified in the order, shall be given by statement on oath of information or belief, or by production of documents or entries in books, or by copies of documents or entries or otherwise as the Court or Judge may direct.”

This rule does not appear to have been extensively used, except in the Commercial Court, where evidence from abroad is frequently required.

It is further provided by Order 37, r. 1, as follows:—

“In the absence of any agreement in writing between the solicitors of all parties, and subject to these Rules, the witnesses at the trial of any action or at any assessment of damages shall be examined *vivá voce* and in open Court, but the Court or a Judge may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by

affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing or trial, on such conditions as the Court or Judge may think reasonable, or that any witness whose attendance in Court ought for some sufficient cause to be dispensed with be examined by interrogatories or otherwise before a commissioner or examiner; provided that, where it appears to the Court or Judge that the other party *bonâ fide* desires the production of a witness for cross-examination, and that such witness can be produced, an order shall not be made authorising the evidence of such witness to be given by affidavit."

And by Order 38, r. 1, as follows:—

"Upon any motion, petition, or summons, evidence may be given by affidavit; but the Court or a Judge may, on the application of either party, order the attendance for cross-examination of the person making any such affidavit."

In a few cases written evidence is required by Statute. For instance, by the Statute of Frauds (see *post*, p. 311) and the Sale of Goods Act (see *post*, p. 340).

PAROL EVIDENCE.

The general rule may be thus stated :—

The law requires evidence to be given—

- (1) by legally competent witnesses ;
- (2) upon oath or affirmation ;
- (3) in regular course of examination ;
- (4) subject to contradiction as to facts ;
- (5) and to discredit as to veracity ;
- (6) and to privilege in refusing to answer ;
- (7) at the trial of the matter in issue, unless depositions taken previously are admissible.

The cases following are intended to illustrate, successively these several features of the rule.

WITNESSES.

THEIR COMPETENCY.

Evidence must be given by legally competent witnesses. The normal man is competent, and presumed to be so. The law of competency is therefore practically the law of incompetency, consisting of rules of exclusion.

Formerly there were several grounds of exclusion of witnesses, the chief being (1) incompetency from interest, and (2) incompetency from want of mental capacity. On the former ground, not only were parties themselves and their husbands and wives excluded, but also all persons who were *in pari jure* with either party, or otherwise substantially interested in the proceedings. Successive Statutes

have abolished this kind of incompetency, leaving the fact of interest in the proceedings to affect credibility merely.

The change in the law of incompetency from interest was effected by the following steps:—

1833. The incompetency of persons *in pari jure* with the parties was abolished (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42).

1843. The Evidence Act (Denman's Act) provided that no person should be excluded by reason of incapacity from crime or interest, save the parties themselves or persons on whose behalf the action was brought or defended, and their husbands and wives (6 & 7 Vict. c. 85). See *post*, p. 315.

1846. The County Courts Act provided that parties and their wives might give evidence in the new County Courts (9 & 10 Vict. c. 95).

1851. The Evidence Act (Brougham's Act) allowed parties to all civil proceedings, and the persons on whose behalf they were instituted, to give evidence, except in breach of promise and adultery cases (14 & 15 Vict. c. 99). See *post*, p. 319.

1853. The Evidence Act made husbands and wives of parties, etc., to civil proceedings competent and compellable witnesses except in adultery cases (16 & 17 Vict. c. 83). See *post*, p. 320.

1869. The Evidence Act made parties in breach of promise and adultery cases, and their husbands and wives, competent witnesses (32 & 33 Vict. c. 68). See *post*, p. 329.

1882. The Married Women's Property Act made husbands and wives competent to give evidence against each other in proceedings under the Act for protection of her separate property (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75). See *post*, p. 333.

1898. The Criminal Evidence Act made persons charged, and their husbands and wives competent witnesses (61 & 62 Vict. c. 36). See *post*, p. 341.

Other Acts, from 1833 to 1909, have simplified oaths and substituted affirmations, etc., and may be said to have rendered many persons competent witnesses.

Mental incompetency, as shown by the cases given below, is a question of degree only. Stress is laid, in the older cases, upon the ability to understand the nature of an oath. The real question now is generally considered to be—is the witness mentally capable of understanding and giving an intelligible account of the matter in question?

THEIR COMPELLABILITY.

It should be observed that “competency” is not identical with “compellability.” A witness may be competent, but not compellable. It is said that Sovereigns and Ambassadors are competent but not compellable. Generally, however, persons who are competent are compellable also, to give evidence, although they may not be compellable to answer certain questions, being excused so far on the ground of privilege (see *post*, p. 234). But, apart from special privilege, it would appear that there are a few cases where competency and compellability do not go together.

Thus, in criminal cases, the *prisoner* is competent, but not compellable (Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, ss. 1 and 6, see *post*, p. 341). And in civil cases, the *parties* to actions for breach of promise or proceedings in consequence of adultery appear to be competent but not compellable; as the Evidence Act, 1869, uses the word “competent” only. See *post*, p. 329. *

Further, husbands and wives of parties or prisoners are sometimes competent, but not compellable. This matter requires detailed treatment.

HUSBANDS AND WIVES.

The general rule of the common law, both in civil and in criminal cases, was that the husbands and wives of the parties were not competent to give evidence. In civil cases there appear to have been no exceptions. In criminal cases, however,

But see *Pherson's Manual* p 146 which cites the case of *Nottingham v Tomkinson* 4 G.P.D 350.

there was an exception where either husband or wife charged the other with personal injury or violence. But legislation on the matter appears to have produced the following result.

But see
P.H. Man
p 140

(a) In civil cases, husbands and wives are always competent. But they are, apparently, not compellable in proceedings instituted in consequence of adultery; as the Evidence Act, 1869, uses the word "competent" only. (See *post*, p. 329.)

(b) In criminal cases, husbands and wives are always competent; but only on the application of the person charged (Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, ss. 1 and 6, see *post*, p. 341), except in the following cases, when they are competent without such consent. That is to say, in proceedings for—

(1) Personal injury or violence committed by husband or wife to or against wife or husband. (Common law. See Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, s. 4 (2), *post*, 343.)

(2) Enforcing civil rights only. (Evidence Act, 1877, s. 1, *post*, p. 331. See Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, s. 6 (1), *post*, p. 343.)

(3) Neglecting to maintain wife or family, under the Vagrancy Act, 1824. (Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, s. 4 (1) and Schedule. See *post*, p. 343.

(4) Rape, indecent assault and seduction, under the Offences against the Person Act, 1861. (Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, s. 4 (1) and Schedule. See *post*, p. 343.)

(5) The protection or security of property of husband or wife, when the proceedings are against wife or husband, under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, ss. 12 and 16. (Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, s. 4 (1) and Schedule. See *post*, p. 343.)

(6) Offences against girls and women, under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885. (Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, s. 4 (1) and Schedule. See *post*, p. 343.)

(7) Offences under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1904. (S. 12. See *post*, p. 346.)

(8) Offences under the Incest Act, 1908 (s. 4 (4). See *post*, p. 347).

(9) Offences under the Children Act, 1908, and in the Schedule thereto. (S. 27. See *post*, p. 348.)

In the above cases it would appear that husbands and wives are not only competent but compellable also, except in case (7), the words used in the Act in question being "competent but not compellable." (See *post*, p. 346.)

R. v. BRASIER (1779).

1 LEACH, C. C. 199.

Mental competency to give evidence depends not upon age but upon understanding or intelligence. There is no fixed limit of age under which an infant is excluded as a witness.

The question having arisen, in a prosecution for assault, whether the evidence of a child under seven years of age was admissible, it was submitted to the twelve Judges, who held that, under the circumstances, it was not admissible, as the child did not have sufficient understanding of the nature of an oath, without which (at that time) evidence could not be given. The Judges were unanimously of opinion :—

"That no testimony whatever can be legally received except upon oath ; and that an infant, though under the age of seven years, may be sworn in a criminal prosecution, provided such infant appears, on strict examination by the Court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the nature and consequences of an oath, for there is no precise or fixed rule as to the time within which infants are excluded from giving evidence, but their admissibility depends upon the sense and reason they entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood, which is to be collected from their answers to questions propounded to them by the Court ; but if they are found incompetent to take an oath their evidence cannot be received."

Note.—It is to be observed that the decision in the above case was based on the fact that the child appeared not to possess sufficient understanding of the nature and consequences of an oath. At the time of such decision no evidence could be given without an oath. This is not now always the case. For instance, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (see *post*, p. 336), the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1904 (see *post*, p. 347), and the Children Act, 1908 (see *post*, p. 349), each provide that, in proceedings thereunder, if a child of tender years who is tendered as a witness does not, in the opinion of the Court, understand the nature of an oath, the evidence of such child may be received, though not given upon oath, if, in the opinion of the Court, such child is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence, and understands the duty of speaking the truth. The question in any case, whether as to taking the oath or giving the evidence, is one of understanding and intelligence, not of age.

The above case “settled the modern law and practice relative to the admissibility of the testimony of children. As in the criminal law, *malitia supplet etatem*, so here the maxim of the canonists was followed *prudentialia supplet etatem*” (*Best on Evidence*, p. 144).

R. v. HILL

(1851).

20 L. J. M. C. 222 ; 2 DEN. C. C. 254.

Persons suffering from insanity are not necessarily incompetent as witnesses. Whether they are competent or not depends on the character and extent of their insanity. A person insane on one matter can give evidence on matters not connected with his insanity.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J. “If there be a delusion in the mind of a party tendered as a witness, it is for the Judge to see whether the party tendered has a sense of religion and understands the nature and sanction of an oath; and then if the Judge admits him as a witness, it is for the jury to say what degree of credit is to be given to his testimony. Various old authorities have been brought forward to show that a person *non compos mentis* is not a competent witness; but the question is in what sense the

expression *non compos mentis* is used. If by that term is meant one who does not understand the sanction of an oath, of course he ought not to be admitted as a witness; but he may be *non compos* in another sense, and yet understand the sanction of an oath and be capable of giving material testimony. . . . He had a clear apprehension of the obligation of an oath, and was capable of giving a trustworthy account of any transaction which took place before his eyes, and he was perfectly rational upon all subjects except with respect to his particular delusion."

COLERIDGE, J. "He appeared to be unusually well instructed in the nature and obligation of an oath, and *primâ facie* therefore to be quite competent to give evidence proper for the consideration of the jury. If his evidence had, in the course of the trial, been so tainted with insanity as to be unworthy of credit, it was the proper function of the jury to disregard it, and not to act upon it."

TALFOURD, J. "If the prisoner's counsel could maintain the proposition which he has laid down, that any human being who labours under a delusion of the mind is incompetent as a witness, there would be most wide-spreading incompetency. Martin Luther, it is said, believed that he had had a personal conflict with the devil. The celebrated Dr. Samuel Johnson was convinced that he had heard his mother calling to him in a supernatural manner."

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J. "The rule contended for would have excluded the evidence of Socrates, for he believed that he had a spirit always prompting him."

OATH OR AFFIRMATION.

OMICHUND v. BARKER

(1744).

WILLES, 538; 1 ATKYNS, 21; 1 WILSON, 84.

Evidence must generally be given upon oath.

The oath is not a peculiarly Christian ceremony. The mode of administering it may, and should, be adapted

to the special religious belief of the deponent. But religious belief is necessary in the deponent.

Several persons resident in the East Indies and professing the Gentoo religion, having been examined on oath administered according to the ceremonies of their religion, under a commission sent there by the Court of Chancery, it became a question whether those depositions could be read in evidence here. The Lord Chancellor, conceiving it to be a question of considerable importance, desired the assistance of the two Chief Justices and the Chief Baron, who were of opinion that the depositions ought to be unanimously read.

WILLES, C.J. "I only give my opinion that such infidels who believe a god and that he will punish them if they swear falsely, in some cases and under some circumstances, may and ought to be admitted as witnesses in this, though a Christian country. And on the other hand, I am clearly of opinion that such infidels (if any such there be) who either do not believe a god, or, if they do, do not think that he will either reward or punish them in this world or in the next, cannot be witnesses in any case or under any circumstances, for this plain reason: because an oath cannot possibly be any tie or obligation upon them. . . . The oath was administered to the witnesses in the same words as here in England, which fully answers the objection (if there was anything in it) that the form of the oath cannot be altered; and after the oath was read and interpreted to them, they touched the Bramin's hand or foot, the same being the usual and most solemn manner in which oaths are administered to witnesses who profess the Gentoo religion . . . it being their usual form, is as much signifying their assent as kissing the book is here, where the party swearing likewise says nothing."

Note.—The rule laid down in the above case, that a witness can be sworn according to his own religious belief, is confirmed by the Oaths Act, 1838, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 105 (see *post*, p. 314).

Protestants are sworn on the Evangelists, Jews on the Pentateuch, Mohammedans on the Koran, Hindoos on the Vedas or other sacred books, Parsees on the Zendavesta, Chinese on a broken saucer, etc.

By the Oaths Act, 1888, any person may make an affirmation instead of an oath, on stating either

- (1) That he has no religious belief; or,
- (2) That the taking of an oath is contrary to his religious belief.

The same Act also provides that any person may, if he so desire, be sworn in the Scotch manner, with uplifted hand, without kissing the book; and that, if an oath has been duly taken, it shall not be affected by the fact that the person taking it had no religious belief (see *post*, p. 338).

The Oaths Act, 1909, provides a new form of oath, which does not require "kissing the book" (see *post*, p. 350).

It will be observed that the Act specifies the "Old Testament" and "New Testament," not the "Pentateuch" and "Evangelists," which apparently cannot be used under the Act.

Although the above case indicates that religious belief is necessary for an oath, it should be observed that the Oaths Act, 1888, sect. 3, enacts that want of religious belief shall not affect the validity of an oath duly administered (see *post*, p. 339). And it has been shown, *ante*, p. 208, that children may sometimes give evidence without oath. The unsworn statement of a prisoner is also admissible (see *post*, p. 251).

Jan 8 '26.

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF.

Two points should be noticed as to the questions put in examination-in-chief.

(a) They must be confined to strictly relevant facts. They must not be as to the character or credibility of the witness.

(b) They must not be leading questions suggesting the required answer, except on introductory matters, or matters not really in dispute.

NICHOLLS v. DOWDING AND KEMP (1815).

1 STARKIE, 81 ; 18 R. R. 746.

Leading questions may not be put, in examination-in-chief, unless they are necessary to lead the mind of the witness to the subject of inquiry ; or they are upon matters merely introductory or not in dispute. Questions permitting the simple answer "Yes" or "No," or suggesting the answer desired, are generally inadmissible as "leading."

In order to prove that the defendants were partners, a witness was asked whether one of them had not interfered in the business of the other. The question was objected to as a leading one, but the Court allowed it to be put.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "I wish that objections to questions as leading might be a little better considered before they are made. It is necessary, to a certain extent, to lead the mind of the

witness to the subject of inquiry. If questions are asked to which the answer 'Yes' or 'No' would be conclusive, they would certainly be objectionable; but in general no objections are more frivolous than those which are made to questions as leading ones."

Note.—The objection as to leading questions does not apply to cross-examination (see *post*, p. 215).

MAUGHAM v. HUBBARD

(1828).

6 L. J. K. B. 229; 8 B. & C. 14; 2 M. & R. 5;
32 R. R. 328.

A witness may refresh his memory by referring to any writing or document made by himself, or by another person if verified by him at or so soon after the transaction in question that the Judge considers it was fresh in his memory at the time.

But it is not necessary that the witness should have any independent recollection of the fact recorded, if he is prepared to swear to it on seeing the writing or document.

Refreshing memory by inspecting a writing or document does not make it documentary evidence; so the fact that the same would be inadmissible in evidence as a document for want of a stamp is immaterial.

A witness, called to prove the receipt of a sum of money, was shown an acknowledgment of the receipt of the money signed by himself. On seeing it, he said he had no doubt that he had received it, although he had no recollection of the fact. It was held that this was sufficient parol evidence of the payment of the money, and that the written acknowledgment having been used to refresh the memory of the witness, and not as evidence of the payment, did not require any stamp.

LORD TENTERDEN, C.J. "In order to make the paper itself evidence of the receipt of the money it ought to have been stamped

The consequence of its not having been stamped might be that the party who paid the money, in the event of the death of the person who received it, would lose his evidence of such payment. Here the witness, on seeing the entry signed by himself, said that he had no doubt that he had received the money. The paper itself was not used as evidence of the receipt of the money, but only to enable the witness to refresh his memory; and when he said that he had no doubt that he had received the money there was sufficient parol evidence to prove the payment.

BAYLEY, J. "Where a Witness called to prove the execution of a deed sees his signature to the attestation, and says that he is, therefore, sure that he saw the party execute the deed, that is a sufficient proof of the execution of the deed, though the witness add that he has no recollection of the fact of the execution of the deed."

Note.—The opposite party is, naturally, always entitled to inspect any writing or document used to refresh memory, in order to check it, and to cross-examine upon it. But such cross-examination does not make it documentary evidence, except so far as it refers to parts of the writing or document other than those used by the witness in refreshing his memory (*Gregory v. Tavernor*, 6 C. & P. 280). This appears to be in accordance with the rule that a party who calls for and inspects a document held by the other party is bound to put it in evidence if required to do so (see *Wharam v. Routledge*, *post*, p. 257).

Perhaps the commonest examples of writings used to refresh memory are entries in diaries, call-books, account books and letter books, and the like.

BURROUGH v. MARTIN (1840).

2 CAMPBELL, 112; 11 R. R. 679.

A witness may refresh his memory not only from writings or documents in his own handwriting, but also from those made under his immediate observation when his recollection of the facts recorded was recent and fresh.

In an action on a charter-party, a witness was called to give an account of the voyage, and the log-book was laid before him for

the purpose of refreshing his memory. Being asked whether he had written it himself, he said that he had not, but that from time to time he examined the entries in it while the events recorded were fresh in his recollection, and that he always found the entries accurate. He was allowed to refresh his memory from such book.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "If the witness looked at the log-book from time to time, while the occurrences mentioned in it were recent and fresh in his recollection, it is as good as if he had written the whole with his own hand. This collation gave him an ample opportunity to ascertain the correctness of the entries, and he may therefore refer to these on the same principle that witnesses are allowed to refresh their memory by reading letters and other documents which they themselves have written."

Note.—An expert witness may even refresh his memory by reference to text-books, price lists, or other such printed matter.

CROSS-EXAMINATION.

Two points should be noticed as to the questions put in cross-examination.

- (a) They need not be confined to strictly relevant facts. They may be as to the character or credibility of the witness.
- (b) They may be leading questions.

CONDUCT, CHARACTER, AND CONVICTIONS OF WITNESSES.

The cases in which evidence may be given of the conduct, character, and convictions of the parties themselves has been discussed, *ante*, p. 84.

Similar matters concerning witnesses may sometimes be brought before the Court, chiefly by cross-examination of the witnesses themselves, but in some cases by the evidence of other witnesses.

The matter rests partly on decided cases, but mainly on Statute; the result appearing to be as follows:—

CROSS-EXAMINATION.

(a) A party may always cross-examine his opponent's witness in order to test his credibility; questions being permissible as to his conduct on other occasions, his character and his previous convictions. (See *post*, p. 217.)

(b) A party may not cross-examine his own witness, unless the judge allows him to do so on the ground that the witness is actually hostile, not merely adverse to him. (See *post*, p. 221.)

(c) A person charged with an offence and giving evidence on his own behalf, cannot be cross-examined as to other offences or convictions, or as to his character, except in the cases specified in sect. 1 (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, *post*, p. 342.

OTHER WITNESSES.

(d) A party cannot generally call witnesses to discredit his opponent's witness, when he has failed to shake him by cross-examination as to character; but he may do so in the four cases mentioned, *post*, p. 227.

(e) A party cannot in any case call witnesses to discredit his own witness, except that he may, by leave of the judge, if his witness proves to be actually hostile, not merely adverse, to him, call witnesses to prove that he has made previous statements inconsistent with his present testimony. (See *post*, p. 231.)

The above rules apply to witnesses generally, whether they are parties to the action or not.

WOOD v. MACKINSON

(1840).

2 M. & R. 273.

If a witness has been sworn, the opposite party is entitled to cross-examine him. This is so although he is not examined-in-chief, but is merely called to produce a document.

But a party is not entitled to cross-examine a witness called by mistake, if the mistake be discovered before any question is put to him.

The plaintiff's counsel called a witness, who was sworn in the usual way ; but, before he had put any question to him, he said he had been misinstructed as to what the witness was able to prove, and he should not examine him at all. The defendant's counsel then claimed the right to cross-examine the witness. It was held that he had no right to do so.

COLERIDGE, J. "Upon the whole, it appears to me that the more satisfactory principle to lay down is this, that if there really be a **mistake**, whether on the part of counsel or officer, and that mistake be **discovered before the examination-in-chief has begun**, the adverse party ought not to have the right to take advantage of this mistake by cross-examining the witness. Here the learned counsel explains that there has been a mistake, which consists in this, that the witness is found not to be able to speak at all as to the transaction which was supposed to be within his knowledge. **This is, I think, such a mistake as entitles the party calling the witness to withdraw him without his being subject to cross-examination.** If, indeed, the witness had been able to give evidence of the transaction which he was called to prove, but the counsel had discovered that the witness, besides that transaction, knew other matters inconvenient to be disclosed, and therefore attempted to withdraw him, that would be a different case. I think the defendants have here no right to cross-examine the witness."

PARKIN v. MOON

(1836).

7 C. & P. 408.

In cross-examination a witness may be examined by means of leading questions, as the presumption is that he is biassed against the opposite party and will not be inclined to follow his lead. This is so, apparently, although the witness may actually appear to be favourable to the opposite party.

The plaintiff's counsel was cross-examining one of the defendant's witnesses (who, it seemed, was an unwilling witness for the defendant, but a willing one on the part of the plaintiff), by putting leading questions in the usual way. The defendant's counsel submitted that, under the circumstances, leading questions ought not to be allowed even on cross-examination. It was held that they were admissible.

ALDERSON, B. "I apprehend you may put a leading question to an unwilling witness on the examination in chief at the discretion of the Judge; but you may always put a leading question in cross-examination whether a witness be unwilling or not."

Note.—It is provided by Order 36, rule 38, of the Rules of the Supreme Court—"The Judge may in all cases disallow any questions put in cross-examination of any party or other witness which may appear to him to be vexatious, and not relevant to any matter proper to be inquired into in the cause or matter."

BROWNE v. DUNN

(1894).

6 THE REPORTS, 67.

In cross-examination a witness may be examined as to his credibility, but he should have his attention drawn to any facts with respect to which it is intended to impeach his credit, so as to give him an opportunity

of explanation, unless the evidence he gives is so incredible or romancing that it is reasonable to let him leave the box without such questions being put.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

LORD HERSCHELL, L.C. "It seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been made upon excessive cross-examination of witnesses, and it has been complained of as undue; but it seems to me that a cross-examination of a witness which errs in the direction of excess may be far more fair to him than to leave him without cross-examination, and afterwards to suggest that he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a point on which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that he has had full notice beforehand that there is an intention to impeach the credibility of the story which he is telling. Of course I do not deny for a moment that there are cases in which that notice has been so distinctly and unmistakably given, and the point upon which he is impeached, and is to be impeached, is so manifest, that it is not necessary to waste time in putting questions to him upon it. All I am saying is that it will not do to impeach the credibility of a witness upon a matter on which he has not had any opportunity of giving an explanation by reason of there having been no

suggestion whatever in the course of the case that his story is not accepted."

LORD HALSBURY. "With regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to."

LORD MORRIS. "There is another point upon which I would wish to guard myself, namely, with respect to laying down any hard-and-fast rule as regards cross-examining a witness as a necessary preliminary to impeaching his credit. In this case, I am clearly of opinion that the witnesses, having given their testimony, and not having been cross-examined, having deposed to a state of facts which is quite reconcilable with the rest of the case, it was impossible for the plaintiff to ask the jury at the trial, and it is impossible for him to ask any legal tribunal, to say that those witnesses are not to be credited. But I can quite understand a case in which a story told by a witness may have been of so incredible and romancing a character that the most effective cross-examination would be to ask him to leave the box. I therefore wish it to be understood that I would not concur in ruling that it was necessary, in order to impeach a witness's credit, that you should take him through the story which he had told, giving him notice by the questions that you impeached his credit."

PRICE v. MANNING
(1889).

L. R. 42 CH. D. 372; 58 L. J. CH. 649; 61 L. T. 537;
37 W. R. 785.

A party cannot generally cross-examine or discredit his own witness.

It is in the discretion of the Judge whether a party shall be permitted to cross-examine a witness whom he has called, even if the witness be a hostile litigant, as when one party calls the other party as a witness.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

COTTON, L.J. "The plaintiff says that, having called the defendant, he is entitled as of right to cross-examine him. . . . But in my opinion that is a matter in the discretion of the Judge. He sees the witness, and can determine from his manner whether he is so hostile that the plaintiff should be allowed to cross-examine him."

FRY, L.J. "It has been urged before us that, as the plaintiff called the defendant, he had a right to cross-examine him. . . . The plaintiff had no right to cross-examine the witness he had called; he could only do so with the sanction of the presiding Judge."

LOPES, L.J. "Whether the witness called by one party is a litigant or non-litigant, it is a matter of discretion in the presiding Judge whether the witness has shown himself so hostile as to justify his cross-examination by the party calling him. This rule applies in a case where an opponent is called as a witness."

Note.—It must be observed that the judge can only allow a party to "cross-examine" his own witness. He cannot allow him to "discredit" generally a witness whom he has produced as a reliable person. This rule is now statutory by the Criminal Procedure Act, 1865, which applies to both civil and criminal cases (see *post*, p. 324).

RE-EXAMINATION.

Two points should be noticed as to the questions put in re-examination :

(a) They must be confined to matters arising out of the cross-examination.

(b) They must not be leading questions.

PRINCE v. SAMO

(1838).

7 L. J. Q. B. 123 ; 2 JUR. 323 ; 7 A. & E. 630 ; 3 N. & P. 139 ; 1 W. W. & H. 132 ; 45 R. R. 783.

Re-examination must be confined to matters arising out of, or explanatory of, the cross-examination. No new matter may be introduced without leave of the Judge.

So, proof by a witness, on cross-examination, of a statement made by him at a former time, does not authorise proof, on re-examination of all that he said at the same time, but only of so much thereof as is connected with the statement proved on cross-examination.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. "This was an action for a malicious arrest, on a false suggestion that money was lent by the defendant to the plaintiff, when it had, in fact, been given. The plaintiff called his attorney as a witness ; he happened to be present at the trial of a prosecution for perjury, instituted by the plaintiff against a witness in the action, wherein he had been arrested. The defendant's counsel inquired of him in cross-examination whether the plaintiff had not, on the trial for perjury, stated that he himself had been insolvent repeatedly, and remanded by the Court. This question was not objected to. On his re-examination the same witness was asked whether the plaintiff had not also on that occasion given an account of the circumstances out of which the arrest had arisen, and what that account was, for the purpose of laying before the jury proof

that the arrest was without cause, or malicious, of both which facts there was scarcely any, if any, evidence whatever. The question, expressly confined to that purpose, was whether the plaintiff did not say, in his examination, that the money was given, and not lent. To this question the defendant's counsel objected, not on account of its leading form, but because the defendant, having proved one detached expression that fell from the plaintiff when a witness, does not make the whole of what he then said evidence in his own favour. My opinion was, that the witness might be asked as to everything said by the plaintiff, when he appeared on the trial of the indictment, that could in any way qualify or explain the statement as to which he had been cross-examined, but that he had no right to add any independent history of transactions wholly unconnected with it. That a witness's statement of some one thing said by him, though drawn out by a cross-examination, does not permit the opposite party to add to it all that he may have uttered on the same occasion, was in effect decided by seven out of eight Judges, whose opinion was taken by the House of Lords, in the progress of the bill of pains and penalties against Her Majesty Queen Caroline. Lord Tenterden, in delivering that opinion, said: 'I think the counsel has a right, on re-examination, to ask all questions which may be proper to draw forth an explanation of the sense and meaning of the expressions used by the witness on cross-examination, if they be in themselves doubtful, and also of the motive by which the witness was induced to use those expressions; but I think he has no right to go further, and to introduce new matters not suited to the purpose of explaining either the expressions or the motives of the witness'; and as many things may pass in one and the same conversation, which do not relate to either, the learned Chief Justice declared the opinion of the Judges, that the witness could not be re-examined, even to the extent of all that might have passed relating to his becoming a witness, to which the statement proved had reference."

"Upon the whole, we think that it must be taken as settled that proof of a detached statement made by a witness at a former time, does not authorise proof by the party calling that witness, of all that he said at the same time, but only of so much as can be in some way connected with the statement proved."

Note.—The judge will, whenever he considers it proper or necessary, allow questions to be put although they may not arise out of the cross-examination. For instance, on important matters which have been overlooked. But in such case he will of course allow a further cross-examination on such questions. The Judge may, moreover, put further questions himself, or allow witnesses to be recalled.

CONTRADICTION OF WITNESSES.

EWER v. AMBROSE

(1825).

3 B. & C. 746.

If a witness gives evidence which is unfavourable to the party calling him, such party may contradict him by other witnesses, but he may not call general evidence to show that his own witness is not to be believed.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

BAYLEY, J. "I have no doubt that if a witness gives evidence contrary to that which the party calling him expects, the party is at liberty afterwards to make out his own case by other witnesses."

HOLROYD, J. "I take the rule of law to be, that if a witness proves a case against the party calling him, the latter may show the truth by other witnesses. But it is undoubtedly true, that if a party calls a witness to prove a fact, he cannot, when he finds the witness proves the contrary, give general evidence to show that that witness is not to be believed on his oath, but he may show by other evidence that he is mistaken as to the fact which he is called to prove."

LITTLEDALE, J. "Where a witness is called by a party to prove his case, and he disproves that case, I think the party is still at liberty to prove his case by other witnesses. It would be a great hardship if the rule were otherwise, for if a party had four witnesses upon whom he relied to prove his case, it would be

very hard, that by calling first the one who happened to disprove it, he should be deprived of the testimony of the other three. If he had called the three before the other who had disproved the case, it would have been a question for the jury upon the evidence whether they would give credit to the three or to the one. The order in which the witnesses happen to be called ought not, therefore, to make any difference."

Note.—This rule as to contradiction of a witness by other evidence is now statutory, by the Criminal Procedure Act, 1865, which applies to both civil and criminal cases (see *post*, p. 324).

HARRIS v. TIPPETT (1811).

2 CAMPBELL, 637 ; 11 R. R. 767.

Although questions going to the character or credibility of a witness are admissible upon cross-examination, yet, if they be directed to matters collateral to the issue, the answers must be accepted as conclusive, and other witnesses cannot be called to contradict him, except in a few cases.

A witness for the defendant, being asked in cross-examination whether he had not attempted to dissuade one of the plaintiff's witnesses from attending to give evidence, swore that he had not done so. The plaintiff's counsel then proposed to call back the other witness to contradict him. This was not allowed.

LAWRENCE, J. "Had this been a matter in issue, I would have allowed you to call witnesses to contradict what the last witness has sworn, but it is entirely collateral, and you must take his answer. I will permit questions to be put to a witness as to any improper conduct of which he may have been guilty, for the purpose of trying his credit ; but when these questions are irrelevant to the issue on the record, you cannot call other witnesses to contradict the

answers he gives. No witness can be prepared to support his character as to particular facts, and such collateral inquiries would lead to endless confusion."

R. v. HOLMES

(1871).

L. R. 1 C. C. R. 334; 41 L. J. M. C. 12; 25 L. T. 669;
20 W. R. 122; 12 Cox, 137.

In prosecutions for rape, or assault with intent to commit rape, or indecent assault, the prosecutrix may be cross-examined as to particular acts of immorality with any persons. But, although as regards her acts committed with the prisoner himself, witnesses may be called to contradict her, if she denies them; it is otherwise as to her acts of immorality committed with other persons.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

KELLY, C.B. "On an indictment for rape, or for an attempt to commit a rape, or for an indecent assault, which, upon the circumstances of the case, amounts to an attempt to commit a rape, a question put to the prosecutrix as to an act of connexion with a particular person, and denied by her, cannot be contradicted. If a witness is cross-examined as to a collateral fact, the answer must be taken for better or worse, and the witness cannot be contradicted. If the question were admissible it might involve an inquiry into her whole life. . . . There is no doubt the prosecutrix may be asked as to connexion with the prisoner on a prosecution for rape. There the fact has a direct bearing on the question before the Court, which involves the fact of consent or non-consent on the part of the prosecutrix."

BYLES, J. "I concur. I think the prosecutrix, on an indictment for rape, cannot be contradicted by men called to speak

to connexion with her. Rape may be committed on a prostitute ; the evidence therefore is immaterial."

LUSH, J. "I am convinced that this evidence is too remote from the issue to be admissible. It has no bearing upon the particular charge, and was, therefore, properly rejected."

HANNEN, J. "I think no distinction can be drawn between a charge of rape and an indecent assault, and that the same reasoning applies to both cases. . . . It would be impossible for the prosecutrix to be prepared to meet the cases which might be produced."

Note.—The above case merely decides that witnesses cannot be called to contradict the prosecutrix as to acts of immorality committed with persons other than the prisoner. It is an illustration of the rule stated in the previous case. The case of *R. v. Riley* (*ante*, p. 90) had decided that evidence could be called to contradict her as to other acts of immorality committed with the prisoner himself. Such evidence is admitted as relevant to consent, not as evidence of character ; as such case shows.

EVIDENCE TO DISCREDIT WITNESSES.

As a general rule a party is not allowed to call witnesses to prove facts which merely tend to discredit his opponents' witnesses, and are not otherwise relevant to the matters in issue. Such collateral inquiries are rejected on the grounds that they would unduly complicate and prolong trials without adequate reason, and that a man cannot be expected to defend all the acts of his life without notice. But there appear to be four generally recognised cases in which evidence to discredit is allowed.

Evidence may be called to show :—

1. That the witness has made previous statements inconsistent with his present evidence.

2. That he is prejudiced or biassed in favour of the party calling him, or is giving his evidence from some corrupt or indirect motive.

14 Jan '26
9.12 PM
16 Jan '26

3. That he has such a general bad character for veracity that he is not to be believed on his oath.

4. That he has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanour.

Cases are here given on the first three points. The last was first laid down by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, sect. 25, which is now repealed; but it is re-enacted, and applied to both civil and criminal cases, by the Criminal Procedure Act, 1865, which also makes statutory point (1) above. (See *post*, p. 325.)

ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. HITCHCOCK (1847).

16 L. J. Ex. 259; 11 JUR. 478; 1 Ex. 91; 74
R. R. 592.

When a witness is asked in cross-examination if he has made a certain statement, which is material to the issue, and at variance with his evidence, and he denies that he made such a statement, witnesses may be called to prove that he did make such statement.

When a witness is cross-examined with the view of showing that he is biassed, or giving his evidence from some corrupt or indirect motive, and he denies it, witnesses may be called to prove that he is biassed; for instance, that he has been bribed to give evidence, or has offered a bribe to another witness, but not that a bribe has been offered to him and refused.

The defendant, a maltster, was charged on information with having used a cistern for the making of malt, without making an entry thereof, as required by Act of Parliament. A witness, having sworn that the cistern had been used, was asked if he had not said to one Cook that the Excise officers had offered him 20*l.* to say the

cistern had been used ; and he denied that he had made such statement. The defendant's counsel thereupon called Cook, and proposed to ask him whether the witness had told him so. The evidence was disallowed.

POLLOCK, C.B. "The test of whether an inquiry is collateral or not is, whether the fact to be elicited is material to the issue. If it be, then the witness may be contradicted, or, as it is better put by my Brother Alderson, thus : **If you ask a witness whether he has not made a certain statement which would be material, and opposed to part of his testimony, you may then call witnesses to prove that he has made the statement, and the jury are at liberty to believe either the one account or the other. . . . The statement which may be contradicted must be one which refers to matter that may be given in evidence, and if answered in one way would contradict part of the witness's testimony, and be material.**"

"There is, however, a distinction between contradicting a witness in particulars stated by him, and those which have reference to his motives, temper, character, and feelings. . . . **A witness may be asked how he stands affected towards one of the parties ; and if his relation towards them is such as to prejudice his mind, and fill him with sentiments of revenge or other feelings of a similar kind, and if he denies the fact, evidence may be given to show the state of his mind and feelings.** But these cases of the witness's connexion with the parties in feelings and sentiments are not to be confounded with those other cases where the matter to be admissible in evidence must be connected with the question."

"In the present case it could not be proved that a bribe was offered to the witness and not accepted, for such a fact is clearly irrelevant to the matter in issue. **The offer of a bribe is a matter of no importance, if it be not accepted, for it does not disparage the party to whom it is offered.**"

ALDERSON, B. "A witness may be asked a question, and if the answer tends to qualify another part of his testimony, evidence may be given in contradiction. So if the question relates not to what he has said, but to some fact material to the issue, the same rule prevails. . . . **The offer of a bribe by a witness to another, or the fact of**

a bribe having been accepted by him, tends to show that he is not impartial."

"A witness, however, is not to be examined as to collateral facts. In many cases his doing a particular act is collateral. In such cases his evidence as to the fact is to be received as final; but no witness ought to be called on to prove his whole life; and if contradiction of his testimony were permitted, he ought to be allowed to support it by other evidence, and to prove his innocence; the result of which would be, that an endless amount of collateral issues would have to be tried. The convenient administration of justice, therefore, requires that this course should not be adopted. If the witness has spoken falsely he may be indicted for perjury. When the answer given is not material to the issue, public convenience requires that it be taken as decisive, and that no contradiction be allowed. In the present case, the witness was asked whether he had been offered a bribe to say the cistern had been used. This was not material, nor did it qualify what had gone before, for his being offered a bribe did not show that he was not a fair and credible witness."

ROLFE, B. "The rules of evidence are founded on abstract and practical consideration; and one principle is, that you may contradict any part of the testimony that has been given, and which tends to support the issue. Here the question was, whether the witness had ever said he had been offered a bribe; and if that may be contradicted, not by showing that he had received a bribe, but by showing that he had said he had been offered a bribe, there would be no end to the collateral inquiries that would arise. The offer of a bribe, if rejected, has no bearing upon the credit of the witness. In fact, it was offered in the present case merely for the purpose of discrediting other persons, and not to disparage the witness."

Note.—The rule as to calling evidence of previous inconsistent statements is now embodied in the Criminal Procedure Act, which applies to both civil and criminal cases, but it is provided by s. 4, that the witness's attention must first be called to the particular occasion (see *post*, p. 325). The other point in the above case, as to bias or corrupt motive, is further illustrated by the case of *Thomas v. David*, *post*, p. 232.

GREENOUGH v. ECCLES

(1859).

28 L. J. C. P. 160 ; 5 JUR. N. S. 766 ; 5 C. B. N. S. 786.

Although a party calling a witness may not discredit him, even if he proves "adverse" or "unfavourable," yet if he proves actually "hostile" he may under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 (now the Criminal Procedure Act, 1865), by leave of the Judge, give evidence that such witness has made previous inconsistent statements. But he may not give general evidence of the bad character of a witness he himself produces.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

WILLIAMS, J. "The question in this case is, whether in construing the terms of the 22nd section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 'in case the witness shall prove adverse,' the word 'adverse' ought to be understood as meaning merely 'unfavourable,' or as meaning 'hostile.' . . . The section lays down three rules as to the power of a party to discredit his own witness: First, he shall not be allowed to impeach his credit by general evidence of his bad character. Secondly, he may contradict him by other evidence. Thirdly, he may prove that he has made at other times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony. These three rules appear to include the principal questions that have ever arisen on the subject. . . . The law relating to the first two of these rules was settled before the passing of the Act, while, as to the third, the authorities were conflicting."

"The section requires the Judge to *form an opinion* that the witness is adverse, before the right to contradict or prove that he has made inconsistent statements is to be allowed to operate. This is reasonable, and indeed necessary, if the word 'adverse' means 'hostile,' but wholly unreasonable and unnecessary if it means 'unfavourable.' On these grounds we think the preferable construction is, that in case the witness shall, in the opinion of the

Judge, prove 'hostile,' the party producing him may not only contradict him by other witnesses, as he might heretofore have done, and may still do, if the witness is unfavourable, but may also, by leave of the Judge, prove that he has made inconsistent statements."

Note.—The words of sect. 22 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, which in the above case came before the Court for construction, were:—

"A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his credit by general evidence of bad character, but he may, in case the witness shall in the opinion of the Judge prove *adverse*, contradict him by other evidence, or by leave of the Judge prove that he has made at other times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony; but before such last-mentioned proof can be given, the circumstances of the supposed statement, sufficient to designate the particular occasion, must be mentioned to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not he has made such statement."

In the above case the word "adverse" was held to mean "hostile."

The above section is now repealed, but it is re-enacted *verbatim* by the Criminal Procedure Act, 1865, which applies to both civil and criminal cases (see *post*, p. 324).

THOMAS v. DAVID (1836).

7 C. & P. 350; 48 R. R. 794.

A witness may be cross-examined as to facts tending to show that he is prejudiced in any way in favour of the party calling him, and if he denies such facts, witnesses may be called to contradict him.

In an action on a promissory note, one of the plaintiff's witnesses, who was his female servant, and who was one of the attesting witnesses to the defendant's signature of the promissory note, was asked, on cross-examination, whether she did not constantly sleep in the same bed with her master. She said that she did not. The defendant was allowed to call a witness to prove she did.

COLERIDGE, J. "Is it not material to the issue, whether the principal witness who comes to support the plaintiff's case is his kept mistress? If the question had been, whether the witness had walked

the streets as a common prostitute, I think that that would have been collateral to the issue, and that, had the witness denied such a charge, she could not have been contradicted; but here, the question is, whether the witness had contracted such a relation with the plaintiff as might induce her the more readily to conspire with him to support a forgery, just in the same way as if she had been asked if she was the sister or daughter of the plaintiff, and had denied that. I think that the contradiction is admissible."

Note.—See also *A.-G. v. Hitchcock*, *ante*, p. 228.

R. v. BROWN (1867).

L. R. 1 C. C. R. 70; 36 L. J. M. C. 59.

A party may call witnesses to swear that, in their opinion, based on their knowledge of the general character and reputation of a witness on the other side, he is not to be believed on his oath.

At the close of the case for the prosecution, the counsel for the defendants, after having called several witnesses to character, proposed to call witnesses to prove that they would not believe the witnesses for the prosecution on their oaths. The Court refused to receive such evidence, but stated a case for the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. The evidence was held admissible.

KELLY, C.B. "It has been the practice to admit the evidence rejected in this case for centuries without dispute, and we have personal knowledge of its existence during our time. So long a practice cannot be altered but by the legislature."

MARTIN, B. "The practice has existed as long as I can remember in my professional career."

Note.—Notwithstanding the clear and emphatic language of the Judges in this case, there appears to be some question as to how far it can be relied on in practice. It certainly is not at all usual to call such evidence. But it seems clear that the evidence must relate to general reputation only and not to specific acts of misconduct.

As to proof of Previous Convictions, see *post*, p. 325.

PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES.

Although a witness may be compelled to give evidence, he may still refuse to answer certain questions, or to produce certain documents, on well-recognised grounds of privilege.

The chief grounds of privilege are:—

1. That the answer to the question, or the production of the document, would tend to criminate the witness, or expose him to a criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture.

2. That the answer or document would disclose confidential communications between client and legal adviser, or information obtained for the purposes of litigation.

3. That the answer or document would disclose State secrets, or matters of State, the disclosure of which would be injurious to the public.

4. That the document relates solely to the title or case of the witness, if he be a party to the action.

5. That the document is a document of title of the witness, if he be no party to the action.

6. That the answer or document would disclose a communication made to the witness by his wife or her husband.

7. That the answer would tend to show that the witness has been guilty of adultery.

Cases are given below on the first five points. The sixth is statutory, by the Evidence Act, 1853 (see *post*, p. 321) and the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (see *post*, p. 341). The seventh is also statutory, by the Evidence Act, 1869 (see *post*, p. 329).

CRIMINATING QUESTIONS AND DOCUMENTS.

R. v. BOYES

(1861).

30 L. J. Q. B. 301 ; 5 L. T. 147 ; 7 JUR. 1158 ; 1
B. & S. 311.

No witness, whether a party or stranger, is compellable to answer any question, or to produce any document, the tendency of which would be to expose the witness (or probably the wife or husband of the witness) to any criminal charge, penalty, or forfeiture reasonably likely to be brought, sued for, or enforced. But the danger to be apprehended must be real or appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things.

Thus, where a witness had been pardoned under the Great Seal, and so could not be prosecuted in the ordinary way, it was no valid objection that he still remained liable to impeachment, to which a pardon is no bar (by the provision of the Act of Settlement).

COCKBURN, C.J. "The question on which our opinion is now required is, whether the enactment of the 3rd section of the Act of Settlement, that 'no pardon under the Great Seal shall be pleadable to an impeachment by the Commons in Parliament,' is a sufficient reason for holding that the privilege of the witness still existed in this case, on the ground that the witness, though protected by the pardon against every other form of prosecution, might, possibly, be subject to parliamentary impeachment. . . . It was contended that a bare possibility of legal peril was sufficient to entitle a witness to protection ; nay, further, that the witness was the sole judge as to whether his evidence would bring him into danger of the law, and that the statement of his belief to that effect, if not manifestly made *mala fide*, should be received as conclusive."

“With the latter of these propositions we are altogether unable to concur. Upon a review of the authorities, we are clearly of opinion . . . that, to entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the Court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer. We, indeed, quite agree that if the fact of the witness being in danger be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed to him in judging for himself of the effect of any particular question, there being no doubt . . . that a question, which might appear at first sight a very innocent one, might, by affording a link in a chain of evidence, become the means of bringing home an offence to the party answering. Subject to this reservation a Judge is, in our opinion, bound to insist on a witness answering, unless he is satisfied that the answer will tend to place the witness in peril. Further than this, we are of opinion that the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things; not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct. We think that a merely remote and naked possibility, out of the ordinary course of law, and such as no reasonable man would be affected by, should not be suffered to obstruct the administration of justice. The object of the law is to afford to a party, called upon to give evidence in a proceeding *inter alios*, protection against being brought by means of his own evidence within the penalties of the law. But it would be to convert a salutary protection into a means of abuse if it were to be held that a mere imaginary possibility of danger, however remote and improbable, was sufficient to justify the withholding of evidence essential to the ends of justice.”

“Now, in the present case, no one seriously supposes that the witness runs the slightest risk of an impeachment by the House of Commons. . . . To suppose that such a proceeding would be applied to the case of this witness would be ridiculous.”

“It appears to us, therefore, that the witness in this case was not,

in a rational point of view, in the slightest real danger from the evidence he was called upon to give when protected from all legal proceedings, and that it was, therefore, the duty of the presiding Judge to compel him to answer."

Note.—Although, as a rule, a witness is not compelled to incriminate himself, several statutes have provided that he shall, in certain specified proceedings, make full discovery and answer all questions, but it is invariably provided that such evidence shall not afterwards be used against him. See, for instance, the Larceny Act, 1861, ss. 29, 85 (*post*, p. 321); the Explosive Substances Act, 1883, s. 6 (*post*, p. 334); the Corrupt Practices Act, 1883, s. 59 (*post*, p. 335); the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, s. 19 (*post*, p. 337); and the Bankruptcy Act, 1890, s. 27 (*post*, p. 340). But, it should be observed, the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 17, provides that answers given under compulsory examination may be used in evidence against the bankrupt (*post*, p. 336), except as provided by the Bankruptcy Act, 1890 (*post*, p. 340).

PYE v. BUTTERFIELD (1864).

34 L. J. Q. B. 17; 11 JUR. 220; 5 B. & S. 829.

A witness can, on the ground of privilege, refuse to answer a question which tends to show he has done an act which would render him liable to forfeit property.

Therefore, in an action of ejectment, the Court refused to compel the defendant to answer interrogatories where the answer would tend to show that he had incurred a forfeiture of his lease by reason of his having broken a covenant therein not to under-let the premises.

COCKBURN, C.J. "According to the authorities which have been cited and the expressions used by the text-writers who have written upon the subject, those rules are perfectly fixed and established, that no man shall be compelled to give an answer which shall have an effect leading to the forfeiture of his estate, except when granted subject to a conditional limitation."

CROMPTON, J. "It is a principle of the law of evidence which these Courts have always recognised as applicable to the examination

of witnesses, and everything shows that they were averse to extending the power of discovery to cases of forfeiture. From the earliest times the rule has been adopted in the Courts of Equity with regard to discovery.

Note.—It is only on this ground of forfeiture that a witness can object to answer a question tending to subject him to a civil suit. Otherwise there is no privilege. (See the Witnesses Act, 1806, *post*, p. 312.)

LEGAL PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AND DOCUMENTS.

WHEELER v. LE MARCHANT (1881).

L. R. 17 CH. D. 675 ; 50 L. J. CH. 793 ; 44 L. T. 632 ;
45 J. P. 728.

Communications made in professional confidence to counsel, solicitors and their clerks, may not be disclosed without consent of the client.

This privilege extends to communications, statements, reports, etc., made by other persons to the legal adviser, if obtained by the latter for the purpose of litigation, but not otherwise.

Communications made to any other persons than legal advisers, e.g., to medical advisers or clergymen, are not privileged.

The Court ordered production of letters which had passed between the solicitors of the defendants and their surveyor, except such (if any) as the defendants should state by affidavit to have been prepared confidentially after dispute had arisen between the plaintiff and the defendants and for the purpose of obtaining information, evidence or legal advice with reference to litigation existing or contemplated between the parties to the action.

JESSEL, M.R. "The principle is of a very limited character.

It does not protect all confidential communications which a man must necessarily make in order to obtain advice, even when necessary for the protection of his life or of his honour, to say nothing of his fortune. There are many communications which must be made because without them the ordinary business of life cannot be carried on, and yet they are not protected. As I have said in the course of the argument, the communication made to a medical man, whose advice is sought by a patient . . . is not protected. Communications made to the priest in the confessional, on matters perhaps considered by the penitent to be more important even than the care of his life or his fortune, are not protected. Communications made to a friend with respect to matters of the most delicate nature, on which advice is sought with respect to a man's honour or reputation, are not protected. Therefore it must not be supposed that there is any principle which says that every confidential communication which, in order to carry on the ordinary business of life, must necessarily be made, is protected. The protection is of a very limited character. It is a protection in this country restricted to the obtaining the assistance of lawyers, as regards the conduct of litigation or the rights of property. It has never gone beyond the obtaining legal advice and assistance ; and all things reasonably necessary in the shape of communication to the legal advisers are protected from production or discovery, in order that that legal advice may be obtained safely and sufficiently."

"The actual communication to the solicitor by the client is, of course, protected, and it is equally protected whether that communication is made by the client in person or by an agent on behalf of the client, and whether made to the solicitor in person or to a clerk or subordinate of the solicitor, who acts in his place and under his direction. Again, with the same view, the evidence obtained by the solicitor, or by his direction, or at his instance, even if obtained by the client, is protected if obtained after litigation has been commenced or threatened, or with a view to the defence or prosecution of such litigation. So, again, it does not matter whether the advice is obtained from the solicitor as to a dealing which is not the subject of litigation. What is protected is the communication necessary to obtain legal advice. It must

be a communication made to the solicitor in that character and for that purpose."

"But what we are asked to protect here is this : The solicitor being consulted in a matter as to which no dispute has arisen, thinks he would like to know some further facts before giving his advice, and applies to a surveyor to tell him what the state of a given property is, or information of that character, and it is said that information given in answer to such application ought to be protected because it is desired or required by the solicitor in order to enable him the better to give legal advice. It appears to me that it is not only extending the rule beyond what has been previously laid down, but beyond what necessity warrants. . . . It is a rule invented and maintained only for the purpose of enabling a man to obtain legal advice with safety."

BRETT, L.J. "The proposition laid before us for approval is, that where one of the parties to an action has in his possession or control documents which passed between his solicitor and third parties, and which contain either information or advice, those documents are protected in his hands from inspection on the ground that they are documents which passed between the solicitor and the third party for the purpose of enabling the solicitor to give legal advice to his client, although such information and advice was obtained by the solicitor for that purpose at a time when there was no litigation pending between the parties nor any litigation contemplated. It seems to me that that proposition cannot be acceded to. It is beyond any rule which has ever been laid down by the Court, and it seems to me that it is beyond the principle of the rules which has been laid down. The rule as to the non-production of communications between solicitor and client is a rule which has been determined upon as a matter of general or public policy. It is confined entirely to communications which take place with a view to obtaining legal advice from professional persons. It is so confined in terms, it seems to me it is so confined in principle, and it does not extend to the suggested case."

COTTON, L.J. "It is said communications between a client and his legal advisers, for obtaining legal advice, are privileged, and therefore any communication between the representatives of the

client and the solicitor must also be privileged. That is a fallacious use of the word 'representatives.' If the representative is a person employed as an agent on the part of the client to obtain the legal advice of the solicitor, of course he stands in exactly the same position, as regards protection, as the client, and his communications with the solicitors stand in the same position as the communications of the principal with his solicitor. But these persons were not representatives in that sense. They were representatives in this sense, that they were employed on behalf of the clients, the defendants, to do certain work, but that work was not the communicating with the solicitors to obtain legal advice. So their communications cannot be protected on the ground that they are communications between the client by his representatives and the solicitor."

"In fact, the proposition of the defendant comes to this, that all communications between a solicitor and a third person, in the course of his advising his client, are to be protected."

"It was conceded that there was no case that went that length, and the question is, whether we ought, in fully developing the principle, with all reasonable consequences, to protect such documents. Hitherto such documents have been protected only when they have been made in contemplation of some litigation, or for the purpose of giving advice or obtaining evidence with reference to it. And that is reasonable, because then the solicitor is preparing for the defence, or for bringing the action, and all communications he makes for that purpose, and the communications made to him for the purpose of giving him the information are, in fact, the brief in the action, and ought to be protected."

Note.—It should be particularly noticed that the privilege in this case is that of the client himself, who can waive it and consent to the disclosure (*Wilson v. Rastall*, 4 T. R. 754).

The extent of the privilege is stated very clearly in *Wills on Evidence*, p. 276, in these words—

"This privilege protects from disclosure two classes of communications :
(i) Confidential communications which have passed at any time between the party or witness and his legal adviser in his professional capacity for the purpose of the former obtaining legal advice for the protection of his interests, information procured in pursuance of such communications for the same purpose, and notes and other records of such communications and information made for the same object ;

(ii) Similar communications, information, notes and records, made or

procured with a view to litigation, whether commenced or only contemplated, including therefore instructions to counsel or solicitor, cases to advise, reports, evidence, briefs, etc., prepared on the client's behalf."

A very important case on this matter, in the House of Lords, is *Lyell v. Kennedy*, 9 App. Cas. 81. See also *Minet v. Morgan*, L. R. 8 Ch. 368.

R. v. COX AND RAILTON (1884).

L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 153 ; 54 L. J. M. C. 41 ; 52 L. T. 25 ;
33 W. R. 396 ; 49 J. P. 374 ; 15 Cox, 611.

Privilege extends only to those communications between solicitor and client which are made in the legitimate course of professional employment of the solicitor.

Communications made in furtherance of any criminal or fraudulent purpose are not privileged.

The Court must in each case determine, upon the facts, whether the accused consulted his solicitor after the crime for the legitimate purpose of being defended, or before the crime for the purpose of being assisted in committing it.

So a solicitor was compelled to disclose what passed between the prisoners and himself on an occasion when they called to consult him with reference to drawing up a Bill of Sale which was alleged to be fraudulent.

STEPHEN, J. "The conduct of Mr. Goodman, the solicitor, appears to have been unobjectionable. He was consulted in the common course of business, and gave a proper opinion in good faith. The question therefore is, whether, if a client applies to a legal adviser for advice intended to facilitate or to guide the client in the commission of a crime or fraud, the legal adviser being ignorant of the purpose for which his advice is wanted, the communication between the two is privileged. We expressed our opinion at the end of the argument that no such privilege existed. If it did, the result would be that if a man intending to commit treason or murder might safely

take legal advice for the purpose of enabling himself to do so with impunity, and that the solicitor to whom the application was made would not be at liberty to give information against his client for the purpose of frustrating his criminal purpose. Consequences so monstrous reduce to an absurdity any principle or rule in which they are involved."

"We were greatly pressed with the argument that, speaking practically, the admission of any such exception to the privilege of legal advisers as that it is not to extend to communications made in furtherance of any criminal or fraudulent purpose would greatly diminish the value of that privilege. The privilege must, it was argued, be violated in order to ascertain whether it exists. The secret must be told in order to see whether it ought to be kept."

"In each particular case the Court must determine upon the facts actually given in evidence, or proposed to be given in evidence, whether it seems probable that the accused person may have consulted his legal adviser, not after the commission of the crime for the legitimate purpose of being defended, but before the commission of the crime, for the purpose of being guided or helped in committing it. We are far from saying that the question whether the advice was taken before or after the offence will always be decisive as to the admissibility of such evidence. Courts must in every instance judge for themselves on the special facts of each particular case, just as they must judge whether a witness deserves to be examined on the supposition that he is hostile, or whether a dying declaration was made in the immediate prospect of death. . . . Of course, the power in question ought to be used with the greatest care not to hamper prisoners in making their defence, and not to enable unscrupulous persons to acquire knowledge to which they have no right, and every precaution should be taken against compelling unnecessary disclosures."

STATE DOCUMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS.

BEATSON v. SKENE

(1860).

29 L. J. Ex. 430 ; 2 L. T. 378 ; 8 W. R. 544 ; 6 JUR.
N. S. 780 ; 5 H. & N. 838.

Documents and communications respecting matters of State are privileged from disclosure, whenever it would be injurious to the public interests. The judge will generally be guided in this matter by the opinion of the head of the department having the control of a document.

The facts sufficiently appear from the judgment.

POLLOCK, C.B. "It appeared that the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Sidney Herbert, had been subpœnaed to produce certain letters written to the plaintiff by him, and also the minutes of a Court of Inquiry as to Colonel Shirley's conduct in writing the letters in question to General Vivian. Mr. Sidney Herbert attended at the trial, but objected to produce the documents on the ground that his doing so would be injurious to the public service. The learned Judge refused to compel their production on Mr. Sidney Herbert making this statement."

"We are all of opinion that it cannot be laid that all public documents of every sort, including treaties with foreign powers, and all the correspondence that may precede or accompany them, and all communications to the heads of departments, are to be produced and made public whenever a suitor in a court of justice thinks that his case requires such production. It is manifest, we think, that there must be a limit to the duty or the power of compelling the production of papers which are connected with acts of State."

"We are of opinion that if the production of a State paper

would be injurious to the public service, the general public interest must be considered paramount to the individual interest of a suitor in a court of justice; and the question then arises, how is this to be determined?"

"It is manifest it must be determined either by the presiding Judge or by the responsible servant of the Crown in whose custody the paper is. The Judge would be unable to determine it without ascertaining what the document was, and why the publication of it would be injurious to the public service, an inquiry which cannot take place in private, and which, taking place in public, may do all the mischief which it is proposed to guard against. It appears to us, therefore, that the question, whether the production of the document would be injurious to the public service, must be determined, not by the Judge, but by the head of the department having the custody of the paper; and if he is in attendance, and states that in his opinion the production of that document would be injurious to the public service, we think the Judge ought not to compel the production of it. . . . If the head of the department does not attend personally to say that the production of the document will be injurious, but sends the document to be produced or not as the Judge may think proper, or . . . where a subordinate is sent with the document, with instructions to object, but nothing more; then, indeed, the case may be different, and the Judge may compel the production of it. . . . Perhaps cases might arise where the matter would be so clear that the Judge might well ask for it in spite of some official scruples as to producing it; but this must be considered rather as an extreme case; and extreme cases throw very little light upon the practical rules of law."

Note.—Although, generally, in cases of privilege, other evidence may be given of the facts, yet in the case of State documents or matters the exclusion appears to be absolute, so that no evidence thereof at all is admissible.

DOCUMENTS RELATING SOLELY TO A PARTY'S OWN CASE.

MORRIS v. EDWARDS

(1890).

L. R. 15 A. C. 309 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 292 ; 63 L. T. 26.

A party to an action cannot be compelled to produce documents which he swears relate solely to his own title or case, and do not tend to prove or support that of his adversary.

In an action to recover land, the defendant swore, in an affidavit of documents, that the documents in question related solely to his own title and did not tend in any way to prove or to support the plaintiff's title.

LORD HALSBURY, L.C. "The affidavit appears to be as plain as anything can be: 'I object to produce the said documents set forth in the first part of the second schedule hereto, on the ground that they relate solely to my own title to the freehold property in the statement of claim mentioned, and do not in any way tend to prove or to support the title of the plaintiffs or either of them.' It appears to me that it is absolutely hopeless to contend that there is any authority for going behind that statement. . . . It would be absolutely destructive of anything like privilege of documents, because in every case you might controvert an affidavit and have an interrogatory as to whether or not the document might be seen, and the 'privilege' would then be absolutely nugatory: the effect of it would be gone. For that plain and simple reason the Courts have always refused to enter into an inquiry of that sort."

LORD HERSHELL. "The defendant, in relation to those documents, has stated on oath that they 'do not in any way tend to prove or to support the title' of the plaintiffs, and that they are deeds relating solely to his own title . . . It appears to me that *primâ facie* this affidavit, according to the authorities, is absolutely sufficient."

Note.—It would appear from this case that, with respect to a party's documents, there is no real or substantial privilege, as he can only refuse production if they will not help his opponent. It is otherwise with respect to a mere witness's documents. See next case.

DOCUMENTS OF TITLE OF A WITNESS.

PICKERING v. NOYES

(1823).

1 L. J. K. B. 110 ; 1 B. & C. 262 ; 2 D. & R. 386 ;
28 R. R. 430.

A person who is not a party to the action cannot be compelled to produce his title deeds, or other documents referring to his title to the property.

The Court therefore, on the application of the defendant, in an action brought to try the title to land, refused to compel the plaintiff or his landlord to permit the defendant to inspect or take a copy of one of the landlord's title deeds to his estate.

ABBOTT, C.J. "The present request is made, not in furtherance of a right, but with the intention of looking into and examining another man's title to his estate. We should be much concerned if any authority could be found for such an application. The Courts have gone quite far enough in these matters, but yet they have never made the order unless one party was clearly a trustee for the other."

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83, s. 3, *post*, p. 321, and 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, s. 1 (d), *post*, p. 341.

QUESTIONS TENDING TO SHOW ADULTERY OF WITNESS.

See 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, s. 3, *post*, p. 329.

ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. DEPOSITIONS.

The evidence of the witnesses must, if possible, be given in Court at the regular trial of the proceedings. But depositions taken previously may be read as evidence in certain events when they have been regularly taken, both in Civil and Criminal proceedings. In the latter case, when the trial is on Indictment, depositions are invariably taken on the preliminary inquiry before the Justices, under the provisions of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848 (*post*, p. 316). They are therefore always available if wanted in such cases. Depositions are also taken under the provisions of certain other Statutes, some of which are mentioned below, the result being that they are ordinarily taken under :—

- (1) The Indictable Offences Act, 1848 (see *post*, p. 316).
- (2) The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1867 (see *post*, p. 326).
- (3) The Coroners Act, 1887 (see *post*, p. 338).
- (4) The Children Act, 1908 (see *post*, p. 348).

In Civil cases depositions are only taken by special order when required, Order 37 of the rules of the Supreme Court providing :—

R. 5. The Court or a Judge may, in any cause or matter where it shall appear necessary for the purposes of justice, make any order for the examination upon oath before the Court or Judge or any officer of the Court, or any other person, and at any place, of any witness or person, and may empower any party to any such cause or matter to give such deposition in evidence therein on such terms, if any, as the Court or Judge may direct.

R. 11. The examination shall take place in the presence of the parties, their counsel, solicitors, or agents, and the witnesses shall be subject to cross-examination and re-examination.

R. 12. The depositions taken before an officer of the Court, or before any other person appointed to take the examination, shall be taken down in writing by or in the presence of the examiner, not ordinarily by question and answer, but so as to represent as nearly as may be the statement of the witness, and when completed shall be read over to the witness and signed by him in the presence of the parties, or such of them as may think fit to attend.

R. 18. Except where by this Order otherwise provided, or directed by the Court or a Judge, no deposition shall be given in evidence at the hearing or trial of the cause or matter without the consent of the party against whom the same may be offered, unless the Court or Judge is satisfied that the deponent is dead, or beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, or unable from sickness or other infirmity to attend the hearing or trial, in any of which cases the depositions certified under the hand of the person taking the examination shall be admissible in evidence saving all just exceptions without proof of the signature to such certificate.

R. v. SCAIFE

(1851).

20 L. J. M. C. 229 ; 15 JUR. 607 ; 17 Q. B. 242 ;
2 DEN. 281 ; 5 COX, 243.

The deposition of a witness in a criminal case, if properly taken before a magistrate under the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, is admissible in evidence at the trial, not only if the witness is "dead, or so ill as not to be able to travel," as provided by such Act, but also when the witness is kept out of the way by the prisoner's procurement ; but not if there be merely unexplained absence. If procurement of the absence be shown, and there are several prisoners,

the deposition is evidence against those only who are proved to have procured such absence.

The facts sufficiently appear from the judgments.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J. "The prisoner Smith having resorted to a contrivance to keep the witness out of the way, the evidence would be admissible against him, but it would not be admissible on that ground against the other prisoners. The learned Judge does not seem to have made any distinction in this respect, but to have admitted the evidence against the two who were convicted, without proof of any contrivance on their part."

PATTESON, J. "If there were enough to show that the witness was kept out of the way by Smith, the deposition would be admissible against him; but it would not be admissible against the other prisoners, unless they were affected with the contrivance of Smith. No such distinction appears to have been made, but the evidence was admitted generally against all the prisoners. It was assumed that all were connected with the contrivance, without any evidence whatever to support such an assumption."

ERLE, J. "With respect to two of the prisoners, the admissibility of the deposition must be rested solely upon the ground of absence unexplained; . . . it is not receivable on that ground."

Note.—Although depositions are, by the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, s. 17, to be taken "in all cases where any person shall appear or be brought before any justice or justices of the peace charged with any indictable offence," yet they are not used as evidence upon the trial of such person if the witnesses are able to be present and to give their evidence again. The Act provides that "if upon the trial of the person so accused as first aforesaid it shall be proved, by the oath or affirmation of any credible witness, that any person whose deposition shall have been taken as aforesaid is dead, or so ill as not to be able to travel, and if also it shall be proved that such deposition was taken in the presence of the person so accused, and that he or his counsel or attorney had a full opportunity of cross-examining the witness, then, if such deposition purport to be signed by the justice by or before whom the same purports to have been taken, it shall be lawful to read such deposition," etc.

It was held in the above case that the admissibility of the depositions was not limited to the two cases mentioned in the Act, death, and illness. They can probably be used also in the case of the insanity of a witness (*R. v. Marshall*, C. & M. 147), but not merely because he has gone abroad (*R. v. Austin*, 7 Cox, 55).

The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1867, and the Children Act, 1908, both specify the circumstances in which depositions taken thereunder are admissible in evidence (see *post*, pp. 326, 348). The Coroners Act, 1887, does not specify the circumstances (see *post*, p. 338). They appear to be admissible in the same events as those taken under the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, mentioned above.

The magistrate's duties under the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, with reference to taking depositions, may be thus summarised:—

1. He must take the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution, in the presence of the accused, allowing him to cross-examine, taking down such evidence in writing, causing it to be read to the accused and signed by the witnesses, and sign it himself.

2. He must ask the accused whether he wishes to say anything in answer, warning him that he need not do so, but that what he says may be given in evidence against him, take down in writing what he says, read it over to him, and sign it himself.

3. He must ask the accused whether he desires to call witnesses, take their evidence in the presence of the accused, cause it to be signed by the witnesses, and sign it himself.

The full text of the Act is given *post*, p. 316.

It will be observed that the prisoner's statement, under par. 2 above, is unsworn, and is not strictly a deposition, but it is practically treated as part of the depositions and is read at the trial by the prosecution, whether it is in his favour or not. But it should be distinguished from the unsworn statement of the prisoner made at the trial itself, the right to make which is recognised and preserved by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, sect. 1 (*h*), *post*, p. 342.

x not so
in bank

24 Jan 26
1:35 AM

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.

When a party seeks to put in evidence the contents of a document, the "best evidence" rule (see *ante*, p. 126), lays down that he shall produce the original, the "primary evidence" thereof, unless his opponent has admitted the contents of the original: an admission being also considered "primary evidence" (see *ante*, p. 145). This rule is strongly illustrated by the first of the cases following. Other cases show that the rule only applies where the *contents* of the document are in question, and not merely its *existence*; or the *position* created by it.

But in certain cases, where the party is unable to get the original, "secondary evidence" of the document is allowed, *i.e.*, either a copy of the document or verbal evidence of its contents.

The cases in which such secondary evidence of the contents of a document is allowed are:—

1. When the original is in the possession or power of an opponent, who refuses to produce it after notice to produce.
2. When the original is in the possession of a stranger, not legally compellable to produce it, who refuses to do so when served with a *subpœna duces tecum*.
3. When the original is lost or destroyed, and it is proved that proper search has been made for it.
4. When the original cannot be brought to Court, either because it is physically impossible, or not legally allowed, to be so brought, as in the case of "Public Documents."

Cases are given on each of these points.

MACDONNELL v. EVANS

(1852).

11 C. B. 930 ; 87 R. R. 818.

The best evidence in the possession or power of the party tendering it must be given. As a rule the best evidence of a document is the original document, which is treated as "primary evidence" of its contents. Such original must be produced unless its absence is accounted for.

In an action on a bill of exchange, a witness, called by the plaintiff, was asked in cross-examination by the defendant's counsel, who produced a letter purporting to have been written by the witness : "Did you not write that letter in answer to a letter charging you with forgery?" The counsel for the plaintiff objected to the question on the ground that it was an attempt to get in evidence the contents of a written document without producing the document itself. It was held that the objection was a good one.

JERVIS, C.J. "The rule of evidence which governs this case is applicable to all cases where witnesses are sworn to give evidence upon the trial of an issue. That rule is, that the best evidence in the possession or power of the party must be produced. What the best evidence is must depend upon circumstances. Generally speaking, the original document is the best evidence ; but circumstances may arise in which secondary evidence of the contents may be given. In the present case, those circumstances do not exist. For anything that appeared, the defendant's counsel might have had the letter in his hand when he put the question. It was sought to give secondary evidence of the contents of a letter, without in any way accounting for its absence, or showing any attempt to obtain it. It is enough for us to decide upon the application of the general rule. The best evidence of the contents of the document was not tendered."

MAULE, J. "It is a general rule that, if you want to get at the contents of a written document, the proper way is, to produce it, if you can. That is a rule in which the common sense of mankind

concur. If the paper is in the possession of the party who seeks to have the jury infer something from its contents, he should let them see it. That is the general and ordinary rule: the contents can only be proved by the writing itself. If the document does not exist, or the party seeking to show its contents cannot get at it, he is at liberty to give secondary evidence, because in that case no better is to be had. An early writer on the law of evidence states the rule to be, that **you shall not give evidence which shows that better is in existence.** That seems to me to be a reasonable way of dealing with the matter. Here, the very form of the question, 'Did you not write that letter in answer to a letter containing so and so?' assumes that there is another letter in existence, the production of which would be the best proof of its contents. **There was nothing to show why that letter was not forthcoming.** Our decision does not, and need not, go further than that."

CRESSWELL, J. "It is said here that the object of the question objected to was merely to test the accuracy of the witness's memory, to try his credit. But, shift it as you will, it was a mere attempt to get in evidence of the contents of a written document, without putting in the document itself. The jury were expected and intended to be induced to act upon the inference that the fact existed which that letter was assumed to state. **There was nothing to show that the defendant had not the letter in his possession or under his control at the time.** If the contents of an absent document may be repeated under pretence of testing the credit or the memory of a witness, it will always be in the power of parties to evade the rule which requires the best evidence to be produced, viz., the instrument itself. The most mischievous consequences would, I conceive, result from such a relaxation of the rule."

Note.—The only other kind of primary evidence of a private document is afforded by an admission (see *ante*, p. 145). "Duplicate originals," or copies executed by all parties are primary evidence against all such parties. "Counterparts," or copies executed by certain parties only, are primary evidence against such parties only.

In a few cases, copies of public documents are made primary evidence—e.g. a probate copy of a will—by various statutes.

It should be observed that a writing is not necessarily a "document." See *post*, p. 303.

R. v. ELWORTHY

(1867).

L. R. 1 C. C. R. 103 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 3 ; 17 L. T. 293 ;
16 W. R. 207 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 579.

The original document must be produced whenever there is a question as to its contents, unless for special reasons secondary evidence is allowed ; for instance, where it is in the possession of the other party and notice to produce the original has been given to him.

But where its contents are not in question, the document being in the position of a chattel or piece of property merely, as where there are conflicting claims as to its possession, there is no legal obligation to produce it.

A solicitor was indicted for perjury in having sworn there was no draft of a certain statutory declaration. No notice to produce this draft had been given to the person in whose possession it was.

The materiality of the existence of such draft turned upon its contents and the fact of certain alterations having been made in it. It was held that secondary evidence of its contents was not admissible, as no notice to produce the original had been given, and the nature of the proceedings was not such as to operate as a notice to produce.

KELLY, C.B. "The exact contents of the draft, therefore, became essential to the prosecution on the present indictment, because upon its contents depended the materiality or immateriality of the evidence on the former trial. The prosecution then gave evidence of the existence of the draft, that it came into the prisoner's hands and had not passed from him. Parol evidence of its contents was thereupon admitted, and the question raised is, whether, in order to give parol evidence of the contents of that document, notice to produce it ought to have been given. There is no doubt that, according to the general rule of evidence, such notice must have been given ; but

it is contended that this case falls within those cases which have established an exception to the rule, and made the secondary evidence here admissible without notice to produce the original. For example, it is said that in trover for a deed or other written document, parol evidence might be given of the contents of the document without notice to the defendant to produce it; but the defendant there has notice by the nature of the action itself and the description of the document in the declaration, without further notice that he is called upon to produce the document. He can therefore do so if he thinks fit. We do not, however, think that that case is applicable here."

"There was nothing on the indictment or the evidence to show that, in order to sustain this prosecution, the prisoner was called upon to admit secondary evidence of this document being given against him. If sufficient notice had been given to him, he might have produced it. Speaking for myself, I think that the admissibility of secondary evidence, without the production of the best evidence or the document itself, ought not to be extended."

BRAMWELL, B. "If the question had been merely as to the existence of the draft, I should have been inclined to think the evidence admissible; but the prosecution gave in evidence the contents to show that the prisoner's denial of its existence was wilful; therefore the contents and the alterations therein became material. I think that parol testimony cannot be given of any existing written document without laying a proper foundation for it. No exception to that rule is here applicable. The indictment did not give notice to the prisoner that he would be required to produce the original draft."

R. v. HOLY TRINITY, HULL
(1827).

6 L. J. M. C. 24; 7 B. & C. 611; 1 M. & R. 444;
31 R. R. 267.

Although a certain legal relation or position has been created by a written document, yet the mere fact of

such relation or position may be proved by secondary evidence, without production of the document.

The question was, whether a pauper had gained a settlement in a certain parish by the occupation of a tenement. Parol evidence was admitted to prove the mere fact of tenancy, although it had been created by a written document.

BAYLEY, J. "The general rule is that the contents of a written document cannot be proved without producing it. But although there may be a written instrument between a landlord and tenant defining the terms of the tenancy, the fact of the tenancy may be proved by parol without proving the terms of it. It was unnecessary in this case to prove by the written instrument either the fact of tenancy or the value of the premises."

LITLEDAL, J. "Payment of rent as rent is evidence of tenancy, and may be proved without producing the written instrument."

WHARAM v. ROUTLEDGE (1805).

5 ESPINASSE, 235 ; 8 R. R. 851.

A party who produces a document when called for on notice to produce may insist that it shall be put in evidence by his opponent if the latter uses it or inspects it, provided it is relevant.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C.J. "You cannot ask for a book of the opposite party and be determined upon the inspection of it whether you will use it or not. If you call for it you make it evidence for the other side if they think fit to use it."

Note.—"The reason for this rule is, that it would give an unconscionable advantage to a party, to enable him to pry into the affairs of his adversary, without at the same time subjecting him to the risk of making whatever he inspects evidence for both parties" (*Taylor*, 1304).

DOE v. HODGSON

(1840).

12 A. & E. 135 ; 4 P. & D. 142 ; 2 M. & R. 283 ;
9 L. J. Q. B. 327 ; 4 JUR. 1202 ; 54 R. R. 553.

A party who refuses to produce a document when called for on notice to produce, and so allows secondary evidence of its contents to be given, cannot afterwards use the original as evidence without the consent of the other party.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. "In this case the question was, whether a party, who, at the trial, had refused to produce a writing which he possessed, and thereby had drawn the other party to give secondary evidence of its contents, could afterwards produce it. I thought, at the trial, that he could not ; considering it to be the rule that, where he had the opportunity, and had declined to produce the writing, he could not afterwards bring forward its contents. Our opinion is, that that is the rule of practice ; and that, when that refusal has taken place, the party who had refused to produce the writing could not afterwards be at liberty to give it in evidence."

Note.—The same rule has been applied to the refusal to produce things when called for by the opposite party, *e.g.* a dog (*Lewis v. Hartley*, 7 C. & P. 405).

R. v. HUNT

(1820).

3 B. & ALD. 566 ; 22 R. R. 485.

The original writing need only be produced, or its absence accounted for, when it is really a "document." Parol evidence may be given of any other written or printed

words, inscriptions, etc., without production or accounting for the originals.

On a charge of conspiracy, seditious meeting and riot, it appeared in evidence that there were various flags and banners, bearing inscriptions and devices of a seditious and inflammatory tendency, and that they were seized by the police officers on dispersion of the mob. On parol evidence of such inscriptions and devices being tendered, it was objected that the flags or banners ought to have been produced, or that notice should have been given to produce the originals. This objection was overruled, and the parol evidence was held admissible.

ABBOTT, C.J. "With respect to the last point, the reception of the evidence as to the inscriptions on the flags or banners, I think it was not necessary either to produce the flags or to give notice to the defendants to produce them. The cases requiring the production of a writing itself will be found to apply to writings of a very different character. There is no authority to show that in a criminal case ensigns, banners, or other things exhibited to public view, and of which the effect depends upon such public exhibition, must be produced or accounted for on the part either of the prosecutor or of the defendants. And in many instances the proof of such matters from eye-witnesses, speaking to what they saw on the occasion, has been received, and its competency was never, to my knowledge, called in question until the present time. Inscriptions used on such occasions are the public expression of the sentiments of those who bear and adopt them, and have rather the character of speeches than of writings. If we were to hold that words inscribed on a banner so exhibited could not be proved without the production of the banner, I know not upon what reason a witness should be allowed to mention the colour of the banner or even to say that he saw a banner displayed, for the banner itself may be said to be the best possible evidence of its existence and its colour. And if such parol proof may be received generally, the proof at this trial was properly received: notwithstanding the allegation that the things themselves, or some of them, were in the hands of a constable then at York; for, in the first place, this fact did not appear (if indeed it appeared at any time distinctly) until after the

evidence was received ; and, in the second place, if it had appeared distinctly at the time when the parol evidence was offered, still that particular fact would not affect the competency of the other proof, such other proof being competent upon general principles. Its proper effect would only be to furnish matter of observation to the jury on the part of the defendants, that the prosecutor chose to offer only the fallible testimony of witnesses where he had it in his power to produce the infallible testimony of the things themselves."

SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

DWYER v. COLLINS

(1852).

21 L. J. Ex. 225 ; 16 JUR. 569 ; 7 Ex. 639 ;
86 R. R. 770.

Secondary evidence of a document is admissible when the original is in the possession of an adverse or opposite party, who refuses to produce it after a proper notice to produce.

The object of a notice to produce is merely to give the opposite party sufficient opportunity to produce it if he pleases, and not that he may have time to consider the terms of the document, and to prepare evidence or argument in support of or against it. Therefore, where the document is in Court at the time of the trial, a notice to produce it immediately is sufficient to render secondary evidence of its contents admissible if it be not produced.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

PARKE, B. "The next question is, whether the bill being admitted to be in Court, parol evidence was admissible on its non-production

by the attorney on demand, or whether previous notice to produce was necessary. On principle the answer must depend on this: why the notice to produce is required. If it be to give to the opponent notice that such a document would be used by the party to the cause, so that the opponent may be enabled to prepare evidence to explain or confirm it, then, no doubt, a notice at the trial, although the document be in Court, is too late; but if it be merely to enable the party to have the document in Court, to produce it if he likes, and if he does not, to enable his opponent to give parol evidence,—if it be merely to exclude the argument that the opponent has not taken all reasonable means to procure the original, which he must do before he can be permitted to make use of secondary evidence, then the demand of production at the trial is sufficient.”

“We think the plaintiff’s alleged principle is not the true one on which the notice to produce is required, but that it is merely to give sufficient opportunity to the opposite party to produce it if he pleases, and thereby to secure the best evidence of its contents, and the request to produce it immediately is quite sufficient for that purpose if the document be in Court.”

Note.—It should be observed that one party to an action can always serve another party with a *subpœna duces tecum* to produce a document in his possession, and thus compel him to produce the original, but he need not do so. It may be that he has satisfactory secondary evidence of the document and does not require the original. But he cannot put in such secondary evidence without giving the other party the opportunity of producing the original if he wishes to do so. Such opportunity is afforded by serving the party holding the original with a mere *notice to produce* it. The party so served need not obey the notice and produce the original. As the document is to be put in evidence against himself, he may elect that secondary evidence thereof may be put in. If, therefore, he does not produce the original, the party serving the notice may avail himself of his secondary evidence. Naturally it is not so when the original is in the possession of a stranger, who cannot thus consent that secondary evidence shall be used against another person, a party to the action. The two cases following deal with such question.

Shortly, a *subpœna* is a writ, which must be obeyed. Its object is to compel production. A *notice to produce* is a mere invitation from one party to another. It cannot be used for a stranger to the action. It invites one party to produce the document and legally intimates to him that, if he does not do so, secondary evidence may be tendered against him. Its object is not to compel production, but to enable secondary evidence to be put in.

MILLS v. ODDY

(1834).

6 C. & P. 728 ; 40 R. R. 847.

Secondary evidence of a document is admissible when the original is in the hands of a stranger, who is, on the ground of privilege, not compellable by law to produce it, and who refuses to do so, either when summoned as a witness with a "subpœna duces tecum," or when sworn as a witness without a subpœna, if he admits that he has the document in Court.

In order to show the amount of ground-rent at which a certain house was held, a witness, not a party to the action, was called, having been subpœnaed to produce the lease. He said : "I am the principal clerk in the office of the Comptroller of the Bridge-house estates. I have the counterpart of the lease of this house from the Corporation of the City of London to a person named Longmore. I decline producing it as it is a title-deed of the Corporation. I am an attorney. The Comptroller of the Bridge-house estates is the attorney and solicitor of the Corporation in all matters relating to the Bridge-house estates."

It was held that production of the deed was rightfully refused, and therefore secondary evidence of its contents might be given.

PARKE, B. "The attorney is not to produce his client's title-deeds, nor to disclose their contents ; and this witness is in fact in the same situation as the attorney. The Comptroller is the solicitor of the Corporation for this purpose, and this gentleman is the principal clerk in his Office."

"If you have any one who has seen this lease, who does not claim under it as one of his title deeds, and who is not privileged as attorney or solicitor, he may give secondary evidence of its contents. There is an impossibility of your producing it, as the person who has it cannot be compelled to produce it under his subpœna."

Note.—As to privilege for title-deeds, see *ante*, p. 247. As to the differences between a *subpœna* and a *notice to produce*, and between parties and strangers, see note to previous case.

R. v. INHABITANTS OF LLANFAETHLY (1853).

23 L. J. M. C. 33; 2 E. & B. 940; 2 C. L. R. 230.

Secondary evidence of a document is not admissible if a stranger wrongfully refuses to produce the original after being served with a *subpœna* to do so, as the witness can be compelled to produce the original.

A *subpœna* had been served on a witness to produce a rate-book, supposed to be in his possession. He did not attend, and the rate-book was not produced. It was held that parol evidence of rating was not admissible, the witness having improperly neglected to produce the book.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J. "It has been held that if, under a *subpœna duces tecum*, the witness appears and stands on his privilege and refuses to produce the document, and the Judge admits the objection, secondary evidence is then admissible. But here no privilege existed, and the witness would have been bound to produce the rate-book, and would have been punishable for contempt if he had refused to do so."

ERLE, J. "The appellants had the duty cast upon them of establishing the contents of the rate-book, and they must therefore either produce it or account satisfactorily for its absence. They have not done either of these things by serving the party who is supposed to have the rate-book, but who, in fact, had it not, with a *subpœna* to produce it. I am further of opinion that, even if they had served the party in whose possession it really was, to produce the book, and that party has disobeyed the *subpœna*, secondary evidence of its contents would not have been admissible."

Note.—The law requires that a party shall do all that he can legally do to compel production of a document by a stranger before he puts in

secondary evidence against an opponent. Otherwise secondary evidence of an unreliable character might be tendered against a party by collusion between his opponent and the stranger. If production can be compelled by *subpœna* it must be compelled. See note to the two previous cases.

BREWSTER v. SEWELL

(1820).

3 B. & ALD. 296 ; 22 R. R. 395.

Secondary evidence of a document is admissible when the original is lost or destroyed, but it must be shown that proper search has been made for it. What is proper search depends on the nature and value of the document. More careful search will be required for a valuable than for a useless document.

In 1813, a fire occurred at the plaintiff's premises, and the Insurance Co. paid the claim. A fresh policy was afterwards taken out by the plaintiff. In 1819 the plaintiff had occasion to give evidence concerning the earlier policy, but he could not produce the original. He produced evidence to the effect that search had been made in every place in which such a document, if still in existence, would be likely to be found, but it could not be found ; and that he had treated it as a worthless document after the new policy had been issued, and did not remember what had become of it. It was held that sufficient search for such an apparently useless document had been made to allow secondary evidence to be given.

ABBOTT, C.J. "All evidence is to be considered with regard to the matter with respect to which it is produced. Now it appears to be a very different thing, whether the subject of inquiry be a useless paper, which may reasonably be supposed to be lost, or whether it be an important document which the party might have an interest in keeping, and for the non-production of which no satisfactory reason is assigned. This is the case of a policy of insurance, by which a company undertook to indemnify the plaintiff against losses by fire. A fire took place, and a loss was

paid. That having taken place, the original policy became mere waste paper. There was no reason to suppose that the policy could, at any future time, be called for, to answer any reasonable purpose whatever. . . . This being a case, therefore, where the loss or destruction of the paper may almost be presumed, very slight evidence of its loss or destruction is sufficient."

"The clerk of the plaintiff's attorney then went to the plaintiff's house, where the plaintiff himself showed him all his drawers and places where a person might reasonably be supposed to keep his papers; the clerk examines them all, searches a pile of papers, opens the iron chest, and, in short, he looks not only in every place which the plaintiff pointed out, but in every place which he thought, on his view of the premises, was likely to contain a paper of this description. Upon such evidence, applied to such a paper, it does appear to me to be reasonable to presume that it was lost, and that the legal presumption is, that it was absolutely lost."

BAYLEY, J. "There is a great distinction between useful and useless papers. The presumption of law is that a man will keep all those papers which are valuable to himself, and which may, with any degree of probability, be of any future use to him. The presumption on the contrary is that a man will not keep those papers which have entirely discharged their duty, and which are never likely to be required for any purpose whatever. Under the circumstances of this case, and considering the lapse of time which has occurred, I should have thought that much less evidence would have been sufficient to entitle the party to give the secondary evidence."

HOLROYD, J. "It appears that the document had for some time become wholly useless. The contents of the paper, at least as far as particular terms of the policy were concerned, were perfectly immaterial. . . . Now the reason why the law requires the original instrument to be produced is this, that other evidence is not so satisfactory, where the original document is in the possession of the party, and where it is in his power to produce it or to get it produced, provided he gives notice. In either of these cases, if

he does not produce it, or take the necessary steps to obtain its production, but resorts to other evidence, the fair presumption is, that the original document would not answer his purpose, and that it would differ from the secondary evidence which he gives with respect to the instrument itself. . . . It seems to me, therefore, that this being a useless instrument, where the particular terms of the instrument are immaterial, the party cannot be presumed to have any improper purpose in resorting to secondary evidence. Then, as to the search for the paper, I think, for the reasons stated by the Court, that sufficient was done to entitle the party to give secondary evidence."

BEST, J. "It is very difficult to lay down any general rule as to the degree of diligence necessary to be used in searching for an original document, to entitle the party to give secondary evidence of its contents. That must depend, in a great measure, upon the circumstances of each particular case. If a paper be of considerable value, or if there be reason to suspect that the party not producing it has a strong interest which would induce him to withhold it, a very strict examination would properly be required; but if a paper be utterly useless, and the party could not have any interest in keeping it back, a much less strict search would be necessary to let in parol evidence of its contents. It seems to me, however, in this case, that sufficient diligence was used."

Note.—Even if the document had been destroyed by the party tendering the secondary evidence under very suspicious circumstances, it would appear that the secondary evidence would be admissible, subject of course to strong criticism and discredit.

The case of *Sugden v. St. Leonards*, ante, p. 185, might properly be placed under the present heading.

MORTIMER v. M'CALLAN (1840).

4 JUR. 172; 6 M. & W. 58.

Secondary evidence of a document is admissible, where the original cannot be brought to Court; either because it is physically impossible to bring the

original, as in the case of writings on walls, tombstones and the like; or because the law does not allow, or require, the original to be brought to the Court, on grounds of public convenience, as in the case of public registers, and other "Public Documents," including the books of the Bank of England.

In order to prove acceptance of certain stock by the defendant, evidence was adduced that a person unknown to the clerk in the Bank of England came there with one Taylor, and made an entry of his acceptance of the stock, and a witness was then called, who proved that he had inspected the Bank books, and that the signature to the acceptance of the stock was in the defendant's handwriting. It was held that this evidence was admissible to prove the acceptance of the stock by the defendant, and that it was not necessary that the Bank books themselves should be produced—on the ground of public convenience.

LORD ABINGER, C.B. "It has been established by a series of decisions, the first of them I think by Lord Mansfield, that the books of the Bank of England being of great concernment to the whole of the national creditors, the removal of them would be so inconvenient, that copies of them might be received in evidence. It was founded upon the principle, that the public inconvenience, from the removal of documents of that sort, would justify the introduction of secondary evidence. That principle has been adopted in a variety of cases, and has never been questioned since. I know there have been attempts to apply it in cases where it was not applicable: the first was the case of *Rex v. Lord George Gordon*, where copies of the journals of the House of Commons were offered to be given in evidence, and supported on the ground of the above decision by Lord Mansfield as to the books of the Bank of England; but they were rejected by him on the trial, on the ground that no such inconvenience would attend the removal of the journals of the House of Commons, as any wishing to remove them could get the sanction of the Speaker to do so. . . . The next case that arose was with respect to the books of the Customs and Excise. It was formerly the practice to produce them, but after some consideration it was

thought that the public inconvenience was so great, that it has become every day's practice, in this and the other Courts, to allow copies of those books to be received in evidence. That goes upon the general principle of not removing books of general concernment."

"Then does not that principle apply in all such cases? The public inconvenience in this case is as great as in the case of any other books. I think a case has been aptly put by my brother Alderson, that if a writing were on a wall, might you not give evidence of the character of the handwriting, as probable evidence of who wrote it, without producing the wall in Court? Suppose a man, instead of printing a libel in the usual way, were to write it on the dead walls of the metropolis, is it to be said that he cannot be punished, because you cannot produce the wall in Court? May you not, in such a case, prove his handwriting?"

"I think it was competent evidence, for the purpose of proving the identity of the party who accepted this stock, to show that an entry in the books of the Bank of England was the handwriting of that party. The principle of law is, that where you cannot get the best possible evidence, you must take the next best; and where the law was laid down that you cannot remove the document in which the writing is made, you are to be entitled to the next best evidence of it, by proving whose writing it is."

ALDERSON, B. "The Bank books are not capable of being produced without so much public inconvenience, that the Courts have directed them to remain in the Bank, and copies of them to be received in evidence for the purpose for which the books are receivable. Then, if they are not removable on the ground of public inconvenience, that is upon the same footing in point of principle as in the case of that which is not removable by the physical nature of the thing itself. Inscriptions upon tombstones or on a wall are proved every day in this way for that reason. The necessity of the case in the one instance, and in the other case the general public inconvenience which would follow from the books being removed, supplies the reason of the rule."

Note.—The two special rules respecting "public documents" have been stated *ante*, p. 196, where the former of such rules has been shortly

explained. The latter rule, as to proof by secondary evidence, is here in question.

The reason for not requiring production of original public documents, and the consequent admission of secondary evidence—the inconvenience to the public—is obvious, and is emphasised in the above case.

A multitude of statutory provisions have been made for the proof of public documents of various kinds. These cannot be referred to here in detail, but an excellent summary of such provisions, in a tabular form, has been drawn up by Mr. *Wills* in his book on Evidence (Appendix A), which has been copied in *Stephen* (Appendix). The matter is also dealt with at length in *Taylor*, Pt. V, Ch. IV; *Phipson*, Ch. XLIII; and *Powell*, Book II, Ch. VI. Reference should be made to the above works for the rules in any special case.

Shortly, there are three chief methods of proof of public documents, namely by—

(1) Examined copies. Copies proved by oral evidence to have been examined with, and to correspond with, the originals. The witness may either have examined the original himself with the copy, or have examined the copy while another person, not called as a witness, read from the original. All public documents may be proved in this manner, but certified or office copies are generally used when available.

(2) Certified copies. Copies signed and certified as correct by officials having custody of the originals. They are allowed as evidence by various statutes, and are used chiefly to prove entries in registers, proceedings of corporations and companies, bye-laws and the like.

(3) Office copies. Copies made by officials having custody of judicial documents, and sealed with the seal of the Court. They are the usual means of proving judicial documents, such as judgments, orders, affidavits and the like.

(See as to proof of copies, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 14, *post*, p. 320.)

It will be observed that, in the above case, the books of the Bank of England were treated as public documents, as “being of great concernment to the whole of the national creditors.” But the books of other banks were not so treated as public. The Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1879, contains very important provisions with regard to banks generally (see *post*, p. 332).

DOE v. ROSS (1840).

10 L. J. Ex. 201; 4 JUR. 321; 7 M. & W. 102;
8 D. P. C. 389.

There are no degrees of secondary evidence. When a party is at liberty to adduce secondary evidence, he may adduce any description of the same he pleases.

Thus, although he has a copy of a document, he may give verbal evidence of it; subject of course to observation when more satisfactory evidence is thus withheld.

LORD ABINGER, C.B. "Upon examination of the cases, and upon principle, we think there are no degrees of secondary evidence. The rule is, that if you cannot produce the original, you may give parol evidence of its contents. If indeed the party giving such parol evidence appears to have better secondary evidence in his power, which he does not produce, that is a fact to go to the jury, from which they might sometimes presume that the evidence kept back would be adverse to the party withholding it. But the law makes no distinction between one class of secondary evidence and another."

PARKE, B. "There can be no doubt that an attested copy is more satisfactory, and therefore, in that sense, better evidence than mere parol testimony; but whether it excludes parol testimony is a very different thing. The law does not permit a man to give evidence which from its very nature shows that there is better evidence within his reach, which he does not produce. And, therefore, parol evidence of the contents of a deed, or other written instrument, cannot be given, without producing or accounting for the instrument itself. But as soon as you have accounted for the original document, you may then give secondary evidence of its contents. When parol evidence is then tendered, it does not appear from the nature of such evidence that there is any attested copy, or better species of secondary evidence behind. We know of nothing but of the deed which is accounted for, and therefore the parol evidence is in itself unobjectionable. Does it then become inadmissible, if it be shown from other sources that a more satisfactory species of secondary evidence exists? I think it does not; and I have always understood the rule to be, that when a party is entitled to give secondary evidence at all, he may give any species of secondary evidence within his power."

ALDERSON, B. "The objection must arise from the nature of the evidence itself. If you produce a copy, which shows that there was an original, or if you give parol evidence of the contents of a deed, the evidence itself discloses the existence of the deed. But

reverse the case,—the existence of an original does not show the existence of any copy; nor does parol evidence of the contents of a deed show the existence of anything except the deed itself. If one species of secondary evidence is to exclude another, a party tendering parol evidence of a deed must account for all the secondary evidence that has existed. He may know of nothing but the original, and the other side, at the trial, may defeat him by showing a copy, the existence of which he had no means of ascertaining. Fifty copies may be in existence unknown to him, and he would be bound to account for them all.”

Note.—Mr. Phipson states two exceptions to the rule that there are no degrees of secondary evidence, viz.—

(1) Public documents are only provable by oral evidence when originals are lost and copies are not obtainable.

(2) Depositions are only provable by parol testimony or copies when originals are lost, destroyed, in possession of opposite party who refuses to produce, or do not comply with the statute (*Phipson*, 502).

(If depositions are considered secondary evidence, this would appear to be so, except when they do not comply with the statute, when they would not be proper depositions at all. See *ante*, p. 251.)

PROOF OF DOCUMENTS.

It is not sufficient merely to produce a document. It must generally be proved to have been signed, sealed, or otherwise executed by the person whose document it purports to be, unless its due execution is admitted. But the matter is simplified by certain presumptions as to sealing, date, etc., as will appear in the cases following. The result of the first case given and the statute referred to in the note thereto appears to be that

Handwriting may be proved in the following ways:—

(1) By the evidence of a witness who saw the document in question signed, who may be either

(a) The person who signed, or

(b) An attesting witness, or

(c) Any person present.

(2) By the evidence of a witness who did not see the document in question signed, but who gives his opinion as

to the signature, based on his acquaintance with the handwriting, obtained by either

- (a) Having seen the person in question write on other occasions, or
- (b) Having received documents purporting to be written by him, or
- (c) Having dealt with such documents in the ordinary course of business.

(3) By the evidence of a witness who neither saw the document in question signed, nor offers his opinion as to the signature, but who swears to another signature of the person in question, upon which comparison of the two signatures is made by

- (a) Witnesses acquainted with the handwriting, or
 - (b) Expert witnesses, or
 - (c) The Court.
- (4) By admissions of the party against whom the document is offered in evidence.

DOE v. SUCKERMORE

(1837).

7 L. J. Q. B. 33 ; 5 A. & E. 703 ; 2 N. & P. 16 ;
W. W. & D. 405 ; 44 R. R. 533.

Handwriting may be proved not only by the person who saw the particular document signed, but also by any person acquainted in any manner with the handwriting of the person said to have signed the document in question, e.g., by (a) having seen him write at any time, (b) having received documents purporting to be in his handwriting, or (c) having observed

in the ordinary course of business documents purporting to be in his handwriting.

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

COLERIDGE, J. "The rule as to the proof of handwriting, where the witness has not seen the party write the document in question, may be stated generally thus:—either the witness has seen the party write on some other occasion, or he has corresponded with him, and transactions have taken place between them, upon the faith that letters purporting to have been written or signed by him have been so written or signed. On either supposition, the witness is supposed to have received into his mind an impression, not so much of the manner in which the writer has formed the letters in the particular instances, as of the general character of his handwriting; and he is called on to speak as to the writing in question, by a reference to the standard so formed in his mind. It is obvious that the weight of this evidence may vary in every conceivable degree; but the principle appears to be sound."

WILLIAMS, J. "That proof of handwriting is to be submitted to the consideration of the jury, like every other species of proof, I apprehend to be clear. From the highest degree of certainty, carrying with it perfect assurance and conviction, to the lowest degree of probability upon which it is found to be unsafe to act, it may be, and constantly is, so submitted. From continued and habitual inspection, or correspondence, or both, carried on till the trial itself, down to a single instance, or knowledge twenty years old, evidence may be received."

"I am aware of no rule attempting to prescribe the quantity of knowledge which is requisite to enable a witness to speak to his belief; what degree of freshness and recency in the correspondence to admit, or what antiquity to exclude, may (as the reason of the thing would induce one to expect) in vain be looked for."

PATTESON, J. "All evidence of handwriting, except where the witness sees the document written, is in its nature *comparison*. It is the belief which a witness entertains upon comparing the

writing in question with an exemplar in his mind derived from some previous knowledge. That knowledge may have been acquired, either by seeing the party write, in which case it will be stronger or weaker according to the number of times and the periods, and other circumstances under which the witness has seen the party write; but it will be sufficient knowledge to admit the evidence of the witness (however little weight may be attached to it in such cases), even if he has seen him write but once, and then merely signing his surname; or the knowledge may have been acquired by the witness having seen letters or other documents professing to be the handwriting of the party, and having afterwards communicated personally with the party upon the contents of those letters or documents, or having otherwise acted upon them by written answers, producing further correspondence, or acquiescence by the party in some matter to which they relate, or by the witness transacting with the party some business to which they relate, or by any other mode of communication between the party and the witness, which, in the ordinary course of the transactions of life, induces a reasonable presumption that the letters or documents were the handwriting of the party."

LORD DENMAN, C.J. "He did not see him sign it; nor has he ever seen him write: but this is professedly immaterial, if he has had other adequate means of obtaining a knowledge of his hand. . . . The clerk who constantly read the letters, the broker who was ever consulted upon them, is as competent to judge whether another signature is that of the writer of the letters, as the merchant to whom they were addressed. The servant who has habitually carried letters addressed by me to others has an opportunity of obtaining a knowledge of my writing though he never saw me write, or received a letter from me."

Note.—"Strictly speaking, the only evidence of handwriting which is entitled to be called direct is the evidence of a witness who proves that he himself wrote or signed the document in question, or that of a witness who proves that he saw the document written or signed. All other evidence of handwriting must rest in greater or less degree upon inferences drawn from the appearance of the writing in question or other circumstances" (*Wills on Circumstantial Evidence*, p. 184).

It should be noted that by Statute there is another way of proving handwriting. The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, enacted: "Comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction

of the Judge to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by witnesses; and such writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the Court and jury as evidence of the genuineness, or otherwise, of the writing in dispute." This is re-enacted and applied to both civil and criminal cases by the Criminal Procedure Act, 1865 (see *post*, p. 326).

An instructive case on this matter is *R. v. Silverlock*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 766, in which a solicitor, who had given considerable study and attention to the question of handwriting, was held a sufficiently skilled witness to give evidence as to comparison of handwriting. Such witness need not be a professional "expert."

Re SANDILANDS

(1871).

L. R. 6 C. P. 411.

There is a presumption that a signed document, purporting to be a deed, and attested as such, was duly sealed and delivered by the person who signed it, although no trace of a seal appears.

Thus, a signed document, attested by witnesses and certified by Commissioners as a deed, was held sufficiently executed.

BOVILL, C.J. "To constitute a sealing, neither wax, nor wafer, nor a piece of paper, nor even an impression, is necessary. Here is something attached to this deed which may have been intended for a seal, but which from its nature is incapable of retaining an impression. Coupled with the attestation and the certificate, I think we are justified in granting the application that the deed and other documents may be received and filed by the proper officer, pursuant to the Statute."

BYLES, J. "The sealing of a deed need not be by means of a seal; it may be done with the end of a ruler or anything else. Nor is it necessary that wax should be used. The attestation clause says that the deed was signed, sealed, and delivered by the several parties; and the certificate of the two special commissioners says that the deed was produced before them, and that the married women 'acknowledged the same to be their respective acts and

deeds.' I think there was *primâ facie* evidence that the deed was sealed."

MONTAGUE SMITH, J. "Something was done with the intention of sealing the deed in question. I concur in granting this application, on the ground that the attestation is *primâ facie* evidence that the deed was sealed."

Note.—Although it is clear that a deed must be sealed, there is some doubt as to whether it must also be signed. The better opinion seems to be that it need not be signed. But the advantage of signature is obvious, as identifying the seal.

ABBOT v. PLUMBE

(1779).

1 DOUGLAS, 216.

When a document is (required by law to be) attested, one of the attesting witnesses must be called in order to prove it, if he be alive and capable of giving evidence. This is so even if the person by whom the document was executed has admitted its execution by himself.

An action being brought by the assignees of a bankrupt, it became material to prove a debt due from the bankrupt under a bond executed by him and attested by an attorney living in Somersetshire (the proceedings being in London). The bond was produced, and a witness swore that the bankrupt had admitted its execution to him. It was held that this was not sufficient, and that the attesting witness must be called.

LORD MANSFIELD, C.J. "It is a technical rule that the subscribing witness must be produced, and it cannot be dispensed with unless it appear that his attendance could not be procured."

ASHHURST, J. "If the evidence of the subscribing witness were to be dispensed with by this confession of the bankrupt, the defendant would be deprived of the benefit of cross-examining him concerning the time of the execution of the bond, which might be material."

BULLER, J. "It is necessary, to recover on a bond, to call the

subscribing witness, unless some reason can be shown for his absence."

Note.—The above case must now be considered as applicable to those cases only in which attestation of a document is legally required, for the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, provided: "It shall not be necessary to prove by the attesting witness any instrument to the validity of which attestation is not requisite, and such instrument may be proved by admission or otherwise, as if there had been no attesting witness thereto." This is now repealed, but is re-enacted, for both civil and criminal cases, by the Criminal Procedure Act, 1865 (see *post*, p. 326).

As a rule, a document does not require "attestation," or the formal signing of the same by witnesses present at its execution. This is so even in the case of deeds, conveyances, leases, mortgages, etc. But attestation is sometimes required by statute in the case of specific documents, the most noticeable being wills and bills of sale.

ANDERSON v. WESTON

(1840).

6 BINGHAM, N. C. 296.

There is a presumption that a document was made on the date which it bears.

A document thirty years old, i.e., a document dated thirty years back, proves itself, if produced from "proper custody," as an "ancient document."

The facts are immaterial to the point of evidence involved.

BOSANQUET, J. "The question is, what is the general rule of law on the subject, where an instrument is proved to be in the handwriting of a party, and to bear a certain date; whether that is evidence as to the time of making the instrument;—that it is not conclusive evidence is perfectly clear;—the question is, whether it is not *prima facie* evidence."

"Now when a deed is produced, and the execution of that deed is proved by the subscribing witness, or by accounting for the absence of the subscribing witness by death or otherwise, and proving the signature, and that deed bears a date, as far as my experience goes,

that date has uniformly been taken to be *primâ facie* evidence that the deed was executed at the time when it purports to bear date. It is the practice in cross-examination to inquire whether the deed was executed when it bears date, but I certainly never heard it contended that it was part of the proof of the person producing the instrument, not only to give evidence of the execution of the instrument, but in the first instance, and before any evidence is offered to render doubtful the time of making the instrument, that it was executed at the time it bears date."

"This is the case not merely with respect to instruments binding on the person of the party in the cause, but also with respect to his title where a deed of conveyance comes from third parties."

"But there is another case which may be put on the subject, which is a very strong one in proof of this being the general rule : that is this. It is a general rule that an instrument thirty years old proves itself, provided it be produced from the proper custody : if an instrument be produced from a custody where deeds of that description ought to be, then, if the instrument be thirty years old, there is no necessity for further proof."

"What is the meaning of its being thirty years old ? Parties are not called upon to prove that the deed has been in existence for thirty years ; if it bears date thirty years before the time of its production, the course is, unless it be impeached, to receive that as proof of the instrument."

MEATH v. WINCHESTER

(1836).

3 BINGHAM, N. C. 183.

The rule that "ancient documents," or those thirty years old, "prove themselves," or, in other words, are presumed to have been duly executed, applies only to those coming from "proper custody"; that is, not necessarily from the strictly legal or most proper custody, but from any custody consistent with their

genuineness and legitimate origin, in which they might reasonably be expected to be found, if they are what they purport to be.

Thus, documents which had belonged to a deceased bishop by virtue of his office, and which were found among his private papers in possession of his family, were held to be produced from proper custody, although the most proper custody of the same would have been in the hands of his successor, the present bishop.

TINDAL, C.J. "These documents were found in a place in which, and under the care of persons with whom, papers of Bishop Dopping might naturally and reasonably be expected to be found; and that is precisely the custody which gives authenticity to documents found within it; for it is not necessary that they should be found in the best and most proper place of deposit. If documents continue in such custody there never would be any question as to their authenticity; but it is when documents are found in other than the proper place of deposit that the investigation commences, whether it was reasonable and natural under the circumstances in the particular case, to expect that they should have been in the place where they are actually found; for it is obvious that whilst there can be only one place of deposit strictly and absolutely proper, there may be various and many that are reasonable and probable, though differing in degree; some being more so, some less; and in those cases the proposition to be determined is, whether the actual custody is so reasonably and probably to be accounted for that it impresses the mind with the conviction that the instrument found in such custody must be genuine."

Note.—It has been held that in the following cases documents have been produced from proper custody—expired leases produced by either lessor or lessee, a will produced by a tenant for life claiming under it, a settlement produced by an equitable tenant for life claiming under it, and family bibles produced by members of the family.

PEARCE v. HOOPER

(1810).

3 TAUNTON, 60.

Although a document must generally be proved by evidence of its due execution, this is not so where the document is produced by an opponent who himself claims some interest under it.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for trespass to land. The defendant gave notice to the plaintiff to produce, at the trial, the deeds under which he held the land. The plaintiff produced these, but he contended that the defendant must prove their due execution. The defendant contended that, since the deeds came from the hands of the plaintiff, under a notice to produce, and contained his title to the land, if he had any, further proof was unnecessary. It was held that the defendant need not prove execution.

SIR J. MANSFIELD, C.J. "The mere possession of an instrument does not dispense with the necessity which lies on the party calling for it, of producing the attesting witness. . . . Supposing that an heir-at-law is in possession of a will, and the devisee brings an ejectment, and calls on the heir to produce the will; there the heir claims, not under the will, but against the will, and it would be very hard that the will should be taken to be proved against him, because he produces it; but that is very different from the case where a man is called on to produce the deed under which he holds an estate. The defendant has no interest in the fee-simple of the estate, if this deed does not convey it; consequently, if he produces the deed under which he claims, shall it not be taken to be a good deed so far as relates to the execution, as against himself?"

DOE v. CATOMORE

(1851).

20 L. J. Q. B. 364; 16 Q. B. 745; 83 R. R. 714.

An alteration, in a deed, is presumed to have been made before execution; in a will, after execution.

The facts sufficiently appear in the judgment.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J. "In this case the deed on which the plaintiff's title depended, when produced, appeared to have an interlineation and erasure in parts not material. Objection was made that the deed was void unless the plaintiff gave evidence to show when the alterations were made. The learned Judge left it to the jury to say whether the alterations were made before the execution of the deed; and it was found that they were."

"In moving for a new trial it was contended that this question ought not to have been left to the jury without some evidence besides the deed itself. In Co. Lit. 225 b. it is said that 'of ancient time if the deed appeared to be raised or interlined in places material, the Judges adjudged upon their view the deed to be void. But the latter time the Judges have left that to the jurors to try whether the rasing or interlining were before the delivery.' In a note, (1) [136], upon this passage in Hargrave and Butler's edition of 'Coke upon Littleton,' it is laid down: "'Tis to be presumed, that an interlining, if the contrary is not proved, was made at the time of making the deed.' This doctrine seems to us to rest upon principle. A deed cannot be altered, after it is executed, without fraud or wrong. A testator may alter his will without fraud or wrong after it has been executed; and there is no ground for any presumption that the alteration was made before the will was executed."

"We therefore think that the defendant has no right to complain of the course pursued by the learned Judge at the trial."

Note.—The Wills Act, 1837, sect. 21, provides that no alteration in a will shall have any effect unless executed as a will.

PAROL EVIDENCE RESPECTING DOCUMENTS.

It has been remarked by an eminent writer on the subject that "the admissibility of extrinsic parol testimony to affect written instruments is, perhaps, the most difficult branch of the law of evidence" (*Taylor on Evidence*, II, 807).

The general rule can, indeed, be laid down in clear and definite terms—parol evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, or contradict a written transaction—but the application of the rule is beset with difficulties. The rule is ancient. Lord Bacon said—"The law will not couple and mingle matter of specialty, which is of the higher account, with matter of averment, which is of inferior account in law" (*Bacon's Maxims*, Reg. 23). And in *Coke's Reports* we read—"It would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory" (*Countess of Rutland's Case*, 5 Coke, 25b).

It is frequently said that there are several exceptions to the rule; but it is submitted that there is no real exception at all; no case in which parol evidence is admissible either to add to, vary, or contradict a written transaction.

The cases given below show that parol evidence can be used for the several purposes indicated, but, it can scarcely be said that there is in such cases either addition to, or variation or contradiction of, a written transaction.

Parol evidence may be given to prove or explain:—

(1) The terms of any verbal transaction, although a writing exists concerning it, if such writing be not the transaction itself, but a mere note, memorandum, receipt or the like.

(2) Fraud, mistake, illegality, incapacity, failure of consideration, or other matter showing that the writing is not the valid transaction it purports to be.

(3) Any collateral verbal agreement on the same subject matter, consistent with the written transaction.

(4) Any collateral verbal agreement suspending the operation of the written transaction, or being a condition precedent thereto, so that the writing is not a presently operative transaction.

(5) Any subsequent verbal agreement rescinding or modifying the written transaction, so that the writing has ceased to be operative.

(6) Any local or trade custom applicable to such written transaction, and not excluded thereby.

(7) The subject matter or persons to which the written transaction applies; explaining latent, and (apparently) even patent ambiguities.

(8) The meaning of words having a special or unusual meaning, or, generally, the translation of a written transaction.

Cases are here given on each of these points.

MERES v. ANSELL

(1771).

3 WILSON, 275.

Parol evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, or contradict a written agreement or other written transaction.

An agreement in writing had been made between the parties for the exchange of certain land, etc., no mention being made therein as to a certain piece of land in dispute. The defendant called evidence to show that it was at the same time verbally agreed that such other land was to be included in the agreement. On such

evidence a verdict was found for the defendant. The Court granted a new trial on the ground that such evidence was inadmissible.

PER CURIAM. "We are all clearly of opinion that the verdict is wrong, and must be set aside ; that no *parol* evidence is admissible to disannul and substantially to vary a written agreement ; the *parol* evidence in the present case totally annuls and substantially alters and impugns the written agreement. Indeed in some cases of wills and deeds, where there are two *Johns* named or two *Blackacres* mentioned, *parol* evidence may be admitted to explain which *John* or which *Blackacre* was meant and intended by the will or deed. The rules of evidence are universally the same in Courts of law and Courts of equity. Suppose a bill in equity was to be brought by the defendant to have a specific performance of this agreement, the Court would not admit *parol* evidence."

"You cannot depart from the writing, but may argue touching the operation thereof. If a man agrees in writing to sell *Blackacre* for 1,000*l.*, shall *parol* evidence be admitted that he intended *Whiteacre* should also pass ? Certainly it shall not."

Note.—There may be a substantial difficulty in deciding the preliminary question—is the "transaction" itself in writing ? The rule applies only in such event, as the next case shows. Unless the law requires the transaction to be in writing, the formality of a writing would generally settle the question. But informal writings lead to doubt. They may be loosely drawn transactions, or mere notes, memoranda, receipts, etc.

ALLEN v. PINK

(1838).

4 M. & W. 140 ; 1 H. & H. 207.

Parol evidence of a verbal transaction is not excluded by the fact that a writing was made concerning it, unless such writing was in fact the transaction itself, and not merely a note or memorandum of it, or portion of it.

The plaintiff bought of the defendant a horse, and received from him the following memorandum :—"Bought of G. Pink a horse for

the sum of 7*l.* 2*s.* 6*d.* G. Pink." The horse having proved vicious, the plaintiff sued for the return of the price, and gave evidence of a verbal warranty of the horse. It was held that such evidence was admissible, as the agreement itself had not been reduced into writing, the memorandum only referring to a portion of it.

LORD ABINGER, C.B. "The general principle is quite true, that if there has been a parol agreement, which is afterwards reduced by the parties into writing, that writing alone must be looked to to ascertain the terms of the contract; but the principle does not apply here; there was no evidence of any agreement by the plaintiff that the whole contract should be reduced into writing by the defendant; the contract is first concluded by parol, and afterwards the paper is drawn up, which appears to have been meant merely as a memorandum of the transaction, or an informal receipt for the money, not as containing the terms of the contract itself."

Note.—It is clear that the mere existence of a writing concerning a verbal transaction cannot exclude proof by parol evidence. Otherwise, one party might exclude evidence of items of the transaction not to his liking by writing a letter, or giving some memorandum, to the other party, containing merely the items favourable to himself.

DOBELL v. STEVENS

(1825).

3 L. J. K. B. 89; 3 B. & C. 623; 5 D. & R. 490;
27 R. R. 441.

Parol evidence is admissible to show that a written document is not really the valid transaction which it purports to be. Such evidence may therefore be given to prove fraud, mistake, illegality, incapacity, failure of consideration, or other matter affecting the validity of the document.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages for fraudulently misrepresenting the takings of a public house sold to the plaintiff by the defendant. A written contract for the sale and an assignment of the lease of the premises were afterwards executed ; but neither of such documents mentioned the alleged verbal representation. Parol evidence of such representation was allowed to go to the jury, who found a verdict thereon for the plaintiff. On a motion for a new trial, the defendant urged that such parol evidence was inadmissible, as "the contract having been reduced into writing the parties must be bound by that, and cannot add to it by evidence of previous conversations." It was held that the evidence was rightly admitted.

ABBOTT, C.J. "Whether any fraud or deceit had or had not been practised in this case was peculiarly a question for the jury ; nor has any complaint been made against the mode in which that question was presented to their consideration. If, then, this motion be sustainable at all, it must be sustainable on the ground that evidence of a fraudulent or deceitful representation could not be received, inasmuch as it was not noticed in the written agreement, or in the conveyance which was afterwards executed by the parties. The case of *Lysney v. Selby* (2 Ld. Raym. 1118) is to the contrary of that position, and precisely analogous to the present case. That was an action against the defendant for falsely and fraudulently representing to the plaintiff that certain houses of his (defendant) were then demised at the yearly rent of 68*l.*, to which plaintiff giving credit, bought the houses for a large sum of money, to wit, etc., and an assignment was afterwards executed to him ; whereas, in truth and in fact, the houses were at that time demised at the yearly rent of 52*l.* 10*s.*, and no more. After verdict for the plaintiff a motion was made in arrest of judgment, on the ground that it did not appear that the assertion was made at the time of the sale. LORD HOLT says, 'If the vendor gives in a particular of the rents, and the vendee says he will trust him, and inquire no further, but rely upon his particular, then if the particular be false an action will lie.' Here the plaintiff did rely on the assertion of the defendant, and that was his inducement to make the purchase. The representation was not of any matter or quality pertaining to the thing sold, and

therefore likely to be mentioned in the conveyance, but was altogether collateral to it; as was the rent in the case of *Lysney v. Sleby*. That case appears to me to be exactly in point, and the jury having found that that which was untruly represented was fraudulently and deceitfully represented, I think that we ought not to grant a rule for a new trial."

Note.—The principle of this case may be taken as applicable to any matter affecting the validity of the document or transaction. So, with regard to mistake, it was said by Lord Hardwicke, as long back as 1749—"No doubt, but this Court has jurisdiction to relieve in respect of a plain mistake in contracts in writing as well as against fraud in contracts; so that if reduced into writing contrary to intent of the parties, on proper proof that would be rectified" (*Henkle v. Royal Ex. Ass. Co.*, 1 Ves. 317). And the matter was stated in wider terms by Baron Bramwell—"When the parties have recorded their contract in writing, the rule, that they are not at liberty to alter or vary it, comes into effect. That which they put down is final as to what they mean; it is the binding record of the agreement. But they are always at liberty to show whether it is the binding record of the agreement. Suppose that the signature were made in the course of a dramatic representation, or suppose a printed form of agreement were used, and the witness, by mistake, signed his name in the space meant for the principal, and *vice versa*, would not the parties be at liberty to show the real state of the case?" (*Wake v. Harrop*, 7 Jur. 710).

MORGAN v. GRIFFITH

(1871).

L. R. 6 Ex. 70; 40 L. J. Ex. 46; 23 L. T. 783;

16 W. R. 956.

Parol evidence is admissible to prove any collateral verbal agreement as to any matter on which the document is silent, and which is separate from it and not inconsistent with its terms.

The plaintiff took a lease of land from the defendant, reserving to the latter the sporting rights. Evidence was admitted of a collateral verbal agreement by which the defendant promised to destroy the

rabbits if the plaintiff would sign the lease, although the lease was silent on the point.

KELLY, C.B. "I think the verbal agreement was entirely collateral to the lease, and was founded on a good consideration. The plaintiff, unless the promise to destroy the rabbits had been given, would not have signed the lease, and a Court of equity would not have compelled him to do so, or only on the terms of the defendant performing his undertaking."

PIGOTT, B. "The verbal agreement in this case, although it does affect the mode of enjoyment of the land demised, is, I think, purely collateral to the lease. It was on the basis of its being performed that the lease was signed by the plaintiff, and it does not appear to me to contain any terms which conflict with the written document."

Note.—There is no rule that there shall only be one agreement upon any matter. There may be two (or more), as in the above case, if they can consistently stand together: and one may be written and the other oral. If proceedings are taken on the written agreement, evidence may be given of the oral agreement. This is not "adding to" the written agreement, although it may, at first sight, look like it.

Another useful case is *De Lassalle v. Guildford*, [1901] 2 K. B. 215, in which a lease was executed by the plaintiff upon the defendant giving a verbal warranty that the drains were in good order, the lease itself containing no reference to drains. It was held that such verbal warranty was collateral to the lease and admissible in evidence.

It will be observed that in both these cases the subject matter of the verbal undertaking was temporary and immediate; a matter which did not require to be dealt with amongst those permanent or continuous matters which are the subject of the covenants in the lease. Such covenants generally deal with matters to be periodically attended to during the tenancy, and it would, doubtless, be far more difficult to induce the Court to admit verbal evidence of agreements concerning such matters, as it would be by no means natural to leave them to a collateral verbal arrangement when there is a formal written transaction between the parties. On the other hand, it is most natural to omit from a lease an arrangement as to the immediate destruction of rabbits, or the condition of drains at the commencement of the tenancy.

ANGELL v. DUKE

(1875).

32 L. T. 320 ; 23 W. R. 548.

In order that parol evidence may be admissible to prove a collateral agreement, it must not conflict with, or be inconsistent with, the written document; the evidence must not amount in effect to adding additional terms to the writing.

The defendant let to the plaintiff, by written agreement, a house and the furniture therein. The plaintiff offered evidence of a verbal agreement made at the same time to the effect that the defendant would do certain repairs to the premises and send in additional furniture. It was held that such evidence was inadmissible, it being inconsistent with the written agreement.

COCKBURN, C.J. "To allow the plaintiff to recover in this action would be to allow a parol agreement to conflict with a written agreement afterwards entered into. I agree with the cases which have been cited to this extent, that there may be instances of collateral parol agreements which would be admissible, but this is not the case here: something passes between the parties during the course of the negotiations, but afterwards the plaintiff enters into a written agreement to take the house and the furniture in the house, which is specified. Having once executed that, without making the terms of the alleged parol agreement a part of it, he cannot afterwards set up the parol agreement."

MELLOR, J. "There is one contract; the house is the same, the rent the same, and the general terms the same. During the negotiations it appears to have been suggested that some more furniture should be put in, but afterwards a written contract is made affecting the house, affecting the furniture, and affecting the rent, and to this agreement the plaintiff is attempting to add an additional term."

BLACKBURN, J. "It is a most important rule that where there is a contract in writing it should not be added to if the written

contract is intended to be the record of all the terms agreed upon between the parties ; where there is a collateral contract the written contract does not contain the whole of the terms."

"Here the lease expresses the whole of the terms ; the defendant agrees to let, and the plaintiff to take, the house and furniture at a certain rent ; there is said to have been an arrangement made beforehand during the negotiation, that the defendant should let the plaintiff have more furniture for the same rent ; how is this collateral ? I cannot perceive that it is."

PYM v. CAMPBELL

(1856).

25 L. J. Q. B. 277 ; 27 L. T. 122 ; 4 W. R. 528 ;
20 JUR. N. S. 641 ; 6 E. & B. 370.

Parol evidence is admissible to prove any collateral verbal agreement, showing that a document, apparently complete and operative on its face, should be conditional upon, and not operate until the happening of, a certain event, which has not occurred.

The defendants agreed in writing to buy of the plaintiff a certain invention. Evidence was tendered by the defendants to the effect that they declined to purchase unless one Abernethy, an engineer, approved of the machine, and that as Abernethy was absent, and one of the defendants could not conveniently return to sign the document after seeing him, it was expressly agreed verbally that the written document was signed conditionally upon Abernethy's approval being obtained ; and that Abernethy had disapproved of the machine. It was held that such evidence was admissible to show that the written document was not operative.

ERLE, J. "There was a paper signed by the parties, and there would be a very strong presumption indeed that it contained all the terms agreed upon, and if the jury had found that it was signed *animo contrahendi*, I am clearly of opinion that no evidence to vary

it would be admissible. But the matter goes a step farther here, for the jury have found that the parties, when they signed the paper, expressly said, 'we do not agree to the terms contained in it; we are prevented by the absence of a person whose judgment we desire to have from making up our minds definitely, and therefore, although we put our names to the paper, we do so without making an agreement.' I grant that there may be danger in admitting such evidence, and that a jury ought to look very scrupulously at such a case; but if it is a true case, all that can be said about the danger of admitting parol evidence tells equally against the party seeking to set up as an agreement a document which was never intended so to operate. The distinction is, that the evidence is admitted not to vary or alter an actual written agreement, but to show that the paper was not at the time an agreement."

CROMPTON, J. "If the parties really intended this agreement to operate from its date, no doubt it could not be varied by parol. But the jury have found that no absolute agreement was ever intended to be made, and they were justified in so finding. Therefore the parties never had an agreeing mind, but signed the paper for convenience, leaving it to take effect or not according as Abernethy did or did not approve; and there is nothing to prevent their so doing."

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J. "It is well established that no alteration of a written instrument can be made by parol. But here the evidence was not admitted to vary the written instrument, but to show that no agreement had been entered into; and that evidence is found by the jury to be true. Before the paper was signed it was expressly declared by the defendants, and the plaintiff agreed, that the document was not to operate until the machine had been shown to Abernethy and he had approved of it. The paper was signed at that time merely because one of the defendants had another engagement, and could not conveniently go and see Abernethy and return and sign the paper, the plaintiff being contented with this; the signature, therefore, not being put for the purpose of binding the defendants, did not constitute an agreement. By this evidence the plea denying the making of the agreement was proved."

Note.—Another useful case is *Wallis v. Littell*, 11 C. B. N. S. 369, in

which evidence was allowed of a verbal arrangement that a written agreement for the sale of a lease should be conditional on the consent of the landlord. The Court said, "It is in analogy with the delivery of a deed as an escrow; it neither varies nor contradicts the writing, but suspends the commencement of the obligation." Thus, even a formal deed, fully executed, may be suspended in its operation by a verbal agreement, as an "escrow."

GOSS v. LORD NUGENT (1833).

2 L. J. K. B. 127; 5 B. & AD. 64; 2 N. & M. 28;
39 R. R. 392.

Parol evidence is admissible to prove any subsequent verbal agreement rescinding or modifying the terms of a written document, unless writing is requisite by law to so rescind or modify.

The plaintiff agreed to sell fourteen lots of freehold land to the defendant, by a written agreement, undertaking to make a good title to each lot; and he offered evidence of a subsequent verbal agreement discharging him from the duty of making a good title to one of the lots. It was held that such evidence would have been admissible but for the Statute of Frauds, which requires writing in the case of any agreement relating to land.

DENMAN, C.J. "By the general rules of the common law, if there be a contract which has been reduced into writing, verbal evidence is not allowed to be given of what passed between the parties, either before the written instrument was made, or during the time that it was in a state of preparation, so as to add to or subtract from, or in any manner to vary or qualify the written contract; but after the agreement has been reduced into writing, it is competent to the parties, at any time before breach of it, by a new contract not in writing, either altogether to waive, dissolve, or annul the former agreements, or in any manner to add to, or subtract from, or vary or qualify the terms of it, and thus to make a new contract; which is to be proved, partly by the

written agreement, and partly by the subsequent verbal terms engrafted upon what will be thus left of the written agreement.”

“And if the present contract was not subject to the control of any Act of Parliament, we think that it would have been competent for the parties, by word of mouth, to dispense with requiring a good title to be made to the lot in question, and that the action might be maintained.”

“But the Statute of Frauds has made certain regulations as to contracts for the sale of lands.”

“We think the object of the Statute of Frauds was to exclude all oral evidence as to contracts for the sale of lands, and that any contract which is sought to be enforced must be proved by writing only.”

Note.—The provisions of the Statute of Frauds are given, *post*, p. 311.

WIGGLESWORTH v. DALLISON (1779).

DOUGLAS, 201.

Parol evidence is admissible to prove any local custom of general application, in order that it may be applied to the subject matter and bind the parties to a written document, unless it is inconsistent with the writing.

Therefore, in the case of an agricultural lease, evidence was allowed of a custom whereby, contrary to the general law, the tenant, on leaving at the end of his term, was allowed to take away his “way-going crop, that is to say, all the corn growing upon the said lands which hath before the expiration of such term been sown by such tenant upon any part of such lands”; although the lease was in writing and no mention was therein made of such custom.

LORD MANSFIELD, C.J. “The custom is good. It is just, for he who sows ought to reap, and it is for the benefit and encouragement of agriculture. It is, indeed, against the general rule of law concerning

emblems, which are not allowed to tenants who know when their term is to cease, because it is held to be their fault or folly to have sown, when they knew their interest would expire before they could reap. But the custom of a particular place may rectify what otherwise would be imprudence or folly. The lease being by deed does not vary the case. The custom does not alter or contradict the agreement in the lease; it only superadds a right which is consequential to the taking, as a heriot may be due by custom, although not mentioned in the grant or lease."

BROWN v. BYRNE

(1854).

23 L. J. Q. B. 313; 18 JUR. 700; 2 W. R. 471;
3 E. & B. 703; 2 C. L. R. 1599.

Parol evidence is admissible to prove any trade or mercantile custom or usage, either as to the obligations of the parties in such transactions as that in question, or as to the meaning of words or terms used.

A bill of lading specified a certain amount as payable for freight. Parol evidence was offered of a custom whereby three months' credit or discount was allowed for freight. The evidence was held admissible.

COLERIDGE, J. "The principles on which this case is to be decided are perfectly clear; the difficulty lies in the application of them to the facts. **Mercantile contracts are very commonly framed in a language peculiar to merchants**; the intention of the parties, though perfectly well known to themselves, would often be defeated if this language were strictly construed according to its ordinary import in the world at large: evidence, therefore, of mercantile custom and usage is admitted in order to expound it and arrive at its true meaning. Again, in all contracts, as to the subject-matter of which known usages prevail, parties are found

to proceed with the tacit assumption of these usages; they commonly reduce into writing the special particulars of their agreement but omit to specify these known usages, which are included however, as of course, by mutual understanding: evidence therefore of such incidents is receivable. The contract in truth is partly express and in writing, partly implied or understood and unwritten. But, in these cases, a restriction is established on the soundest principle, that the evidence received must not be of a particular which is repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the written contract. Merely that it varies the apparent contract is not enough to exclude the evidence; for it is impossible to add any material incident to the written terms of a contract without altering its effect, more or less. Neither, in the construction of a contract among merchants, tradesmen, or others, will the evidence be excluded because the words are in their ordinary meaning unambiguous; for the principle of admission is, that words perfectly unambiguous in their ordinary meaning are used by the contractors in a different sense from that. What words more plain than 'a thousand,' 'a week,' 'a day'? Yet the cases are familiar in which 'a thousand' has been held to mean twelve hundred, 'a week' a week only during the theatrical season, 'a day' a working day. In such cases the evidence neither adds to, nor qualifies nor contradicts the written contract; it only ascertains it, by expounding the language. Here the contract is, to pay freight on delivery at a certain rate per pound: is it inconsistent with this to allege that, by the custom, the shipowner, on payment, is bound to allow three months' discount? We think not. . . . *Webb v. Plummer* (2 B. & Ald. 746) and *Hutton v. Warren* (1 M. & W. 466) are cases which illustrate this principle. In the first of these, by the custom of the country the outgoing tenant was bound to do certain acts, and entitled to receive certain compensation; but the lease which formed the written contract bound him to do the same acts in substance and specially provided for his payment as to some of them, omitting the others: and the Court held that the expression as to some excluded the implication as to the remainder, and that the language of the lease was equivalent to a stipulation that the lessor should pay for the things mentioned and no more. The custom therefore

would have been repugnant to the contract. But in the latter case, in which the former was expressly recognized, the Court held that a specific provision, as to a matter *dehors* the custom, left the custom untouched and in full force. This latter case appears to us like the present : the contract settles the right of freight ; whether or not discount is to be allowed on the payment, it leaves open ; and to that the custom applies."

Note.—The cases in which evidence of custom or usage is receivable have been well summarized by an eminent author, thus :—

- (1) To annex incidents to contracts and wills.
- (2) To explain the meaning of peculiar or technical terms.
- (3) To furnish standards of comparisons on questions of negligence, etc.
- (4) To fix a party with knowledge or notice of this subject-matter of the usage.

(5) To rebut a fraudulent intent.

And the methods of proof of such customs or usages are stated :—

(1) By the direct evidence of witness (which must be positive and not amount to mere opinion).

(2) By a series of particular instances in which it has been acted upon.

(3) By proof of similar customs in the same or analogous trades in other localities.

(4) When ancient, by, *e.g.*, the declarations of deceased persons of competent knowledge, or other forms of reputation.

(*Phipson on Evidence*, p. 91 ; to which reference should be made for further details.)

DOE v. NEEDS

(1836).

6 L. J. Ex. 59 ; 2 M. & W. 129 ; 46 R. R. 52.

Parol evidence is admissible to show the subject-matter to which, or the persons to whom, a written document applies or refers ; and for such purpose to explain "latent" ambiguities.

Such parol evidence may be of the surrounding circumstances, or, apparently, of statements of intention made by parties to the document.

Thus, where a devise was "to George Gord the son of Gord," and there appeared by extrinsic evidence to be two persons answering

such description, evidence was allowed of the circumstances and of the testator's statements of intention to show which of the two persons he meant.

PARKE, B. "If upon the face of the devise, it had been uncertain whether the devisor had selected a particular object of his bounty, no evidence would have been admissible to prove that he intended a gift to a certain individual : such would have been a case of *ambiguitas patens* within the meaning of Lord Bacon's rule, which ambiguity could not be holpen by averment ; for to allow such evidence would be, with respect to that subject, to cause a parol will to operate as a written one ; or, adopting the language of Lord Bacon, 'to make that pass without writing which the law appointeth shall not pass but by writing.' But here, on the face of the devise, no such doubt arises. There is no blank before the name of Gord the father, which might have occasioned a doubt whether the devisor had finally fixed on any certain person in his mind. The devisor has clearly selected a particular individual as the devisee. . . . Upon the proof of extrinsic facts, which is always allowed in order to enable the Court to place itself in the situation of the devisor, and to construe his will, it would have appeared that there were at the date of the will two persons, to each of whom the description would be equally applicable. . . . The evidence of the declarations of the testator has not the effect of varying the instrument in any way whatever : it only enables the Court to reject one of the subjects, or objects, to which the description in the will applies ; and to determine which of the two the devisor understood to be signified by the description which he used in the will. . . . He is pointed out in the devise itself by a description which, so far as it goes, is perfectly correct."

Note.—A "latent" ambiguity is one which does not appear from the words of the document itself, but is created or shown by extrinsic evidence. Obviously, similar evidence should be allowed to explain or remove it. A "patent" ambiguity is one apparent on the face of the document. It is indicated in the above judgment that parol evidence is inadmissible to explain such an ambiguity. On this question see the note to the next case. The admissibility of statements of intention, as distinguished from that of surrounding circumstances, is a very difficult

question, which cannot be here treated with the necessary detail. For a very full and clear statement of the matter the reader is referred to *Phipson on Evidence*, Ch. 46.

COLPOYS v. COLPOYS (1822).

JACOB, 451 ; 53 R. R. 42.

Parol evidence is admissible to explain even patent ambiguities, but only, it would seem, when they cannot be otherwise explained by construction of the context.

So, evidence of the amount of a testator's property was held admissible to explain the meaning of certain bequests ambiguous in themselves.

SIR T. PLUMER, M.R. "I hope it will not be supposed that I dissent from the case of *Fonnereau v. Poyntz* (1 Bro. C. C. 472) ; nor that I agree to the opinion, that parol evidence is never to be let in, except in cases where there is a latent ambiguity. The admission of extrinsic circumstances to govern the construction of a written instrument, is in all cases an exception to the general rule of law, which excludes everything dehors the instrument. It is only from necessity, and then with great jealousy and caution, that Courts, either of law or equity, will suffer this rule to be departed from. It must be the case of an ambiguity, which cannot otherwise be removed, and which may by these means be clearly and satisfactorily explained. This is always permitted in the case of a latent ambiguity, which not appearing on the face of the instrument, but arising entirely from extrinsic circumstances, may always be removed by a reference to extrinsic circumstances."

"In the case of a patent ambiguity, that is one appearing on the face of the instrument, as a general rule a reference to matter dehors the instrument is forbidden. It must, if possible,

be removed by construction, and not by averment. But in many cases this is impracticable ; where the terms used are wholly indefinite and equivocal, and carry on the face of them no certain or explicit meaning, and the instrument furnishes no materials by which the ambiguity thus arising can be removed : if in such cases the Court were to reject the only mode by which the meaning could be ascertained, viz. the resort to extrinsic circumstances, the instrument must become inoperative and void. As a minor evil, therefore, common sense, and the law of *England* (which are seldom at variance), warrant the departure from the general rule, and call in the light of extrinsic evidence. The books are full of instances sanctioned by the highest authorities both in law and equity. When the person or the thing is designated on the face of the instrument, by terms imperfect and equivocal, admitting either of no meaning at all by themselves, or of a variety of different meanings, referring tacitly or expressly for the ascertainment and completion of the meaning to extrinsic circumstances, it has never been considered an objection to the reception of the evidence of those circumstances, that the ambiguity was patent, manifested on the face of the instrument. When a legacy is given to a man by his surname, and the Christian name is not mentioned ; is not that a patent ambiguity ? Yet, it is decided, that evidence is admissible (*Price v. Page*, 4 Ves. 680). So where there is a gift of the testator's stock, that is ambiguous, it has different meanings when used by a farmer and a merchant. So with a bequest of jewels ; if by a nobleman, it would pass all ; but if by a jeweller, it would not pass those that he had in his shop. Thus, the same expression may vary in meaning according to the circumstances of the testator."

"To show how mistaken the idea is, that extrinsic evidence is never to be received in cases of patent ambiguity, we may refer to a case in the House of Lords, unquestionably of that description, where the evidence was admitted. I mean the case of *Doe dem. Jersey v. Smith* (2 Brod. & Bing. 553). Mr. Justice Bayley thus states the principle upon which it was introduced. 'The evidence here is not to produce a construction against the direct and natural meaning of the words ; not to control a provision which was distinct and accurately described ; but because there is an

ambiguity on the face of the instrument; because an indefinite expression is used capable of being satisfied in more ways than one; and I look to the state of the property at the time, to the estate and interest the settlor had, and the situation in which she stood with regard to the property she was settling, to see whether that estate, or interest, or situation, would assist us in judging what was her meaning by that indefinite expression.' ”

“If it were necessary, I could refer to many other instances of resorting to extrinsic matter in cases of patent ambiguity; but this decision I ground upon the case of *Fonnereau v. Poyntz*.”

Note.—It is commonly stated that parol evidence is not admissible to explain a “patent” ambiguity, or one appearing on the face of the document itself. But it is pointed out by a very well-known writer that this is not generally true, and that “the only patent ambiguity that is not open to explanation by extrinsic matter is one which in the nature of things is incapable of explanation” (*Phipson on Evidence*, 579–80; where it is explained how the supposed rule arose out of a misapplication of Bacon’s rule referred to in the case of *Doe v. Needs*, *ante*, p. 296. See also a very full discussion of the matter in *Thayer on Evidence*, 422). The correct rule appears to have been thus stated in 1852, in the last edition of *Phillipps on Evidence*, p. 391: “The result appears to be, with regard to an ambiguity apparent on the face of the instrument, that there is no peremptory rule of law, which, in all instances, should exclude the reception of extrinsic evidence; and that, although some descriptions are so uncertain as to be beyond the aid of extrinsic evidence, and incurable, others are capable of explanation, and, when sufficiently explained, may admit of being carried into effect.” But, as a very recent treatise says, “where after the application of extrinsic evidence to determine the literal meaning of the words used, and of intrinsic evidence to determine in what secondary meaning, if any, they are employed, a patent ambiguity remains as to the person or thing intended, or as to what is to be done, the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained, or, as the rule is commonly expressed, the deed or clause is void for uncertainty” (*Norton on Deeds*, 97).

It would certainly not be in accordance with common sense (as was indicated in the above case), if parol evidence were to be rejected where it could clear up satisfactorily an ambiguity, on the mere ground that it was patent. But, as the next case shows, if the words used are so defective or ambiguous as to be unmeaning, and really incapable of being thus solved, they must fail.

BAYLIS v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL

(1741).

2 ATKYNS, 239.

Parol evidence is not admissible to supply total blanks in written documents, or to explain the meaning of words or expressions so defective or ambiguous as to be unmeaning in themselves, by showing what a party to such document intended to say.

A legacy was given to the ward of Bread Street, London, "according to Mr. — his will." It was held that evidence could not be received to supply the blank.

LORD HARDWICKE, L.C. "These are instances where this Court had admitted parol evidence to ascertain the person intended by the testator, where he has been mentioned only by a nickname, or where there have been two persons who have had the same Christian and surname; but I do not remember any case where the Court has gone so far, as to allow parol evidence of the intention of a testator, where there is only a blank."

SMITH v. WILSON

(1832).

1 L. J. K. B. 194; 3 B. & Ad. 728; 37 R. R. 536.

Parol evidence is admissible to translate or interpret a written document, or to show that a word therein has been used with, and has acquired a special and unusual meaning, in the locality or among the persons in question, with reference to the subject-matter; unless a definite meaning has been given to such word or term by statute.

In a lease it was provided that at the end of the term, the tenant should leave not less than 10,000 rabbits on the premises, to be taken

and paid for by the landlord, at the rate of 60*l.* "per thousand." It was held that evidence was admissible to show that the custom of that part of the country, in counting rabbits, was to allow six score to the hundred.

LORD TENTERDEN, C.J. "I think that where in a deed, or in a declaration, or other pleading, a term is used, to which an Act of Parliament has given a definite meaning, the use of the term will be governed by the meaning given by the Act of Parliament. There is no Act of Parliament which provides that an hundred rabbits shall consist of five score to the hundred. Then we must suppose that the parties to this deed used the word 'thousand,' with reference to the subject-matter, according to the meaning which it received in that part of the country. I cannot say, then, that evidence to show what was the acceptation of the term 'thousand,' with reference to this subject-matter, ought not to have been received at all."

PARKE, J. "I am of the same opinion. I think the principle has been correctly laid down from the authorities, in the passage cited from Mr. Starkie's book—'Where terms are used which are known and understood by a particular class of persons, in a certain special and peculiar sense, evidence to that effect is admissible, for the purpose of *applying* the instrument to its proper subject-matter.'"

Note.—It may be said that this is but a case of "translation" of a document according to local language. As foreign language might be translated by verbal evidence, so might local, technical, obsolete, trade, or family, language be translated, it would appear. "There is no doubt that not only where the language of the instrument is such as the Court does not understand, it is competent to receive evidence of the proper meaning of that language, as when it is written in a foreign tongue; but it is also competent, where technical words or peculiar terms, or indeed any expressions are used, which at the time the instrument was written had acquired an appropriate meaning, either generally or by local usage, or amongst particular classes" (*Shore v. Wilson*, 9 C. & F. 555). See also the case of *Morrell v. Frith*, *ante*, p. 8.

REAL EVIDENCE.

It has been stated (*ante*, p. 201) that the third kind of evidence recognised by English law is that known as "Real Evidence," or the evidence afforded by inspection of chattels or other physical objects.

The Court most naturally expects to see, and is invariably allowed to see, such things as the implement with which an alleged crime is said to have been committed, the wound or other damage alleged to have been inflicted, a young person whose age is in question, a dog alleged to be vicious, a writing alleged to have been tampered with, a label or device alleged to be an infringement, the premises in question in cases of obstruction of light, nuisance, or other injury, and the like.

The necessity and reason for such evidence are indeed so obvious that there are few cases dealing with the matter, and even text-books on the law of evidence commonly neglect the subject. But, for the sake of completeness, it appears proper to refer shortly to the main features of such evidence. Perhaps the best short summary of the matter is in *Powell on Evidence*, Book II, Ch. X, to which the reader is referred for further details and observations.

One of the most important points to be noticed is that dealt with in the leading case given below—production of chattels or physical objects is not legally requisite in order to render parol evidence admissible. Even if such production were easy, and manifestly the proper course, non-production would only be matter of observation or comment. This is so even although an important feature of the object in question consists of writing or words (*R. v. Hunt*, *ante*, p. 258), so long as it does not really amount to a "document," in which case, as we have seen (*ante*, p. 255), parol evidence is not allowed without satisfactorily accounting for the original. It may indeed be a fine question to determine whether a particular physical object with words inscribed on it is a document or

not. On the one hand, objects without any words upon them may be documents, such as pieces of wood with notches only on them indicating the quantity of goods delivered, which appear to be sometimes used, and the old Exchequer tallies indicating money paid in the same manner. On the other hand, flags, banners and the like with verbal inscriptions, or labels on bottles or packages, bearing descriptive words, would generally not be documents.

The well-known case of *Armory v. Delamirie* (1 Strange, 504) illustrates the disadvantage of failure to produce an object when necessary. There, a chimney-sweeper's boy sued a goldsmith for detaining a jewel which the latter had taken from a ring found by the former. As the jewel was not produced, when the question came as to the value of the jewel to be paid by the defendant, the evidence of several jewellers was taken as to the value of the best jewel to fit the socket, and such value was taken as the measure of the damages.

Real evidence generally requires some parol evidence to introduce it or to explain it, *e.g.* to prove where the object was found, its condition, or the use to which it was put. Even the conduct and demeanour of a witness in the witness-box, from which the Court may draw conclusions, may be considered real evidence.

But there is danger in real evidence, especially with juries or persons inexperienced in judicial enquiries. Although, *primâ facie*, such evidence is most satisfactory, being directly addressed to the senses of the tribunal, a jury may too readily draw conclusions from it. They may, in their natural horror or sympathy, excited by the sight of a bloody weapon or serious wound, too readily connect it with the prisoner charged, and lose sight of the necessity of establishing a clear connection, or showing that the object in question had actually been used as alleged. Readers of Dickens will remember how the country folk in "*Barnaby Rudge*" were satisfied that Queen Elizabeth had really stayed at the Maypole Inn, and

had cuffed an unlucky page whilst standing on a mounting block, by merely being shown that there was such a mounting block outside the inn; and how the patriarch Jacob drew the hasty but erroneous conclusion that Joseph had been devoured by an evil beast, on the sight of his bloody coat of many colours.

But if real evidence is strictly and carefully dealt with and properly applied, it may fairly be said to be the most reliable evidence.

R. v. FRANCIS

(1874).

L. R. 2 C. C. R. 128; 43 L. J. M. C. 97; 30 L. T. 503;
22 W. R. 663; 12 Cox, 612.

Evidence may be adduced by production of chattels or physical objects and inspection thereof by the Court. Such evidence is known as "Real Evidence." But it is not compulsory to produce any such thing for inspection by the Court, as in the case of documents capable of production. Although such thing might conveniently be produced, its non-production does not prevent other evidence being given concerning it. It is only a matter for observation or criticism; going to the weight but not to the admissibility of such evidence.

The prisoner was indicted for false pretences, by having falsely represented a ring to be a diamond ring. In order to prove his guilty knowledge, evidence was admitted of attempts on other occasions to obtain money on a false ring, at Leicester. It was held that verbal evidence of the nature of such ring was admissible although it was not produced in Court.

LORD COLERIDGE, C.J. "It was objected that the evidence of
L.C. 20

what took place at Leicester was not properly received, because the cluster ring which he there attempted to pass was not produced in Court, and that the evidence of two witnesses who saw it, and swore to its being false, was not admissible. No doubt if there was not admissible evidence that this ring was false it ought not to have been left to the jury; but though the non-production of the article may afford ground for observation more or less weighty, according to circumstances, it only goes to the weight, not to the admissibility, of the evidence, and no question as to the weight of this evidence is now before us. Where the question is as to the effect of a written instrument, the instrument itself is primary evidence of its contents, and until it is produced, or the non-production is excused, no secondary evidence can be received. But there is no case whatever deciding that, when the issue is as to the state of a chattel, *e.g.* the soundness of a horse, or the equality of the bulk of the goods to the sample, the production of the chattel is primary evidence, and that no other evidence can be given till the chattel is produced in Court for the inspection of the jury. The law of evidence is the same in criminal and civil suits."

Note.—Inspection may also be had out of Court and before trial, by the provisions of Order 50 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, which provide as follows:—

(3) It shall be lawful for the Court . . . to make any order for the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing, being the subject of such cause or matter, or as to which any question may arise therein.

(4) It shall be lawful for any Judge, by whom any cause or matter may be heard or tried . . . to inspect any property or thing concerning which any question may arise therein.

(5) The provisions of Rule 3 of this Order shall apply to inspection by a jury.

The last sentence in the above judgment, as to the similarity of evidence in criminal and civil suits, must be read as generally true only, and subject to certain exceptions now to be dealt with.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE.

R. v. GIBSON

(1887).

L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 537 ; 56 L. J. M. C. 49 ; 56 L. T. 367 ;
35 W. R. 411 ; 51 J. P. 742 ; 16 Cox, C. C. 181.

In a criminal trial, if any evidence be improperly admitted or rejected, and the prisoner is convicted, the conviction will be quashed, although there was other evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction.

The facts sufficiently appear from the judgment.

LORD COLERIDGE, C.J. "Evidence was received of a statement by a passer-by which tended to the identification of the prisoner. It was admitted that the statement was not proved to have been made in the hearing of the prisoner. Therefore it was in itself not receivable in evidence. The counsel for the prisoner, in the exercise of his discretion, did not object, and the evidence was admitted. The Chairman summed up to the jury, and he tells us that he did specifically leave to the jury this bit of evidence which ought not to have been received. After the jury had retired, the prisoner's counsel objected that that evidence ought not to have been left to the jury ; but the Chairman refused to withdraw it from them. How far a technical withdrawal at that time would have been sufficient, it is not necessary now to say. Therefore the verdict proceeded upon that which was not evidence. The question is whether such a conviction can stand. If it had been a verdict in a civil action prior to the Judicature Acts, it certainly could not have stood, because the rule was that if any evidence, however slight, which was not legal evidence and might have affected the verdict, was received and went to the jury, a new trial was a matter of right, for the Courts said that they would not weigh evidence and could not say how the particular

evidence might have affected the jury. It clearly cannot be said that at the time of the passing of the Judicature Acts there was any difference between a civil and criminal case as to the result of the finding of a jury arrived at upon evidence partly legal and partly not. No doubt the consequences were different; but in each case the verdict of the jury would have been set aside upon the ground that it proceeded upon some evidence which should not have been left to the jury. In a civil case, it is true, that might have been redressed by a second trial. In a criminal case there could not be a second trial. But in each case I am of opinion that the decision would have been vitiated by the admission of evidence part of which was legal and part illegal. Here it is clear that evidence was left to the jury which should not have been left to them. Therefore I am of opinion that the conviction cannot stand. . . . A Judge in criminal cases must take care that the finding of the jury is not founded upon any evidence other than that which the law allows."

MATHEW, J. "We have to lay down a rule which shall apply whether a prisoner is defended or undefended. In every case it is the duty of the Judge to tell the jury what is the law applicable to the case, and above all things to warn them against acting upon that which is not evidence against the prisoner. Here the jury were directed that that was evidence which was not evidence. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the conviction should be quashed."

WILLS, J. "The course taken by the prisoner's counsel has no bearing upon the question before us. If a mistake had been made by counsel, that would not relieve the Judge from his duty to see that only that which was proper evidence was before the jury. The Judge must take care that the prisoner is not convicted upon any but legal evidence. I am, therefore, of opinion that the conviction must be quashed."

Note.—The effect of misreception of evidence is not so serious in civil cases. Order 39, r. 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides:—

"A new trial shall not be granted on the ground of misdirection or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence . . . unless in the opinion of the Court to which the application is made some substantial wrong or miscarriage has been thereby occasioned in the trial."

This is one of the differences between the rules of evidence in criminal cases and those in civil cases. Other differences are :—

1. Stricter proof is required to prove crimes than civil claims. They must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Corroboration is more frequently required, as in treason (see *ante*, p. 120), and perjury (see *ante*, p. 121). In practice, the evidence of an accomplice is not sufficient to convict (see *ante*, p. 122).

2. A prisoner can always give evidence of his good character, which can be answered by evidence of his bad character (see *ante*, p. 98). In civil cases evidence of the plaintiff's character is only admissible when it is in issue (see *ante*, p. 94), or when damages depend on it (see *ante*, p. 97), but evidence of the defendant's character seems never to be admissible.

3. The rules as to the evidence of the parties themselves are somewhat different. In civil cases, the parties and their husbands and wives are generally both competent and compellable witnesses. In criminal cases, prisoners and their husbands and wives were, until 1898, generally incompetent. Now they are competent, but only with the prisoner's consent (Criminal Evidence Act, 1898).

4. Admissions made by the parties for the purposes of the trial are freely admitted in civil cases (see *ante*, p. 134), but not in criminal cases; and even confessions are not admitted unless they are proved to be quite voluntary (see *ante*, p. 145).

5. Depositions of absent witnesses are more readily available in criminal than in civil cases (see *ante*, p. 248). On the other hand, the evidence of witnesses abroad is more available in civil cases (Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 37, r. 5).

6. In civil proceedings unstamped documents cannot be given in evidence. In criminal proceedings they can be.

7. In trials for homicide, dying declarations are admitted (see *ante*, p. 181). In civil cases they never are.

(See, generally, *Kenny, Criminal Law*, Ch. XXVI.; *Harris, Criminal Law*, p. 454; *Phipson*, p. 5.)

PART II.

STATUTES ON EVIDENCE.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 1677.

(29 CAR. 2, c. 3.)

4. No action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate or whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriages of another person or to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage or upon any contract or sale of lands tenements or hereditaments or any interest in or concerning them or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised.

7. All declarations or creations of trusts or confidences of any lands tenements or hereditaments shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust or by his last will in writing or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect.

9. All grants and assignments of any trust or confidence shall likewise be in writing signed by the party granting or assigning the same or by such last will or devise or else shall likewise be utterly void and of none effect.

Note.—The Statute of Frauds contains several other sections requiring writing for certain transactions; but those given above appear to be the only sections actually dealing with “evidence.” Other sections

require the *transaction* itself to be in writing, or a written transaction; the sections above are understood to require merely written *evidence* of the transaction, which may itself be verbal. This appears, indeed, from the actual wording of sections 4 and 7. But section 9 is worded differently, and it may be that it requires the transaction itself to be in writing, unless the word "likewise" gives it the same effect as section 7. The position under sections 4 and 7 respectively is explained in *Leroux v. Brown*, 22 L. J. C. P. 1, and *Forster v. Hale*, 3 Ves. 696. For details concerning the particular matters referred to in the Statute, reference must be made to books on Common Law, Contracts, and Trusts.

TREASON ACT, 1695.

(7 & 8 WILL. 3, c. 3.)

2. No person or persons whatsoever shall be indicted, tried or attainted of high treason, whereby any corruption of blood may or shall be made to any such offender or offenders, or to any the heir or heirs of any such offender or offenders or of misprision of such treason but by and upon the oaths and testimony of two lawful witnesses, either both of them to the same overt act or one of them to one and the other of them to another overt act of the same treason, unless the party indicted and arraigned or tried shall willingly, without violence in open court confess the same.

Note.—This is one of the two cases in which two witnesses are required for corroboration. The other case is personation at elections, by 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18 (*post*, p. 314). As to corroboration generally, see *ante*, p. 120.

WITNESSES ACT, 1806.

(46 GEO. 3, c. 37.)

Whereas doubts have arisen whether a witness can by law refuse to answer a question relevant to the matter in issue, the answering of which has no tendency to accuse himself, or to expose him to any penalty or forfeiture, but the answering of which may establish, or tend to establish, that he owes a debt, or is otherwise subject to a civil suit at the instance of his Majesty, or of some other person or persons; be it therefore declared . . . that a witness cannot by law refuse to answer a question relevant to the matter in issue, the answering of which has no tendency to accuse himself, or to expose

him to penalty or forfeiture of any nature whatsoever, by reason only or on the sole ground that the answering of such question may establish, or tend to establish that he owes a debt, or is otherwise subject to a civil suit, either at the instance of his Majesty, or of any other person or persons.

Note.—As to the privilege of refusing to answer incriminating questions, see *ante*, p. 235.

PREVIOUS CONVICTION ACT, 1836.

(6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 111.)

Whereas by an Act passed in the seventh and eighth years of the reign of King George the Fourth, intituled "An Act for further improving the administration of justice in criminal cases," provision is made for the more exemplary punishment of offenders who shall commit any felony not punishable with death after a previous conviction for felony : And whereas since the passing of the said Act the practice has been on the trial of any person for any such subsequent felony to charge the jury to inquire at the same time concerning such previous conviction : And whereas doubts may be reasonably entertained whether such practice is consistent with a fair and impartial inquiry as regards the matter of such subsequent felony, and it is expedient that such practice should from henceforth be discontinued : Be it therefore enacted . . . it shall not be lawful on the trial of any person for any such subsequent felony to charge the jury to inquire concerning such previous conviction until after they shall have inquired concerning such subsequent felony, and shall have found such person guilty of the same ; and whenever in any indictment such previous conviction shall be stated, the reading of such statement to the jury as part of the indictment shall be deferred until after such finding as aforesaid : **Provided nevertheless, that if upon the trial of any person for any such subsequent felony as aforesaid such person shall give evidence of his or her good character, it shall be lawful for the prosecutor, in answer thereto, to give evidence of the indictment and conviction of such person for the previous felony before such verdict of guilty shall have been returned, and the jury shall inquire concerning such**

previous conviction for felony at the same time that they inquire concerning the subsequent felony.

Note.—The law as to proof of previous convictions is summarised, *ante*, p. 85.

OATHS ACT, 1838.

(1 & 2 VICT. c. 105.)

In all cases in which an oath may lawfully be and shall have been administered to any person, either as a juryman or a witness, or a deponent in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court of law or equity in the United Kingdom, or on appointment to any office or employment, or on any occasion whatever, such person is bound by the oath administered, provided the same shall have been administered in such form and with such ceremonies as such person may declare to be binding ; and every such person in case of wilful false swearing may be convicted of the crime of perjury in the same manner as if the oath had been administered in the form and with the ceremonies most commonly adopted.

Note.—This Act should be read in connection with the Oaths Act, 1888, *post*, p. 339, and the Oaths Act, 1909, *post*, p. 350.

PARLIAMENTARY REGISTRATION ACT, 1843.

(6 & 7 VICT. c. 18.)

88. (*Dealing with Personation at Elections.*) If on the hearing of the said charge the said two justices shall be satisfied, upon the evidence on oath of not less than two credible witnesses, that the said person so brought before them has knowingly personated and falsely assumed to vote in the name of some other person within the meaning of this Act, and is not in fact the person in whose name he voted, then it shall be lawful for the said two justices to commit the said offender to the gaol of the county, city, or borough within which the offence was committed, to take his trial according to law, and to bind over the witnesses in their respective recognizances to

appear and give evidence on such trial as in the case of other misdemeanours.

Note.—This is one of the two cases in which two witnesses are required for corroboration. The other case is treason, by 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3 (*ante*, p. 312). As to corroboration generally, see *ante*, p. 120.

EVIDENCE ACT, 1843.

(6 & 7 VICT. c. 85.)

No person offered as a witness shall hereafter be excluded by reason of incapacity from crime or interest from giving evidence, either in person or by deposition, according to the practice of the court, on the trial of any issue joined, or of any matter or question or on any inquiry arising in any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court, or before any judge, jury, sheriff, coroner, magistrate, officer, or person having, by law or by consent of parties, authority to hear, receive, and examine evidence; but that every person so offered may and shall be admitted to give evidence on oath, or solemn affirmation in those cases wherein affirmation is by law receivable, notwithstanding that such person may or shall have an interest in the matter in question, or in the event of the trial of any issue, matter, question, or injury; or of the suit, action, or proceeding in which he is offered as a witness, and notwithstanding that such person offered as a witness may have been previously convicted of any crime or offence.

Note.—This Act abolished incompetency from crime or interest, but it further provided that it should not render the parties themselves, or their husbands or wives competent witnesses. The parties and their husbands and wives were made competent by the Evidence Acts, 1851, 1853, and 1869. See *ante*, p. 204, and *post*, pp. 319, 320, and 329.

BASTARDY ACT, 1845.

(8 & 9 VICT. c. 10.)

6. (*Dealing with Appeals to Quarter Sessions against Bastardy Orders.*) On the trial of any such appeal before any court of quarter sessions the justices therein assembled, or the recorder (as

the case may be), shall hear the evidence of the said mother, and such other evidence as she may produce, and any evidence tendered on behalf of the appellant, and proceed to hear and determine the said appeal in other respects according to law, but shall not confirm the order so appealed against unless the evidence of the said mother shall have been corroborated in some material particular by other testimony, to the satisfaction of the said justices in quarter sessions assembled, or the said recorder.

Note.—This Act deals with appeals only. The Bastardy Act, 1872, *post*, p. 330, requires corroboration also on original applications.

INDICTABLE OFFENCES ACT, 1848.

(11 & 12 VICT. c. 42.)

17. Where any person shall appear or be brought before any justice or justices of the peace, charged with any indictable offence, whether committed in England or Wales, or upon the high seas, or on land beyond the sea, or whether such person appear voluntarily upon summons or have been apprehended, with or without warrant, or be in custody for the same or any other offence, such justice or justices, before he or they shall commit such accused person to prison for trial, or before he or they shall admit him to bail, shall, in the presence of such accused person, who shall be at liberty to put questions to any witness produced against him, take the statement on oath or affirmation of those who shall know the facts and circumstances of the case, and shall put the same into writing, and such depositions shall be read over to and signed respectively by the witnesses who shall have been so examined, and shall be signed also by the justice or justices taking the same; and the justice or justices before whom any such witness shall appear to be examined as aforesaid shall, before such witness is examined, administer to such witness the usual oath or affirmation, which such justice or justices shall have full power and authority to do; and if upon the trial of the person so accused as first aforesaid it shall be proved, by the oath or affirmation of any credible witness, that any person whose deposition shall have been taken as aforesaid is dead, or so ill as not to be able to travel,

and if also it be proved that such deposition was taken in the presence of the person so accused, and that he or his counsel or attorney had a full opportunity of cross-examining the witness, then, if such deposition purport to be signed by the justice by or before whom the same purports to have been taken, it shall be lawful to read such deposition as evidence in such prosecution, without further proof thereof, unless it shall be proved that such deposition was not in fact signed by the justice purporting to sign the same.

18. After the examinations of all the witnesses on the part of the prosecution as aforesaid shall have been completed, the justices of the peace or one of the justices by or before whom such examination shall have been so completed as aforesaid shall, without requiring the attendance of the witnesses, read or cause to be read to the accused the depositions taken against him, and shall say to him these words, or words to the like effect : "Having heard the evidence, do you wish to say any thing in answer to the charge? you are not obliged to say any thing unless you desire to do so, but whatever you say will be taken down in writing, and may be given in evidence against you upon your trial"; and whatever the prisoner shall then say in answer thereto shall be taken down in writing and read over to him, and shall be signed by the said justice or justices, and kept with the depositions of the witnesses, and shall be transmitted with them as hereinafter mentioned; and afterwards upon the trial of the said accused person the same may, if necessary, be given in evidence against him, without further proof thereof, unless it shall be proved that the justice or justices purporting to sign the same did not in fact sign the same: Provided always, that the said justice or justices, before such accused person shall make any statement, shall state to him, and give him clearly to understand, that he has nothing to hope from any promise of favour, and nothing to fear from any threat which may have been holden out to him to induce him to make any admission or confession of his guilt, but that whatever he shall then say may be given in evidence against him upon his trial, notwithstanding such promise or threat: Provided nevertheless, that nothing herein enacted or contained shall prevent the prosecutor in any case from giving in evidence any

admission or confession or other statement of the person accused or charged, made at any time, which by law would be admissible as evidence against such person.

20. It shall be lawful for the justice or justices before whom any such witness shall be examined as aforesaid to bind by recognizance the prosecutor and every such witness to appear at the next court . . . at which the accused is to be tried, then and there to prosecute, or to prosecute and give evidence, or to give evidence, as the case may be, against the party accused, . . . and the several recognizances so taken, together with the written information (if any), the depositions, the statement of the accused, and the recognizance of bail (if any) in every such case, shall be delivered by the said justice or justices, or he or they shall cause the same to be delivered, to the proper officer of the court in which the trial is to be had, before or at the opening of the said court on the first day of the sitting thereof, or at such other time as the judge, recorder, or justice who is to preside in such court at the said trial, shall order and appoint: Provided always, that if any such witness shall refuse to enter into or acknowledge such recognizance as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for such justice or justices of the peace, by his or their warrant, to commit him to the common gaol or house of correction for the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place, in which the accused party is to be tried, there to be imprisoned and safely kept until after the trial of such accused party.

Note.—S. 17. As to the events in which depositions can be read at the trial, see *ante*, p. 250.

S. 18. As to admissions and confessions in criminal cases, see *ante*, pp. 134, 138, and 145.

The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1867, makes provision for taking the depositions of witnesses on behalf of the person charged with an indictable offence (s. 3), and also for taking the depositions of any persons dangerously ill, by way of "perpetuation of testimony," whether any person is already accused or not (s. 6). See *post*, p. 326.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1848.

(11 & 12 VICT. c. 43.)

14. (*Dealing with Proceedings before Courts of Summary Jurisdiction.*) If the information or complaint in any such case shall negative any exemption, exception, proviso, or condition in the statute on which the same shall be framed it shall not be necessary for the prosecutor or complainant in that behalf to prove such negative, but the defendant may prove the affirmative thereof in his defence, if he would have advantage of the same.

Note.—This provision should be read in connection with s. 39 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, *post*, p. 333. See also note, *ante*, p. 118.

EVIDENCE ACT, 1851.

(14 & 15 VICT. c. 99.)

2. On the Trial of any Issue joined, or of any Matter or Question, or on any Inquiry arising in any Suit, Action, or other Proceeding in any Court of Justice, or before any Person having by Law, or by Consent of Parties, Authority to hear, receive, and examine Evidence, the Parties thereto, and the Persons in whose Behalf any such Suit, Action, or other Proceeding may be brought or defended, shall, except as herein-after excepted, be competent and compellable to give Evidence, either *vivâ voce* or by Deposition, according to the Practice of the Court, on behalf of either or any of the Parties to the said Suit, Action, or other Proceeding.

3. But nothing herein contained shall render any Person who in any criminal Proceeding is charged with the Commission of any indictable Offence, or any Offence punishable on summary Conviction, competent or compellable to give Evidence for or against himself or herself, or shall render any Person compellable to answer any Question tending to criminate himself or herself, or shall in any criminal Proceeding render any Husband competent or compellable to give Evidence for or against his Wife, or any Wife competent or compellable to give Evidence for or against her Husband.

4. *Nothing herein contained shall apply to any Action, Suit, Proceeding, or Bill in any Court of Common Law, or in any Ecclesiastical Court, or in either House of Parliament, instituted in consequence of Adultery, or to any Action for Breach of Promise of Marriage.*

14. Whenever any Book or other Document is of such a public Nature as to be admissible in Evidence on its mere Production from the proper Custody, and no Statute exists which renders its Contents provable by means of a Copy, any Copy thereof or Extract therefrom shall be admissible in Evidence in any Court of Justice, or before any Person now or hereafter having by Law or by Consent of Parties Authority to hear, receive, and examine Evidence, provided it be proved to be an examined Copy or Extract, or provided it purport to be signed and certified as a true Copy or Extract by the Officer to whose Custody the Original is intrusted, and which Officer is hereby required to furnish such certified Copy or Extract to any Person applying at a reasonable Time for the same, upon Payment of a reasonable Sum for the same, not exceeding Fourpence for every Folio of Ninety Words.

16. Every Court, Judge, Justice, Officer, Commissioner, Arbitrator, or other Person, now or hereafter having by Law or by Consent of Parties Authority to hear, receive, and examine Evidence, is hereby empowered to administer an Oath to all such Witnesses as are legally called before them respectively.

Note.—S. 3. As to the evidence of persons charged with criminal offences, and their husbands and wives, see now the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, *post*, p. 341; and generally as to competency and compellability, *ante*, p. 205. As to incriminating questions, see *ante*, p. 235.

S. 4. This was repealed by the Evidence Act, 1869, a new provision being made thereby. See *post*, p. 329.

S. 14. As to proof of documents by copies, see *ante*, p. 269.

EVIDENCE AMENDMENT ACT, 1853.

(16 & 17 VICT. c. 83.)

1. On the Trial of any Issue joined, or of any Matter or Question, or on any Inquiry arising in any Suit, Action, or other Proceeding in any Court of Justice, or before any Person having by Law or by Consent of Parties Authority to hear, receive, and examine Evidence,

the **Husbands and Wives of the Parties** thereto, and of the Persons in whose Behalf any such Suit, Action, or other Proceeding may be brought or instituted, or opposed or defended, **shall, except as here-in-after excepted, be competent and compellable to give Evidence**, either *vivâ voce* or by Deposition according to the Practice of the Court, on behalf of either or any of the Parties to the said Suit, Action, or other Proceeding.

2. **Nothing herein shall render any Husband competent or compellable to give Evidence for or against his Wife, or any Wife competent or compellable to give Evidence for or against her Husband, in any Criminal Proceeding (or in any Proceeding instituted in consequence of Adultery).**

3. **No Husband shall be compellable to disclose any Communication made to him by his Wife during the Marriage, and no Wife shall be compellable to disclose any Communication made to her by her Husband during the Marriage.**

Note.—S. 1. As to the evidence of husbands and wives generally, see *ante*, p. 205.

S. 2. As to criminal proceedings, see now the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, *post*, p. 341. The words in italics were repealed by the Evidence Act, 1869, *post*, p. 329.

S. 3. As to the disclosure of matrimonial communications, compare s. 1 (*d*) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, *post*, p. 341.

LARCENY ACT, 1861.

(24 & 25 VICT. c. 96.)

29. (*Dealing with Larceny of Deeds and Wills, &c.*) **No person shall be liable to be convicted of any of the felonies in this and the last preceding section mentioned, by any evidence whatever, in respect of any act done by him, if he shall at any time previously to his being charged with such offence have first disclosed such act, on oath, in consequence of any compulsory process of any court of law or equity in any action, suit, or proceeding which shall have been *bonâ fide* instituted by any party aggrieved, or if he shall have first disclosed the same in any compulsory examination or deposition before any court upon the hearing of any matter in bankruptcy or insolvency.**

85. (*Dealing with Frauds by Bankers, Agents, &c.*) Nothing in any of the last ten preceding sections of this Act contained shall enable or entitle any person to refuse to make a full and complete discovery by answer to any bill in equity, or to answer any question or interrogatory in any civil proceeding in any court, or upon the hearing of any matter in bankruptcy or insolvency; and no person shall be liable to be convicted of any of the misdemeanours in any of the said sections mentioned by any evidence whatever in respect of any act done by him, if he shall at any time previously to his being charged with such offence have first disclosed such act on oath, in consequence of any compulsory process of any court of law or equity, in any action, suit, or proceeding which shall have been *bonâ fide* instituted by any party aggrieved, or if he shall have first disclosed the same in any compulsory examination or deposition before any court upon the hearing of any matter in bankruptcy or insolvency.

116. In any indictment for any offence punishable under this Act, and committed after a previous conviction or convictions for any felony, misdemeanor or offence or offences punishable upon summary conviction . . . the offender shall, in the first instance, be arraigned upon so much only of the indictment as charges the subsequent offence, and if he plead not guilty, or if the court order a plea of not guilty to be entered on his behalf, the jury shall be charged, in the first instance, to inquire concerning such subsequent offence only; and if they find him guilty, or if on arraignment he plead guilty, he shall then, and not before, be asked whether he had been previously convicted, as alleged in the indictment, and if he answer that he had been so previously convicted the court may proceed to sentence him accordingly, but if he deny that he had been so previously convicted, or stand mute of malice, or will not answer directly to such question, the jury shall then be charged to inquire concerning such previous conviction or convictions, and in such case it shall not be necessary to swear the jury again, but the oath already taken by them shall for all purposes be deemed to extend to such last-mentioned inquiry: Provided, that if upon the trial of any person for any such subsequent offence such person shall give evidence of his good character, it shall be lawful for the prosecutor, in answer thereto, to give evidence of the

conviction of such person for the previous offence or offences before such verdict of guilty shall be returned, and the jury shall inquire concerning such previous conviction or convictions at the same time that they inquire concerning such subsequent offence.

Note.—Ss. 29, 85. These sections afford instances of the cases in which a witness is compelled to answer incriminating questions but is protected from subsequent prosecution for the offences disclosed. Other instances are given, *ante*, p. 237. S. 85 should be read in connection with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Acts, 1883 and 1890, *post*, pp. 335, 340.

S. 116. The law as to proof of previous convictions is summarized, *ante*, p. 85.

COINAGE ACT, 1861.

(24 & 25 VICT. c. 99.)

37. Where any person shall have been convicted of any offence against this Act or any former Act relating to the coin, and shall afterwards be indicted for any offence against this Act committed subsequent to such conviction . . . the offender shall, in the first instance, be arraigned upon so much only of the indictment as charges the subsequent offence, and if he plead not guilty, or if the court order a plea of not guilty to be entered on his behalf, the jury shall be charged, in the first instance, to inquire concerning such subsequent offence only; and if they find him guilty, or if on arraignment he plead guilty, he shall then, and not before, be asked whether he had been previously convicted as alleged in the indictment; and if he answer that he had been so previously convicted the court may proceed to sentence him accordingly, but if he deny that he had been so previously convicted, or stand mute of malice, or will not answer directly to such question, the jury shall then be charged to inquire concerning such previous conviction or convictions, and in such case it shall not be necessary to swear the jury again, but the oath already taken by them shall for all purposes be deemed to extend to such last-mentioned inquiry: **Provided that if upon the trial of any person for any such subsequent offence such person shall give evidence of his good character, it shall be lawful for the prosecutor, in answer thereto, to give evidence of the conviction of such person for the previous offence or offences, before**

such verdict of guilty shall be returned, and the jury shall inquire concerning such previous conviction or convictions at the same time that they inquire concerning such subsequent offence.

Note.—The law as to proof of previous convictions is summarized, *ante*, p. 85.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, 1865.

(28 & 29 VICT. c. 18.)

1. The Provisions of Sections from Three to Eight, inclusive, of this Act shall apply to all Courts of Judicature, as well Criminal as all others, and to all Persons having, by Law or by Consent of Parties, Authority to hear, receive, and examine Evidence.

2. If any Prisoner or Prisoners, Defendant or Defendants, shall be defended by Counsel, but not otherwise, it shall be the Duty of the presiding Judge, at the Close of the Case for the Prosecution, to ask the Counsel for each Prisoner or Defendant so defended by Counsel whether he or they intend to adduce Evidence, and in the event of none of them thereupon announcing his Intention to adduce Evidence, the Counsel for the Prosecution shall be allowed to address the Jury a Second Time in support of his Case, for the Purpose of summing up the Evidence against such Prisoner or Prisoners, or Defendant or Defendants; and upon every Trial for Felony or Misdemeanor, whether the Prisoners or Defendants, or any of them, shall be defended by Counsel or not, each and every such Prisoner or Defendant, or his or their Counsel respectively, shall be allowed if he or they shall think fit, to open his or their Case or Cases respectively; and after the Conclusion of such Opening or of all such Openings, if more than One, such Prisoner or Prisoners, or Defendant or Defendants, or their Counsel, shall be entitled to examine such Witnesses as he or they may think fit, and when all the Evidence is concluded to sum up the Evidence respectively; and the Right of Reply, and Practice and Course of Proceedings, save as hereby altered, shall be as at present.

3. A Party producing a Witness shall not be allowed to impeach his Credit by general Evidence of bad Character, but he may, in case the Witness shall, in the Opinion of the Judge,

prove adverse, contradict him by other Evidence, or, by Leave of the Judge, prove that he has made at other Times a Statement inconsistent with his present Testimony ; but before such last-mentioned Proof can be given the Circumstances of the supposed Statement, sufficient to designate the particular Occasion, must be mentioned to the Witness, and he must be asked whether or not he has made such Statement.

4. If a Witness, upon Cross-examination as to a former Statement made by him relative to the Subject Matter of the Indictment or Proceeding, and inconsistent with his present Testimony, does not distinctly admit that he has made such Statement, Proof may be given that he did in fact make it ; but before such Proof can be given the Circumstances of the supposed Statement, sufficient to designate the particular Occasion, must be mentioned to the Witness, and he must be asked whether or not he has made such Statement.

5. A Witness may be cross-examined as to previous Statements made by him in Writing or reduced into Writing relative to the Subject Matter of the Indictment or Proceeding, without such Writing being shown to him ; but if it is intended to contradict such Witness by the Writing, his Attention must, before such contradictory Proof can be given, be called to those Parts of the Writing which are to be used for the Purpose of so contradicting him : Provided always, that it shall be competent for the Judge, at any Time during the Trial, to require the Production of the Writing for his Inspection, and he may thereupon make such Use of it for the Purposes of the Trial as he may think fit.

6. A Witness may be questioned as to whether he has been convicted of any Felony or Misdemeanor, and upon being so questioned, if he either denies or does not admit the Fact, or refuses to answer, it shall be lawful for the cross-examining Party to prove such Conviction ; and a Certificate containing the Substance and Effect only (omitting the formal Part) of the Indictment and Conviction for such Offence, purporting to be signed by the Clerk of the Court or other Officer having the Custody of the Records of the Court where the Offender was convicted, or by the Deputy of such Clerk or Officer, (for which Certificate a Fee of Five Shillings and no more shall be demanded or taken,) shall, upon Proof of the Identity of the Person, be sufficient Evidence of the said Conviction,

without Proof of the Signature or official Character of the Person appearing to have signed the same.

7. It shall not be necessary to prove by the attesting Witness any Instrument to the Validity of which Attestation is not requisite, and such Instrument may be proved as if there had been no attesting Witness thereto.

8. Comparison of a disputed Writing with any Writing proved to the Satisfaction of the Judge to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by Witnesses; and such Writings, and the Evidence of Witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the Court and Jury as Evidence of the Genuineness or otherwise of the Writing in dispute.

Note.—S. 1. It should be particularly noted that, notwithstanding its inconsistent title, the Act applies to civil cases.

S. 2. The right of the prosecution to a second speech, by way of “summing up” the evidence, depends upon the prisoner being defended by counsel. The right of the prosecution to a second speech, by way of “reply” to the case of the prisoner, depends upon the prisoner calling evidence. See *Powell on Evidence*, pp. 593–6.

Ss. 3–5. The law as to evidence to discredit witnesses is dealt with generally, *ante*, p. 227; as to previous inconsistent statements, by an opponent’s witness, *ante*, p. 228, and by a party’s own witness, *ante*, p. 231.

S. 6. It appears that such conviction may be proved, although it is wholly irrelevant to the issue (*Ward v. Sinfield*, 49 L. J. C. P. 696).

S. 7. As to attestation of documents, see *ante*, p. 276.

S. 8. As to proof of documents, see *ante*, p. 271.

CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 1867.

(30 & 31 VICT. c. 35.)

3. Whereas complaint is frequently made by persons charged with indictable offences, upon their trial, that they are unable by reason of poverty to call witnesses on their behalf, and that injustice is thereby occasioned to them; and it is expedient to remove, as far as practicable, all just ground for such complaint: Therefore, in all cases where any person shall appear or be brought before any justice or justices of the peace, charged with any indictable offence, whether committed within this realm or upon the high seas or upon land beyond the sea, and whether such person appear

voluntarily upon summons, or has been apprehended with or without warrant, or be in custody for the same or any other offence, such justice or justices, before he or they shall commit such accused person for trial or admit him to bail, shall, immediately after obeying the directions of the eighteenth section of the Act eleventh and twelfth Victoria, chapter forty-two, demand and require of the accused person whether he desires to call any witness; and if the accused person shall in answer to such demand call or desire to call any witness or witnesses, such justice or justices shall, in the presence of such accused person, take the statement on oath or affirmation, both examination and cross-examination, of those who shall be so called as witnesses by such accused person, and who shall know anything relating to the facts and circumstances of the case, or anything tending to prove the innocence of such accused person, and shall put the same into writing; and such depositions of such witnesses shall be read over to and signed respectively by the witnesses who shall have been so examined, and shall be signed also by the justice or justices taking the same, and transmitted in due course of law with the depositions; and such witnesses, not being witnesses merely to the character of the accused, as shall in the opinion of the justice or justices give evidence in any way material to the case or tending to prove the innocence of the accused person, shall be bound by recognizance to appear and give evidence at the said trial; and afterwards, upon the trial of such accused person, all the laws now in force relating to the depositions of witnesses for the prosecution shall extend and be applicable to the depositions of witnesses hereby directed to be taken.

6. Whereas it may happen that a person dangerously ill, and unable to travel, may be able to give material and important information relating to an indictable offence, or to a person accused thereof, . . . and it is desirable in the interests of truth and justice that means should be provided for perpetuating such testimony, and for rendering the same available in the event of the death of the person giving the same: Therefore, whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of any justice of the peace that any person dangerously ill, and in the opinion of some registered medical practitioner not likely to recover from such illness, is able

and willing to give material information relating to any indictable offence, or relating to any person accused of any such offence, . . . it shall be lawful for the said justice to take in writing the statement on oath or affirmation of such person so being ill, and such justice shall thereupon subscribe the same, and shall add thereto by way of caption a statement of his reason for taking the same, and of the day and place when and where the same was taken, and of the names of the persons (if any) present at the taking thereof, and, if the same shall relate to any indictable offence for which any accused person is already committed or bailed to appear for trial, shall transmit the same with the said addition to the proper officer of the court for trial at which such accused person shall have been so committed or bailed; and in all other cases he shall transmit the same to the clerk of the peace of the county, division, city, or borough in which he shall have taken the same, who is hereby required to preserve the same, and file it of record; and if afterwards, upon the trial of any offender or offence to which the same may relate, the person who made the same statement shall be proved to be dead, or if it shall be proved that there is no reasonable probability that such person will ever be able to travel or to give evidence, it shall be lawful to read such statement in evidence, either for or against the accused, without further proof thereof, if the same purports to be signed by the justice by or before whom it purports to be taken, and provided it be proved to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable notice of the intention to take such statement has been served upon the person (whether prosecutor or accused) against whom it is proposed to be read in evidence, and that such person, or his counsel or attorney, had or might have had, if he had chosen to be present, full opportunity of cross-examining the deceased person who made the same.

Note.—These provisions should be read in connection with those of ss. 17, 18, and 20 of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848 (*ante*, p. 316, referred to in s. 3 above), under which depositions generally are taken.

S. 3. The object of this provision is to require justices to take the evidence of witnesses for the defence, having taken them for the prosecution under the Act of 1848.

S. 6. The object of this provision is to enable depositions to be taken by way of "perpetuation of testimony," of persons dangerously ill, whether any person is actually accused of the offence in question or not.

As to the events in which depositions can be read at the trial, see *ante*, p. 250. Further details as to depositions are rather appropriate to criminal procedure than to evidence.

EVIDENCE FURTHER AMENDMENT ACT, 1869.

(32 & 33 VICT. c. 68.)

2. The parties to any action for breach of promise of marriage shall be competent to give evidence in such action: Provided always, that no plaintiff in any action for breach of promise of marriage shall recover a verdict unless his or her testimony shall be corroborated by some other material evidence in support of such promise.

3. The parties to any proceeding instituted in consequence of adultery, and the husbands and wives of such parties, shall be competent to give evidence in such proceedings: Provided that no witness in any proceeding, whether a party to the suit or not, shall be liable to be asked or be bound to answer any question tending to show that he or she has been guilty of adultery, unless such witness shall have already given evidence in the same proceeding in disproof of his or her alleged adultery.

Note.—As to the previous position respecting competency, see *ante*, p. 203. As to corroboration generally, see *ante*, p. 120. As to privileged questions generally, see *ante*, p. 234.

PREVENTION OF CRIMES ACT, 1871.

(34 & 35 VICT. c. 112.)

19. Where proceedings are taken against any person for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his possession stolen property, evidence may be given at any stage of the proceedings that there was found in the possession of such person other property stolen within the preceding period of twelve months, and such evidence may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that such person knew the property to be stolen which forms the subject of the proceedings taken against him.

Where proceedings are taken against any person for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his possession stolen property, and evidence has been given that the stolen property has been found in his possession, then if such person has within five years immediately preceding been convicted of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty, evidence of such previous conviction may be given at any stage of the proceedings, and may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that the person accused knew the property which was proved to be in his possession to have been stolen; provided that not less than seven days notice in writing shall have been given to the person accused that proof is intended to be given of such previous conviction; and it shall not be necessary for the purposes of this section to charge in the indictment the previous conviction of the person so accused.

Note.—It is commonly understood that the offence of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, is particularly difficult of proof, so far as regards the guilty knowledge. The above provisions are designed to facilitate the proof of such knowledge.

Under the first clause of the section, it has been held that the finding of the other property must have been at or soon after the time when the property the subject of the charge was found in the accused's possession (*R. v. Carter*, 12 Q. B. D. 522, *ante*, p. 92). The period of twelve months referred to is the period within which such other property had been stolen.

Under the second clause of the section, previous conviction must be for "fraud or dishonesty"; and it must be particularly noticed that evidence thereof can be given as soon as the finding of the property is proved. This is the only case in which evidence of a previous conviction can be given, before verdict, when the accused does not give evidence of his good character. (See *ante*, p. 85.)

BASTARDY LAWS AMENDMENT ACT, 1872.

(35 & 36 VICT. c. 65.)

4. (*Dealing with Summonses in Petty Sessions by Women for Bastardy Orders.*) The justices in such petty session shall hear the evidence of such woman and such other evidence as she may produce, and shall also hear any evidence tendered by or on behalf of the person alleged to be the father, and if the evidence of the mother be corroborated in some material particular by other evidence

to the satisfaction of the said justices, they may adjudge the man to be the putative father of such bastard child.

Note.—This Act deals with original applications only. The Bastardy Act, 1845, *ante*, p. 315, requires corroboration also on appeals. As to corroboration generally, see *ante*, p. 120.

DIVIDED PARISHES ACT, 1876.

(39 & 40 VICT. c. 61.)

34. Where any person shall have resided for the term of three years in any parish, in such manner and under such circumstances in each of such years as would in accordance with the several statutes in that behalf render him irremovable, he shall be deemed to be settled therein until he shall acquire a settlement in some other parish by a like residence or otherwise; provided that an order of removal in respect of a settlement acquired under this section shall not be made upon the evidence of the person to be removed, without such corroboration as the justices or court think sufficient.

Note.—As to corroboration generally, see *ante*, p. 120.

EVIDENCE ACT, 1877.

(40 & 41 VICT. c. 14.)

1. On the trial of any indictment or other proceeding for the non-repair of any public highway or bridge, or for a nuisance to any public highway, river, or bridge, and of any other indictment or proceeding instituted for the purpose of trying or enforcing a civil right only, every defendant to such indictment or proceeding, and the wife or husband of any such defendant, shall be admissible witnesses and compellable to give evidence.

Note.—As to the evidence of husbands and wives generally, see *ante*, p. 205.

BANKERS' BOOKS EVIDENCE ACT, 1879.

(42 VICT. c. 11.)

3. Subject to the provisions of this Act, a copy of any entry in a banker's book shall in all legal proceedings be received as *prima facie* evidence of such entry, and of the matters, transactions, and accounts therein recorded.

4. A copy of an entry in a banker's book shall not be received in evidence under this Act unless it be first proved that the book was at the time of the making of the entry one of the ordinary books of the bank, and that the entry was made in the usual and ordinary course of business, and that the book is in the custody or control of the bank.

Such proof may be given by a partner or officer of the bank, and may be given orally or by an affidavit sworn before any commissioner or person authorised to take affidavits.

5. A copy of an entry in a banker's book shall not be received in evidence under this Act unless it be further proved that the copy has been examined with the original entry and is correct.

Such proof shall be given by some person who has examined the copy with the original entry, and may be given either orally or by an affidavit sworn before any commissioner or person authorised to take affidavits.

6. A banker or officer of a bank shall not, in any legal proceeding to which the bank is not a party, be compellable to produce any banker's book the contents of which can be proved under this Act, or to appear as a witness to prove the matters, transactions, and accounts therein recorded, unless by order of a judge made for special cause.

7. On the application of any party to a legal proceeding a court or judge may order that such party be at liberty to inspect and take copies of any entries in a banker's book for any of the purposes of such proceedings. An order under this section may be made either with or without summoning the bank or any other party, and shall be served on the bank three clear days before the same is to be obeyed, unless the court or judge otherwise directs.

9. In this Act the expressions "bank" and "bankers" mean

any person, persons, partnership, or company carrying on the business of bankers and having duly made a return to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, and also any savings bank certified under the Acts relating to savings banks, and also any post office savings bank.

Expressions in this Act relating to “bankers’ books” include ledgers, day books, cash books, account books, and all other books used in the ordinary business of the bank.

Note.—Books of the Bank of England seem to have been treated as “public documents” at Common Law; and production thereof was excused, secondary evidence being admissible. But books of private banks were not so treated. See note, *ante*, p. 268.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1879.

(42 & 43 VICT. c. 49.)

39.—(2). (*Dealing with Proceedings before Courts of Summary Jurisdiction.*) Any exception, exemption, proviso, excuse, or qualification, whether it does or does not accompany in the same section the description of the offence in the act, order, byelaw, regulation, or other document creating the offence, may be proved by the defendant, but need not be specified or negatived in the information or complaint, and, if so specified or negatived, no proof in relation to the matter so specified or negatived shall be required on the part of the informant or complainant.

Note.—This provision should be read in connection with s. 14 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, *ante*, p. 319. See also note, *ante*, p. 118.

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1882.

(45 & 46 VICT. c. 75.)

12. Every woman . . . shall have in her own name against all persons whomsoever, including her husband, the same civil remedies, and also (subject, as regards her husband, to the proviso hereinafter contained) the same remedies and redress by way of criminal proceedings, for the protection and security of her own separate

property, as if such property belonged to her as a *feme sole*, but, except as aforesaid, no husband or wife shall be entitled to sue the other for a tort . . . and in any proceeding under this section a husband or wife shall be competent to give evidence against each other, any statute or rule of law to the contrary notwithstanding.

16. A wife doing any act with respect to any property of her husband, which, if done by the husband with respect to property of the wife, would make the husband liable to criminal proceedings by the wife under this Act, shall in like manner be liable to criminal proceedings by her husband.

Note.—S. 12. Criminal proceedings under this section afford one of the instances in which husband or wife can give evidence without consent of wife or husband. See *ante*, p. 206.

S. 16. This section did not enable a husband to give evidence in criminal proceedings against his wife, although s. 12 expressly allowed both husband and wife to give evidence in proceedings by wife against husband. This is now altered by the Act of 1884. See *post*, p. 336.

EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES ACT, 1883.

(46 & 47 VICT. c. 3.)

4.—(1). Any person who makes or knowingly has in his possession or under his control any explosive substance, under such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he is not making it or does not have it in his possession or under his control for a lawful object, shall, unless he can show that he made it or had it in his possession or under his control for a lawful object, be guilty of felony.

6.—(2). (*Relating to Inquiries as to Offences under the Act.*) A witness examined under this section shall not be excused from answering any question on the ground that the answer thereto may criminate, or tend to criminate, himself; but any statement made by any person in answer to any question put to him on any examination under this section shall not, except in the case of an indictment or other criminal proceeding for perjury, be admissible in evidence against him in any proceeding, civil or criminal.

Note.—S. 4. This is an instance of the cases in which the burden of proof is put upon the person charged. See note, *ante*, p. 118.

S. 6. This is an instance of the cases in which a witness is compelled to answer incriminating questions, but is protected from subsequent proceedings thereon. See note, *ante*, p. 237.

CORRUPT PRACTICES PREVENTION ACT, 1883.

(46 & 47 VICT. c. 51.)

59.—(1). A person who is called as a witness respecting an election before any election court shall not be excused from answering any question relating to any offence at or connected with such election, on the ground that the answer thereto may criminate or tend to criminate himself or on the ground of privilege ;

Provided that—

(a) A witness who answers truly all questions which he is required by the election court to answer shall be entitled to receive a certificate of indemnity under the hand of a member of the court stating that such witness has so answered : and

(b) An answer by a person to a question put by or before any election court shall not, except in the case of any criminal proceeding for perjury in respect of such evidence, be in any proceeding, civil or criminal, admissible in evidence against him.

Note.—This is an instance of the cases in which a witness is compelled to answer incriminating questions, but is protected from subsequent proceedings thereon. See note, *ante*, p. 237.

BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883.

(46 & 47 VICT. c. 52.)

17.—(1). Where the Court makes a receiving order it shall hold a public sitting, on a day to be appointed by the Court, for the examination of the debtor, and the debtor shall attend thereat, and shall be examined as to his conduct, dealings, and property.

(7). The Court may put such questions to the debtor as it may think expedient.

(8). The debtor shall be examined upon oath, and it shall be his duty to answer all such questions as the Court may put or allow to be put to him. Such notes of the examination as the Court

thinks proper shall be taken down in writing, and shall be read over to and signed by the debtor, and may thereafter be used in evidence against him; they shall also be open to the inspection of any creditor at all reasonable times.

Note.—This provision should be read in connection with s. 27 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1890, *post*, p. 340. See also note, *ante*, p. 237, as to the compulsion to answer incriminating questions.

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1884.

(47 & 48 VICT. c. 14.)

1. In any such criminal proceeding against a husband or wife as is authorized by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the husband and wife respectively shall be competent and admissible witnesses, and, except when defendant, compellable to give evidence.

Note.—See the provisions of the Act of 1882, *ante*, p. 333.

CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 1885.

(48 & 49 VICT. c. 69.)

2. (*Providing Penalties for Procurement of Girls, &c.*) No person shall be convicted of any offence under this section upon the evidence of one witness, unless such witness be corroborated in some material particular by evidence implicating the accused.

3. (*Providing Penalties for Threatening, Intimidating, and Administering Drugs, &c., to Girls, &c., for Purposes of Prostitution, &c.*) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section upon the evidence of one witness only, unless such witness be corroborated in some material particular by evidence implicating the accused.

4. (*Providing Penalties for Carnal Knowledge of Girls of Tender Age, &c.*) Where, upon the hearing of a charge under this section, the girl in respect of whom the offence is charged to have been committed, or any other child of tender years who is tendered as a witness, does not, in the opinion of the court or justices, understand the nature of an oath, the evidence of such girl or other child of tender years may be received, though not given upon

oath, if, in the opinion of the court or justices, as the case may be, such girl or other child of tender years is **possessed of sufficient intelligence** to justify the reception of the evidence, and understands the duty of speaking the truth: **Provided that no person shall be liable to be convicted of the offence unless the testimony admitted by virtue of this section and given on behalf of the prosecution shall be corroborated by some other material evidence in support thereof implicating the accused**: **Provided also, that any witness whose evidence has been admitted under this section shall be liable to indictment and punishment for perjury in all respects as if he or she had been sworn.**

Note.—As to corroboration generally, see *ante*, p. 120. As to taking evidence of children, etc., not upon oath, see *ante*, p. 208.

MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT, 1887.

(50 & 51 VICT. c. 28.)

2.—(1). Every person who—

(a) forges any trade mark; or

(b)—(f) (*commits certain other offences respecting trade marks and descriptions*)

shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless he proves that he acted without intent to defraud, be guilty of an offence against this Act.

19.—(2). Nothing in this Act shall entitle any person to refuse to make a complete discovery, or to answer any question or interrogatory in any action, but such discovery or answer shall not be admissible in evidence against such person in any prosecution for an offence against this Act.

Note.—S. 2. This is an instance of the cases in which the burden of proof is put upon the person charged. See note, *ante*, p. 118.

S. 19. This is an instance of the cases in which a witness is compelled to answer incriminating questions, but is protected from subsequent proceedings thereon. See note, *ante*, p. 237.

CORONERS ACT, 1887.

(50 & 51 VICT. c. 71.)

4.—(1) The coroner and jury shall, at the first sitting of the inquest, view the body, and the coroner shall examine on oath touching the death all persons who tender their evidence respecting the facts and all persons having knowledge of the facts whom he thinks it expedient to examine.

(2) It shall be the duty of the coroner in a case of murder or manslaughter to put into writing the statement on oath of those who know the facts and circumstances of the case, or so much of such statement as is material, and any such deposition shall be signed by the witness and also by the coroner.

5.—(3) The coroner shall deliver the inquisition, deposition, and recognizances, with a certificate under his hand that the same have been taken before him, to the proper officer of the court in which the trial is to be, before or at the opening of the court.

Note.—It will be observed that this Act contains no provision as to the circumstances under which the depositions are admissible in evidence at the trial. In this respect it differs from the Indictable Offences Act, 1848 (*ante*, p. 316), the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1867 (*ante*, p. 326), and the Children Act, 1908 (*post*, 348). As to such circumstances, see *ante*, p. 250.

OATHS ACT, 1888.

(51 & 52 VICT. c. 46.)

1. Every person upon objecting to being sworn, and stating, as the ground of such objection, either that he has no religious belief, or that the taking of an oath is contrary to his religious belief, shall be permitted to make his solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath in all places and for all purposes where an oath is or shall be required by law, which affirmation shall be of the same force and effect as if he had taken the oath; and if any person making such affirmation shall wilfully, falsely, and corruptly affirm any matter or thing which, if deposed on oath, would have amounted to wilful and corrupt perjury, he shall be liable to prosecution,

indictment, sentence, and punishment in all respects as if he had committed wilful and corrupt perjury.

2. Every such affirmation shall be as follows :

"I, A.B., do solemnly, sincerely, and truly declare and affirm," and then proceed with the words of the oath prescribed by law, omitting any words of imprecation or calling to witness.

3. Where an oath has been duly administered and taken, the fact that the person to whom the same was administered had, at the time of taking such oath, no religious belief, shall not for any purpose affect the validity of such oath.

5. If any person to whom an oath is administered desires to swear with uplifted hand, in the form and manner in which an oath is usually administered in Scotland, he shall be permitted so to do, and the oath shall be administered to him in such form and manner without further question.

Note.—This Act should be read in connection with the Oaths Act 1838 (*ante*, p. 314), and the Oaths Act, 1909 (*post*, p. 350).

FOREIGN JURISDICTION ACT, 1890.

(53 & 54 VICT. c. 37.)

4.—(1) If in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in a court in Her Majesty's dominions or held under the authority of Her Majesty any question arises as to the existence or extent of any jurisdiction of Her Majesty in a foreign country, a Secretary of State shall, on the application of the court, send to the court within a reasonable time his decision on the question, and his decision shall for the purposes of the proceeding be final.

(2) The court shall send to the Secretary of State, in a document under the seal of the court, or signed by a judge of the court, questions framed so as properly to raise the question, and sufficient answers to those questions shall be returned by the Secretary of State to the court, and those answers shall, on production thereof, be conclusive evidence of the matters therein contained.

Note.—A similar method of informing the Court of enquiry at the Foreign Office is appropriate when questions arise as to foreign States. See note, *ante*, p. 16.

BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1890.

(53 & 54 VICT. c. 71.)

27.—(2). (*Dealing with Prosecutions for the Frauds by Agents, Bankers and Factors referred to in sect. 85 of the Larceny Act, 1861, see ante, p. 322.*) **A statement or admission made by any person in any compulsory examination or deposition before any court on the hearing of any matter in bankruptcy shall not be admissible as evidence against that person in any proceeding in respect of any of the misdemeanours referred to in the said section eighty-five.**

Note.—This provision should be read in connection with s. 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, *ante*, p. 335. See also note, *ante*, p. 237.

SALE OF GOODS ACT, 1893.

(56 & 57 VICT. c. 71.)

4.—(1) **A contract for the sale of any goods of the value of ten pounds or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract be made and signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf.**

Note.—This is one of the few cases in which written evidence is required. Compare the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, *ante*, p. 311.

MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.

(57 & 58 VICT. c. 60.)

457.—(1) **If any person sends or attempts to send, or is party to sending or attempting to send a British ship to sea in such an unseaworthy state that the life of any person is likely to be thereby endangered, he shall in respect of each offence be guilty of a misdemeanour, unless he proves either that he used all reasonable means to insure her being sent to sea in a seaworthy state, or that**

her going to sea in such an unseaworthy state was, under the circumstances, reasonable and justifiable, and for the purposes of giving that proof he may give evidence in the same manner as any other witness.

(2) If the master of a British ship knowingly takes the same to sea in such an unseaworthy state that the life of any person is likely to be thereby endangered, he shall in respect of each offence be guilty of a misdemeanour, unless he proves that her going to sea in such an unseaworthy state was, under the circumstances, reasonable and justifiable, and for the purpose of giving such proof he may give evidence in the same manner as any other witness.

Note.—This is an instance of the cases in which the burden of proof is put upon the person charged. See note, *ante*, p. 118.

CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT, 1898.

(61 & 62 VICT. c. 36.)

1. Every person charged with an offence, and the wife or husband, as the case may be, of the person so charged, shall be a competent witness for the defence at every stage of the proceedings, whether the person so charged is charged solely or jointly with any other person. Provided as follows :—

- (a.) A person so charged shall not be called as a witness in pursuance of this Act except upon his own application :
- (b.) The failure of any person charged with an offence, or of the wife or husband, as the case may be, of the person so charged, to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by the prosecution :
- (c.) The wife or husband of the person charged shall not, save as in this Act mentioned, be called as a witness in pursuance of this Act except upon the application of the person so charged :
- (d.) Nothing in this Act shall make a husband compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during the marriage, or a wife compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband during the marriage :
- (e.) A person charged and being a witness in pursuance of this

Act may be asked any question in cross-examination notwithstanding that it would tend to criminate him as to the offence charged :

(f.) A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character, unless—

(i) the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other offence is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then charged ;
or

(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character, or has given evidence of his good character, or the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution ; or

(iii) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the same offence :

(g.) Every person called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall, unless otherwise ordered by the court, give his evidence from the witness box or other place from which the other witnesses give their evidence :

(h.) Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of section eighteen of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, or any right of the person charged to make a statement without being sworn.

2. Where the only witness to the facts of the case called by the defence is the person charged, he shall be called as a witness immediately after the close of the evidence for the prosecution.

3. In cases where the right of reply depends upon the question whether evidence has been called for the defence, the fact that the person charged has been called as a witness shall not of itself confer on the prosecution the right of reply.

4.—(1.) The wife or husband of a person charged with an offence under any enactment mentioned in the schedule to this Act

may be called as a witness either for the prosecution or defence and without the consent of the person charged.

(2.) Nothing in this Act shall affect a case where the wife or husband of a person charged with an offence may at common law be called as a witness without the consent of that person.

6.—(1.) This Act shall apply to all criminal proceedings, notwithstanding any enactment in force at the commencement of this Act, except that nothing in this Act shall affect the Evidence Act, 1877.

SCHEDULE.

ENACTMENTS REFERRED TO.

Session and Chapter.	Short Title.	Enactments referred to.
5 Geo. 4, c. 83. -	The Vagrancy Act, 1824.	The enactment punishing a man for neglecting to maintain or deserting his wife or any of his family.
8 & 9 Vict. c. 83.	The Poor Law (Scotland) Act, 1845.	Section eighty.
24 & 25 Vict. c. 100.	The Offences against the Person Act, 1861.	Sections forty-eight to fifty-five.
45 & 46 Vict. c. 75.	The Married Women's Property Act, 1882.	Section twelve and section sixteen.
48 & 49 Vict. c. 69.	The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885.	The whole Act.
57 & 58 Vict. c. 41.	The Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1894.	The whole Act.

Note.—A good many cases have been decided under this statute, the most important decisions being the following:—

S. 1. It is the duty of the judge to inform a prisoner of his right to give evidence, but his neglect to do so will not render the conviction invalid (*R. v. Warren*, 73 J. P. 359). Although the Act says the person charged shall be a competent witness "for the defence at every stage" of

the proceedings, yet, as evidence for the defence is not given before the Grand Jury, the person charged cannot give evidence before them (*R. v. Rhodes*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 77). Nor can he give evidence in mitigation of sentence after he has pleaded guilty. The phrase "stage of the proceedings" is not applicable to the period between the plea of guilty and sentence (*R. v. Hodgkinson*, 64 J. P. 808). But he can give evidence both on the preliminary proceedings before the magistrate and at the trial by the petty jury.

A person charged jointly with another is "a competent witness for the defence," so he may give evidence, not only on behalf of himself, but also on behalf of his fellow-prisoner (*R. v. McDonald*, 73 J. P. 490).

S. 1 (a). If the person charged has chosen to give evidence before the magistrate, it can be put in against him at the trial, although he then chooses not to give evidence (*R. v. Bird*, 79 L. T. 359). And where a person is about to be committed for trial, the magistrate should impress upon him the advisability of giving any evidence he intends to give at the earliest stage, as the value thereof might otherwise be lessened (*R. v. Humphries*, 67 J. P. 396).

S. 1 (b). Although the prosecution may not comment on failure to give evidence, the judge may do so. The right to do so rests solely on his discretion; its exercise depends upon the circumstance of each case, and no general rule can be laid down (*R. v. Rhodes*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 77). And the prosecution may comment on any evidence given by the person charged (*R. v. Gardner*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 150).

S. 1 (c). See *post*, s. 4.

S. 1 (d). A similar provision as to such privileged communications, in civil cases, is contained in the Evidence Act, 1853, s. 3, *ante*, p. 321.

S. 1 (e). If the question asked actually tends to show the offence charged, it cannot be objected to on the ground that it tends to show that the person charged has committed another offence, or is of bad character (*R. v. Chitson*, [1909] 2 K. B. 945). If a person charged does not give evidence on his own behalf, but does so on behalf of a fellow-prisoner, he can be cross-examined in order to show that he himself is guilty of the offence charged (*R. v. Rowland*, [1910] 1 K. B. 458).

S. 1 (f). As this Act applies to all criminal proceedings (s. 6), a person charged cannot be asked the questions mentioned in this section even in a case in which he is allowed to give evidence under any other statute which renders him a competent witness (*Charnock v. Merchant*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 474). But the Court will not, as a matter of course, quash a conviction on the ground that a prisoner has been improperly asked and has answered such question, if it appears that his counsel allowed the question to be answered without objection (*R. v. Bridgwater*, [1905] 1 K. B. 131).

In considering whether a question tends to show that a person charged has committed another offence, it must be judged by the light of the other questions put to him. Any questions which would reasonably lead the jury to believe that it is being imputed that he has committed another offence tends to show that he has committed the same. The object of the enactment is that, except in the specified cases, it should not be suggested to the jury by means of questions put to the person charged that he has committed another offence. Where a question of this nature is improperly put, it is the duty of the judge not to wait for

counsel to object, but to stop the question himself; and if by mischance the question is put, it is the duty of the judge to direct the jury to disregard it, and not to let it influence them (*R. v. Ellis*, [1910] 2 K. B. 746).

S. 1 (f) (i). This appears to be a re-statement of s. 1 (e). So, where a prisoner was charged with an offence against a girl under sixteen, he was allowed to be cross-examined as to his relations with another girl, and his statements made to the prosecutrix in relation thereto, as such evidence tended to show the credibility of the story of the prosecutrix, and was some evidence that he had committed the offence against her (*R. v. Chitson*, [1909] 2 K. B. 945). So also, evidence of such other offence might be admissible evidence to show the offence charged under the head of "similar conduct" on other occasions (see *ante*, p. 89), or as being part of the same "transaction" (see *ante*, p. 54).

S. 1 (f) (ii). The provision with regard to a person charged asking questions or giving evidence as to his good character is intended to apply where witnesses to his character are called, or where evidence thereof is sought to be elicited from witnesses for the prosecution (see *ante*, p. 98). It does not apply to mere assertions of innocence, or repudiation of guilt, by the person charged, nor to reasons given by him for such assertions or repudiation (*R. v. Ellis*, [1910] 2 K. B. 746).

Where a person charged, in reply to a question put to him in cross-examination as to the truth of a statement made by the prosecutor, said, "It is a lie, and he is a liar," it was held that this did not "involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor" within the meaning of the Act (*R. v. Rouse*, [1904] 1 K. B. 184). And in another case, a statement by a prisoner that a constable, who was giving evidence against him, was telling lies, was not such an imputation on the constable's character (*R. v. Grout*, 26 T. L. R. 60). And a mere denial of the truth of the evidence given for the prosecution, or setting up a defence inconsistent with the truth of the statements made by the witnesses for the prosecution, does not thus involve such imputations. It is merely "developing the defence" (*R. v. Bridgwater*, [1905] 1 K. B. 181).

So where a prisoner alleged, in his evidence, that his identification at the police-station was not reliable, as the persons brought to identify him had been coached for the purpose by a police officer who was called as a witness, saying, "it was not an honest case, but a got-up affair," it was held that such evidence was not part of the "nature or conduct of the defence," and questions as to previous convictions were inadmissible (*R. v. Preston*, [1909] 1 K. B. 568).

But if answers given by a person charged are not "necessary for the conduct of the defence," and they involve imputations on the character of a witness for the prosecution, he brings himself within the provisions of the Act, and can be cross-examined as to other offences (*R. v. Jones*, 74 J. P. 30).

And evidence by a prisoner that a witness for the prosecution had himself committed the offence charged was held to involve an imputation on the character of such witness (*R. v. Marshall*, 63 J. P. 36). But where a person was tried for rape, and gave evidence to the effect that the prosecutrix consented to the act, it was held that it did not amount to an imputation on her character within the Act (*R. v. Sheean*, 72 J. P. 232).

S. 1 (f) (iii). Where a prisoner gives evidence, and in doing so

incriminates another prisoner jointly indicted with him, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the former.

S. 1 (*g*). The prisoner's "unsworn statement" (see *ante*, p. 251), if any, is made from the dock.

S. 1 (*h*). The provisions of the Indictable Offences Act are set out, *ante*, p. 316. As to the unsworn statement of the person charged, see *ante*, p. 251.

S. 2. Where the person charged calls other witnesses to the facts (not merely as to his character), his own evidence is given, together with the evidence of his other witnesses, after he or his counsel has opened his defence. (See *Powell on Evidence*, pp. 593-6.)

S. 3. As to the right of reply, see *ante*, p. 326, and *Powell on Evidence*, pp. 593-6. If the person charged calls his wife, or her husband, as a witness, the prosecution has a right of reply.

S. 4 (1). The schedule referred to must now be read as including Offences under the Punishment of Incest Act, 1908 (s. 4, *post*, p. 347), and the Children Act, 1908, and the schedule thereto (s. 27, *post*, p. 348): and as excluding the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1894, repealed by s. 33 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1904; which latter Act contains, however, a provision bringing offences thereunder within the same rule (s. 12, *post*, p. 346). The cases in which the husband or wife of a person charged can give evidence without consent of the person charged are summarized, *ante*, p. 206.

S. 4 (2). See hereon, *ante*, p. 206.

S. 6 (1). See *Charnock v. Merchant*, *supra*; and the Evidence Act, 1877, *ante*, p. 331.

MOTOR CAR ACT, 1903.

(3 EDW. 7, c. 36.)

9.—(1) (*Providing penalties for driving in excess of maximum speed.*) A person shall not be convicted under this provision for exceeding the limit of speed of twenty miles merely on the opinion of one witness as to the rate of speed.

Note.—As to corroboration generally, see *ante*, p. 120.

PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN ACT, 1904.

(4 EDW. 7, c. 15.)

12. In any proceeding against any person for an offence under this Act . . . such person shall be competent but not compellable to give evidence, and the wife or husband of such person may be

required to attend to give evidence as an ordinary witness in the case, and shall be competent but not compellable to give evidence.

15.—(1) Where, in any proceeding against any person for an offence under this Act, . . . the child in respect of whom the offence is charged to have been committed, or any other child of tender years who is tendered as a witness, does not in the opinion of the Court understand the nature of an oath, the evidence of such child may be received, though not given upon oath, if in the opinion of the Court, such child is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence, and understands the duty of speaking the truth ; and the evidence of such child, though not given on oath, but otherwise taken and reduced into writing in accordance with the provisions of section seventeen of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, . . . shall be deemed to be a deposition within the meaning of those sections respectively :

Provided that—

(a) A person shall not be liable to be convicted of the offence unless the testimony admitted by virtue of this section and given on behalf of the prosecution is corroborated by some other material evidence in support thereof implicating the accused.

Note.—S. 12. As to competency and compellability of persons charged, and their husbands and wives, see *ante*, p. 205.

S. 15. As to taking evidence of children, etc., not on oath, see *ante*, p. 208. As to corroboration generally, see *ante*, p. 120.

PUNISHMENT OF INCEST ACT, 1908.

(8 EDW. 7, c. 45.)

4.—(4). Section 4 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, shall have effect as if this Act were included in the schedule to that Act.

Note.—The schedule in question appears *ante*, p. 343.

CHILDREN ACT, 1908.

(8 EDW. 7, c. 67.)

27. As respects proceedings against any person for an offence under this Part of this Act, or for any of the offences mentioned in the First Schedule to this Act, the **Criminal Evidence Act, 1898**, shall apply as if in the schedule to that Act a reference to this Part of this Act and to the First Schedule to this Act were substituted for the reference to the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1894.

28.—(1) **Where a justice is satisfied by the evidence of a duly qualified medical practitioner that the attendance before a court of any child or young person in respect of whom an offence under this Part of this Act, or any of the offences mentioned in the First Schedule to this Act, is alleged to have been committed, would involve serious danger to the life or health of the child or young person, the justice may take in writing the deposition of the child or young person on oath, and shall thereupon subscribe the deposition and add thereto a statement of his reason for taking the deposition and of the day when and place where the deposition was taken, and of the names of the persons (if any) present at the taking thereof.**

29. **Where, on the trial of any person on indictment for an offence of cruelty, or any of the offences mentioned in the First Schedule to this Act, the court is satisfied by the evidence of a duly qualified medical practitioner that the attendance before the court of any child or young person in respect of whom the offence is alleged to have been committed would involve serious danger to the life or health of the child or young person, any deposition of the child or young person taken under the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, or this Part of this Act, shall be admissible in evidence either for or against the accused person without further proof thereof—**

- (a) **if it purports to be signed by the justice by or before whom it purports to be taken; and**
- (b) **if it is proved that reasonable notice of the intention to take the deposition has been served upon the person against whom it is proposed to use it as evidence, and that that person or his**

counsel or solicitor had, or might have had if he had chosen to be present, an opportunity of cross-examining the child or young person making the deposition.

30. Where in any proceeding against any person for an offence under this Part of this Act, or for any of the offences mentioned in the First Schedule to this Act, the child in respect of whom the offence is charged to have been committed, or any other child of tender years who is tendered as a witness, does not in the opinion of the court understand the nature of an oath, the evidence of that child may be received, though not given upon oath, if, in the opinion of the court, the child is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence, and understands the duty of speaking the truth; and the evidence of the child, though not given on oath, but otherwise taken and reduced into writing in accordance with the provisions of section seventeen of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, or of this Part of this Act, shall be deemed to be a deposition within the meaning of that section and that Part respectively:

Provided that—

(a) A person shall not be liable to be convicted of the offence unless the testimony admitted by virtue of this section and given on behalf of the prosecution is corroborated by some other material evidence in support thereof implicating the accused.

FIRST SCHEDULE.

Any offence under sections 27, 55, or 56 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, and any offence against a child or young person under sections 5, 42, 43, 52, or 62 of that Act, or under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885.

Any offence under the Dangerous Performances Acts, 1879 and 1897.

Any other offence involving bodily injury to a child or young person.

Note.—S. 27. The schedule in question appears *ante*, p. 343.

S. 28. As to depositions generally, see *ante*, p. 248.

S. 30. As to taking evidence of children, etc., not on oath, see *ante*, p. 208.

OATHS ACT, 1909.

(9 EDW. 7, c. 39.)

2.—(1) Any oath may be administered and taken in the form and manner following :—

The person taking the oath shall hold the New Testament, or, in the case of a Jew, the Old Testament, in his uplifted hand, and shall say or repeat after the officer administering the oath the words “I swear by Almighty God that . . .,” followed by the words of the oath prescribed by law.

(2) The officer shall (unless the person about to take the oath voluntarily objects thereto, or is physically incapable of so taking the oath) administer the oath in the form and manner aforesaid without question :

Provided that, in the case of a person who is neither a Christian nor a Jew, the oath shall be administered in any manner which is now lawful.

3. In this Act the word “officer” shall mean and include any and every person duly authorised to administer oaths.

Note.—This Act should be read in connection with the Oaths Act, 1838, *ante*, p. 314, and the Oaths Act, 1888, *ante*, p. 338. It will be observed that the “New Testament” and “Old Testament” are mentioned in the above Act, not the “Gospels” and “Pentateuch,” upon which Christians and Jews have hitherto been sworn. See *ante*, p. 210.

INDEX.

- ABSENCE FOR SEVEN YEARS,
presumption of death, 23
in bigamy cases, 24
of *cestui que vie*, 24
- ABSENCE OF PARTY,
acts and statements in, 48
- ACCOMPLICES,
corroboration of, 122
- ACTS DONE,
in the same transaction, 54, 61
in other transactions, 84-94
in absence of party, 48
by conspirators, etc., 61
documents explanatory of, 62
as evidence of ownership, 76, 78
circumstantial evidence of, 50
- ACTS OF PARLIAMENT,
judicial notice of, 12, 200
statements in, 196, 199
- ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE,
question for judge, 7
- ADMISSIONS, FORMAL,
generally, 29-31
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vi
- ADMISSIONS, INFORMAL,
generally, 133-145
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, ix
- ADMITTED FACTS,
no proof required, 29
- ADULTERY,
evidence in cases of, 204, 206, 320, 329
questions showing, 234, 329

- ADVERSE WITNESS,
discredit of, 231, 324
inconsistent statements of, 231, 325
- AFFIDAVIT,
evidence by, 201
- AFFILIATION,
corroboration required, 120, 315, 330
- AFFIRMATION,
instead of oath, 211, 338
- AGENTS,
admissions by, 141-144
estoppel of, 45
- ALTERATIONS IN DOCUMENTS,
presumption as to, 281
- AMBIGUITIES IN DOCUMENTS,
evidence as to, 296-301
- ANCIENT DOCUMENTS,
what are, 277
when they require no proof, 277
- ATTESTATION OF DOCUMENT,
when required, 277
how proved, 276, 326
- ATTESTING WITNESSES,
when they must be called, 276, 326
- BAILEE,
estoppel of, 45
- BANKERS' BOOKS,
copies admissible, 332
production may be ordered, 332
- BANKRUPT,
compelled to answer all questions, 335
answers are evidence against him, 336
except in certain cases, 340
- BASTARDY,
corroboration required, 120, 315, 330
- BEGIN, RIGHT TO,
explanation of, 109
- BEHIND THE BACK OF PARTY,
acts and statements, 48

- BEST EVIDENCE RULE,
its scope, 126, 252
- BIAS OF WITNESSES,
evidence of, 228, 232
- BIBLE,
entries in as evidence, 164, 173
- BIGAMY,
marriages require strict proof, 83
effect of seven years' absence, 24
- BODILY FEELINGS,
statements as to, 59
- BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE,
corroboration required, 120, 329
evidence of character, 97
parties as witnesses, 204, 320, 329
- BURDEN OF PROOF,
generally, 109-119
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, viii
- BUSINESS, COURSE OF,
relevantly of, 75
presumption from, 25
declarations in, 154
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, ix
- CALLING FOR DOCUMENT,
effect of, 257
- CERTIFIED COPIES,
when allowed and used, 269, 320
- CESTUI QUE VIE*,
seven years' absence of, 24
- CHARACTER OF PARTIES,
generally, 93-102
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vii
- CHARACTER OF WITNESSES,
generally, 215-233
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xi, xii
- CHATTELS,
documents treated as, 255
production of, 303

- CHILDREN,
competency of, 207
unsworn evidence of, 208, 336, 347, 349
corroboration required, 120, 336, 347, 349
depositions of, 347, 348
- CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE,
generally, 49-108
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vi-viii
- CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES,
differences as to evidence, 307-309
- COGENCY,
not generally dealt with, 120
- COHABITATION,
evidence of marriage, 82
discredit of witness, 232
- COINAGE OFFENCES,
previous convictions, 86, 323
- COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS,
parol evidence of, 283, 287
- COLONIAL LAW,
not judicially noticed, 14
proved by experts, 106
- COMMON KNOWLEDGE,
matters of, judicially noticed, 16
- COMMUNICATIONS, PRIVILEGED,
generally, 234-247
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xii, xiii
- COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING,
when allowed, 272, 326
- COMPELLABILITY OF WITNESSES,
generally, 205-207
distinguished from competency, 205
- COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES,
generally, 203-209
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xi
- COMPLAINTS,
generally, 69-75
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vii
- CONDITION OF THINGS,
presumption of continuance, 22

- CONDUCT,
as circumstantial evidence, 50
admissions by, 135-141
declarations by, 173
estoppel by, 41
cross-examination as to, 215, 216
- CONDUCT ON OTHER OCCASIONS,
generally, 84-94, 215
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vii
- CONFESSIONS,
generally, 145-153
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, ix
- CONSPIRATORS,
acts and statements of, 61
- CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS,
judicial notice of, 14
- CONSTRUCTION,
of documents, 8, 282-302
of verbal contracts, 6
- CONTENTS OF WILLS, DECLARATIONS AS TO,
generally, 185-189
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, x
- CONTINUANCE,
presumption of, 22, 29
- CONTRADICTION OF WITNESSES,
generally, 224-227
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xii
- CONVICTIONS, PREVIOUS,
of witnesses, 215, 325
of prisoners, 85, 313, 322, 323, 330, 342
- COPIES OF DOCUMENTS,
certified, 269, 320
examined, 269, 320
office, 269, 320
bankers' books, 332
special order as to proof by, 201
- CORONER,
depositions taken before, 248, 338
- CORROBORATION,
generally, 120-125
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, viii
- COUNSEL,
admissions by, 30

- COURSE OF BUSINESS OR DUTY,
presumption from, 25
relevancy of, 75
declarations in, 154-158
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, ix
- COURSE OF NATURE,
judicial notice of, 16
- CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES,
guarantee of, 132
cross-examination as to, 215
- CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES,
differences as to evidence, 307-309
- CRIMINATING QUESTIONS,
privilege as to, 234-238, 312
- CROSS-EXAMINATION,
generally, 215-221
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xi
- CUSTODY, PROPER,
of ancient documents, 278
of public documents, 320
- CUSTOMS,
judicial notice of, 12
proof of, 293-296
- DAMAGES,
character as affecting, 97
burden of proof as to, 118
- DATE OF DOCUMENT,
presumption as to, 277
- DEATH,
declarations as to cause of, 181-185
presumption of, 23
- DECEASED PERSONS,
claims against estates of, 124
declarations by, 153-189
- DECLARATIONS BY DECEASED PERSONS,
generally, 153-189
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, ix, x
- DEEDS,
alterations in, 281
attestation of, 277, 326
date of, 277

DEEDS—*continued.*

- estoppel by, 40
- execution of, 275
- privilege of, 246, 247

DEFAMATION,

- evidence of character, 94, 97
- evidence of circumstances, 97

DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF TERMS,

- admission, 133
- adverse witness, 232
- affirmative in substance, 110
- ancient document, 278
- bank, 332
- bankers, 332
- bankers' books, 333
- burden of proof, 109
- certified copy, 269
- character, 93
- circumstantial evidence, 52
- confession, 134
- counterpart, 254
- declaration, 132
- depositions, 248
- direct evidence, 52, 127
- document, 254, 303
- duplicate original, 254
- estoppel, 32
- evidence, 1, 2
- examined copy, 269
- expert witness, 103
- facts in issue, 47
- free and voluntary confession, 145, 146
- general right, 176
- guarantee of credibility, 132
- hearsay, 127
- hostile witness, 231
- indirect evidence, 52
- leading questions, 212
- narrative, 55
- office copy, 269
- parol evidence, 203
- pecuniary interest, 158
- pedigree case, 169
- person in authority, 152
- prejudice, without, 46
- presumption, 18
- privity, 36
- proper custody, 278
- proprietary interest, 162
- public right, 176

DEFINITIONS—*continued.*

- real evidence, 303
- recent possession, 80, 81
- relevancy, 47
- relevant facts, 47
- res gestæ*, 54
- right to begin, 109
- threat or promise, 149
- transaction, 55
- without prejudice, 46

DEPOSITIONS,

- generally, 248-251
- in civil cases, 248
- under Indictable Offences Act, 1848...316
- under Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1867...326
- under Coroners Act, 1887...338
- under Children Act, 1908...348

DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENT,

- secondary evidence admitted, 264

DIRECT EVIDENCE,

- as opposed to circumstantial, 52
- as opposed to hearsay, 126

DISCREDIT

- evidence to, 227-233, 325
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, xii

DIVORCE,

- strict proof of marriage required, 83
- corroboration required, 125

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE,

- generally, 252-302
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, xiii-xv

DOCUMENTS,

- what are, 254, 303
- alterations in, 281
- ancient, 277-279
- attestation of, 276, 326
- construction of, 8, 282-302
- copies of, 269, 320
- counterparts of, 254
- date of, 277
- destruction of, 264
- duplicate originals, 254
- handwriting of, 271-275
- interpretation of, 8, 282-302
- loss of, 264
- notice to produce, 260
- parol evidence respecting, 282-302

DOCUMENTS—*continued*.

- primary evidence of, 252
- privilege of, 234
- production of, 252-260
- proof of, 271-281, 320
- public, 193-196, 268, 320
- refreshing memory, 213
- refusal to produce, 260-264
- res gesta*, as, 62
- secondary evidence of, 260
- signature of, 271
- subpœna to produce, 261
- transaction, as parts of, 62
- verbal evidence respecting, 282-302

DUTY, COURSE OF,

- presumption from, 25
- relevancy of, 75
- declarations in, 154-158
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, ix

DYING DECLARATIONS,

- generally, 181-185
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, x

ESTOPPEL,

- generally, 32-45
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, vi

EVIDENCE,

- definitions of, 1
- circumstantial, 49-108
- direct, 52, 126
- documentary, 252-302
- hearsay, 126-200
- indirect, 52
- parol, 203-251
- primary, 252-260
- real, 303-306
- secondary, 252, 260-271
- in former proceedings, 189-193
- misreception of, 307
- weight of, 53, 120, 304

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES,

- generally, 212-224
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, xi, xii

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF,

- generally, 212-215
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, xi

EXAMINED COPIES,

when allowed and used, 269, 320

EXCEPTIONS, EXEMPTIONS, ETC.

burden of proof of, 118, 319, 333

EXISTENCE OF THINGS,

presumption of continuance, 22

EXPERT WITNESSES,

opinion evidence of, 102-107

FACTS,

jury decides, 5

unless admissibility depends on, 7

FACTS IN ISSUE

what are, 47

FOREIGN JURISDICTION,

how questions of are decided, 339

FOREIGN LAW,

not judicially noticed, 14

proved by experts, 106

FOREIGN STATES,

judicial notice of, 15

FORFEITURE,

privilege as to questions showing, 237

FORMER PROCEEDINGS,

evidence given in, 189-193

See TABLE OF CONTENTS, x, xi

FRAUD,

parol evidence of, 283, 285

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF,

writing required by, 311

FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND JURY,

generally, 3-9

See TABLE OF CONTENTS, v

GENERAL RIGHTS,

Declarations as to, 173-181

See TABLE OF CONTENTS, x

GIRLS, OFFENCES AGAINST,

corroboration required, 336

unsworn evidence, 208, 336, 347, 349

- GOODS, SALE OF,
writing sometimes required, 340
- GOVERNMENT MATTERS,
judicial notice of, 14
- GUARANTEE OF CREDIBILITY,
of witnesses, 132
- GUILTY KNOWLEDGE, EVIDENCE OF
conduct on other occasions, 87
conduct, subsequent, 50
convictions, previous, 84, 330
possession of property, 80, 329
- HANDWRITING,
proof of, 271-275
- HEALTH,
statements as to, 5, 9
- HEARSAY,
generally, 126-200
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, viii-xi
- HOSTILE WITNESS,
discredit of, 231, 324
inconsistent statements of, 231, 325
- HUSBANDS AND WIVES
evidence of, 204-207
privileged communications, 234, 321, 341
- IDENTIFICATION,
opinion evidence, 103, 107
of subject-matter of document, 296
- ILLEGALITY,
parol evidence of, 283, 285
- INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS,
proof of, 228-232, 325
- INCRIMINATING QUESTIONS,
privilege as to, 234-238, 312
- INFANTS,
competency as witnesses, 207
unsworn evidence of, 208, 336, 347, 349
- INNOCENCE,
presumption of, 20, 29

- INSANE PERSONS,
competency as witnesses, 208
- INSPECTION,
of things, premises, etc., 303-306
at the trial, 303
before the trial, 306
- INTENTION,
conduct admissible to prove, 88-91
- INTEREST, DECLARATIONS AGAINST,
generally, 158-164
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, ix, x
- INTERPRETATION,
of documents, 8, 282-302
of verbal contracts, 6
- JOINT OFFENDERS, ETC.,
acts and statements of, 61
- JUDGE,
functions of, 3-9
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, v
- JUDGMENT,
as evidence, 37
as estoppel, 33-39
when to be pleaded, 39
- JUDICIAL NOTICE,
generally, 10-17
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, v, vi
- JURY,
functions of, 3-9
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, v
- LAND,
proof of ownership, 76-79
estoppel of tenant, 44
- LARCENY,
recent possession, 321
previous convictions, 86, 322
- LAW,
judge decides questions of, 5
judicial notice of, 11
foreign, proof of, 106
- LAWFUL ORIGIN,
presumption of, 25

- LEADING QUESTIONS,**
in examination-in-chief, 212
in cross-examination, 215
in re-examination, 222
- LEGAL ADVISERS,**
communications privileged, 238-243
- LEGAL ORIGIN,**
presumption of, 25
- LEGITIMACY,**
presumption of, 21
evidenced by declarations, 173
- LETTERS,**
omission to reply to, 136
proof of posting, 76
- LIBEL,**
evidence of character, 94, 97
evidence of circumstances, 97
- LICENSEE,**
estoppel of, 45
- LIFE,**
presumption of continuance, 22, 29
presumption of ceasing, 23
- LOSS OF DOCUMENT,**
secondary evidence admitted, 264
- MARRIAGE,**
communications during, privileged, 234, 321, 341
proof of, 81-83
breach of promise of, 97, 120, 204, 320, 329
- MEANING OF TERMS,**
evidence as to special, 8, 301
- MEMORANDUM,**
refreshing memory, 213
under Statute of Frauds, 311
under Sale of Goods Act, 340
distinguished from transaction, 284
- MEMORY, REFRESHING,**
generally, 213-215
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xi
- MISRECEPTION OF EVIDENCE,**
effect of, 307
- MISTAKE,**
parol evidence of, 283, 285

- MODE OF PROOF,
generally, 201-306
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xi-xv
- MOTIVE,
as circumstantial evidence, 50
- MOTOR CARS,
speed of, corroboration required, 120, 346
- NARRATIVE,
statements after the transaction, 55
inadmissibility of, 55
admissible as complaints, 69
and as admissions, 133
and as dying declarations, 181
- NATURE, COURSE OF,
judicial notice of, 16
- NEW TRIAL,
on account of wrong evidence, 308
- NOTICE TO ADMIT,
admissions on, 30, 31
- NOTICE TO PRODUCE,
nature and object of, 260
- NUMBER OF WITNESSES,
when two required, 121
- OATH,
nature and form of, 209, 314, 339, 350
must be taken in court, 130
who may administer, 320
affirmation in lieu of, 211, 338
evidence of children without, 208, 336, 347, 349
- OFFICES, PUBLIC,
judicial notice as to, 16
presumption of regularity in, 25
- ONUS OF PROOF,
generally, 109-119
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, viii
- OPINION,
generally, 102-108
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, viii
- ORAL EVIDENCE,
generally, 203-251
respecting documents, 282-302

OWNERSHIP,
proof of, 76-79

PARLIAMENT,
acts of, judicially noticed, 12
law of, judicially noticed, 11
officials of, judicially noticed, 16

PAROL EVIDENCE,
generally, 203-251
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xi-xiii
introductory of real evidence, 304

PAROL EVIDENCE RESPECTING DOCUMENTS,
generally, 282-302
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xiv, xv

PAUPERS, REMOVAL OF,
corroboration required, 120, 331

PEDIGREE, DECLARATIONS AS TO,
generally, 164-173
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, x

PERJURY,
corroboration required, 121

PERPETUATION OF TESTIMONY,
concerning indictable offences, 327

PERSONATION AT ELECTIONS,
corroboration required, 120, 314

PLEADINGS,
admissions on, 30
facts in issue determined by, 47
burden of proof determined by, 109

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY,
evidence of ownership, 76
and of larceny or receiving, 80
and of knowledge of larceny, 81, 329

PRACTICE OF COURTS,
judicial notice of, 11

PREDECESSORS IN TITLE,
admissions by, 144
declarations against interest by, 163
evidence given by or against, 191
judgments concerning, 33

PREJUDICE,
statements made without, 45

- PREPARATION,
as circumstantial evidence, 50
- PRESUMPTIONS,
generally, 17-29, 275, 277, 281
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vi
- PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS,
of witnesses, 215, 325
of prisoners, 85, 313, 322, 323, 330, 342
- PRIMARY EVIDENCE,
of documents, 252-260
admissions are, 145
- PRISONER,
admissions of, 138, 318
character of, 94, 98-101
confessions of, 145-153, 318
cross-examination of, 216, 342
evidence of, 204, 341-346
evidence on behalf of, 327
unsworn statement of, 251, 317, 342
- PRIVIES,
kinds of, 36
judgments as affecting, 33
former evidence as affecting, 191
declarations as affecting, 163
admissions as affecting, 144
- PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES,
generally, 234-247
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xii, xiii
- PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS,
generally, 234-247
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xii, xiii
- PRODUCTION,
of chattels or physical objects, 303-306
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xv
of documents, 252-260
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xiii
- PROOF,
when none required, 10-31
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, v, vi
when none allowed, 32-46
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vi
of what matters allowed, 47-108
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vi-viii
burden of, 109-119
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, viii

PROOF—*continued.*

- amount of evidence required for, 120-125
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, viii
- nature of evidence required for, 126-200
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, viii-xi
- mode of, 201-306
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, xi-xv
- differences in civil and criminal cases, 307-309
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, xv
- special order as to particular facts, 201
- by statement of information or belief, 201
- by copies, entries or otherwise, 201
- by affidavit, 202

PROPER CUSTODY,

- of ancient documents, 278
- of public documents, 320

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS,

- special rules respecting, 196
- proof of, 266-269
- statements in, 193-196
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, xi

PUBLIC OFFICES,

- judicial notice as to, 16
- presumption of regularity in, 25

PUBLIC RIGHTS,

- declarations as to, 173-181
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, x

RAPE, AND SIMILAR CHARGES,

- complaints, 69
- similar conduct, 90
- character of prosecutrix, 101
- contradiction of prosecutrix, 226

REAL EVIDENCE,

- generally, 303-306
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, xv

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS,

- recent possession, 80
- possession of other stolen property, 81, 329
- previous conviction for dishonesty, 330

RECENT POSSESSION,

- evidence of larceny or receiving, 80

RECITALS,

- estoppel by, 40
- in public documents, 196
- in private statutes, 199

- RECOGNIZANCES,
 taken before justices, 318, 327
- RE-EXAMINATION,
 generally, 222-224
 See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xii
- REFRESHING MEMORY,
 generally, 213-215
 See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xi
- REGULARITY,
 presumption of, 25
- RELATIONSHIP,
 declarations as to, 164-173
 as affecting credibility, 233
- RELEVANCY,
 generally, 47-108
 See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vi-viii
- RELEVANT FACTS,
 what are, 47
- REPLY,
 right of, 324, 342
- REPUTATION,
 as evidence of character, 93, 98
 and of marriage, 81
 and of relationship, 172
 and of public rights, 173
 and to discredit witnesses, 233
- RES GESTÆ*,
 generally, 54-68
 See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vii
- SALE OF GOODS,
 writing sometimes required, 340
- SEALING OF DEED,
 presumption as to, 275
- SECONDARY EVIDENCE,
 generally, 252, 260-271
 See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xiii, xiv
- SECRETARY OF STATE,
 matters settled by, 16, 339
- SIGNATURE,
 proof of, 271-275

SIMILAR ACTS OR CONDUCT,
when admissible, 84-93

SLANDER,
evidence of character, 94, 97
evidence of circumstances, 97

SOLICITOR,
admissions by, 30
privileged communications, 238-243

STATE DOCUMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS,
privilege of, 244

STATE OF HEALTH,
statements as to, 59

STATE OF MIND,
conduct as evidence of, 87

STATEMENT OF PRISONER,
made before justices, 251, 317, 342
made at the trial, 251, 342

STATEMENTS,
accompanying acts, 55-62
parts of same transaction, 55-62
after transaction, 69
in presence of party, 135, 138
in absence of party, 48
made without prejudice, 45
as to state of health, 59
inconsistent with evidence, 228-232, 325
by deceased persons, 153-189
in private statutes, 199
in public documents, 193
unsworn, of prisoner, 251, 317

STATUTES, PRIVATE,
judicial notice of, 12, 200
statements in, 199

STATUTES, PUBLIC,
judicial notice of, 12, 200
statements in, 196

SUBPŒNA,
distinguished from notice to produce, 261
refusal to obey, 262, 263

SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT,
as circumstantial evidence, 50
as evidence of intention, etc., 90

SUMMING UP,
right of, 324

- SYSTEM,
acts showing, 89-92
- TENANTS,
estoppel of, 44
- TESTATORS, DECLARATIONS BY,
generally, 185-189
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, x
- THINGS,
production of, 303
- TITLE DEEDS,
privilege as to, 234, 247
- TRANSACTION,
what is, 55
parts of the same, 54-68
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vii
statements made after, 55, 69, 133, 181
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, vii
in writing, parol evidence as to, 282-302
See TABLE OF CONTENTS, xiv, xv
similar, 86-92
- TREASON,
corroboration required, 120, 312
- UNSWORN STATEMENTS OR EVIDENCE,
of children and girls, 208, 336, 347, 349
of prisoners, 251, 317, 342
- WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE,
not generally dealt with, 120
direct and circumstantial compared, 53
real evidence, 304
confessions, 146
- WILLS,
declarations as to, 185-189
alterations in, 281
attestation of, 277
- WITHOUT PREJUDICE,
statements so made, 45
- WITNESSES,
adverse, 231, 324, 325
affirmation of, 211, 338
bias of, 228, 332

WITNESSES—*continued.*

- character of, 215-233
- compellability of, 205-207
- competency of, 203-209
- conduct of, 215
- contradiction of, 224-227
- convictions of, 215, 325
- discredit of, 227-233, 324, 325
- examination of, 212-224
- hostile, 231, 324, 325
- husbands and wives as, 204-207
- inconsistent statements of, 228-232, 325
- number of required, 121
- oath of, 130, 209, 314, 320, 339, 350
- previous statements of, 228-232, 325
- privilege of, 234-247
- refreshing memory of, 213-215
- unsworn evidence of, 208, 336, 347, 349

WIVES AND HUSBANDS,

- evidence of, 204-207
- privileged communications, 234, 321, 341

WRITING,

- sometimes required, 202, 311, 340
- transaction or memorandum, 282-284
- under Statute of Frauds, 311
- under Sale of Goods Act, 340

WRITTEN TRANSACTIONS,

- distinguished from memorandum, 284
- parol evidence as to, 282-302
- See* TABLE OF CONTENTS, xiv, xv

THE END.

August 1924 pd. 150

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



A 000 668 356 9

